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Abstract 
Globalisation represents the increased international integration of goods, services, labour, 
technology, knowledge, ideas and capital of national economics from around the world. It 
also evokes many opinions in relation to the costs and benefits it can provide. Globalisation 
can bring greater benefits to countries in the form of greater productivity and output, 
potentially faster economic growth, increased welfare and even greater incentives to 
innovate. However, workers fear that globalisation costs more jobs than it creates 
(Eurobarometer, 69) and it could cause the structure of employment to permanently change 
over time. Ideally, workers would like to have jobs that last a life time Gob security) and jobs 
that pay a predictable wage Gob stability). Yet, should workers become dislocated from their 
jobs through firm closure or through layoffs, workers hope their prospective re-employment in 
new jobs is secure and stable with few short-term adjustment costs over time. But, many 
workers believe 'jobs are not for life' and this is in part attributed towards globalisation -
increased trade and advancements in technology, the fall in transportation costs, exchange 
rate volatility and offshoring are all potential factors that have contributed towards greater 
competition in world markets for goods and services over the last thirty years. This thesis 
examines whether job security and job stability have changed over this time. It focuses on 
whether offshoring and the advancements in technology have increasing made jobs less 
secure and whether they have increasing made wage levels within jobs more volatile. 
Chapters 2 and 3 review the literature: chapter 2 explores the potential forces that could 
cause labour market insecurity to rise and chapter 3 examines the existing empirical literature 
to see whether labour market security has declined over time. From these reviews, chapter 2 
finds that trade, the advancements in ICT and domestic policy reforms to labour market 
institutions have caused the structure of employment to change in favour of skilled labour at 
the expense of less-skilled workers even though the employment level has not significantly 
changed over the post 1990s to the latter 2000s. And the empirical evidence from chapter 3 
finds that labour market security, which is composed of (a) job security, (b) income volatility 
within jobs (job stability) and (c) the loss of earnings between jobs has also not changed 
significantly from the 1970s to the early 20OOs. 
Chapter 4 examines the effects of industry level offshoring intensity and the advancements in 
ICT over the post 1990s have increasingly had an impact on the wage levels of individual 
workers. This chapter finds the impact of service offshoring (measured at the industry level), 
the potential threat from the advancements of technology that increasingly pose a threat to 
many more potentially tradable occupations (job tradability measured from the application of 
Blinder's (2007) occupation tradability index) and the threat of TBTC - particularly from the 
importance of completing routine intensive job tasks, have all had a negative and significant 
impact on the wage levels of workers over the period 1992 to 2007. 
Chapter 5 examines whether a rise in offshoring intensity could lead to a rise in job insecurity 
by increasing the probability of becoming unemployed. Using individual level data from 1992-
2005, the results show a rise in offshoring (materials and services) and the advancements in 
ICT did not lower job security, it actually raises the probability of remaining in employment. 
This chapter also finds workers were more likely to remain in employment with their current 
employers. But workers employed in potentially the more tradable jobs that are also routine 
job task intensive appear to have a higher probability of becoming unemployed. Collectively, 
chapter 4 and 5 suggest that while offshoring may put downward pressure on wage levels, it 
has had little impact on job security. Workers appear to sacrifice job stability for job security. 
Chapter 6 addressed whether there has been a secular decline in job security over the last two 
decades. Using job tenure and job transitions as measures for job security, this thesis finds 
medium [longer-term] job tenure shares (job tenure greater than or equal to five [ten] years) 
declined by 7.95% [8.85%] and 8.70% [7.95%] for men and for women with no children from 
1992 to 2006. These declines are not indicative of a rise in job-to-job transitions, but a slender 
rise in job-to-unemployment and job-to-non-employment transitions over the time frame. 
Further analysis shows there is no evidence that these latter job transition results have arisen 
because of a rise in involuntary job separations resulting from redundancies or from firm 
closures over time. 
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Introduction 
"Globalisation is a non-stop economic process. Individuals, companies or governments are 
always on the lookout for new processes or innovations - and so the economic structure of 
the world is never stagnant ." YQleGlobolOnline 
Globalisation - the increased international integration of goods, services, labour, technology, 
knowledge, ideas and capital of national economies evokes many opinions in relation to the 
costs and benefits it can provide. As the quote above suggests, the process of creative 
destruction lies at the heart of economic prosperity and growth. Authors' such as Romer 
(1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) have all argued that 
countries that are more open to the rest of the world have a greater ability to absorb 
technological advances generated in leading nations, which lead to positive growth and higher 
output. In other words there are benefits from globalisation. Firms try to maximise profits 
through innovation and investment by trying to use the right combination of production 
factors that achieve this goal. Governments try to encourage investment into their countries 
to create jobs and growth. Whilst workers want jobs that are stable and secure over time. 
However, the process of job creation and destruction that can emanate from globalisation and 
technological advancements has lead to worries of increased vulnerabilities for some workers 
(OECD, 2007c) and because of the adjustment costs which workers could face from this 
process. This increasing vulnerability for workers is reflected in the rise in press references to 
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outsourcing and job security and insecurity over the last two decades. Amiti & Wei (200S) 
show press references to 'outsourcing' has increased in the u.s. and U.K. ([see figure 1.lA in 
appendix 1] and Mankiw & Swage I (2006a,b) [see figure 1.2A in appendix 2]) over the post 
1990s time frame. And Green (2003) shows that press references to 'job security' and 
'insecurity' have increased dramatically over the same time period in the U.K. than in the U.s. 
[see figure 1.3A in appendix 3]. 
From these changes, less skilled workers fear they will face increasing job insecurity and 
instability as their jobs and skills become increasingly substitutable with foreign labour from 
less developed countries that are able to offer their skills at a fraction of what it would cost to 
produce output in developed countries. By sourcing production inputs from foreign markets, 
the demand for less skilled labour falls, but productivity levels rise with lower prices that can 
lead to higher sales, which can promote job creation. However, newly created jobs may 
encapsulate the latest technologies which require higher skills that may not match the skills of 
those workers displaced from their jobs (Mortensen & Pissarides, 1998). 
What is meant by job security and job stability and why are changes to them important? Job 
security and job stability refer to two different aspects of an employment relationship. Job 
security refers to how long jobs last and this also reflects the probability of job endings. Job 
endings can be of two types: First, they can be voluntary job separations initiated by the 
employee to raise their welfare to exploit better work opportunities; and the second type is a 
non-voluntary job separation that is initiated by firms through mass layoffs or through firm 
closure. Job security is typically measured by exploring changes to job tenure, job transitions, 
job retention rates and the inflow and outflow rates from employment and non-employment 
over time. Job stability refers to the stability of continuing jobs. Job stability depends on a 
number of within job characteristics such as the number of hours that are worked, wage 
movements and the prospects of promotion. Job stability is typically measured by exploring 
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changes to wages and its volatility over time. Changes to job security can have important 
implications for job stability. More specifically, the returns to wages from general and specific 
experience can be significant; Topel (1991) finds substantial returns to wages from job 
seniority: ceteris paribus, 10 years of job seniority raises the wage of a typical male worker by 
over 25 percent. Thus, what this implies is that any change to job security can mean that the 
returns from job seniority can have a significant impact on job stability. 
A rise in competition between domestic and foreign workers can make jobs less secure if 
domestic firms are able to threaten workers with the possibility of transferring their 
production operations to other countries. This can also cause jobs to be less stable. But if 
workers value their jobs they could be forced to accept lower pay if there are few good job 
opportunities available over the long-term. These changes depend on the relative skill 
intensities of the industries (Geishecker & Gorg, 2005) and whether firms face import 
competition from foreign firms in their sectors. It is evident that less skilled workers employed 
by firms within less skill intensive sectors that face import competition may experience greater 
job insecurity and job instability, with fewer job opportunities within these sectors compared 
to other sectors that are expanding. With rising economic growth, displaced workers from 
contracting sectors may not necessarily see the benefits from globalisation and the 
advancements that technology can bring to their lives, if their way of life and the traditions of 
the types of jobs that may have been completed in local areas of developed countries start to 
disappear. Globalisation could also permanently raise job insecurity if labour markets are 
continually adjusting to changing demands for goods and services. 
This can explain why there exists a "globalisation paradox" between the likely benefits and the 
costs cited amongst proponents and adversaries of globalisation (OECD, 2007b). There is an 
agreed consensus amongst academics that trade leads to higher welfare for a country overall 
through higher living standards and higher economic growth but not all workers will benefit, 
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especially less skilled workers. Traditional trade theory suggests trade and globalisation 
should encourage competition amongst various economic agents and this should benefit both 
consumers and producers through lower prices, but it is also a source of increased job 
insecurity. Ex-Prime Minister Tony Blair, acknowledged thatl , " ... , China competes with us and 
can take jobs away. But our exports to China have also trebled since 1996, creating more jobs 
here", but with these benefits of globalisation there was also "a deep and abiding insecurity". 
Hence, there is the possibility that the benefits associated with globalisation may not benefit 
all workers. 
Widely quoted results from public opinion polls reflect the above disparities on the benefits 
and costs from globalisation. From a recent public opinion poll published by Eurobarometer 
69 (Spring 2(08) noted that, Ndespite recognised economic benefits [from globalisation], 
Europeans are slightly inclined to see globalisation as a threat to their national companies". 
39% of Europeans (37% of British respondents) thought globalisation represented a good 
opportunity for their country's companies thanks to the opening up of markets; whilst 43% of 
Europeans (U.K.: 42%) thought globalisation represented a threat to employment and 
companies in their countries2• Another poll, the German Marshall Fund (GMF) (December 
2006) reports 78% of Americans and 76% of Europeans believe free trade leads to lower prices 
and more product choice for consumers3. The same poll reports globalisation fears weakened 
compared to the previous year (American views: 52% vs. 46%; UK views: 53% vs. 47%), but 
there were anxieties over jobs over the period 2005/2006: 57% of Americans, 65% of British 
and 62% of French respondents reported that foreign direct investment creates jobs. 
However, 59% of Americans, 58% of French respondents reported that freer trade costs more 
1 Reported by George Jones, Political Editor of the Telegraph Newspaper, published on 23n1 March, 2004. This speech was made 
at Goldman Sachs. 
2 Similar views are reflected within Eurobarometer 66, published in December 2006 comparing SprIng and Autumn poll results: (1) 
globalisation represents a good opportunity for home countries: 37" vs. 40%; (2) globalisation represents a threat to employment 
and home countries: 47" vs. 41". 
3 Similar views are reflected by a PEW public opinion poll taken in 2007 supporting key features of economic globalisation, 
refIectIns positive views on trade (U.S.: s ~ , , Britain: 789'), foreign companies (U.S.: 4S", Britain: 49") and free markets (U.S.: 
7<17', Britain: 72"). 
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jobs than it creates compared to only 44% in the U.K. The GMF poll also reports 59% of both 
Americans and Europeans believe China's growing economy to be a threat because of the 
competition that is created from low-cost Chinese products and from U.S. and Europeans 
firms re-Iocating to China. The U.K. however expressed opinions whereby more respondents 
saw China as an opportunity than those who viewed it as a threat. Public opinions on 
globalisation also vary by socio-economic groups; the negative views expressed on the 
potential effects globalisation may have on employment increase with age (although positive 
views decrease with age) and manual workers and the unemployed were more likely to have a 
negative view (Eurobarometer 66). 
Two key recent developments to trade patterns have been proposed as possible reasons why 
workers in developed countries might become increasingly vulnerable. The first is related to 
the increasing presence of 'BRIC' (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries accounting for a 
greater share of the world's labour supply (45% of the world's labour supply) compared to the 
OECD (20% of the world's labour supply) where competition has been concentrated at the 
sector level. This is where firms transfer some of their labour-intensive production stages 
abroad (DECO, 2007c). And secondly, ongoing developments of ICT have enabled the 'great 
unbundling' of service related job tasks (Baldwin, 2006). Technology including the fall in 
telecommunication costs has made it easier to fragment the production process further, 
where job tasks in service sectors that were not affected by outsourcing during the 1990s, are 
increasingly at risk of being offshored (DECO, 2007c; Amiti & Wei, 2005, 2006). For example, 
many service sector jobs from call centres have been transferred to India. Additionally, many 
high-skilled white-collar jobs in accountancy and radiology are at risk of being offshored in a 
global market place, where high-skilled labour in other geographic locations are able to 
provide their services electronically without face-to-face contact with customers at a fraction 
of the cost (Blinder, 2007). 
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This thesis has the following structure: Chapter 2 provides a detailed synopsis of the 
theoretical and empirical literature that assesses the potential forces that could cause labour 
market security to change over time. Structural changes resulting from changes in tastes and 
technology can lead to changes in the costs of production. Forces stemming from 
globalisation, technological innovations and domestic labour market policies such as 
offshoring, outward FOI, product market competition, a fall in transportation costs, 
improvements in telecommunications, the dynamic nature of comparative advantage and 
reforms to labour market institution policies encouraging labour market flexibility can affect 
the rate of job creation and destruction over time. This review assesses whether these forces 
can lower the employment level and exert downward pressure on wages to potentially raise 
labour market insecurity over time. 
Chapter 3 assesses the empirical evidence from (a) job security, (b) income volatility within 
jobs (job stability) and (c) the earnings losses following job displacement between jobs, which 
represent a trio of components that I define as labour market security. This review assesses 
whether the magnitude of losses has increased over time to substantiate claims for a rise in 
labour market insecurity. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine whether offshoring and technological advancements as proposed by 
the routinization hypothesis [Autor et al., (2003)] have had a negative impact on pay [job 
stability] (chapter 4) and job security (chapter 5). Chapter 4 contributes to the growing 
literature that has examined the impact of offshoring and technology on the wage levels for 
individual workers in Britain for the period 1992-2007 using a Mincer wage regreSSion 
approach. If structural changes in tastes and technology are allowing forces associated with 
globalisation and technology to affect the job creation and destruction rates over time (or the 
demand for labour), this chapter examines whether they can cause wage levels (the price 
level) to rise or fall over time for different groups of skilled workers. This chapter examines 
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the effects from industry level offshoring intensity (services and materials), from the potential 
tradability of jobs by creating a British version of Blinder's (2007) occupation tradability index 
and by exploring the implications of the task biased technological change hypothesis (TBTC) 
proposed by Autor et al., (2003) on wage levels. 
Chapter 5 examines whether a rise in the offshoring intensity and the impact from the TBTC 
hypothesis can lower job security over time. This chapter uses discrete time survival analysis 
to estimate a single risks model to study the impact offshoring and task biased technological 
change have on the probability of making job-to-unemployment transitions over time. 
Additionally, this chapter estimates competing risk models to examine the impact of 
offshoring and the TBTC hypothesis on other competing job transition states. 
Chapter 6 assesses the job security trends for the period 1991-2007. This chapter examines 
the changes to job security using two different measures of job security using the QLFS and 
the BHPS data sets. The first measure examines the changes from median job tenure and the 
changes from three job tenure groups: short, medium and long-term. For the second measure 
of job security, I examine the trends from three different job transition states: job-to-job, job-
to-unemployment and job-to-inactivity transitions over time. For each of these measures of 
job security, I apply Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) methodology to assess the changes in job 
security trends over time. 
Finally, chapter 7 provides the concluding comments from this thesis. 
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1.2 Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Figure 1.lA: Press references to outsourcing in the U.S. and U.K. 
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Source: This is figure 1 from Amiti & Wei (2005). 
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Appendix 2 
Figure 1.2A: Press references to outsourcing in the u.s. 
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Appendix 3 
Figure 1.3A: Press references to Job Security and Insecurity in the U.S. and U.K. 
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2 
The Potential Causes of Increased Labour Market Insecurity: Theory & 
Evidence 
2.1 Introduction 
Labour market flows are determined by the simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs that 
occurs every day within the labour market. Job creation occurs due to the entry of new firms 
and through employment growth from incumbent firms. Similarly, job destruction takes place 
through the exit of firms and through the contraction of workforces within existing firms. 
They are necessary processes to achieve innovation and growth, where job destruction leads 
to the creation of new jobs which embody the latest technology and improve productivity. 
Although this process of creative destruction is necessary for economic prosperity, it requires 
the movement of workers between jobs which can lead to a number of adjustment costs. For 
example, when jobs are destroyed, workers become involuntarily unemployed and they will 
have to search for new jobs which require a period of search. 
This chapter proposes that labour market security1 can be thought to be comprised of three 
parts: (a) job security, (b) the volatility of income within jobs and (c) the changes to earnings 
levels between jobs. A worker may experience a sense of labour market security if their job is 
1 Milberg & Winkler (2009) use the term 'rear economic security to ascertain the trends from the following components: (a) real 
wage growth; (b) Income inequality; (c) labours' share of national Income; (d) the incidence of longer term unemployment and (e) 
the number of workers displaced by foreign trade and investment. This chapter does not consider all of these factors but a trio of 
measures which I define as labour market security. 
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secure, their labour income is stable and there are sufficient opportunities for re-employment 
if the worker should separate from their job (whether this is voluntary or firm initiated). 
From the first component of labour market security, job security refers to how long jobs last. 
This can reflect the probability of a job ending, which depends on the exit type from 
employment. An exit from employment may be voluntary, where the worker initiates the job 
separation by quitting or involuntary where the employer initiates the job separation through 
mass layoffs or plant closures. This latter form of job separations can be driven by job 
destruction which can result from structural changes in tastes and technology. Firms may 
destroy jobs if the demand for a product made by labour falls or workers are laid off because 
their jobs were temporary. High rates of job destruction and job creation can lower job 
security over time if workers are not able to retain a job for a sustained length of time and 
where their employment histories consist of numerous jobs. The question is whether job 
security has declined over time to have made workers worse off. 
The second component of labour market security is income volatility. The volatility of income 
within jobs is called job stability. The stability of jobs can vary with the movements of the 
business cycle, which can affect the number of hours worked. Changes to the number of 
hours that are worked can affect income levels. For instance during favourable economic 
conditions, the number of hours that are worked may be above average and labour income 
will therefore be higher than the average. But during unfavourable economic conditions, the 
number of hours that are worked may be below the average number of hours that may 
typically be completed and thus labour income will be lower than the average if wages are 
linked to the number of hour of work. The stability of jobs can also be tied to firm 
performances and firm sales. Additionally, income volatility can result from globalisation, 
where greater competition from foreign firms and foreign workers and the advancements in 
technology can affect the costs of production which could also affect income volatility. The 
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changes brought by technology may make it difficult for workers to transfer their skills to new 
capital which embodies the latest technology. Thus, firms may have to decide whether it is 
profitable to undertake renovation costs to train workers to use the latest capital. If the 
renovation costs are too high, with few prospects for growth to recoup the costs, then firms 
may not undertake training their existing workforce. This decision may lead to the loss of 
labour income in the short run, where old jobs are increasingly marginalised while old jobs 
may be competed away by new jobs that embody the latest technology in the long run. The 
question is whether income volatility has increased over time and whether this has made 
workers worse off over time. 
The third component of labour market security examines the change to the earnings levels 
between jobs. Changes to labour income can result from job dislocation, where spells in 
unemployment can lead to a fall in real income. During this period, workers may experience 
unemployment scarring between jobs. This is where the incidence of unemployment can 
lower the trajectory of wage levels from new jobs and it can increase the probability of 
experiencing future spells of unemployment. This can be due to two reasons. The first is if 
workers have been unemployed for a long time, they will lower their reservation wage levels 
to try to obtain employment. And second, workers lose human capital accumulation when 
they become unemployed. Thus, if firms are uncertain about the quality of the workers they 
are hiring, they may offer short term jobs with low pay to better ascertain the quality of the 
worker and their skills. Many short term positions are more often destroyed rather than 
maintained, but short term jobs can also be stepping stones to permanent jobs. Workers can 
therefore become stuck in a cycle of low pay and short term employment. The mere threat of 
job destruction can also affect the stability of jobs and threaten long-term job security. The 
question is whether workers must accept lower wages and lower quality jobs to return to 
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employment, and whether the earnings losses following job displacement has increased in 
magnitude over time. 
The key focus with respect to labour market security is whether the three components: (a), 
(b), and (c) have changed over time. For instance, the earnings losses following job loss can be 
large in the short run and the long run. However, the key issue is whether the magnitude of 
these losses has become larger. This chapter explores the potential reasons why labour 
market security components: (a), (b), and (c) might change. This review does not seek to 
explore one off changes in relative demand for different worker groups. But to explore the 
reasons that may cause structural changes to the demand for labour over time. We use a flow 
model of job search with job creation and destruction to examine these structural changes to 
the demand for labour over time. 
This chapter examines the potential reasons that might cause labour market insecurity to rise 
in theory coupled with empirical evidence. This chapter has the following structure: Section 
2.2 outlines a basic theoretical model of job creation and destruction. Section 2.3 explores the 
forces that could cause the job creation and destruction rates to change. Section 2.4 provides 
the empirical evidence from the forces outlined in section 2.3. Finally, section 2.5 provides the 
concluding comments. 
2.2 Job Creation and Destruction 
The concept of job creation and destruction was pioneered by the various theoretical works of 
Dale Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides. These concepts were presented within a series of 
selected papers by Mortensen & Pissarides (1994, 1998, & 1999) and a book by Pissarides 
(2000) to illustrate the impact upon unemployment. This section draws heavily from their 
work to describe the job flow process. 
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Figure 2.1: Job Flows and Worker Flows 
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Source: Rocheteau (2006), 
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The process of job creation and destruction is best understood from figure 2.1 which presents 
the flow of jobs. From this diagram there are three important forces which affect the level of 
employment and the dynamics of labour market security. These forces are job creation, job 
destruction and the matching process. At any point in time, there are stocks of employed 
workers and filled jobs. The flow of job creations adds to the stock of employed workers 
within filled jobs where these jobs can be temporary or long term permanent jobs. And the 
stock of unemployed workers is replenished by the flow of job destruction. This process of job 
creation and destruction is more complicated than figure 2.1 demonstrates. This process is 
outlined in more detail from the Mortensen-Pissarides Model (1994) of equilibrium 
unemployment. 
2.2.1 Job Creation and Job Destruction: A Basic Model 
From the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model of equilibrium unemployment, firms and 
workers must spend resources before job creation takes place. The model assumes firms and 
workers are homogenous and wealth maximisers. From the workers perspective they must 
spend their time and resources to search for new jobs. From the firm's perspective, they have 
jobs that are in one of two states: (1) filled and producing or (2) vacant and searching. Firms 
must decide on the type of technology and the product value that is to embody the new jobs. 
It is assumed that firms always choose a high value for the level of productivity and the latest 
15 
level of technology to embody the new jobs. Once job creation has taken place, firms have no 
choice over either. Firms must then advertise the jobs to attract unemployed workers; on the 
job search does not exist in the model. The most productive jobs offer higher wages as job 
vacancies make use of the latest technology available within the market; thus new jobs offer 
higher wages. Each job is characterised by a fixed irreversible technology and produces a unit 
of a differentiated product which has a price that is p + UE. The price simply reflects the 
productivity of the job where p is the aggregate component of productivity that does not 
affect the dispersion of prices. Parameter U represents the price variance and the parameter 
E represents the idiosyncratic component of the price of productivity for a specific job, 
where Eu > E > Ed, which are the upper and lower limits. The process that changes the 
idiosyncratic component of the price is a Poisson process with an arrival rate A. When the 
idiosyncratic component changes, new values of E are drawn from a fixed distribution. 
Modelling the arrival process as Poisson implies perSistence in job specific shocks. Exogenous 
events that affect the persistence or distribution of idiosyncratic shocks (these are assumed to 
be micro-level shocks) shift A and U respectively. Events that affect the productivity of all jobs 
by the same amount and in the same direction (these are assumed to be macro-level shocks) 
is reflected by changes to the common price component p. Firms create jobs that are equal to 
the upper portion of the price distribution: p + UEu' 
Higher values of U raises price dispersion, implying profitable jobs become more profitable 
and the less profitable jobs become less profitable. Thus, a higher U necessitates a rise in the 
reservation productivity - this is a threshold or a level of productivity that must be achieved 
for a job to continue. If the reservation productivity threshold is not achieved, then marginal 
jobs that are less profitable are destroyed. This implies that a rise in U raises the job 
destruction rate. A rise in A raises the level of persistence, meaning the rate at which 
idiosyncratic shocks affect jobs; these shocks can be good or bad. If the shocks are bad, this 
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raises the option value of jobs because job-specific product values are less persistent. This 
means jobs are less likely to be destroyed as the level of Ed decreases, but this also lowers the 
rate of job creation. Additionally, a higher discount rate T reduces the profitability of jobs at 
all prices in the future. This reduces the option value of waiting for improvements in 
productivity and therefore jobs are more likely to be destroyed. Thus, this raises the level of 
Ed' Finally, the business cycle can lead to an overall change in the price of jobs by affecting the 
aggregate component of productivity p. If net aggregate productivity shocks are positive, 
represented by a rise in p, the effect would be a rise in the rate of job creation and the rate of 
job destruction. Conversely, a negative productivity shock increases the rate of job 
destruction, but the model assumes the rate of job creation remains unchanged. Thus, job 
destruction rates are more volatile than job creation rates. 
Job creation takes place when vacant jobs advertised by firms are matched with unemployed 
workers according to the prevailing matching2 technology at a negotiated wage. The model 
assumes there is unemployment in the steady state because during the matching process and 
prior to all unmatched job-worker pairs meeting, some existing job matches are destroyed. 
This leads to a flow into unemployment. Existing jobs are destroyed only if the idiosyncratic 
component of their productivity falls below some reservation level where Ed < Cu. However, 
filled jobs are not necessarily destroyed because there is a cost associated with recruiting and 
maintaining vacancies. 
Once job destruction takes place, workers move from employment to unemployment and 
firms either withdraw from the market place or re-open new vacancies which embody the 
latest technology. This implies that job destruction forces workers to separate from their 
employment non-voluntarily. Job destruction leads to a flow into unemployment and this can 
affect the employment level that can result from job specific (idiosyncratic) shocks at the 
2 See Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001) for a survey of the matching function. 
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Poisson rate A. These specific shocks may be caused by structural shifts in labour demand as it 
is a derived demand. This can lead to changes in the relative price of the goods produced by 
jobs or the change can be caused by productivity shocks that change the unit costs of 
production. These changes in labour demand can result from shocks that may be associated 
with shifts in tastes and technology. These shifts in tastes and technology can result from 
product market competition, product and process innovation, new production diffusion 
processes, the entry and exit of products and product life cycles (Blanchflower & Burgess, 
1996). They can also result from other factors such as globalisation and be influenced by 
domestic labour market policies. The former relates to the processes of offshoring, 
technological change, falling transportation costs and international trade which can affect the 
costs of production, exchange rate volatility and the kaleidoscopic nature of comparative 
advantage. Domestic labour market policies include unemployment insurance benefits, 
employment protection legislation and other policies related to taxation and subsidies 
received by firms. 
This basic model of job creation and destruction provides useful insights as to how firms 
create new jobs and destroy jobs and how they can potentially affect labour market security 
over time. Labour market security can fall and potentially make workers worse off, if there are 
high rates of job creation and destruction over time. This can lower job security because 
higher rates of job creation and destruction can raise the probability of job endings where jobs 
will not last a life time. Additionally, higher rates of job destruction that could be caused by 
structural changes in tastes and technology can raise job instability over time. But this can 
also raise the costs of job displacement between jobs, where the prospects of obtaining a 
temporary job that could lead to a permanent job will diminish over time as the least 
profitable jobs will always be destroyed. Hence, the earnings losses between jobs that can 
result from job displacement and from unemployment scarring could rise over time and make 
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workers worse off. The next section explores the potential factors that could cause structural 
changes in tastes and technology which can affect the job creation and job destruction rates. 
Changes in tastes and technology are arguments that could be made with respect to the rise in 
globalisation over the last 30-40 years. 
2.3 Forces which cause changes in Job Creation and Job Destruction 
2.3.1 The Impact of Technology 
Mortensen & Pissarides (1998) extend their equilibrium unemployment model to explore the 
impact of technological progress embodied in new capital equipment. Firms face three 
choices regarding the deployment of the new technology: First, firms commit to the new level 
of technology at the date of job creation where this technology is irreversible. Second, firms 
may pay a fixed renovation cost to update technology3 embodied within existing capital and 
continue to produce using existing labour within existing jobs from time to time. Third, firms 
may close existing jobs and exit production. This leads to job destruction and workers become 
displaced and unemployed. 
The arrival of new technology signifies that firms will have to update existing jobs or destroy 
them as new jobs drive out old jobs by bidding away workers. The authors' note that workers 
may fear the arrival of new technology because capital embodied with the latest technology 
may lead to greater labour productivity. This may threaten existing jobs because: (1) the level 
of technology encapsulated within existing capital used by existing jobs may not be as 
productive as the new level of technology. New jobs utilising new technology are more 
profitable. (2) Firms may not want to undertake the cost of renovation investment to update 
existing capital and provide existing labour within existing jobs the required training to use the 
3 This may take the form of updatins existins capital equipment with the latest production processes and trainins existins workers 
to use the new technology. 
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new technology. Therefore existing jobs may be destroyed. This uncertainty over the arrival 
of new technology may raise job insecurity fears. 
Whether firms choose to update the technology utilised by existing jobs depends on: (a) the 
rate of technological progress; (b) the size of the idiosyncratic component for productivity and 
(c) the size of the structural renovation costs with growth productivity. First, the rate of 
technological progress plays a part in determining the length and life of old and new jobs. 
With high rates of technological progress, firms may not want to create new jobs or invest 
money into updating existing jobs as these jobs will have shorter life-spans. Thus, firms may 
not be able to re-coup the investment costs before these jobs are destroyed. However, slower 
rates of technological progress will lead to longer lasting jobs as they are profitable for longer 
which will lower job creation and job destruction rates. 
Secondly, the model assumes each job-worker pair has an idiosyncratic component for output 
productivity. The model predicts that if employers have a high idiosyncratic output, firms 
update the technology for existing jobs because the high idiosyncratic match productivity 
signifies a good employer-employee relationship. This is a valuable resource firms will not 
destroy, and they will preserve the resource by updating it from time to time where the 
frequency of the renovation updates increases the idiosyncratic component of the match 
product between firms and workers. This will ensure job security for those workers. 
However, if the firm-worker pairs have low idiosyncratic output, then jobs will be destroyed 
sooner as they are not profitable. This will raise job insecurity for those workers who have a 
low idiosyncratic component for the match product. However, this is a difficult concept to 
measure in practise. 
Finally, the decision to update existing jobs rather than destroy them depends on the size and 
cost of the structural change and the level of productivity. The model predicts that if the size 
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of implementing the updates to existing jobs is sufficiently small and the growth in 
productivity is rising over time, the value of existing jobs rises as productivity growth rises. 
Thus, existing jobs would be updated, job destruction would fall and the unemployment level 
would fall. However, if updating existing capital requires substantial structural change where 
the renovation costs are large, it may not be profitable for existing job matches to continue 
and existing jobs would be destroyed as productivity grows. The increased job destruction 
rate implies a higher unemployment level. 
Mortensen & Pissarides (1998) note that whilst new technology may stimulate job creation 
and the destruction of old jobs, this does not imply that the economy will achieve a higher 
level of employment or the same employment level as before once old jobs are replaced by 
new jobs. This is because different firms of different sizes within different sectors may pursue 
different job creation and job destruction policies. The model assumes that if there is perfect 
factor mobility, then new technology would induce some sectors to expand and other sectors 
to contract. Jobs within declining sectors would be destroyed and jobs within expanding 
sectors would take their place. With costless mobility of labour and capital between two 
sectors, the model shows if both sectors have high and equal productivity growth, resources 
from the sector with high renovation costs would shift to the sector where costs were low. 
However, with costly factor mobility, the migration of employers and employees to the 
expanding sector may be costly and subsequently the unemployment level may be higher in 
the short run, whilst firms relocate to different sectors and unemployed workers search for 
new employment. 
2.3.1.1 The Origins of TechnolOilcallnnovations and Its Impact on Labour Market Security 
Understanding the origins of the technology-skill and capital-skill complementarity is 
important because this evolution can have important implications on the demand for different 
types of labour and the elasticity of labour demand over time. It began in the U.S. during the 
21 
1830s to the 1880s; Atack et 0/., (2005) estimate that capital-to-Iabour ratios in manufacturing 
establishments increased by at least 75 percent after taking into account the change in the 
price of capital over this period. Along with this increase, there was a change in the mode of 
the production process. Prior to the process of capital deepening (defined as the rise in the 
capital-to-Iabour ratio, where lesser skilled workers are substituted by capital), most 
manufacturing took place in artisan shops, which were small, owner-operated work 
establishments with few work assistants. Most goods that were produced in artisan shops 
were made to order (e.g. jewellery, watch makers, engravers, etc.) and required little in the 
way of capital. On average, workers in artisan shops were highly skilled and produced the 
entire goods with no division of labour using modest tools that could be applied in different 
lines of work. As the manufacturing sector grew and shifted away from artisan shops with no 
power source towards factories (1830s to 1880s), many of the job tasks moved away from 
skilled workers from artisan shops toward less skilled blue collar workers using more 
specialised machinery with steam and water power. The production processes further evolved 
towards assembly lines in the early 1900s and towards continuous- and batch- process 
methods (1890s and beyond) lead to a rise in the demand for blue collar workers with a high 
school education in many high-skilled industries from 1909 to 1929 (Goldin & Katz, 1998). 
Goldin & Katz (1998) further find that blue collar workers in 1940 were in greater demand as a 
result of capital deepening (the substitution of Jesser skilled workers with the fall in the cost of 
capital), the diffusion of new technologies such as electric motors using purchased electricity 
instead of steam and water power (due to a fall in the price of purchased electricity) and with 
the introduction of continuous- and batch- process production methods lead to a further rise 
in the demand for high-skilled production and white collar 'machine maintenance' workers at 
the expense of lesser skilled workers in hauling, conveying and assembly tasks in the twentieth 
century. These factors have contributed towards technology-skill and capital-skill 
complementarity. 
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Another reason for the rise in the demand for blue collar workers was due to many more 
workers becoming educated with the expansion of schools in the U.S. Many workers with a 
high school level education entered ordinary white collar occupations as clerks, bookkeepers, 
secretaries and other sales positions during the early nineteenth century because a high 
school graduate became a reasonable priced input in the production process. This may have 
fuelled skill biased technological change whilst lesser skilled labour became increasingly 
substituted by the introduction of capital. 
More recent innovations in technology such as the adoption of computer processors in 
workplaces, the fall in telecommunication costs and with many workers choosing to go to 
university, many white-collar jobs in bookkeeping and in human resources are now termed 
medium skilled occupation. These workers have at most high school diplomas, are employed 
in these jobs that are now considered to be at risk from being replaced by computer software 
(task biased technological change4) but these are job tasks that are also likely to be offshored 
abroad (Acemoglu & Autor, 2010 & forthcoming). Many jobs in engineering are now termed 
high-skilled white collar jobs which are less likely to be replaced by computer software or be 
offshored abroad for the moment, but this could change in the future. These continued 
innovations in technology and changes to the production processes have raised the demand 
for skilled labour, and they can contribute towards a change in the demand towards skilled 
labour, which can lead to greater wage inequality between skilled and less skilled labour and a 
rise in job insecurity and the own wage elasticity of labour demand for lesser skilled labour 
overtime. 
4 See subsection 2.3.3.5 for the theory and subsection 2.4.7 for the empirical evidence for the TBTC hypothesis proposed by Autor 
et 0/., (2003). 
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2.3.2 The Impact of Policy 
Job creation and destruction rates can also be affected by employment subsidies and taxation. 
The equilibrium unemployment model is extended by Pissarides (2000) to examine the impact 
of six policy instruments: (1) tax subsidy; (2) the marginal rate of tax; (3) the replacement rate 
(unemployment compensation); (4) employment subsidies received by firms; (5) hiring 
subsidies received by firms and (6) firing taxes paid by firms. With the absence of policy 
instruments, and assuming there are no idiosyncratic productivity shocks, no stochastic search 
intensity and excluding unemployment compensation, the supply of jobs are variable and 
determined by profit maximisation. The destruction of jobs takes place at a constant rate A. 
With the introduction of policy instruments, job creation and destruction rates can change 
overtime. 
Within this model the creation of new jobs are advertised by firms. When unemployed 
workers arrive to fill job vacancies to commence a working relationship following the 
completion of a signed contract, firms receive a hiring subsidy in addition to the value from 
the jobs. This hiring subsidy adds a flow to the firm's revenue. After workers have been taken 
on, the benefit to the firms from the continuation of the employment are the value of the jobs 
only as no further hiring subsidies is received by firms. The hiring subsidies work to creative 
incentives for firms to create new jobs because this decreases the reservation productivity 
value of jobs from the matching process and this decreases unemployment. Hiring subsidies 
also raise the number of jobs that are destroyed as older jobs are replaced by new jobs that 
embody the latest technology. They can also potentially crowd out employment from firms 
that do not receive the aid to create jobs and thus this could potentially push firms not being 
aided to fails. 
5 For further details regarding the evaluation of public policies on employment, see chapter 8 in Cahuc & Zylberberg (2006) for the 
issues and references therein. 
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Once workers have been hired, firms are liable for paying a firing tax6 if they are unable to re-
negotiate wages with workers. The extent of job creation and destruction depends on the 
negotiated wage, which affect firms' production costs and the reservation productivity level 
for maintaining a continuing job. Firing taxes discourage job creation because once jobs have 
been created, firms are liable to pay firing taxes which reduces the overall expected value 
from jobs. Firing taxes also discourage job destruction as they reduce the reservation 
productivity value of jobs which makes it expensive to destroy existing jobs. The overall 
impact upon unemployment and job security from this model is ambiguous and is a matter to 
be determined empirically. 
Employment subsidies and tax subsidies reduce job destruction because they reduce the 
reservation productivity level for a given level of labour market tightness. The model predicts 
higher subsidies decreases the unemployment level. Finally, unemployment compensation 
and wage taxes discourages job creation as the former policy increases the costs of production 
and the latter policy reduces the cost of leisure as leisure is untaxed and is preferable to work 
if wage taxes are high. These policies also increase job destruction as they increase the 
reservation productivity levels for jobs as they reduce the expected profits from new and 
continuing jobs. The model predicts that unemployment compensation and wage taxes 
unambiguously increase the unemployment rate. 
2.3.3 The Impact of Globalisation 
Globalisation refers to the increasing integration of the world economy, particularly through 
international trade and the flow of capital, ideas, migration, the transfer of culture and 
technology and the development of transnational regulation. It is a complex process that has 
facilitated trade openness, technological innovation and finance transfers that generate a 
6 Rring taxes can be thought of as redundancy pay. This is paid to workers who are displaced from employment. The size of this 
cost can vary between finns, but it can be linked to the number of years of service at firms and skill levels. 
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wide range of benefits and costs through affecting the rate of job creation and destruction 
that can be the result from structural changes in tastes and technology. 
Economists agree that globalisation encourages flexible borderless markets for goods, services 
and labour which can generate greater competition and trade between many different 
nations. This should encourage job creation where these benefits are in line with those 
predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model (HOS) of international trade. This model 
encapsulates the traditional view of international trade and it assumes each country uses the 
same technology to produce the same goods but they differ with respect to factor 
endowments which determine the patterns of trades. This model predicts that trade is 
determined by the characteristics of each country. With two types of goods that are produced 
by two countries, the country that is capital abundant will produce and export this good 
because they have a comparative advantage in producing this good. Whilst the labour 
abundant country will produce and export the labour intensive good but import those goods 
that are relatively scarce - the capital intensive good. Without trade, each country will 
produce both types of goods. But when international trade takes place, theory predicts that 
trade openness should create jobs in industries that produce goods making intensive use of 
the relative abundant factor of production. This will destroy jobs within industries that 
produce goods using the relatively less abundant factor of production. As the model makes 
full employment assumptions with perfect information and with no labour market frictions, 
there is no unemployment - meaning workers who lose their jobs in the declining sector due 
to job destruction are able to find immediate employment at the market wage in other 
sectors. This implies there is no rise in job insecurity or change to labour market security. 
Therefore, free trade can raise aggregate welfare for a country relative to autarky, where 
there are aggregate effiCiency and productivity gains. One can conclude that both producers 
and consumers benefit from free trade at the aggregate level. Globalisation can bring greater 
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benefits to countries which allow their firms to engage in offshoring and from the outward FDI 
activities of MNEs in the form of greater productivity and output, potentially faster economic 
growth, increased welfare and even greater incentives to innovate (Mann, 2003; OECD, 2003; 
Mankiw & Swagel, 2006a; Amiti & Wei, 2006b; Olsen, 2006; Crina, 2009a, c; Ritter, 2009). 
However, globalisation can severely polarise the labour market winners and losers (Brown, 
2003). One cannot conclude that every individual consumer and producer will benefit from 
free trade because the aggregate gains from free trade can conceal the redistributive effects. 
The assumptions of perfect labour mobility and frictionless labour markets, where each 
country produces the same goods with the same technology are not realistic assumptions. 
Firms are likely to have many stages of production that employ many different types of 
workers with different skill intensities, not just one type of labour. Additionally, the matching 
process is more likely to differ between industries as firms search to find workers that fit their 
needs. This will cause frictions in the labour market, where workers may not be able to regain 
immediate employment after job loss. 
Globalisation and trade can change the economic trading environment (Davidson & Matusz, 
2004), where they can create benefits (as outlined above) and they can raise the anxiety levels 
for workers from advanced industrialised countries. For the latter, anxiety from trade and 
globalisation may manifest itself as fears of job loss, where workers may not be able to 
compete with the imports that are produced by cheaper foreign labour. Globalisation may 
destroy jobs and lower job creation in some or all operations that are performed in-house by 
firms. This may exert downward pressure on average wage levels and raise unemployment 
and possibly increase job turnover rates and raise the substitutability of domestic workers 
with the use of foreign labour over time. Globalisation and trade can change the mixture of 
employment opportunities between good jobs and bad jobs available to domestic workers. 
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They could also affect the number of job opportunities that are available over time and this 
can raise labour market insecurity fears. 
Figure 2.2 examines how job creation and destruction rates can be affected by globalisation 
when it affects the price of productivity for jobs: p + (1E in vacancies (V) and unemployment 
space (U). Curve JCC represent the job creation condition which is drawn through the origin 
and curve BC represents the Beveridge curve, which is convex to the origin in vacancy-
unemployment space. If the job creation condition curve, JCC1 rotates to the left to JCC2 - this 
is a rise in the job creation rate. However, if JCC1 rotates to the right, then the job creation 
rate falls. If the Beveridge curve shifts outwards to BC2, this implies a fall in matching 
efficiency between vacancies and the unemployed. But if the Beveridge curve shifts towards 
the origin, this signifies a rise in matching efficiency. The equilibrium is determined at the 
interaction of the job creation condition and the Beveridge curve - this is at point C. 
Shifts in the JCC and BC curves can result from positive and negative macro- and micro-
economic shocks. For instance, net productivity shocks can result from macro-shocks that can 
change the general level of all goods prices. The price of all goods can also change from 
expectations about future economic conditions. Positive net productivity shocks represented 
by an increase in the common price p and a fall in the reservation productivity level (Ed) 
increases the job creation rate. This causes the job creation condition to pivot upwards to 
JCC2• The Beveridge curve shifts inwards towards the origin and the job destruction rate 
increases due to a rise in labour market tightness, which improves workers employment 
options. The new equilibrium is point I from point C, where the unemployment rate falls and 
the vacancy rate rises according to the diagram. 
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Figure 2.2: Changes to the Rate of Job Creation and Destruction 
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Accordingly, the price dispersion parameter u could also rise because of greater competition 
from foreign firms. This can raise both of the job creation and job destruction rates. If 
domestic firms are able to compete with foreign firms because they are able to offshore their 
intermediate stages of production abroad where they have no comparative advantage in 
producing some of these goods compared to other stages of production. Then its impact in 
the vacancy-unemployment space shifts the Beveridge curve out and rotates the job creation 
condition curve upwards - the new equilibrium is point D from C. Equilibrium vacancies 
increase but the effect on the unemployment rate is ambiguous. This is because offshoring 
the assembly stages of production predominately completed by unskilled labour raises the job 
destruction rate in import and non export competing firms. These domestic firms may destroy 
jobs to lower production costs or even close down within declining sectors. However, 
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domestic firms that are able to compete with foreign firms within expanding sectors can 
create new jobs for skilled and unskilled labour. With perfect information and labour mobility, 
unemployed workers can search for jobs that match their skills and obtain new jobs 
immediately. Therefore, the unemployment rate may not rise if there are high job 
reallocation rates in these sectors. And there is no rise in job insecurity if workers are able to 
find jobs as there is no uncertainty in the models. Thus, the exact impact on the 
unemployment rate is ambiguous. 
Similarly, a reduction in persistence shown by a fall in A. (this is the arrival rate of idiosyncratic 
shocks to jobs) can raise and lower the job creation and job destruction rates for a given 
reservation productivity level (Ed) between industries. This could be caused by the changing 
kaleidoscopic nature of comparative advantage or exchange rate volatility. But its impact on 
the unemployment level is once again unclear. 
Alternative models that incorporate job-search with unemployment in imperfectly competitive 
labour markets can cause job security to fall as workers are not able to find jobs immediately. 
The following section examines the Davidson & Matusz (2003, 2004 & 2008) model of job 
turnover with imperfect labour markets. 
2.3.3.1 Job Search, Unemployment & Job Turnover 
Davidson & Matusz's (2003, 2004 & 2008) model incorporates job search, unemployment and 
job turnover. They are all factors that can affect production costs and job turnover rates 
which can determine patterns of comparative advantage enjoyed by firms. They can also 
affect the rate of job creation and destruction and the decisions made by workers to reallocate 
their employment to other industries which can affect their labour market security. 
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This model makes several assumptions. First, there is imperfect information, where it takes 
time for unemployed workers and firms with vacancies to meet and establish a working 
relationship. This may depend on a number of factors. First, workers and firms are not 
homogenous. Workers can differ by ability and they must choose between two types of jobs 
that require different levels of skills. There are jobs that do not require many skills and offer 
low pay and they are less durable. And there are jobs that require training and pay is relatively 
high where these jobs are durable. Labour markets are not frictionless and workers may not 
be perfectly mobile. Job search takes time once workers have completed their training from 
education for example, where job search and training can be costly. Firms can operate in two 
sectors: a high tech sector and a low tech sector which have different job turnover rates. 
The matching process between workers and vacancies advertised by firms are easier in some 
industries than in others. For instance, jobs that require less skills or experience may be easier 
to fill compared to vacancies advertised in other industries that require high skills and where 
the production process is complex. To fill these latter vacancies, it may take firms more time 
to hire the right person that meets their criteria to fill the job. Therefore the matching process 
can be difficult to solve. Fina"y, the model assumes that once firms and workers establish a 
working relationship, job security is uncertain because random fluctuations in labour demand 
can be caused by basic shifts in comparative advantage. 
Due to this uncertainty, workers cycle between periods of employment and unemployment, 
where job turnover rates determine the length of employment spells in each sector. Whether 
workers have secure jobs in employment or they experience spells of unemployment, this 
depends on their decision to choose occupations based on their future income streams. Jobs 
in the low-tech sectors are easy to find where they require specific skills. But they are not 
durable as they have high job turnover rates. Whereas jobs in the high-tech sector are 
relatively hard to find as they require a period of training before workers can qualify to carry 
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out these jobs. The matching process for these jobs is also hard to solve as firms may have 
specific requirements. But these jobs are durable with low job turnover rates and these 
workers have general work skills. 
As jobs are hard to come by in the high-tech sector, high-skilled workers may obtain 
employment in the low-tech sector. They are assumed to produce more output than low 
ability workers. When a job separation occurs, worker become unemployed, workers must re-
train if they have specific employment skills for a particular job (e.g. a baker versus a sales 
assistant: each occupation has very specific skill). But if they have general skills, they may be 
able to obtain re-employment and not have to re-train if they are re-employed in the same 
sector (e.g. professional jobs such as teachers or accountants). If workers choose to change 
sectors, they will require training to obtain jobs in the new sector. Therefore becoming 
unemployment, searching for a job and re-training can be costly if workers seek employment 
in another industry. 
Firms that have high job turnover rates with less durable jobs have to pay compensating wage 
differentials to workers. This is to convince them that the jobs in this sector are worth 
searching for. Higher compensating wage levels push up the costs of production which affect 
prices. Thus, customers turn to foreign produced goods if the goods produced domestically 
are more expensive. These price changes can affect patterns of trade. This model assumes 
that when job turnover rates are sector and country specific, a fall in the rate at which jobs are 
created or a rise in the job destruction rate in a particular sector-country pair raises the costs 
of production for a particular good. This raises its price and reduces a country's comparative 
advantage in that particular good. This model suggests that unemployment, job search and 
job turnover are determinants of comparative advantage, with particular emphasis on the job 
turnover rates influencing the patterns of trade. This is because different industries in 
different countries have different labour market structures and labour market institutions 
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where job turnover rates vary significantly across these industries and where the length of 
unemployment spells can vary from country to country. It is these differences that may have a 
significant influence on the patterns of comparative advantage. 
The implications from this model are that countries should have a comparative advantage in 
industries that have low job turnover rates. This would imply that jobs in the high-tech sector 
are durable with secure jobs; they are more likely to have a comparative advantage as they 
have lower job destruction rates. But jobs in the low-tech sector are less durable and they 
have higher job turnover rates. This implies that jobs in this sector are less secure as firms are 
not likely to have a comparative advantage in this sector if they have to pay workers 
compensating wage differentials to attract and retain workers in that industry. Thus, changes 
in the costs of production along with job turnover rates determine the basic nature of 
comparative advantage enjoyed by firms when they trade. And therefore job security is 
essentially determined by the job turnover rates within specific sectors and whether workers 
choose to reallocate to other sectors to obtain employment. One off changes to the demand 
for labour for specific groups is unlikely to lead to a change in job security. However, if the 
demand for labour continually changes then job security can be lowered if workers continually 
have to seek re-employment. 
2.3.3.2 Kaleidoscopic Comparative Advantage 
The nature of comparative advantage enjoyed by firms can also change over time with 
globalisation. Bhagwati & Dehejia (1993) name this the 'kaleidoscopic' nature of comparative 
advantage. Their hypothesis is that volatility In employment and income is the result of 
greater internationalisation of world financial markets combined with the growth of 
transnational production by multinational enterprises (MNEs). Together with the diffusion of 
production know-how, this has exposed firms to much fiercer competition. This has narrowed 
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the margin of comparative advantage enjoyed by many industries in developed countries. 
Small shifts in production costs can cause comparative advantage to shift suddenly from one 
country to another and hence cause the comparative advantage to be more 'kaleidoscopic' 
between countries. That is, one country may have comparative advantage in good X and 
another in good Y one day and the next day it may suddenly be reversed (Bhagwati & Dehejia, 
1993; Bhagwati, 1995; Beaulieu et 01., 2004). There are three consequences from this 
hypothesis: 
1. For labour there could be greater job turnover between industries and this could lead 
to greater frictional unemployment. 
2. Greater labour turnover could flatten the growth profile of earnings for workers most 
affected due to less skill accumulation. 
3. Less skilled labour will be affected more than skilled labour assuming that skilled 
workers have greater transferability of workplace acquired skills than less skilled 
workers. This could lead to an increasing wage-differential between the two groups of 
workers. Although this is a weak implication from this theory. 
Thus, the kaleidoscopic nature of comparative advantage may lead to an increase in job 
instability and insecurity if there is little potential for productivity growth for firms to recoup 
any sunk costs they may have invested into their operations to reap the potential benefits 
from globalisation. 
2.3.3.3 Exchange Rate Volatility & Product Market Competition 
Borderless markets can raise international competition and expose more firms to real 
exchange rate changes (G6mez-Salvador et 01.,2004) and greater product market competition 
(Fenoll, 2009). This can further affect costs of production and job turnover rates. Campa & 
Goldberg (2001) identify three sources of currency exposure that can potentially affect job 
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turnover. First, a currency appreciation increases the relative production costs of domestic 
firms relative to foreign firms through export exposure. This reduces the price 
competitiveness of goods produced by domestic firms, lowering export sales which intern 
raises the reservation productivity level. A rise in the reservation productivity level signifies 
firms may layoff workers through job destruction and lower job creation rates. The second 
source of currency exposure is through import competition. An appreciation of the exchange 
rate implies foreign imports are now cheaper, making foreign produced goods cheaper and 
allowing foreign firms to gain market share. Domestic firms that may not engage in trade may 
also be affected by the presence of foreign competition in the domestic market. This second 
effect can again lead to job destruction and lower job creation rates. Finally, the third source 
of currency exposure counteracts the first two through cost exposure 0/ imported intermediate 
imports. Firms which rely on intermediate inputs may regain competitiveness through 
importing intermediate inputs. Firms may lower their costs of production and this may lower 
the number of jobs that are destroyed. 
2.3.3.4 Footloose Multinationals and Offshoring 
Job security can fall if employment within foreign owed firms is more volatile. This is because 
foreign-owned plants that may be owned by MNEs operate in many countries, where they 
may be able to shift production operations between countries should the operating conditions 
change in the host country. It can also be argued that the rise in FDI investment by MNEs can 
contribute towards raising employment risk (Scheve & Slaughter, 2004) as they are footloose -
they can react to changes in the host country and shift production to another country and 
never be fully rooted in the host country. Another argument is that foreign-owned firms are 
more likely than domestically owned plants to exit the market. This raises job uncertainty and 
it can raise worker turnover if jobs are destroyed. 
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Offshoring refers to the relocation of production stages abroad either through arm's length 
supply through market transactions (international outsourcing) or within the boundaries of 
the firm (vertical FOI) (Jabbour, 2010). This relocation can be the material and immaterial 
stages of production. Job and labour market security can fall if firms are able to offshore 
stages of the production process that they are not able to provide at a competitive price in 
comparison to foreign firms who may have a comparative advantage in producing certain 
goods and services compared to domestic firms. Although labour market security can be 
affected by offshoring, not all workers are equally likely to be affected. 
Footloose MNEs, outward FOI and offshoring can change the organisational structure of the 
production process and the composition of the labour force between skilled and unskilled 
labour. Firms employ many different types of labour: they may be skilled and employed 
within knowledge based jobs or less skilled labour employed within manual and repetitive 
jobs. Borrowing terminology from Hijzen et 01., (2007b), take for example a firm which has 
three distinct areas of operations to produce and distribute goods. These areas are (1) 
development: which employs skilled labour in knowledge based jobs, (2) assembly: which 
employs less-skilled labour to assemble together inputs into final products and (3) sales: which 
typically employs skilled labour to carry out sales transactions and provide after sales care 
services. In the past firms would have carried out all of these activities in house and in one 
particular country using local labour where all output would have been produced domestically. 
However, globalisation and the advancements of telecommunication technology can give 
firms access to international markets where firms may take on the opportunity to establish 
production facilities in other countries where labour is cheaper. This can allow firms to 
produce intermediate inputs abroad, whilst also maintaining production in the domestic 
market. Primarily, the motivation for offshoring production stages is to reduce costs, but this 
decision can depend on the sector and the form of the relocation that takes place (OECO, 
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2007a). For instance, the primary motivation for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
to offshore production is due to pricing; whilst the decision to relocate headquarters of large 
MNEs is due to tax (OECD, 2007a). In terms of the example, firms may choose to set up 
assembly operations overseas where foreign intermediate inputs are used in addition to 
domestic assembly operations. Scheve & Slaughter (2004) note the cross-border flows of 
foreign direct investment have grown much faster than the cross-border flow of goods and 
services within the last couple of decades. These decisions have contributed towards the 
fragmentation of the production process, where the 'multinationalisation of production' 
(Scheve & Slaughter, 2004) has contributed towards making workers feel much less secure 
about their employment spells (Davidson & Matusz, 2008). 
The 'multinationalisation of production' can be related to the changing nature of production 
costs that can cause MNEs to become footloose. This can mean, through vertical FOI, MNEs 
can change the geography of their production operations between plants due to changes in 
local production costs (Inui et 01., 2009) in the host country. For example, if there are two 
countries: the North (a developed country which is capital abundant) and the South (a 
developing country which is labour abundant) that produce and assemble intermediate goods 
in both countries. A rise in production costs in the North can enable MNEs to switch 
production to the South to lower the costs of production for a final good. The decision to 
switch production to other plants in other geographic locations may not necessarily be due to 
a rise in local production costs. Decisions to move productions can also be due to tax, 
government subsidies, and labour disputes. MNEs being able to switch their production 
operations to other plants can lower job security. 
The decision to establish overseas production networks can lead to a rise in job instability as it 
enables firms to prevent wage rises for domestic workers as they are a credible threat to 
domestic employment, where foreign labour is cheaper. The threat of job loss by moving 
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operations overseas can suppress wage increases. Additionally, changes in foreign labour 
markets can also affect the structure of the production process in the domestic labour market. 
The fragmentation of the production process can destroy jobs and lower wage increases for 
domestic workers. This process also increases the substitutability of domestic workers, which 
can increase the elasticity of labour demand. This can increase the volatility of wages and 
employment in the future (Greenaway et 01., 2008). Other reasons for workers to accept 
lower wage levels may relate to the fact that if workers do lose their jobs, it may take a 
considerable amount of time and resources to receive other job offers. Labour markets are far 
from perfectly competitive where a worker who refuses a job will not be able to 
instantaneously get a job offer from another firm (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2006). Therefore, 
workers may retain their jobs with lower pay. 
Traditionally, jobs most at risk of being offshored have come from manufacturing industries 
which have employed low-skilled labour; firms tend to move their assembly operations 
offshore and other operations in which they do not have a comparative advantage. 
Deardorffs (2005) model predicts that with the advent of international offshoring in final good 
Z and intermediate activity Y, whilst maintaining the production of good X using skilled 
labour, the wage levels for skilled labour would rise and fall for unskilled labour when trade 
takes place. This model predicts international offshoring benefits skilled labour at the expense 
of unskilled labour, as the work activities carried out by non-skilled labour (this is intermediate 
activity Y in terms of the model) are offshored to the South as the North has no comparative 
advantage in activity Y. The North does not offshore intermediate activity X as it has a 
comparative advantage in X with superior technology. Thus, offshoring leads developed 
countries to retain those jobs with activities that the North has a comparative advantage over 
the South. 
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2.3.3.5 Job Polarization 
Technological innovation may also contribute towards displacing workers from their jobs and 
raise job and labour market insecurity. The current wave of globalisation differs with respect 
to previous waves because international trade has been facilitated by the decline in the real 
price of information technology. The fall in the real price of computer capital has allowed 
firms to substitute computer capital for labour in performing workplace job tasks (Acemoglu & 
Autor, 2010 & forthcoming). But technology can also lead to higher productivity as it can 
benefit workers whose job tasks complement technology. This can lead to more productive 
workers and higher productivity. 
The advancements in information and telecommunications technology have allowed firms to 
trade many more goods and services were previously not at risk from being offshored (Garner, 
2004)7. The Economist (2010)8 notes during the 1970s and 1980s, employment in middle-
skilled occupations grew - occupations relating to sales, bank clerks, factory supervisors and 
secretaries. But during the 199Os, the growth in these middling-skilled occupations started to 
decline. This is because instead of simply trading finished goods and services, there has been 
a move towards trading certain job tasks through offshoring and outsourcing. This process has 
applied to job tasks that are information based which have in recent years become easy to 
deliver at low cost via the internet from foreign labour market locations over the last two 
decades (Acemoglu & Autor, 2010 & forthcoming). The combination of technology and trade 
in tasks has contributed towards job polarization - the simultaneous growth in the share of 
employment in high-skill high-wage occupations and growth in low-skill low-wage occupations 
with a fall in the share of employment from middling jobs (Goos & Manning, 2003, 2007). 
7 Other reasons for greater service offshoring opportunities can be due to economic factors such as lower production costs from 
low-income countries but also because of comparative advantage. This has led to the relocation of labour-lntensive service 
activities such as medical diagnostics of computer-tomography images or X-rays can be easily offshored abroad. Sharp declines in 
shipping and long distance telephone calls have contributed towards more production stages becoming vertically Integrated In 
soods and services production. And the final reason relates to deregulation of service industries and trade liberallsation by 
developed and some developing countries during the early 19905. See Gamer (2004) for further details. 
8 This Economist article can be found at the following link: 
URL: http:Uwww.economist.com/node/16990700?story id=16990700&fsrc=rss. 
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Authors' Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003) present the 'Routinization' hypothesis [also known as 
the 'ALM' hypothesis and the 'Task Biased Technological Change Hypothesis (TBTC)). It is 
nuanced explanation of how new technology can have an impact on labour demand, in 
particular how the composition of job tasks performed by occupations can be affected by the 
use of computer technology. The ALM hypothesis is based on three concepts that describe 
the task content of occupations that are required to perform jobs and its relationship with 
computer capital: (1) Routine Job Tasks- Computer capital can substitute for workers carrying 
out a limited and well defined set of routine cognitive and manual job tasks; those that can be 
accomplished by following explicit rules and procedures. (2) Non-Routine Abstract Job Tasks 
- Computer capital complements workers in carrying out problem solving and complex 
communication activities. Job tasks are not well structured and require non routine cognitive 
skills to perform them. Computers are not able to substitute for these job tasks as yet. (3) 
Non-Routine Manual Job Tasks - The capability of computers to substitute for workers 
carrying out cognitive and interpersonal job tasks is limited. Job tasks demand flexibility, 
creativity, generalized problem-solving and complex communications in a less than fully 
predictable environment. 
The evidence from the ALM hypothesis suggests that jobs within industries that heavily used 
routine intensive skills had seen the greatest adoption of computers. This reduced the relative 
demand for routine intensive skills in those industries. Jobs that are characterised by routine 
cognitive and manual job tasks, such as record keeping and performing calculations (for 
instance a bank clerk), clerical work, or a job which requires repetitive sorting and monitoring 
(such as assembly workers in manual jobs) are jobs that can be substituted by technology. 
However non-routine cognitive and interactive job tasks require workers to engage in high 
degree abstract reasoning; these are skills that are complementary to technology but cannot 
be replaced by technology at this point in time (e.g. a surgeon). Jobs that require a high 
intenSity of non-routine manual job tasks have limited opportunities for technology to 
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substitute or complement these jobs as they consist of job tasks that require a certain degree 
of flexibility in an unpredictable environment. Examples include truck drivers, security guards, 
and construction workers9• 
Building on the work by Autor et 01., (2003), Goos & Manning (2003, 2007) argue that the 
routinization hypothesis has a subtle impact upon the demand for labour across the skill 
spectrum. That is jobs that can be routinized are not distributed uniformly across the wage 
distribution. They identify non-routine job tasks which compliment technology, which include 
skilled professional and managerial jobs are likely to be situated at the upper end of the wage 
distribution, where there is likely to be a rise in these types of jobs. These jobs are referred to 
as lovely jobs. On the other hand, non-routine manual job tasks account for most unskilled 
jobs such as in cleaning and personal help related occupations such as bar staff and child care 
providers or truck drivers are not likely to be affected directly by technology. This is because 
these jobs require situational adaptability and in-person interactions that are not likely to be 
performed by computer capital technology such as software. The impact of technology in 
other parts of the economy is likely to lead to a rise in employment for unskilled jobs 
(Manning, 2004). These types of jobs tend to occupy the lower end of the wage distribution 
and are referred to as lousy jobs. Jobs which exhibit routine-cognitive and routine-manual job 
tasks tend to occupy the middle of the wage distribution and are referred to as middling jobs. 
These jobs are likely to be substituted by computer capital and they are likely to experience a 
fall in relative demand. It is this fall in relative demand for 'middling' jobs which are 
substituted by technology that the authors' call this process job polarization. 
9 The "trade in tasks" view does not only affect manufacturing jobs but also many jobs are In high skill service occupations 
(Grossman & Rossl-Hansberg. 2008; Ritter. 2009). For example, jobs within development and sales can be delivered via telephone 
or remotely via the internet because of a decline in shipping and long-distance telephone costs over the last fifty years. This 
means firms can now offshore not only their assembly operations but also their development and sales operations. The decision 
to offshore skilled jobs from development and sales operatlon can only take place if firms are able to Invest in knowledge capital 
(Markusen, 2005) abroad, where these jobs can easily be monitored at low cost and where there are prospects for productivity 
growth. Jobs will be destroyed within the domestic market If the costs of establishing production networks abroad are cheaper 
than maintaining jobs at horne. Thus, the fears of gIobalisation not only affect Iow-skilled jobs but they can also affect hlgh-skilled 
service jobs that were previously insulated by offshoring. This can further raise employment volatility and job Insecurity. 
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Table 2.1: Tradable Job Task Characteristics 
Study Job Task Characteristics 
Bhagwati {19841 Long distance arm's I e ~ ~vs. Face-to-face delivered services. 
Leamer & Stroper (2001) Codifiable vs. Tadt Information. 
Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003) 'Routinization' Hypothesis: Routine tasks are repetitive and can be replaced by a computer. 
Levy & Murnane (2004) Routine vs. Non-Routine Tasks. 
(1) No face -to-face contact with customers. 
(2) Work via remote communications. 
(3) Tasks reducible to set of instructions. 
Bardhan & Kroll (2003); Kroll (2005) (4) Information the major component of the 'product'. 
(51 Low set-up barriers. 
(6) Low social networking requirements. 
(7) High wage differential compared to the receivill& couf!!r'l. 
Blinder (2006, 2(07) Remote Delivery vs. Physical Contact. 
Source: Author's own compliatlon and part adapted from Grossman & Rossl-Hansberg (20081 
Table 2.1 lists the job task characteristics reported by various published and non-published 
working papers which are most likely to be offshored. Job tasks which appear to be most 
offshorable or tradable must be able to be delivered at long distance arm's length without 
degradation in the quality of the service as opposed to job tasks which require close proximity 
to the customer (Bhagwati 1984; Blinder 2006, 2007). Authors' learner & Stroper (2001), Levy 
& Murnane (2004) and Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008) note the degree to which job tasks 
can be broken down into a series of codifiable job tasks, which can be described by a series of 
written set of rules and procedures can be substituted by machines or computer software 
(Acemoglu & Autor, 2010 & forthcoming). These job tasks can be easily monitored and they 
are most likely to be offshored (Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2007). Job tasks which are non-
routine in nature, have a large degree of tacit information and require visual and motor 
processing which cannot be described by a set of rules or be replaced by computer capital at 
present, they are least likely to be offshored as monitoring these job tasks may not be possible 
or too costly. Bardhan & Kroll (2003), Kroll (2005) provide an array of task and trading 
environment characteristics which enable job tasks to be offshored. 
Thus, structural changes in tastes and technology that can be facilitated by globalisation can 
raise job insecurity and job instability as technology can substitute for labour that are 
employed by occupations that have a high importance for routine intensive job tasks that 
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follow well defined rules that can be performed using computer software or machines. On the 
other hand, workers who are employed in middling jobs perform routine intensive job tasks 
that are highly substitutable with foreign labour, who are able to deliver these job task 
services remotely from foreign labour market locations. This can raise the elasticity of labour 
demand, which is discussed in the next section. 
2.3.3.6 The Elasticity of Labour Demand 
Rodrik (1997) noted the labour demand elasticities could rise with globalisation. A rise in 
international trade through greater offshoring, induced through greater product market 
competition, a fall in trade protection, greater competition from less developed countries and 
technology will increase the own-wage elasticity of labour demand. This is because borderless 
markets for goods, services and labour allow firms greater access to foreign markets. Firms 
may decide to establish production networks abroad through outward FDI or outsource parts 
of their domestic operations abroad to take advantage of cheaper labour costs. Offshoring 
and outward FDI investment establish production networks outside the domestic market 
where firms may have access to cheaper factors of production. This increases the 
substitutability of domestic workers with foreign workers, which raises the elasticity of labour 
demand. This rise can raise job insecurity. 
Similarly, the deregulation of labour market policies and the kaleidoscopic nature of 
comparative advantage will raise the elasticity of labour demand. The deregulation of 
employment protection policies lowers the cost of job destruction, which in turn will allow 
firms greater flexibility to create and destroy jobs without facing large costs in response to 
changing economic trading conditions, where the relative benefits of comparative advantage 
can change over time. A rising elasticity of labour demand will increase the responsiveness of 
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wages and employment through potential labour demand shocks caused by structural changes 
in tastes and technology (Hijzen & Swaim, 2008). 
2.3.4 Worker Heterogeneity 
Workers are not homogeneous; they can differ by their human capital characteristics (whether 
acquired through training or innate) that contributes to their productivity. Worker 
heterogeneity within the labour market may have important implications for the job security 
for different groups of workers. 
Mortensen & Pissarides (1999) extend their equilibrium unemployment model to allow 
workers to differ by their skill endowment. This new model examines the impact of skill-
biased technology shocks and the role labour market policies have upon the unemployment 
level. The model assumes there are high-skilled and low-skilled workers. The labour market 
policies that are explored are unemployment insurance benefits (UI) and employment 
protection policies (EP). 
Unemployment compensation and other forms of welfare payments are paid to workers when 
they are involuntarily displaced from employment. The generosity of these payments 
determines the extent of job search intenSity carried out by workers. Generous UI payments 
discourages job search because it decreases the cost of unemployment. This also discourages 
job creation because higher UI payments are acquired through raising the costs of production 
in the form of higher taxes which are then collected by the state. Employment protection 
policies are policies which reduce the efficient allocation of resources as they restrict the 
ability of firms to adjust their workforces in response to changing economic conditions. EP 
policies can be thought of as job security policies, where they serve three economic goals 
(Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2006): (1) to preserve employment and discourage job destruction; (2) to 
reduce the risk of employment and income fluctuations for existing wage earners and (3) to 
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encourage firms to take the social value of jobs into account. However, strict EP policies may 
not serve any of the three goals if they increase actual or implicit firing costs. This will also 
discourage job creation in response to technology shocks or changing patterns of labour 
demand, as they leave firms with unwanted workers (Mortensen & Pissarides, 1999). 
The model assumes there is a fully segmented labour market separated by skill where each 
market has a separate matching function. When employers create vacancies in this model, 
they must specify the skill requirement for the job, where this decision is irreversible. 
Employers only hire those worker whose skill levels are at or above those required to perform 
the jobs. This is because qualified workers (those who have the required skill level or above) 
generate the required future profit stream that is equal to the asset value of the job. Less 
skilled workers are not accepted for employment as their skill endowment does not match the 
skill level required for the job; they are assumed to produce nothing if hired. The wage in each 
sub-market is determined by a process of bargaining under perfect information, where wages 
are continuously negotiated with the advent of structural changes. If wage negotiations 
cannot be reached between workers and firms, firms are liable to pay firing costs. The cost of 
firing workers increases with skill, so it is more costly to fire skilled workers than unskilled 
workers. 
Strict EP and generous UI policies have an impact on each sub-market for each skill group 
when structural changes affect the demand for labour. They have the following predicted 
impact on job creation and destruction rates for each skill group: First, higher UI payments 
increase production costs which subsequently raise the reservation productivity value for all 
jobs in each sub-market. This increases the job destruction rate which also raises the 
unemployment rate for all workers. However, the unemployment rate for less skilled workers 
increases more than that for skilled workers because the model assumes skilled workers are 
more costly to fire than unskilled workers. The job creation rate remains unchanged. Second, 
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strict EP policies decrease the option value of jobs because high firing taxes prevent firms from 
terminating jobs. This decreases the unemployment rate where the fall in the unemployment 
rate for unskilled workers is less than that for more skilled workers. Third, with strict10 EP and 
generous UI policies, the model predicts the average unemployment rate will rise more in 
response to structural changes than if UI and EP policies were less generous and weak and the 
duration of unemployment would be longer but less frequent. Finally, the fourth prediction 
from the model shows that as low skilled labour represents a smaller fraction of the employed 
work force, wage dispersion would increase in response to a skilled biased shock when UI and 
EP policies are less generous and weak. 
Thus, the rate of job creation and destruction determines the equilibrium level of 
unemployment which subsequently has important implications for labour market security. 
Structural changes in tastes and technology can alter job creation and job destruction rates. 
Job creation and destruction rates are higher with weaker job protection policies, and this 
would imply job security would be lower because firms can adjust their work forces. Job 
stability can be lower if firms want to reduce their production costs but do not want to reduce 
their work forces during unfavourable trading conditions. Workers may accept lower pay and 
a shorter working week to remain employed rather than become unemployed. But firms 
could still shed their work force and close down if their business operations do not improve. 
And finally, the costs associated with job displacement can be higher. Although job creation 
rates are higher, job destruction rates are also higher and this would imply workers who are 
displaced from employment can obtain another job quickly, but there is no guarantee that 
these newly created jobs will be permanent jobs in the future if firms hire workers 
10 Strict EP policy relates to how costly it would be for firms to let go of workers to adjust their labour force In response to 
changing economic conditions. If employment protection policies are strict, this means workers can make a claim for unfair 
dismissal from employers if they have been employed by them for 12 months or more. On the other hand, weak EP policy can 
relate to an unfair dismissal policy which may require workers to be employed by firms for at least 24 months. Thus. the former 
policy is strict in the sense that the cost of firing workers are higher if firms are not able to adjust their worker forces over the 
short term in response to changing economic conditions as opposed to the latter policy. The latter policy Is weak because firms 
can dismiss workers within the 24 month period. In reality the right to make a claim for unfair dismissal is more complicated 
compared to the assumptions made by this model and the policies. 
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temporarily. Additionally, the incidence of unemployment can lead to unemployment scarring 
where becoming unemployment can increase the probability of becoming unemployed in the 
future with lower future earnings trajectory if workers become stuck in a cycle of temporary 
jobs with low pay and eventually out of the labour force. 
If labour market policies were geared towards protecting jobs, labour market security would 
be higher as jobs would be more secure, labour income would be less volatile and the earnings 
losses from job displacement between jobs would be smaller in theory. However, theory 
predicts that less skilled workers would be worse off if labour market policies protected jobs. 
The job creation and destruction literature does not provide predictions as to whether less 
skilled workers would be worse off if labour market policies did not protect jobs; but this is the 
most likely scenario as it is less costly to destroy less skilled jobs than it is to destroy jobs for 
skilled labour. Current labour market policies in the U.K. provide minimal protection for 
existing jobsll. These policies allow for greater labour market flexibility towards changes in 
tastes and technology which affect labour demand. Thus, this chapter asks whether there is 
evidence that technological change, globalisation and changes in labour market policy have 
had a significant impact on job security. 
In summary, this section shows job creation and destruction rates can change from forces 
associated with technological change, labour market policy changes and globalisation. They 
can potentially affect job turnover rates, which can subsequently affect trade patterns. The 
theoretical literature suggests if job turnover rates are high for a particular industry, then firms 
within these sectors have to pay workers high compensating wage differentials to attract 
workers to work within these industries and to retain workers. But these higher costs raise 
the costs of production which can affect the price and the comparative advantage for a 
11 UI payments are paid to workers for a period of six months only. There are minimal EP policies which restrict employers' ability 
to adjust their work forces in response to changin, economic condition. But workers do have the rilht to claim unfair job 
dismissal if they have been employed with an employer for 12 months or more. 
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particular good. Higher prices force customers to switch to foreign goods that are cheaper. 
Thus, a rise in production costs, and a fall in sales may cause firms to outsource parts of their 
production process overseas or in the case of MNEs change the geographic location of 
production. This can increase job turnover rates. Higher job turnover rates can lead to 
unemployment and workers must search for other jobs or re-train to obtain employment in 
other industries. These one off changes in labour demand will not increase job insecurity or 
job instability. However, a rise in the number of job reallocations with job search and 
unemployment can increase labour market insecurity. They can lower job security, because 
jobs are less durable; they can raise job instability if workers prefer to remain in employment 
and thus accept lower pay. They can also raise the earnings losses post job loss if there are 
frequent spells of unemployment and job search. 
2.4 The Empirical Evidence 
This section provides the empirical evidence which sheds light on the potential forces outlined 
in section 2.3 that could lead to changes to the three components of labour market security. 
2.4.1 Job Creation & Destruction 
The job flow literature has established a number of facts in relation to the creation and 
destruction of jobs: First, the 15 percent rule: there are a large number of jobs that are 
simultaneously destroyed and created in all major industrial countries within different 
industrial sectors regardless of the business cycle. These rates are more or less similar for all 
industrialised countries. Roughly, on a national scale, around 15 percent of jobs are destroyed 
each year and roughly 15 percent of new jobs are created each year (Davis & Haltiwanger, 
1999). Recent estimates suggest approximately 53,000 jobs are created and 51,000 jobs are 
destroyed by the services and manufacturing firms in the U.K. economy every week for the 
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period 1998 to 2005 (Hijzen et 01.,2007)12. On average, this is a 15.2% job creation rate and a 
14.5% job destruction rate over the 1998 to 2005 period. Their estimates are in line with the 
15 percent rule. Additionally, their results also show a decline in the job creation and 
destruction rates over time: for 1998 the job creation rate for the manufacturing and services 
sector was 17.2% and the corresponding job destruction rate was 17.5%. In 2001, the job 
creation rate was 15.6% and the job destruction rate was 13.8%. By 2005, the job creation 
rate was 14.8% and the job destruction rate was 14.2%. For other countries, the job creation 
and destruction rates are also similar; Davis et 01 (1997) report gross annual rates of job 
creation and destruction averaged 9.2% and 11.3% for the U.S. manufacturing industry 
between 1972 and 1986. These rates show the relative decline in the manufacturing sector 
over this period, which are somewhat less than the 15 percent rule. These reported rates for 
the manufacturing sector are generally true for most developed countries, where for Norway, 
the respective job creation and job destruction rates for the period 1976-1986 were 7.1% and 
8.4% respectively. However, these rates for the manufacturing sector for developing countries 
are somewhat higher than the 15 percent rule. Estimates reported by Davis et 01., (1997) 
show for Morocco, the job creation and destruction rates for the manufacturing sector for the 
period 1984-1989 were 18.6% and 12.1% respectively. For France, Cahuc & Zylberberg (2006) 
note roughly 10,000 jobs are created and destroyed each day. Roughly this is around 10-12% 
per day or around 11.4% and 12% of all jobs from 1978-1984 for the private non-farm sector 
for France (Davis et 01., 1997)13. These estimates show very little change to these rates over 
time. 
Second, there is a negative relationship between job creation and job destruction over the 
business cycle, where job creation rates are pro-cyclical and job destruction rates are counter 
cyclical. Job destruction rates are found to be more volatile over the business cycle than job 
12 Job creation and destruction rates are on averase hither for the services sector than for the manufacturing sector, where the 
manufacturing sector tends to have higher job destruction rates than job creation rates. 
13 See table 2.2 from DavIs et al., (1997) for estimates for other countries. 
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creation rates. Third, job reallocation rates, defined as the sum of job creation and job 
destruction rates, are inversely related to capital intensity, where more jobs are destroyed and 
created by the service sector than by the manufacturing sector (G6mez-Salvador et 0/., 2004; 
Hijzen et 0/., 2007). Fourth, job reallocation intensity depends on firm specific characteristics 
where job creation rates are negatively associated with firm age and size. Finally, job 
reallocation rates are perSistent over time, such that observed job flows cannot be accounted 
for by temporary lay-offs or recall procedures; they depend on structural changes in tastes and 
technology - or what Joseph Schumpeter refers to as "creative destruction". 
2.4.2 Globalisation and Wages 
2.4.2.1 The causes of Wage Inequality: the Trade ¥s. Technology Debate 
Research from the empirical literature for various developed countries shows that wage 
inequality - the gap between the skilled and non skilled labours' wage bill share have increased 
over the last four decades (See Machin (2010) for a detailed description for these trends). In 
brief, Machin (2011) notes wage inequality between skilled and non skilled labour widened 
rapidly throughout the earnings distribution during the 1980s. These changes continued 
throughout the 19905, where they were a little muted. The post 2000 time frame saw wage 
inequality in the upper tail continue to rise, but the lower tail wage inequality changed very 
little. Similar patterns have also been observed by the U.S.; Katz & Autor (1999) note the 
wages of college educated workers relative to non-college educated workers rose dramatically 
during the period 1979-199514• During this period, there was an observed increase in the 
supply of skilled labour, where the increase in the wage premium was driven by demand side 
factors. Similar trends have also been observed by other developed countries: see Berman et 
0/., (1998) and Machin & Van Reenen (2007) for further details. 
14 The real wage for the latter group declined over the same time frame. 
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There exists a large body of literature that has sought to explain these observed changes to 
the wage structure over time. Katz & Autor (1999) note there are a number of explanations 
that have been explored and tested to explain these observed changes to the wage structure; 
they include the following explanations, though the authors' note these explanations are not 
exclusive. 
The first explanation lies with technological change. The new technology revolution over the 
last 30 years has been associated with the spread of computer technology in micro-processors 
in the work place (Mincer, 1991; Bound & Johnson, 1992; Berman et a/., 1994; Autor et a/., 
1998). This hypothesis suggests the new technology is biased towards skilled labour (skill 
biased technological change, SBTC) because the newly created jobs that incorporate the new 
technology complement their skills but more educated workers are also more likely to have an 
advantage in using ICT more effectively and may be able to cope better with the uncertainty 
surrounding the use of new technology. With the fall in ICT costs, and greater investments 
through higher R&D intensities into new technologies, this could shift demand towards more 
skilled labour (Machin & Van Reenen, 2007). Technology can also lead to job polarization 
whereby technology such as computer software can substitute for jobs that are intensive in 
routine job task functions (task biased technological change, TBTC); this can shift the demand 
for labour away from lesser skilled workers (Machin, 2010). 
The second explanation focuses on the impact of globalisation. This explanation relates to 
increased international trade and greater outsourcing of domestic production processes in 
manufacturing and services abroad to developing countries. Globalisation can lower the 
employment level and shrink the relative demand for less skilled workers in manufacturing 
and service industries which can lead to fall in the wage premium paid to these workers 
(Wood, 1994, 1995, 1998; Borjas & Ramey, 1995; Feenstra & Hansen, 1996; Goos et al., 2010; 
Crino 2009a; Bottini et al., 2009). 
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The third explanation relates to policy changes affecting the strength of labour market 
institutions. Policy changes can relate to the decline in unionisation, changes in minimum 
wage legislation; they can also include UI and EP policy changes that could affect wage 
inequality over time. The argument here is that countries that have experienced a fall in the 
strength of labour market institutions (for instance a fall in the presence of unions, a real 
decline in minimum wage levels and/or less generous UI and weak EP policies) may effectively 
remove protection for less skilled wage workers. This may lead to a fall in relative wages and 
thus a rise in wage inequality (Machin, 2010). 
The debate about the causes for the change in the wage structure and for the increase in the 
demand for more skilled workers has primarily focused on the first two explanations: namely 
the trade hypothesis vs. the technology hypothesis. 
The technology hypothesis as an explanation for the shift towards more skilled labour lies with 
skill biased technological change (SBTC). This explanation notes that the change in the wage 
structure is attributed to a rise in the demand for skilled labour because new technologies can 
lead to higher productivity. Newly created jobs or newly renovated jobs require workers with 
the right skill intensities (skilled workers) who complement the new technology. This can 
lower wages for other less skilled workers or this can cause job displacement for those 
workers who do not have the right skills to use the new technology (Machin, 2008). More 
recent trends have re-examined the implications of the SBTe hypothesis with the proposition 
of the routinization hypothesis by Autor et al., (2003). This hypothesis provides an explanation 
for the polarization of jobs in many developed countries (Autor et al., 2006; Goos & Manning, 
2(07). It proposes that many middle skill jobs have been lost because technology such as 
computer software can substitute for routine intensive job tasks. Many of these routine 
intensive job tasks are also the most offshorable job tasks (Acemoglu & Autor, 2010; Grossman 
& Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) which have been facilitated by the fall in telecommunication costs. 
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This can have a negative impact on the wages for less skilled labour assuming that the relative 
price effect and the labour supply effect dominate the productivity effect from the trade-in-
tasks model proposed by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008). 
The trade hypothesis relates to increased international trade as the explanation for the rise in 
wage inequality which stems from the Heckscher-Ohlin Model (HO) of international trade as to 
why less skilled workers may have fared less favourably from the benefits of trade compared 
to skilled workers. In terms of a North and South model setting, the HO model assumes the 
North is a relatively skill abundant developed country (e.g. u.S. or U.K.) and the South is a 
relatively labour abundant developing country (e.g. China or India). The HO theorem predicts 
that when two countries move from autarky to free trade, the owners of a country's relatively 
abundant factors gain from free trade but the owners of the scarce factors lose out. This 
theorem predicts that less skilled workers from the North now have to compete with less 
skilled labour from the South within similar industries. Thus, with the influx of cheaper goods 
produced using less skilled workers from the South, this can put downward pressure on their 
wages as there is a shift downwards in the demand for less skilled labour in the North. A 
similar argument can be made for outsourcing; firms in the North outsource their 
intermediate stages of production that are completed by less skilled workers to the South in 
the same industry. This can lead to fall in the demand for less skilled labour in the North and 
put downward pressure on wages. 
Another result from the HO model is the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that is relevant to this 
analysis. This theorem relates relative factor prices to relative product prices through the zero 
profit condition. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that an increase in the relative price 
of a good will increase the real return to the factor used intensively in the production of that 
good and will decrease the return to the other factor. This theorem implies that when the 
North moves from autarky to free trade, the fall in trade costs with the removal of trade 
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barriers will raise the relative price for the skilled intensive good in the North, which implies a 
higher wage premium for skilled worker. 
The empirical evidence from the trade hypothesis is mixed. While the HO model provides 
coherent and testable explanations for the potential rise in wage inequality over time, 
Desjonqueres et 0/., (1999) and Berman et 0/., (1998) find the predictions from the HO model 
are at odds with the data and Machin (2010) notes the observed trends are better explained 
by technology variables in favour of the S8TC hypothesis. 
First, according to the trade based explanation from the HO model, we should observe an 
increase in the relative demand for skilled labour in the North that can be the result from an 
increase in specialisation resulting from shifts in the sectoral distribution of employment 
between industries to the skill intensive industries when each country moves towards free 
trade. And with the rise in the relative price of skill, the model predicts there should be a 
within industry shift in employment towards less skilled labour. The empirical evidence from 
Desjonqueres et 0/., (1999) decompose the changes in within-industry employment shares 
from 1981-1991. Their results show most of the shift in employment occurred within 
industries1S was towards skilled labour (skill upgrading). They also found within non-tradable 
sectors such as hotels & restaurants and wholesale & trade, there was an increase in the 
education employment premium - indicating a shift in employment towards skilled workers. 
Desjonqueres et 0/., (1999) conclude their evidence from the within industry shifts is 
consistent with the S8TC hypothesis but is at odds with the HO trade theory. 
Second, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that if wage inequality were to increase in a 
developed country through its impact on domestic product prices, the price of the skilled 
intensive products relative to unskilled intensive products should increase when trade takes 
15 Earlier work by Sennan et al., (1994) also show that the Increase in the reIatNe demand for slcilled labour occurred within 
industries rather than across industries. 
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place16• Empirically, researchers have tried to establish whether rising wage inequality is the 
result of the North experiencing a fall in prices for unskilled intensive products relative to 
skilled intensive products (Slaughter, 1999). Using product price regressions17, authors Leamer 
(1998) and Baldwin & Cain (1997) found the relative product prices for unskilled intensive 
sectors fell during the 1970s for the U.S. However, Bhagwati (1991), Lawrence & Slaughter 
(1993), Leamer (1998) and Baldwin & Cain (1997) find no clear trend in relative prices during 
the 1980s. This evidence is not consistent with the trade based explanation. 
Feenstra & Hanson (1996, 1999, and 2003) take another stance to find support for the trade 
hypothesis by noting that trade in intermediates might be responsible for the increase in the 
skill premium. This is because trade in intermediates differs from trade in final goods. They 
note that a substantial part of the increase in international trade might be associated with a 
vertical disintegration of production processes within industry (i.e. offshoring). Offshoring 
raises the demand for skilled labour in the North because firms within industry offshore the 
relatively less skill intensive stages of production to foreign labour markets. The relative 
demand for labour is not only affected in import competing industries, but in all industries that 
use foreign inputs. Thus, offshore outsourcing may affect the relative demand for labour 
between industries but also within industries. 
Feenstra & Hanson (1995) estimate product price regressions to explore the impact of 
offshoring on wage bill shares for skilled and non-skilled workers. They compute a broad 
material offshoring18 measure for 450 manufacturing industries for the period 1979-1987, 
where skilled and non-skilled workers are proxied by non-production and production workers. 
16 Deardorff (1994) provides a survey describing the many theoretical statements for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 
17 Slaughter (2000) provides a review of nine papers that have explored the impact of trade and technology contributing towards 
increased wage inequality using product price regressions. The majority of the empirical studies have used the correlation version 
of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Product price regressions consist of changes in goods prices that are regressed on share-
weighted changes in the prices of their inputs (that is the factor prices for labour and capital). Under zero-profit conditions, the 
coeffICients reflect the implied change in factor prices followint the change in industry prices. Thls approach implements a 
general equilibrium framework to test the Stolper-Samuelson theorem from the HO model using industry level data. 
18 Broad offshoring measures the values of all Imported Intermediate inputs of an Industry. Narrow offshoring measures the 
value of intermediate inputs that are purchased from the same Industry as the goods being produced; this captures the idea of 
production being transferred abroad that could have been produced by a domestic firm. 
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Their results show the growth in imports as measured by broad material offshoring accounted 
for 15%-33% of the rise in the share of non-production labour costs. These results are further 
confirmed by their 1996 paper which found offshoring accounted for 31%-51.3% of the rise in 
the non-production labour's share of the wage bill for the period 1972-1992. Similarly, Becker 
et al., (2008) examine the onshore composition of job tasks to skill levels within German 
MNEs. They found offshoring predicts an increase in the wage-bill shares for high-skilled 
labour. 
In another paper, Feenstra & Hanson (1999) study the impact of offshoring and technology on 
U.S. wage inequality. This paper endogenise prices and total factor productivity (TFP is the 
measure for technology) in a two stage mandated-wage approach19• They to not estimate 
product price regressions because they argue the conventional price regressions approach is 
fully specified; they become an identity, which can no longer be used to make inferences 
about the implied factor price changes. In the first stage of the mandated-wage approach, 
industry prices and TFP are regressed onto the expenditure on computers and offshorinro. 
And in the second stage, the estimated coefficients from the structural variables from the first 
stage are then used in the second stage as the dependent variable in the mandated wage 
regressions (see Slaughter (2000) and Baldwin (2008) for a detailed synopsis on this method). 
Feenstra & Hanson (1999) find offshoring has sizable effects on wage inequality in the U.S. 
They find offshoring can explain about 11% to 15.2% rise in the wage bill share of skilled 
labour, whilst expenditure on computers can explain up to 31.5% of the increase in the wage 
bill share. 
19 The mandated wage regression approach is a method that has been built upon the contributions of Jones (1965). Hilton (1984). 
Leamer (1995, 1998) and Baldwin & Cain (1997, 2000). This framework interprets the estimated coefficients on the factor shares 
in an equation as "mandated- changes in factor costs that are compatible with zero profit conditions in the presence of changes in 
product prices and technology. 
20 Expenditure on computers and offshoring are known as the structural variables. 
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Third, the HO model predicts that wage inequality should fall in developing countries because 
the North experiences a relative supply increase in skilled labour. Oesjonqueres et 01., (1999) 
find the changes in the relative employment shares of non-production to production workers 
rose for a number of developing countries within industries, which should lead to an increase 
in wage inequality. Additionally, Wood (1997) finds an increase in wage differentials in Latin 
America from the mid-1980s onwards. See further evidence outlined by Milner et 01., (2005). 
The fact that wage premiums are found to increase in the 'South' is at odds with HO model. 
To help explain the rise in the wage premium in the North and the South, Feenstra & Hanson 
(1995) develop a theoretical model of vertical specialisation. The Key point from this model is 
that international outsourcing de-locates unskilled intensive production processes from the 
viewpoint of the North, but these production processes are skilled intensive from the view 
point of the South. This may explain the rise in the skill premium in the North and the South. 
Feenstra & Hanson (1995 & 1997) are able to demonstrate that the within industry shift for 
skilled labour in Mexico have increased due to outsourcing. 
This empirical evidence suggest that the trade hypothesis has little support but the SBTC 
seems to fit the observed trends from the data (Machin, 2008) in explaining the shift in the 
demand for labour towards skilled labour. However, there are two potential caveats: First, 
Oesjonqueres et 01., (1999) and Machin (2008) note that most of the data from the empirical 
studies were based on data prior to 1995 when China started to emerge as a major exporter. 
And second, Acemoglu (2002a, 2002b) notes that trade could partially induce skill biased 
technological change. 
More recent research exploring the impact of offshoring on wages has used individual level 
data using the Mincer wage regression approach. This research was originally explored and 
developed by Mincer (1958, 1962 and 1974), Schultz (1960, 1961) and Becker (1962, 1994) to 
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explore human capital theory. In brief, the human capital theory suggests that individuals who 
invest their time in further education and forgo earnings that could be earned in the labour 
market must be rewarded or compensated with higher earnings levels when they enter the 
labour market with higher skills and qualifications. This is because higher skills and 
qualifications can equate to higher productivity which can be profitable for firms to employ 
and to pay higher wages. On the other hand, screening theory advocated by Arrow (1973) and 
Spence (1973, 1974) suggest that individuals who hold higher degrees and qualifications have 
superior innate abilities and are more productive. The human capital and screening theories 
both note that differences in education levels and decisions to undertake further training can 
lead to differences in wage premiums between skilled and non-skilled workers. In a similar 
vein, Mincer wage regressions can be used to examine the impact offshoring and technology 
can have on wage levels. Specifically, if offshoring enables firms to relocate intermediate 
production processes largely completed by less skilled labour abroad, this relocation can have 
a negative impact on their wage levels. Similarly, technological innovations benefit skilled 
workers because they complement their skills, which should have a positive impact on their 
wage levels but have a negative impact on the wage levels of less skilled workers. This 
approach can be used to quantify the magnitude or the returns to wages from offshoring and 
technology. 
Evidence from the Mincer wage regression approach suggests skilled labour benefit with 
higher wage levels compared to less-skilled labour when firms engage in offshoring; but the 
quantitative impact appears to be small. For instance from Germany, Geishecker & Gorg 
(2oo8a) find a 1% rise in broad and narrow material offshoring intensities lower hourly wage 
levels on average by 0.9% in manufacturing industries. For different skill groups, a 1% rise in 
narrow (broad) offshoring intensity lowers the hourly wage levels for the lowest skill group by 
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1.5% (1.3%). For high-skilled workers, a 1% rise in narrow (broad) offshoring intensity raises 
hourly wage levels by 2.6% (1.9%). 
For the U.K., Geishecker & Garg (2008b) investigate the impact of service and material 
offshoring for male workers employed in manufacturing industries for the period 1992-200421• 
Their results show service and material offshoring lowered the hourly wage levels for workers 
on average by 0.7% and 0.8% from a 1% in service and material offshoring intensity 
respectively. By skill group, a 1% rise in material offshoring intensity lowered the hourly wage 
levels for medium and lower skilled workers by 0.85% and 1.95%. But a 1% rise in service 
offshoring intenSity lowered hourly wage levels for low and medium skilled workers by 1.32% 
and 1.14% respectively. For high-skilled worker, a 1% rise in service offshoring intensity raised 
hourly wage levels by 4.5%. These findings are consistent with the predictions from 
Deardorffs (2005) model. Similar empirical evidence is also reported by Hummels et al., 
(2009) and Munch & Skaksen (2009) for Denmark. Munch & Skaksen (2009) examine the 
impact of domestic and foreign material offshoring on the hourly wage levels for Danish 
manufacturing workers for the period 1993-2002. Their results show domestic offshoring 
raised the hourly wage levels for less skilled labour but foreign outsourcing raised the hourly 
wage levels for skilled labour. They also found male workers appeared to be unaffected by 
foreign outsourcing compared to women, where a 1% rise in foreign outsourcing reduced their 
hourly wage levels by 0.131%. 
However, the impact of offshoring on the wage levels of skilled labour depends on whether 
offshoring takes place to high income countries or to low income countries. Hummels et al., 
(2009) found that an exogenous shock to outsourcing from a low income country depressed 
the wage levels for medium and low skilled workers but raised wages for high-skilled workers. 
However, if the exogenous shock to outsourcing occurred from high income countries, the 
21 This Is the only paper that I have found so far which has examined the Impact of service offshorIng on wace levels; the 
empirical research has so far only examined the impact of material offshorinl. 
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wage levels for medium and low skilled workers rose but depressed the wage levels for high-
skilled workers. Similar evidence is also found by Geishecker et 01., (2007). Their results show 
outsourcing to central and Eastern European countries (CHe) lowered wage levels for skilled 
workers in Germany and the U.K. But if outsourcing took place to non-CEEC, this lowered the 
wage levels for non-skilled workers only in Germany and U.K. For Denmark, outsourcing to 
CEEC's had a negative and significant impact on lowering the wage levels for lower skilled 
workers only. 
The empirical evidence from this section has shown that skilled labour benefit from offshoring 
but less skilled workers suffer lower wage levels. The estimated coefficients show that the 
quantitative impact appears to be quite small at present. This could however change in the 
future. 
2.4.3 Globalisatlon and the Composition of Employment 
2.4.3.1 The Impact on Job Security 
A small selection of papers have explored whether job security as measured by the probability 
of job loss, a job separation and the probability of making a job-to-unemployment transition 
have increased because of offshoring or because of exchange rate v o l a t i l i ~ . . Four papers 
have examined the implications for job security from material offshoring; there are no papers 
which have explored the implications from service offshoring. If job reallocation rates have 
increased, and assuming the job destruction rate is higher than the job creation rate, one 
should find a fall in job security through higher job displacement rates and frequent job to job 
transitions rates. There is however no clear consensus from the literature as to the effects 
offshoring and exchange rate volatility have had on different skill groups; but the empirical 
literature does confirm low skilled workers face greater job insecurity. 
22 This review is limited to Europe and two European countries; to the best of my knowledge there are no papers that have 
explored the job security Implications from offshorlnl for the U.s. 
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The empirical evidence does suggest that the rise in material offshoring intensity and the rise 
in exchange rate volatility have raised the probability of a job separation, but the impact so far 
has been small. For Germany, Geishecker (2008) finds a 1% rise in international outsourcing 
(narrow) in the manufacturing sector leads to a 6% rise in the probability of non-participation 
in the labour market. With a 2.28% rise in international offshoring (narrow) for the period 
1991-2000, this translates to a 13% rise in the probability of non-participation in the labour 
market. Geishecker's (2008) results also show employment security declining with increasing 
duration dependence, meaning longer tenured workers are more likely to exit employment 
due to international outsourcing. Bachmann & Braun (2008) also examine the effects of 
international outsourcing on job security in Germany for the manufacturing and service 
sectors. Their results show jobs security to be greater in the service sector than for the 
manufacturing sector. Their estimates show from a 1% rise in offshoring in the manufacturing 
sector increases the hazard of leaving employment and entering non-employment by 2.6% 
which is a lower estimate compared to Geishecker (2008). Medium skilled workers were 
found to have higher job-to non-employment hazards, but skilled workers in the services 
sectors had the most secure jobs. 
For Denmark, the impact from international outsourcing on job displacement is smaller 
compared to Germany. Munch (2008) finds that a 1% rise in offshoring (broad) raises the job 
separation probability by 0.451%. Additionally, results from a competing risks model found 
offshoring (broad) raises the unemployment risk and lowers the job change hazard rate. 
However, the quantitative impact from offshoring based upon these reported results are 
modest as the impact is analysed over a period of 12 years and not annually. Hummels et al., 
(2009) find doubling the offshoring intensity (material offshoring) increases the job separation 
probability by 5-10%, but the results vary little by skill groups. 
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Exchange rate volatility also has a significant impact on the probability of job displacement. 
The DECO (2oo7b) finds that a depreciation of the industry specific exchange rate (a fall in 
foreign competition) reduces the probability of job-to-unemployment and job-to-non-
employment transitions. With an appreciation in the industry specific exchange rate (a rise in 
foreign competition) raises the job-to-unemployment hazards for workers with job tenure 
under 5 years and it increases the job-to-job hazard for low-tenured and medium skilled 
workers. 
Fenoll (2009) finds that product market competition also raises job insecurity through the 
appointment of temporary work contracts in Spain. Fenol! (2009) reports that a one standard 
deviation increase in international competition measured by the price-cost margin decreases 
the probability that a worker employed on a temporary work contract to be made permanent 
in a given year by more than 40% with a 3% rise in the probability of becoming unemployed. 
There is empirical evidence on the other hand which shows product market competition does 
raise the employment and wage levels which does signify job security and stability; see 
Nicoletti & Scarpetta (2OOS), Griffith et 01., (2007) and Fiori et 01., (2008) for empirical country-
level analysiS on the incidence of product market competition on employment and wages. But 
the evidence from Fenoll (2009) relates specifically to the labour market poliCies pursued by 
Spain; these results cannot be generalised to other countries. 
Has offshoring lead to a fall in the demand for labour that could signify there has been a rise in 
job insecurity? The answer is no; the change to the employment level has been small and 
limited to less skilled labour. This empirical evidence is reviewed below, which shows this 
evidence mirrors the empirical evidence from studies that have examined the impact of 
offshoring and exchange rate volatility on the probability of becoming unemployed/not 
participating in the labour market from this section. 
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2.4.3.2 The Impact on the Employment Level 
The impact that offshoring has had on the demand for labour has been summarised in vast 
detail by Bottini et 01" (2007) and Crino (2009a). The general findings from Bottini et 01" 
(2007) indicate material offshoring has lead to a fall in the demand for less skilled workers, 
where the effects of material offshoring have also lowered the probability of staying in the 
manufacturing sectors: Anderton et 01., (2002) found material offshoring lowered the 
employment level and wage bill shares for low skilled labour for the U.K., U.S. Sweden and 
Italy. Similarly, for the European Union, Falk & Wolfmayr (2005) found imported intermediate 
inputs from low-wage countries had a significant negative impact on total employment and for 
less skilled labour. For Sweden, Ekholm & Hakkala (2008) found offshoring of intermediate 
inputs to low-income countries shifted labour away from workers with an intermediate level 
of education and towards workers with a high level of education. But offshoring to high 
income countries had the opposite impact. Ekholm & Hakkala (2008) report no evidence of 
any particular shift in the employment level for workers with the lowest education level from 
offshoring, but R&D intensity was found to shift labour demand away from workers with the 
lowest education level towards workers with the highest education level. 
Whilst there have been job losses for less skilled workers, the number of job losses appear to 
be small as other researchers have found offshoring to have had little impact on the demand 
for labour. Castellani et 01" (2008) found no evidence of a fall in the employment level for 
Italy, but there was some evidence of skill-upgrading when offshoring occurred to Eastern 
European countries. Marin (2004) found vertical FDI towards Eastern Europe lead to a small 
number of job losses in source countries. Hijzen & Swaim (2007) found offshoring within the 
same industry reduced the labour demand intensity of production but it did not affect the 
overall industry employment level. They report inter-industry offshoring had no impact on 
labour demand intensity, which could possibly have a positive impact on industry 
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employment. The authors' interpret their results to suggest the productivity gains from 
offshoring could be large enough to offset job losses due to production relocation from 
material offshoring. The only paper not to report similar trends is by Ando & Kimura (2007). 
They found material offshoring to East Asia from Japan lead to higher employment only in 
manufacturing firms. 
Head et al., (2007) note the scope for job displacement from service offshoring could rise over 
time, although there is at present limited evidence. Bottini et al., (2007) and Crino (2009a) 
suggest the impact from service offshoring on total employment has also been small where 
the impact essentially depends on the skill intensities within service jobs. They note that the 
shift in the composition of the work force has benefited highly skilled labour. Amiti & Wei 
(2005,2006) find a small change in the composition of employment for U.K. sectors engaged 
in service offshoring were found not to have slower job growth rates compared to non-
outsourcing sectors. For the u.s. manufacturing sectors, offshoring of service inputs had little 
impact on the employment level. Garg & Hanley (2005) found the impact of service and 
material offshoring had a negative impact on plant-level labour demand for the Irish 
electronics sector where the impact was stronger from outsourcing materials than from 
outsourcing services. But Van Welsum & Reif (2006) found no evidence of a fall in the 
employment level for 14 OECD countries from service offshoring. Hijzen et al., (2007b) report 
the offshoring of intermediate service inputs in the U.K. did not destroy jobs; the import of 
intermediate services lead to faster employment growth compared to firms that did not 
engage in service offshoring. These findings imply the demand for labour and the probability 
of becoming unemployed/out of the labour force has been small because offshoring can 
create jobs in addition to the jobs that are destroyed. Thus, the impact on the employment 
level is small at present but this could change in the future. 
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There are few papers that have explored the impact of service offshoring on the composition 
of white-collar employment in light of the fact that many high-skilled service sector jobs such 
in radiology and accountancy are potentially at risk from being offshored because of 
technological advancements. First, Liu & Trefler (2008) examined the effects of service 
offshoring from China and India had on the wage levels and job security for U.S. white-collar 
workers. They found service offshoring had no significant impact on labour income losses for 
high school educated workers or for college educated workers. Service offshoring also had a 
limited impact on the probability of switching industries and occupations for the different 
education groups. Crina (2009c) examined the change in the skill structure of labour demand 
for the U.S. resulting from service offshoring for the period 1997-2002. Crina estimated the 
elasticity of demand with respect to service offshoring for each occupation; each of these 
estimate were then used to evaluate the impact of service offshoring upon broad aggregates 
of occupations with high, medium and low levels of education attainment. Crina's results 
showed service offshoring raised the relative demand for high-skilled white collar workers and 
reduced the demand for medium and low skilled white collar employment by a relatively small 
margin. Crina (2007) also reports similar results for the European Union for the period 1990-
2004. Further analysis by Crina (2010) finds service offshoring did not affect the employment 
level for workers employed within Italian firms that engaged in service offshoring but service 
offshoring did change the composition of the workforce in favour of high-skilled workers. 
Whilst the main focus from the literature has primarily centred upon the number of jobs that 
could potentially be lost due to offshoring, few papers have sort to explore the flip side of 
offshoring - that is the Hinshoring" of services. Inshoring refers to the opposite process of 
offshoring, where firms located outside of Britain relocate their operations to firms located in 
Britain (Kirkegaard et al., 2(06). Inshoring will be in line with a developed country's 
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comparative advantage. There is empirical evidence from two papers that have explored 
offshoring and inshoring effects on employment and wage levels for Denmark and the u.s. 
For Denmark, Kirkegaard et 01., (2006) found the employment effects of offshoring and 
inshoring were limited to less than 1 percent of all jobs lost to offshoring or gained by 
inshoring. They also report inshoring was concentrated among highly skilled and specialised 
job functions, whilst medium skilled administrative jobs, customer relations and trade 
functions experienced both job inshoring and outflow. For the U.S., Liu & Trefler (2008) found 
the net effects from offshore outsourcing and inshoring were positive. However the effects 
had a tendency to be negative for workers without a college degree or for less-skilled white-
collar jobs. 
2.4.3.3 Material Offshorlng vs. Service Offshoring: Does It Matter? 
Should It matter that job are being lost because materials are being offshored compared to 
services? Much of the literature that has been reviewed in this section has provided evidence 
from material offshoring; there are few papers which have explored the impact from service 
offshoring. However, going back to the question, whether it should matter if materials are 
being offshored compared to services, the simple answer is: No it should not matter. This 
answer is based on a u.S. policy brief published by Jensen & Kletzer (2008). Their policy brief 
makes a number of important points for the U.S., but these points should also be important 
for the U.K. This brief makes two key points from economic theory. The first relates to the 
law of comparative advantage, which suggests that whilst the number of jobs that could be 
offshored from the U.S. to low-wage and labour abundant countries could amount to 15-20 
million jobs, many of the jobs (about 40 percent) from the manufacturing sector have long 
been considered to be at risk. About one-third of the jobs are estimated to be at risk of being 
offshored from tradable service activities. 
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The second key point is the u.s. is a net exporter of services; therefore there should be gains 
for high skill and high wage jobs through the export of services, which is in line with U.S. 
comparative advantage as it is a high-skilled capital intensive country. The U.S. also maintains 
a significant manufacturing presence of high-skilled capital intensive goods such as medical 
and scientific equipment. This is consistent with U.S. comparative advantage where 
manufacturing activities have moved towards skill intensive products and capital intensive 
production techniques. The risk to jobs depends on whether firms within industries face 
import competition. Jobs are less likely to be at risk if firms within industries face little import 
competition. Import competition from low income countries is less likely to be a concern 
within industries that are capital intensive. Jensen (2009) notes that workers employed within 
the apparel industry are more likely to face competition from low-income countries and are 
less likely to export. By contrast, the aircraft building industry is less likely to face competition 
from low-income countries and they are more export intensive. There is likely to be a similar 
trend that also determines the number of jobs that could potentially be lost in the future 
within the service sectors. Thus, it does not matter whether jobs are lost because of material 
offshoring or service offshoring, the evidence from by Jensen & Kletzer (2008) and Jensen 
(2009) suggest job creation and destruction is dependent on the nature of comparative 
advantage and the degree of import competition that is faced by industries from low income 
countries. 
The main point from this policy brief is there is evidence of a pattern between material 
offshoring and service offshoring. The trend for the manufacturing sector may be an indicator 
as to which jobs may be lost within the service sector. For the manufacturing sector, many 
low skill jobs have been offshored and a similar pattern is expected for the service sector. The 
authors' expect many jobs will be at risk from tradable service activities which are relatively 
low-skilled and with low pay. Higher skilled and higher wage jobs remain to be a source of 
potential exports for the U.S. However jobs which may be composed of these higher-skilled 
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activities may be at risk in the future if there is a process that enables knowledge capital such 
as 'know how' to be invested in developing countries. These countries will then be able to 
challenge the comparative advantage of developed countries in the future. 
2.4.4 Kaleidoscopic Comparative Advantage 
There is at present very little evidence for the Bhagwati-Dehejia hypothesis (thereafter 
referred to as BDH). Davidson & Matusz (2008) suggest there is some support for some 
elements from the hypothesis, but more research is needed to explore the other implications 
from the hypothesis. Empirical evidence from Beaulieu et 01., (2004) found trade volatility can 
lead to greater labour turnover and greater jobless spells for less skilled workers in canada. 
They also found mixed evidence for less skilled workers having less skill accumulation 
compared to skilled workers, which is one of the predictions from the BDH. However, 
Davidson & Matusz (2008) doubt the rise in labour turnover is linked to globalisation. A 
second caveat with this theory relates to skilled workers having greater transferability of 
workplace acquired skills to other jobs than less skilled workers. Davidson & Matusz (2008) 
note that whilst this is a valid assumption which they have made within their own work, other 
researchers argue that this assumption may not be true in all cases. They provide the example 
of auto-workers as high wage workers having acquired specific skills within the auto-industry. 
These skills mayor may not transfer to other high-wage sectors of the economy. Further 
empirical research is required to determine whether there is empirical support for this 
assumption. 
2.4.5 Footloose Multinationals and Offshorina 
MNEs are termed footloose because of their ability to change the geography of production to 
other plants in other countries. The question is whether job security in foreign owned plants 
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or affiliates is lower because MNEs have greater flexibility in choosing where to locate 
production compared to domestically owned plants? The empirical evidence is not conclusive. 
There is a vast literature that explores the relationship between firm exit and foreign-
ownership of firms. This literature reports the exit of firms from a market is related to its age, 
the industry in which the firms operate and the size of the industry and whether these plants 
export their output. Empirical studies show that plant failure rates decline with plant size, and 
the age of the plant (Dunne et 01., 1988, 1999), and new firms are more likely to fail (Wagner, 
1994; Mata & Portugal, 1994; Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995; and Disney et 01., 2003). Garg & 
Strobl (2003) and Bernard & Sjaholm (2003) find foreign-owned plants by MNEs in Ireland and 
foreign-owned plants in Indonesia were larger compared to domestically owned plants but 
they also had higher exit rates. Similarly, Bernard & Jensen (2007) find u.S. plants that were 
owned by MNEs had higher exit rates even though these plants were larger, older and more 
productive. But Alvarez & Garg (2005) find plants that were part of MNEs that were domestic 
market orientated in Chile were more footloose compared to foreign-owned plants that 
export did not have higher exit rates. 
Having established many foreign owned plants in developed countries have higher exit rates, 
the question is whether workers employed by these plants face greater job turnover and a rise 
in job insecurity. The theoretical literature on firm ownership and job turnover suggests this 
relationship depends on human capital accumulation spillovers and training that is provided by 
foreign-owned firms. Human capital spillovers is defined as spillovers when workers 
accumulate human capital and training from foreign owned plants and then move between 
foreign and domestically owned plants. Fosfur et 01., (2001) note there is little conclusive 
evidence between these spillovers and worker mobility. Glass & Saggi (2002) suggest from 
their theoretical model that job security for workers employed by foreign-owned plants should 
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be high because foreign-owned plants offer workers higher wages to prevent mobility from 
spillovers. 
From empirical evidence, Andrews et al., (2007) find foreign-owned plants in Germany had 
lower plant closure rates and lower job separation rates. When plants were compared by size 
and profitability, they found foreign-owned plants had higher closure and job separation rates 
compared to other plants. But these results were found to be small and not indicative of job 
security and job stability being substantially lower from these plants. They conclude that 
globalisation has not lead to an insecure labour market - at least for Germany. 
Becker & Muendler (2008) also find secure jobs for German workers employed in plants 
owned by MNEs. Using a linked employer-employee data set they examine how a foreign 
expansion (FDI) affects domestic employment and job security. They found outward FDI 
expansion retains more domestic jobs, which are secure and not disrupted by trade compared 
to employment in domestic plants. They note that the job destruction rate would have been 
greater had the expansion not taken place. They also suggest that outward FDI activity raises 
domestic-worker job retention, more amongst highly educated workers. They conclude that 
FDI expansion may present attractive career paths for domestic workers which may reduce job 
losses and it provides better job security (Prendergast, 1999). Similarly, the empirical evidence 
reviewed by (rino (2oo9a) shows that whilst domestic and foreign workers are substitutes in 
the MNEs technology, the strength of the relationship is weak. The nature of substitution 
depends on whether each group of workers are substitutes or complementary to each other in 
the production process and the nature of this relationship depends on the type of FDI 
investment. 
The substitutability between domestic and foreign labour is found to be driven by affiliate 
firms to MNEs in high-income countries, which results from horizontal FDI that has two 
purposes: (1) to serve the domestic market and (2) to try to avoid trade barriers and 
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transportation costs in the foreign market. The substitutability is found to be much weaker 
with respect to employment in affiliate firms in low income countries, which are the result 
from vertical FDI. The empirical evidence reviewed by Crino (2009a) also shows that 
substitutability can switch to complementarity between foreign and domestic labour in the 
long run because of the substantial costs involved in achieving optimal levels of employment 
in foreign labour markets - see Crino (2009a) for further details. 
So far this literature review has shown there is very little evidence to suggest job security is 
lower in MNEs23. But Scheve & Slaughter (2004) find a negative relationship between FDI 
undertaken by MNEs and lower perceived economic security for workers in the U.K. One 
important implication from this latter study is that higher rates of FDI should raise the 
elasticity of labour demand for less skilled workers from developed countries because their 
skills are substitutable compared to skilled labour. This evidence is reviewed in the following 
section. 
2.4.6 The Elasticity of Labour Demand 
The OECD (2007a) notes that the elasticity of labour demand has increased over time, raising 
the potential substitutability of domestic workers with foreign labour. This can increase job 
insecurity because workers are substitutable with foreign labour which implies domestic 
workers can lose their jobs if firms decide to shift their intermediate stages of production 
overseas. Additionally, this rise in the own wage elasticity of labour demand can raise job 
23 The lack of evidence between job security and job mobility Is also supported by studies which have examined the impact of 
offshoring and MNE activity on employment. Empirical reviews by Mankiw & Swage! (2006a), Ebenste!n «DI., (2009) and CrinG 
(2009a) suggest offshorlng and MNE activity does not have a conclusive impact on employment because the evidence is mixed. 
Research from the U.S. by Borga (200s), Desai et 01., (200Sa,b), and Slaughter (2003) find the expansion of U.s. multinationals 
activities abroad stimulated job growth within the dornestic labour market. But other research by Brainard and Riker (2001), 
Hanson et 0/., (2003), Muendler and Becker (2009), Harrison and McMillan (2009) and Harrison et 01., (2007) found jobs abroad do 
replace domestic jobs; but these numbers have been small. Harrison & McMillan (2006) explored the employment changes 
between parent and affiliates for the U.S. Their results showed jobs from low-wage countries were substitutes for U.S. jobs, but 
jobs from high-income countries were complementary to U.S. jobs. Their analysis also showed vertical FDI was associated with 
lower employment within the u.s. regardless of whether the destination country was a high or low income country. Manlciw & 
Swagel (2006a) note offshoring will create winners and losers, where there is evidence for job dislocation, but net jobs can be 
created within the dornestic and foreign labour markets. Their review condudes outsourcing and generally foreign activity has 
been associated with increased employment for the U.S. and where, 'foreign activity does not crowd out domestic activity; the 
reverse is true' . 
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instability because firms can threaten workers with the potential destruction of their jobs if 
they do not accept lower wages to keep their jobs. 
The empirical evidence reviewed below from firm level and industry level studies show the 
rise in the own wage elasticity of labour demand has become more elastic for less skilled 
workers, whilst the own wage elasticity of labour demand has remained unchanged for skilled 
labour over the 1980s and 1990s. The evidence suggests that the rise in the elasticity of 
labour demand for less skilled workers is due to globalisation and trade. Globalisation and 
trade in many of the developed countries has enabled firms to access many more markets for 
goods and services but also for labour as ICT innovations and the fall in transportation costs 
have allowed firms to offshore their intermediate stages of production. Policy changes to 
labour market institution towards greater labour market flexibility have also contributed to 
this rise, although this evidence is limited to Europe and requires further empirical research. 
Firm-level studies have sought to explore whether labour demand elasticities are greater 
within MNEs due to greater access to productions networks compared to domestically owned 
plants. Fabbri et al., (2003) estimated manufacturing wide-elasticities for production workers 
in the U.S. and U.K. were unity in absolute value by the mid 198Os. They found that the labour 
demand elasticities had become more elastic over the 1990s as MNE activities expanded 
within both countries. 
From European evidence, Garg et al., (2009) also found workers employed by MNEs had 
higher labour demand elasticities compared to domestic plants for the Republic of Ireland. 
However, Barba Naveretti et al., (2003) found workers employed by MNEs had less elastic 
labour demand elasticities than workers employed by domestic firms for eleven European 
countries, whilst Hakkala et al., (2007) found wage elasticities did not differ for different types 
of firms from Sweden. 
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The industry level evidence has tried to estimate the change in the absolute value of the own 
wage elasticities of labour demand over time from globalisation and trade. Slaughter (2001) 
found the elasticity of labour demand for production workers became more elastic for 5 out of 
8 manufacturing industries in the U.S. The absolute elasticity was approximately 0.5 in 1975 
and by 1991, the absolute value of the elasticity had increased to 1.0 for production workers. 
For non-production workers, the elasticity of labour demand remained less elastic across all 
industries where estimates ranged from -0.5 and -0.8. The overall impact from trade is 
however only significant with the inclusion of industry fixed effects and it disappears with the 
inclusion of time controls. Slaughter (2001) reports that the time series of labour demand 
elasticities for both types of labour are largely explained by time. 
Senses (2006) found U.S. manufacturing plants operating in industries that heavily outsourced 
unskilled labour experienced a rise in the conditional labour demand elasticities for the 1980-
1992 period. The absolute value for the own-wage elasticity of labour demand was 0.2-0.7 
from 1980-1987, and stable at 0.80 by the 1988-1990 period. Post 1990, the absolute value of 
the elasticity was 1.2 by 1992, but it declined In absolute value to 0.6 by 1995. Senses (2006) 
notes the decline in labour demand elasticities from industries which engage in offshore 
outsourcing may be the result from a decline in the share of unskilled labour which may 
dominate the outsourcing effect. 
For European countries, Bruno et ai, (2004) estimated labour demand elasticities via the 
substitution effect for six European countries including Japan and the U.S. Their analysis found 
that import penetration raised the elasticity of labour demand for the U.K., but the elasticity 
did not increase for all countries in absolute terms. 
Riihimaki (2005) found increased European integration intensified trade competition in Finland 
which then raised the labour demand elasticity for the period 1975-2002. For production 
worker the elasticity was -0.65 by the end of the 1990s. For non-production workers, the 
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elasticity did not decline, but remained stable at -0.5 over the same period. The estimated 
scale effect on the labour demand elasticities was greater for production workers. Their paper 
also found firms which had better advantages from economies of scale decreased the 
elasticity of substitution between differentiated products. Additionally, Riihimaki (2005) notes 
that if increased integration leads to a rise in input substitutability and/or outsourcing, this 
could cause labour demand elasticities to become more elastic. Similarly, Molnar et 01., (2007) 
found outward FOI from manufacturing sectors with strong commercial links to non-OECD 
countries had increased the long-run wage elasticity of labour demand. For the service sector 
there was no evidence. 
Finally, Hijzen & Swaim (2008) found intensive offshoring (material) had lead to an average 
labour demand elasticity that was 30-40% larger in absolute value than the counter-factual 
elasticity for a large sample of OECO countries. This study also found EP policies had 
weakened the link between offshoring and higher labour demand elasticities. Countries which 
employed strict EP policies lead to less elastic labour demand elasticities. The results from this 
study therefore suggests that job security implications from offshoring essentially depends on 
the generosity of EP policies; jobs would be much more stable and secure if EP policies were 
2.4.7 Job Polarization 
The empirical evidence for job polarization is well documented for many developed countries: 
for Britain (Goos & Manning, 2003, 2007), the U.S. (Autor et 01., 2006; Acemoglu & Autor, 2010 
& forthcoming); for Germany (Black & Spitz- Oener, 2007; Dustmann et 01., 2010) and for a 
number of European countries (Goos et 01., 2008, 2009a,b & 2010). They show a simultaneous 
24 Similar evidence has also been found by Hasan et al., (2007); they found labour demand elasticities became more elastic after 
reforms lead to greater trade liberallsatlon in India. Labour demand elasticities were found to be less elastic for industries within 
states that were protected from the reforms. The labour demand elasticities were found to be more elastic within states that 
offered weak employment protection against greater trade reforms. 
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growth in employment for high-wage high-skill occupations such as managers, professional 
and technical occupations and for low wage occupations in personal service occupations that 
involve helping and caring for others. But employment shares in middling jobs in 
manufacturing and routine service jobs have declined over time, thus raising job and labour 
market insecurity for these workers. 
A number of papers have sought to examine which skill groups are most affected by job 
polarisation and how they vary by personal level characteristics. Spitz-Oener (2006) reports 
analytical and interactive job task inputs are most associated with workers with high 
educational qualifications. For workers with medium level qualifications are associated with 
all job tasks. And workers with low educational qualifications are most associated with routine 
manual and cognitive job tasks and non-routine manual job tasks. Black & Spitz-Oener (2007 
& 2010) find job polarization was more pronounced for women compared to men; the 
employment share in middle occupations shrunk by 52% for females compared to 23% for 
men. Similar evidence is also documented by Acemoglu & Autor (2010 & forthcoming) for the 
U.S. 
With the hallowing out of the employment level for routine intensive occupations, workers 
have allocated themselves to high-skilled jobs and to low-skilled jobs. Yet the transfer of 
workers to these abstract and manual intensive occupations at the extreme ends of the skill 
distribution depends on age and education levels. Autor & Oorn (2009) found a fall in the 
share of employment in commuting zones which specialised in occupations intensive in 
routine job tasks from 1980 to 2005 in the U.S. The hallowing out of employment primarily 
generated movement towards low-skill non-routine jobs situated towards the bottom tail of 
the skill distribution. Their results showed prime-aged and older workers obtained 
employment within low-skilled non-routine jobs and workers aged 16-29 years obtained 
employment in high-skilled jobs towards the upper tail of the wage distribution. Further 
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analyses by educational qualifications found college educated workers were able to obtain 
high and low-skilled, non-routine jobs, but high-skilled jobs situated at the top end of the skill 
distribution were concentrated amongst young college educated workers. Thus, there is 
scope for job insecurity for displaced workers from routine-intensive occupations. 
The effects of job polarization can also vary by personal characteristics such as race and 
immigration. Peri & Sparber (2007) present a simple model where the immigration of foreign 
born low-skilled labour specialise in occupations that require manual job tasks such as 
cleaning, cooking or building work. The immigration of foreign born nationals causes native 
born workers to reallocate their labour supply as they have better knowledge of local 
networks, rules, customs and language proficiency that they pursue jobs that require 
interactive job tasks such as coordination, organisation, and communication. Autor & Handel 
(2009) report the job tasks completed by workers with similar levels of education were related 
to race, gender and language proficiency. They found female workers carried out far fewer 
analytical job tasks and far more interpersonal and routine job tasks than equally educated 
male workers. By race, black workers were found to perform a disproportionate number of 
interpersonal job tasks. And by language, Spanish language workers carried out fewer analytic 
and interpersonal job tasks and substantially more repetitive, physical and cognitive job tasks 
compared to equally educated worker within similar occupations. 
The key question for the job polarization hypothesis has been whether technology and 
globalization have contributed towards the polarization of employment which can raise job 
insecurity. Recent cross country empirical evidence shows job polarization is driven by ICT 
developments. Two pieces of research provide evidence. First, Michaels et 01., (2010) use 
industry level data from 11 countries (U.S., Japan and nine European countries) between 1980 
and 2004. They found industries within countries that had faster growth of ICT lead to an 
increase in relative demand for highly skilled educated workers and a bigger fall in the relative 
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demand for middle skilled workers (workers employed in routine-intensive occupations). They 
found technology accounted for up to a quarter of the growth in the demand for college 
educated workers since 1980. They also found trade openness to be associated with job 
polarization, but once the role of technology was accounted for, trade openness had no 
significant impact on job polarization. 
The second piece of research comes from Goos et 01., (2010). They found the routiniztion 
hypothesis proposed by Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003) to be the single most important factor 
explaining the shifts in the employment structure of 16 European countries. They also found 
some evidence to show offshoring can explain job polarization, although its impact is much 
smaller than the routinization hypothesis. 
So far, the empirical evidence has shown the decline in middling jobs has been facilitated by 
ICT developments. There is research from Bloom et 01., (2009) which shows that although 
technology may explain the polarization of employment in middling jobs, technology may have 
been facilitated by globalisation. Bloom et 01., (2009) examine the impact of the growth of 
Chinese import competition on technical change (measured by IT, patent counts and citations, 
TFP and R&D) for over 200,000 European firms. They found that once China entered the 
World Trade Organization, import competition from China led to both within firm technology 
upgrading by industry and between firm reallocation of employment towards more 
technology intensive plants. This innovation was an attempt to move up the value chain. 
They estimate that between 2000 and 2007, 15%-20% of technology upgrading in Europe can 
be explained as responses to Chinese import competition. This evidence shows that job 
polarization has been driven by ICT which has in part been facilitated by globalisation. This 
evidence also shows technology upgrading on the part of firms have created jobs that require 
skilled labour. This may explain why skilled labour has benefited more from technological 
improvements compared to non-skilled labour. But this could change in the future. 
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2.4.8 The Impact of Policy on Labour Market Security 
From sections 2.2 and 2.3, the extensions to the Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) equilibrium 
unemployment framework showed different labour market policies can affect the rate of job 
creation and destruction. Generous UI and strict EP policies encourage labour market security 
as the former policy provides insurance against the loss of labour income and the latter policy 
ensures job security because it protects workers from losing their jobs (Mortensen & 
Pissarides, 1999). These policies reduce the sensitivity to job destruction as firms are not able 
to adjust their demand for labour to their profit maximising level when a structural shock 
occurs due to firing restrictions. Government regulations may present firms with high 
adjustment costs if workers are made redundant, thus firms forgo the adjustment. The down 
side to these policies are, if redundant workers are not laid off to reduce the costs of 
production, abnormal profits could deteriorate, where some firms may accumulate losses up 
to the point where they could become bankrupt. These policies may ensure jobs last longer 
and preserve labour market security among existing firms in response to structural changes in 
tastes and technology. But jobs will eventually be destroyed later on where the least efficient 
firms most affected by the structural changes go out of business (Moser et 01., 2010; Cahuc & 
Zylberberg, 2006). Thus, UI and EP poliCies are favourable if they reduce the rate of job 
destruction more than they reduce the rate of job creation. 
These policies can also prolong unemployment spells for workers who have become displaced 
because it prevents firms from adjusting labour demand in response to structural changes; this 
will discourage job creation. This is because insider workers benefit from higher wages and 
secure jobs whilst outsider workers face slower job reallocation prospects. The resulting 
unemployment spells are less frequent compared to the deployment of weak EP and less 
generous UI policies. 
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The effect these labour market institutions can have on labour market security varies by 
country to country because different countries have different policies; this will therefore have 
a different effect on labour market security. But reforms to UI and EP policies which 
encourage greater labour market flexibility may potentially lead to an increase in labour 
market insecurity over time. The forth coming paragraphs discusses the empirical evidence 
which examine the impact of UI and EP policies on employment and unemployment levels and 
the effect EP and UI policy reforms may potentially have upon labour market security. 
2.4.8.1 UI and EP Policies 
Addison & Teixeira (2003) and the OECD (2004) provide comprehensive literature reviews 
which show the impact of EP policies on employment and unemployment varies widely across 
studies. These two papers provide an in-depth analysis of EP poliCies which the reader is 
referred to for further details. The main findings from the literature shows the generosity of 
EP policies lower employment rates25 (Lazear, 1990; Nickell, 1997) and with significant union 
coverage, this policy raises the unemployment rate and the average jobless duration in 
response to adverse macroeconomic shocks as EP policies reduce both job creation and 
destruction (OECD, 1993; Scarpetta, 1996; Nicoletti & Scarpetta, 2001; Belot & Van Ours, 
2000,2004; Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2006). They also have a tendency to create a dual labour 
marketd where 'insider' workers maintain higher wages and secure jobs. This is at the 
expense of 'outsider' workers who become stuck with less secure jobs which may be 
temporary with low pay (OECD, 2004) and with low job reallocation prospects. However, 
many of these findings are based upon static measures of EP policy indicators. When time-
varying measures for EP and UI policy indicators are employed to account for reforms to 
labour market institutions, there is evidence showing little change to the employment and 
unemployment rates in association with macroeconomic shocks (Blanchard & Wolfers, 2000). 
25 Many workers may abandon job search as EP policies protect exlstll1I jobs and prolongs the duration of unemployment. These 
workers may leave the labour market and become inactive; thus the employment rate falls. 
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Similarly, empirical studies show generous unemployment compensation lowers job search 
intensity and prolongs unemployment duration (for the U.S.: Katz & Meyer, 1990; Newton & 
Rosen, 1979; Moffitt & Nicholson, 1982; for the U.K.: Nickell 1979a, 1979b; for canada: Ham & 
Rea, 1987 and for Germany: Hunt, 1995). This is because Ullowers the cost of unemployment 
and discourages the relative incentives of paid employment as workers raise their reservation 
wage levels as leisure is untaxed ( M o o i - R e ~ i i & Mills, 2008; Devine & Kiefer, 1991; Holmlund, 
1998; Nickell 1997; Narendranathan et 01., 1985; Johnson & layard, 1986). This can lead to 
negative productivity, loss of human capital and a sluggish economy ( M o o i - R e ~ i i & Mills, 2008; 
Abbring et al., 2005; Arulampalam et 01., 2000; Belzil, 1995; Narendranathan & Elias, 1993; 
Heckman & Borjas, 1980). Benefit restrictions may lead to shorter spells of unemployment 
duration near towards the month of benefit exhaustion, where there is a subsequent rise in 
job search intensity (van Ours & Vodopivec, 2006; Katz & Meyer, 1990; card & Levine, 2000; 
Carling et al., 1996; RQ)ed & Zhang, 2003). 
However, job search theory assumes that unemployed job seekers may require time to find 
jobs which match their skills and the UI acts to cover search costs (Mortensen, 1977; Devine & 
Kiefer, 1991; Lippman & Mccall, 1979). This lowers the opportunity cost of job search and 
allows time for job search that is for lithe right job" (Burdett, 1979), which may smooth 
income risks and consumption variability (Acemoglu & Shimer, 2000). Less generous UI 
benefits may not encourage good job searches as workers may be forced to accept jobs that 
are of lower quality which may not suit their skills if benefit payments are low. This may not 
be a sign of great efficiency and the quality of the resulting job matches may be low, which 
may do nothing to raise the quality and quantity of goods and services produced from 
production (cahuc & Zylberberg, 2(06). M o o i - R e ~ i i & Mills (2008) point to evidence which 
suggests generous UI can accelerate economic recovery after unemployment as it improves 
job matching and it additionally heightens earnings after re-employment for certain groups of 
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workers (Belzil, 1995; Burgess & Kingston, 1976; DiPrete, 2002; DiPrete & McManus, 1996; 
Gangl, 2004). Research by Acemoglu & Shimer (2000) showed the U.S. suffered low 
productivity with low unemployment and low quality job matches from short job searches 
during the 1990s. Simulations from their paper reveal that if UI payments were slightly more 
generous and unemployment duration was slightly longer, this would have been beneficial for 
workers to search for better jobs which matched their skills. Their results also indicate that 
better job matches would have led to higher productivity in work, where this could have 
increased the overall production of goods and services in the long-run. Similarly, Gangl (2004) 
reports UI protects workers against earnings losses, downward occupational mobility and from 
entering unstable employment. Pollman-Schult & Buchel (2005) support these findings by 
showing that whilst lower unemployment rates were achieved in West Germany through a 
reduction in UI, this was at the expense of subsequent job matching and quality. 
However, generous UI and strict EP policies can come at a cost of 'eurosclerosis'. Eurosclerosis 
was a term coined to describe European patterns of high unemployment and slow job creation 
with periods of slow economic growth during the late 1970s and 198Os. During this same 
period, the U.S. experienced a period of economic expansion accompanied by high job growth. 
Research by Mortensen & Pissarides (1999) shows through calibrated models, the U.S. would 
have experienced European style unemployment during the late 1980s and early 1990s if it 
had employed generous UI and strict EP policies. They also found European unemployment 
was longer but less frequent than for the U.S. and where income inequality was also found to 
be greater in the U.S. than in Europe. Thus, strict EP and generous UI poliCies ensure labour 
market security but they come at the expense of lower economic growth and lower job 
creation rates. This evidence suggests that although EP and UI policies may protect jobs, the 
increased duration of unemployment along with the eventual destruction of existing jobs and 
lower job creation rates has a larger impact upon the economy though lower economic 
growth. 
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2.4.8.2 Recent Policy Reforms in Britain 
The U.K. has pursued a number of UI and EP policy reforms during the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Two of the most recent reforms took place over the latter half of the 199Os. The first policy 
reform relates to EP policy, where the qualifying period to claim unfair dismissal from 
employment was reduced from 24 months to 12 months. This reform was introduced by the 
1999 Unfair Dismissal and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) 
Order. This policy change raises the potential firing costs faced by firms, but lowers the 
probability of becoming unemployed and thus job destruction. This policy ensures job security 
for existing jobs, but it can also lower the rate of job creation. 
The second policy reform was to the unemployment insurance system. Under the old benefit 
system, UI was paid to workers who became displaced. This was essentially money that was 
paid to workers as a form of entitlement for money they had contributed towards whilst 
working; payments were made for a period of 12 months (Manning, 2009). This system was 
overhauled and was renamed 'Job Seekers Allowances' (JSA). The 'Job Seekers Allowances', as 
the name suggests is an allowance that was granted to workers who agree to search actively 
for employment. Payments were no longer made to workers because they had become 
unemployed or to alleviate the cost of income loss; there was more emphasis upon agreeing 
to look for work to obtain the benefits. The new JSA system took effect in October 1996 
where this new system reduced the benefit coverage period from 12 months to 6 months and 
where the benefits paid roughly ten per cent less than its predecessor. For further details 
about the JSA reforms see Manning (2009), Petrongolo (2009) and a Times Online article dated 
July 200926 for details regarding the current level of benefit entitlements received by 
unemployed labour. The effect of this policy change should lower workers' reservation wage 
levels; it should raise the opportunity cost of unemployment and encourage greater job search 
26 Here is the link to this article: http:Uwww.timesonline.co.uk/toi/moneyJreader guidesJartideS572594.ece. 
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intensity. Job search theory predicts that whilst workers may only have at most 6 months to 
search for a job, they may have to accept the first available job. These jobs may not be the 
right job and they may pay significantly less post-unemployment. The net impact from this 
policy reform is uncertain, but it could decrease unemployment durations and increase job 
creation. 
These policy reforms are designed to encourage greater labour market flexibility, and to 
encourage greater job creation and destruction but also to protect workers from unfair job 
dismissal. On the other hand, these policy reforms appear to lower labour market security as 
they no longer protect existing jobs and workers no longer receive benefit payments to 
maintain their living standards. So the question is whether less generous UI and stricter EP 
policy have lead to greater job creation and destruction? 
The EP policy reform has been examined by Marinescu (2008). Using survival analysis, 
Marinescu (2008) found the policy change significantly reduced the firing hazard by 27% for 
workers with up to 11 months of job tenure and by 29% for workers with 12-23 months of job 
tenure relative to workers with 24-48 months of job tenure. Unemployment duration did not 
rise after the policy change however the author notes there was a significant 11% rise in the 
probability of exiting unemployment towards a permanent job with more than 16 hours of 
work a week. As the policy change only applies to full-time employed workers, Marinescu 
(2008) found no evidence of a rise in the probability of unemployment duration. The results 
also show workers looking for full time jobs were 8.6% more likely to exit unemployment after 
the policy change. But workers under the age of 26 benefited less as they were only 3% more 
likely to exit unemployment after the policy change. This policy change had no significant 
impact upon wages, yet there was an increase in training offered to workers. Workers with 
12-23 months of job tenure received more training compared to workers with 24-48 months 
of job tenure; but workers with 0-11 months of job tenure did not receive increased on the job 
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training. The fall in the firing hazard and a fall in unemployment duration was attributed to 
firms employing greater monitoring and screening procedures to lower the burden of higher 
potential firing costs. 
The UI policy reforms have been examined by Manning (2009) and by Petrongolo (2009). 
Manning (2009) found the short run impact of the JSA reforms did not encourage job search. 
The reforms successfully lead to a large outflow out of claimant status for workers who had 
low levels of job search intensity, but there was no evidence to show employment rates had 
increased. The short-run impact of the policy simply led to some level of savings for the state. 
This result suggests 6 months of JSA payments may not be sufficient to find adequate jobs. 
Petrongolo (2009) examined the long term effects of JSA reform using longitudinal data from 
social security records (LLMBD) for a sample of male workers aged 16-64 years. Using a 
difference-in-difference approach, Petrongolo (2009) found the new reforms successfully lead 
to an outflow of workers claiming unemployment related benefits, but the reforms increased 
the incidence of other benefits. Workers who started unemployment spells after the 
introduction of the JSA system as opposed to starting unemployment spells six months earlier 
were 2Yz-3% more likely to move from unemployment to incapacity benefit spells six months 
after unemployment exit. The reforms also had a negative and Significant impact on post 
unemployment annual earnings. Workers commencing unemployment spells under the new 
reforms were 4-5% less likely to have positive earnings in the following year. Results show 
that an initial loss of labour income amounting to £900 on annual earnings could persist for 4-
5 years after the unemployment shock. Finally, the new reforms were not successful in 
allowing workers to obtain employment within longer lasting and secure jobs27• The author 
27 Tatsiramos (2004) explored the effects of UI on unemployment and subsequent employment duration for the U.K., Germany 
and France. This paper found benefit recipients in Germany and France had lower exit rates from unemployment than the U.K. 
But with generous UI payment In both France and Germany compared to the U.K., recipients were able to search for longer during 
the first year of unemployment and were more likely to obtain greater employment security. 
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concludes the job search requirements under the new reforms appeared to raise the non-
monetary search costs of remaining on UI rather than enhancing job finding rates. 
From the two policy reforms, the evidence suggests that the labour market became more 
flexible. The EP policy reform shows labour market security did not fall as the probability of 
becoming unemployed did not rise. But the introduction of the 1996 JSA reforms appears to 
lower labour market security - where this impact appears to be small. Under the new JSA 
system, workers are not able to obtain secure jobs post-unemployment and workers are more 
likely to have lower post-unemployment earnings which can persist for up to 4-5 years after 
the initial unemployment shock. This policy reform did successfully lower the number of JSA 
benefit claimants but it also increased the number of workers who started to claim other 
forms of benefits. To ascertain the overall impact of these policy changes, further research is 
required. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The process of creative destruction improves productivity to achieve economic prosperity and 
growth. Newly created jobs which embody the latest technology are more productive whilst 
old or existing jobs are destroyed because rising reservation productivity levels dictate old jobs 
are not profitable. Structural changes stemming from technological change, globalisation and 
changes to domestic labour market policies can affect the rate of job creation and destruction 
overtime. 
The survival of jobs and the creation of new jobs depend on whether firms are able to adapt to 
the structural changes. If firms cannot cope with the changes, then firms will shut down or 
exit production from the goods and services that are not profitable to provide. Changes to 
tastes and technology can lead to job loss which can in turn impose a number of adjustment 
costs for workers and raise labour market insecurity. This chapter has sought to establish 
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whether the forces stemming from globalisation, technology and domestic labour market 
policies can potentially increase job and labour market insecurity over time. From this review, 
the following conclusions are drawn: 
• Job creation and destruction rates have observed the 15 percent rule over time. 
Roughly 15 percent of jobs in existence are destroyed each year and 15 percent of 
new jobs come into existence. There is evidence from the U.K. showing these rates 
have fallen over time. At present there is evidence which suggest these rates have not 
changed job security but this could change in the future if these rates change. 
• Material offshoring has raised the wage bill share for non-production workers at the 
expense of non-skilled labour in developed countries in line with a developed 
country's comparative advantage. This is a trend that may continue with service 
offshoring. However, the impact on wage levels has been small and it depends on the 
offshore destination, where non-skilled labour can benefit from offshoring with non-
CEECs. But it is not clear whether the magnitude of earnings losses could rise over 
time for less skilled workers. 
• Material offshoring and exchange rate volatility have raised the probability of job loss 
for less skilled labour, but these estimates are very small. Service offshoring has had 
small negative impact on the employment level for less skilled labour but it has 
benefited skilled labour from white collar occupations, although this may change over 
time with further technological innovations. Additionally, there is limited evidence for 
the Bhagwati-Dehejia Hypothesis for the kaleidoscopic nature of comparative 
advantage as more research is required. 
• Empirical evidence shows MNEs are footloose in the sense that they have higher exit 
rates from production than domestic firms and thus can potentially lower job security. 
But evidence shows MNEs provide jobs that are secure and pay well to prevent human 
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capital spillovers. The estimates for the elasticity of substitution between domestic 
and foreign labour from low income countries is found to be weak. Additionally, 
outward FDI activity raises job retention rates amongst skilled labour and provides 
employment that are more secure compared to domestic plants, thus raising job 
security. 
• The elasticity of labour demand for less skilled labour has become more elastic over 
time. The evidence suggests that this rise appears to be due to globalisation and trade 
but also from policy reforms to labour market institutions that can lead to flexible 
labour markets can also lead to this rise. This suggests that job insecurity and job 
instability could rise over time as domestic workers become more substitutable with 
foreign labour. But also the policy changes to labour market institutions may not 
protect these workers from the potential adjustment costs associated with structural 
changes and from job loss. 
• Advancements in technology has lead to the polarization of middling jobs consisting of 
routine intensive job tasks that are situated in the middle of the skill distribution over 
the last 30 years in Britain, Europe and U.S.A., thus potentially contributing towards 
raising job insecurity and earnings losses between jobs. Technological innovations in 
the future could potentially raise job insecurity for occupations intensive in non-
routine job tasks, although this is not possible at present. 
• Finally, recent labour market policy reforms to EP and UI policies in the U.K. have the 
potential to raise labour market insecurity. Empirical evidence shows EP reforms have 
raised job security, but UI reforms over the latter 1990s have potentially lowered 
labour market security. 
Overall, the findings from this review suggest offshoring (material and services) and outward 
FDI establish foreign production networks which directly substitute for domestic labour and 
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have raised the elasticity of labour demand, particularly for less skilled labour. They have 
raised the job reallocation rates which could potentially lower job security, yet this impact on 
the employment and wage levels and on the own wage elasticity of labour demand has been 
small. There are three potential reasons why the impact may be small. First, part of the 
reason is the empirical literature has failed to account for the inshoring of production and 
service activities and their impact on wages and employment. Secondly, offshoring and 
outward FDI may sustain job which would possibly have been destroyed if they did not take 
place. Third, workers may simply accept lower pay to retain employment, because labour 
markets are not perfectly competitive. Workers may not be able to instantaneously court 
frequent job offers without spending considerable resources and time to search for another 
job offer. 
Thus, the empirical evidence from forces stemming from globalisation, technology and 
domestic labour market policies can affect labour market security over time; although the 
present empirical evidence show they have not significantly affected employment and wage 
levels; this could change in the future. The next chapter assess whether labour market 
security has fallen over time. 
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3 
Has Labour Market Security Declined? The Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided a detailed synopsis of the potential forces that could cause the rate of job 
creation and job destruction to change over time thereby causing labour market security to 
change by affecting the: (1) the employment level, (2) the wage level and (3) increasing the 
elasticity of labour demand. From that review, forces such as exchange rate volatility, product 
market competition, advancements in communications and technology, the fall in 
transportation costs, engaging in offshore outsourcing activities and establishing external 
production networks through outward FDI in foreign labour markets along with employment 
protection policies and unemployment insurance benefits have not significantly affected the 
employment, wage and the elasticity of labour demand for all workers equally over the last 
three decades. For the U.K., the empirical evidence suggests that these forces can lower 
labour market security over time, but their impact has so far been small and limited to low-
skilled labour where: (1) the demand for low-skilled labour has fallen over time; (2) their wage 
levels have also declined over time in certain cases where low-skill intensive production 
processes have been offshored to developing countries and (3) their elasticity of labour 
demand has become more elastic over time due to trade and globalisatlon. 
This second part of the literature review presents a detailed account of whether there is 
empirical evidence from the three components of labour market security to show if they have 
89 
declined over time. The three components that make up labour market security are: (a) job 
security, (b) income volatility within jobs Gob stability) and (c) the earnings losses from job 
displacement between jobs. Rising labour market insecurity can be reflected through shorter 
employment spells with uncertainty over future employment. The variability in income may 
lead to lower national welfare and a fall in output and the earnings losses from job 
displacement can lead to unemployment scarring on future wage levels and re-employment. 
Unemployment scarring describes the negative impact that spells of unemployment can have 
on future re-employment and wage levels. The empirical evidence shows experiencing a spell 
of unemployment can lower wage levels upon re-employment. This is because unemployed 
workers lose some of their general labour market experience by not being in paid employment 
and therefore their re-employment wage levels are lower than their pre-displacement wage 
levels. But by being in a state of unemployment, this can also increase the probability of 
becoming unemployed in the future. This can subsequently lower earnings levels further 
following re-employment over time. The second part of this literature review establishes 
whether there is empirical evidence to support these suppositions. The question is whether 
job insecurity, income volatility within jobs and the earnings losses between jobs have 
Increased in magnitude over time to make workers worse off. 
Why is job security and job stability so important to workers? The established empirical 
literature suggests that changes to job security can have important implications for job 
stability. The empirical research also shows that they have important implications for 
individual welfare and well being for two important reasons. 
First, changes to job security can potentially impact job stability; in particular any changes to 
job tenure can potentially affect the returns to wages and to the potential incomes losses 
workers can incur through job loss for the following reasons. Job tenure is accumulated 
through employment, which is in turn an accumulation from general employment and firm 
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specific employment tenure that workers develop throughout their lives from education and 
from their employment in the labour market. The returns from general and firm specific 
tenure give a picture of the overall wage growth over the life cycle which is important for 
individual wellbeing. It also provides important insights for the overall wage distribution 
(Farber, 1999b; Sulis, 2009). And it provides a way to test the implications from the human 
capital accumulation and job search models and their potential impact on labour market 
security over time. Sulis (2009) suggest the definition for general and firm specific 
employment tenure is important to the evaluation of active labour market programs that may 
be employed to try to aid workers to gain employment through training and acquiring 
transferable skills. Thus, it is important to understand the contributions of general and 
specific labour market experiences. 
Early studies that have estimated the returns to wages from general and specific employment 
tenure have been the subject of an intense debate as the empirical research has shown that 
OLS regressions estimating the returns from experience and specific job tenure can potentially 
be biased due to unobserved heterogeneity. This means that the estimated coefficients are 
biased because they are correlated with the error term. Early studies based on U.S. data 
found that the returns to experience and speCific tenure were large when individual 
heterogeneity was not accounted for (Sulis, 2009). And when previous labour market 
experience is controlled for, the returns to wages from experience and specific seniority are 
found to be substantially reduced (Mincer & Jovanovic, 1981). The reasoning for this bias is 
discussed by Topel (1991); see the paper for further detail. 
Many empirical papers have taken different approaches to account for the bias from 
unobserved heterogeneity: Abraham & Farber (1987) use an instrumental variables (IV) 
approach to account for the bias. They present IV estimates using a residual from a regression 
of tenure on completed job duration as instruments for tenure. Altonji & Shakotko (1987) 
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take another approach; they use deviations of tenure from the average sample observation on 
job matches as instruments for tenure. Both of these empirical papers find the IV estimates 
for the returns to (general) experience and firm specific tenure that is far less than the OLS 
estimates. Topel (1991) takes a different approach and uses the estimated returns to prior 
experience at the start of a job as an estimator to provide an estimate for the lower bound on 
the returns to job specific tenure. Topel (1991) finds substantial returns to wages from job 
seniority: ceteris paribus, 10 years of job seniority raises the wage of a male worker by over 25 
percent. Thus, the returns from job seniority can have a significant impact on job stability. 
Second, workers fears about job insecurity and the prospects of experiencing unemployment 
can have a negative impact on job stability, in particular wage growth, where previous spells of 
unemployment can impact job stability. Campbell et al., (2007) find that high fears of 
unemployment are found to lead to lower levels of wage growth for men, but there is little 
significance for women in Britain. If workers value job security, they may sacrifice job stability 
which may be reflected through a fall in wage growth. 
This chapter has the following structure. Section 3.2 presents an overview of the empirical 
findings for the job security trends from the U.K. and North America. Section 3.3 discusses the 
empirical evidence for income volatility within jobs and section 3.4 presents and discusses 
evidence from the earnings losses associated with job displacement between jobs. Finally, 
section 3.5 provides the concluding comments. 
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3.2 Trends in Job Security: 19705 to 19905 
3.2.1 U.K. Evidence 
The British literature has primarily sought to measure job security via elapsed job tenure with 
current employer. The North American literature has sought to measure job security by 
calculating job retention probabilities over time at similar points along the business cycle. The 
aim from both of these measures of job security has been to establish whether the length of 
jobs (U.K. literature) or the job retention rates (U.S. literature) have changed over time. If they 
have declined over time, they indicate a fall in job security. 
From the British literature, the trends from two different measures of job security have been 
explored; these are (a) median and average elapsed job tenure in years and months and (b) 
the proportion of job tenure less than one year and greater than or equal to five and ten years 
over time. Table 3.1 presents the findings from the changes in median elapsed job tenure for 
the U.K. This table shows there has been a decline in job security in the region of 
approximately 2%-30% at the aggregate level using the Labour Force Survey (lFS) and the 
General Household Survey (GHS). But a broader picture for the main trends from reported 
median elapsed job tenure by the empirical literature are summarised by figures 3.1- 3.4. 
Figure 3.11 presents the trends from reported median job tenure in years and months from 
three empirical papers2 using the lFS and the GHS from the 1970s to 2000. The first point to 
note is median job tenure fluctuations is counter cyclical to the business cycle. To better 
ascertain the movements of elapsed jobs tenure and the economic climate over this period, 
figure 3.2 presents trends from macroeconomic activity. This figure shows from the latter 
period of the 1970s to the early 1980s, the U.K. economy was in a recession - the reported 
unemployment rate was 4% in 1971, reaching a peak of 11.9% by 1984. GOP growth rates 
1 Abbreviation Key of authors' names: G&W: Greg & Wad$worth; G,K&W: Greg, Kni8ht & Wadsworth. 
2 Papers being referred to are by Greg & Wadsworth (199S, 2002) and Greg «01 (2000). 
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were negative during the early 1970s and output per worker was lower during the mid 1970s 
and early 1980s compared to the 196Os3• During recessionary periods, fewer workers tend to 
quit their jobs as there are fewer vacancies and fewer better job opportunities to be exploited. 
What this implies is job layoffs tend to dominate quits and hence average job tenure tends to 
rise. This is demonstrated in figure 3.1 where trends from the GHS show rising median job 
tenure from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. Post 1984, the U.K. economy experienced a 
recovery and it was a period of growth, where the unemployment rate declined to a low of 7% 
by 1990. The employment rate rose and where GOP growth rates and output per worker 
became stable. This was a period where workers were more likely to quit their jobs and 
search for better work opportunities; thus quits tend to dominate layoffs and one observes 
average job tenure to fall. Figure 3.1 shows all reported median job tenure fluctuations show 
a downward trend over this period. Median job tenure was approximately 51-54 months by 
1990 from a high of around 71 months for the year 1983. 
Fluctuations in median job tenure in years and months seem to have similar cyclical 
movements over the post 1980 period apart from observations reported for the year 1975. 
The reported median job tenure figures by Gregg & Wadsworth (1995, 2002) show from the 
lFS, job tenure was approximately 6 years or around 74 months as reported from the graph. 
But reported median job tenure figures from the GHS are less than 5 years or 60 months for 
1975. No explanations are provided as to why these differences may exist between the two 
data sets and there is no way to check the differences between the two data sets as there is 
no data available to measure job tenure from the lFS for the period 1977-1984. Thus, the 
analysis involving observations for 1975 should be treated with caution. 
3 There is no data available for redundancy rates from ONS for the mid 19705 to the early 19905. From the data that Is available, 
the figure shows a downward trend over time up to the point of the most recent recession. 
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Figure 3.1: Comparisons of Reported Elapsed Median Job Tenure 
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Source: Figure compiled by the author. Abbreviation key for authors names G&W: Gregg & Wadsworth; 
G,K&W: Gregg, Knight & Wadsworth. 
Table 3.1 presents the changes in median job tenure from the data plotted by figure 3.1. This 
table tries to reconcile the changes in median job tenure over comparable periods over time. 
From this table, Gregg & Wadsworth (1995) report for the period 1975-1993, median job 
tenure declined by approximately 20% (LFS data); this is verified by my calculations from the 
table. From Gregg et al., (2000), the calculations show median job tenure rose by 15% 
according to the GHS for the period 1975-1995 for a near comparable period to their earlier 
paper which had utilised the LFS. But the differences between the two data sets can be 
accounted for by the large variation in value for median job tenure from 1975. If I exclude the 
value for 19754, the results from Gregg & Wadsworth (1995) indicate a 2% fall in median job 
tenure for the period 1985-1993. Whilst the results from Gregg et al., (2000) suggest there 
4 Data for the Labour Force Survey is available from UKDA for the period: 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983 and 1984-1991. From the 
first survey in 1975, it asks respondents the length of time they have spent in present employment. The name of the data variable 
from the data set is called 'LENGEMPA', where data is recorded and available in discrete bands. For years 1977-1981, the survey 
does not ask for any sought of information on the length of time spent in present employment. For the period 1983-1984, the 
survey does ask for length of time spent in present employment; the name of the data variable is 'LENEMP', but this variable is not 
available from the 1983 or 1984 data files. For 1985, there is data available from a variable called 'EMPLEN', which provides 
details for length of time in present employment. Thus, there is no data available from the LFS for the period 1977-1984 for 
length of time in present employment. This absence explains why Gregg & Wadsworth (1995, 2(02) do not provide calculations 
for median job tenure for these intermediate periods. 
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was no change in median job tenure for the period 1985-1995 with the GHS data. Gregg & 
Wadsworth (2002) report calculations for median job tenure using both the LFS and the GHS, 
but the results still differ widely for similar periods that are analysed from their paper. For the 
period 1975-2000, calculations from the LFS suggest a 32% fall in median job tenure, whilst 
calculations from the GHS reports a 6.5% rise for the period 1975-1998. If reported changes in 
median job tenure are considered for the period 1985-1998, the reported changes in median 
job tenure show they have different signs and imply different changes to median job tenure 
from the two data sets over this period. The LFS suggest median job tenure rose by 1.72%, 
whilst the GHS results indicate an 8% fall. Thus, by using each of the data sets to gather the 
changes in median job tenure over time, they can lead to different conclusions, especially 
when there is an outlie,.s. 
Table 3.1: Changes in Median Elapsed Job Tenure (Aggregate Trends) 
Median Tenure Trends 
Empirical Paper Period 
LFSData GHSData 
Gregg & Wadsworth (1995) 1975-1993 - 2 ~ ~ -
1985-1993 
-2" -
Gregg et 01 (2000) 1975-1995 
- +15" 
1985-1995 
-
No Change 
Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) 1975-2000 
-32" +6.5" (1975-1998) 
1975-1995 -9'l' +14" 
1985-1998 +1.72" -a. 
S o u ~ : : Table complied by the author. 
5 In other analysis, Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) estimate multivariate resressions to examine the changes in elapsed job tenure 
over time. These results are discussed In the forth coming paragraphs, but I believe it is important to note, that from this analysis, 
Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) exciude the observation for 1975 from the LFS data and only use data for the period 1985-1998. This 
may be because the data value for the 1975 observation could be a potential outlier. This one observation from the 19705 could 
distort the results if the aim is to explore secular changes from short, medium and long term job tenure shares over time. 
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Figure 3.2: Trends from Macroeconomic Activity 
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Source: Figure compiled by the author. Appendix 1 provides details of data sources used to construct these 
graphs. 
Figure 3.3 compares median job tenure reported by Gregg & Wadsworth (1995) with average 
elapsed job tenure for men and Women from Burgess & Rees's (1996) paper6. Gregg & 
Wadsworth (1995) report a 20% decline in job security since 1975 (accounting for a 14% fall 
for all employees). Burgess & Rees (1996) report a slight decline in job tenure of 
approximately 10% at the aggregate level (trends not presented). At the disaggregate level, 
the average job tenure trend for men and women from Burgess & Rees (1996) results are 
redrawn for comparison with figures reported by Gregg & Wadsworth (1995). Figure 3.3 
shows there are similar cyclical variations over time from the reported job tenure figures in 
6 The empirical literature does not signify whether reported median job tenure in months is better than being reported in years. 
My opinion on this matter is that, reported median job tenure in months is slightly more accurate than reporting median job 
tenure in years, which may suffer from roundi".. This is because median job tenure in months provides a more accurate figure 
than in years. For example, If reported median job tenure in months is 62 months, this may translate to 5 year or even 6 years If 
this figure is rounded down or rounded up. This discrepancy between median job tenure reported in months and years can be 
small or big. where the former discrepancy is true in this Instance. To illustrate this point, fisure 3.1 compares the reported 
median job tenure in years and months provided by Gregg & Wadsworth (1995, 2002). The reported median job tenure from the 
two papers using the LFS data is very similar over time and they have Similar cyclical variations over time. 
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years to the trends from figure 3.1 and between the two papers7• But there is some evidence 
of a secular fall in average job tenure. For men, there is a slight fall in average job tenure from 
1985 onwards, with elapsed job tenure falling to 9.4 years in 1991 from 10.8 years in 1982. 
For women, there is also a decline in average job tenure after 1982; but their average job 
tenure trends remained stable from 1986 to 1992. Empirical evidence from other research 
tells a similar story - that there is some evidence that average job tenure has fallen over the 
1980s to the 1990s. Booth et 01., (1999) found job separation hazards were higher for more 
recent cohort of workers than for earlier cohorts over the period 1915 to 1990 -implying job 
security had fallen. But they found men to have higher job insecurity than women and the rise 
in job insecurity was more marked in the lowest occupational classifications over time for both 
men and women. Burgess & Rees (1997) also found marginally shorter jobs for men in 1992 
than for women compared to the mid 1970s; but both men and women have continued to 
have stable and secure employment from the latter 1970s to the early 1990s. This empirical 
evidence suggests that although elapsed job tenure has declined for men, workers generally 
have secure employment spells with no great tendency to become unemployed over time. 
Figure 3.4 presents reported and fitted job retention probabilities for job tenure less than 1 
year and greater than or equal to 5 years taken from Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) and from 
Burgess & Rees (1998). Firstly, the reported probabilities from Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) are 
simply calculations of job tenure proportions from the raw data. No controls are imposed for 
the cycle or for personal and job characteristics. Their calculations for the probability of job 
tenure less than 1 year shows a slight upward trend and a slight downward trend for the 
7 At most, median job tenure in years reported by Greg & Wadsworth (1995) fell by one year over a 17 year period. And averqe 
Job tenure for men and for women reported by Burgess & Rees (1996) shows job tenure declined for men (similar to the 
allregate trends reported from figure 3.1) but there is little change for women. This plot may show little tVClical variation over 
time because of the way this graph has been drawn. If this graph focused on each reported measure for job tenure for each 
gender separately, they would reflect similar cydlcal variations over time as presented by figure 3.1. For example, from figure 3.1, 
papers that have used the GHS show rising median job tenure over the latter part of the 19705 to the early periods of the 19805. 
From figure 3.3, the average job tenure reported by Burgess & Rees (1996) for men and women also show rising job tenure over 
this very period. From the early 19805 to 1990, figure 3.1 shows a dedine in median job tenure from the GHS; this very trend is 
reflected by the average job tenure for men and for women over this time frame. 
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probability of job tenure greater than or equal to 5 years. These trends signify a slight fall in 
job security. 
Figure 3.3: Comparisons of Reported Job Tenure in Years 
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Burgess & Rees (1998) estimate the probability of job tenure greater than or equal to 5 years 
and less than 1 year, controlling for the cycle, personal and job characteristics. From these 
results, the trends for the probability of job tenure less than 1 year shows no obvious changes 
for men or for women; but women have a higher probability of holding a job for less than one 
year compared to men. However, the probability of having job tenure greater than or equal to 
5 years shows there is a slight downward trend for men, but there is no obvious trend for 
women. Burgess & Rees (1998) report an increasing likelihood for women to hold long-term 
jobs for the 25-35 age band, but from their results they conclude there to be no evidence for 
shorter job tendency. Thus, these results seem to signify there have been secure jobs from 
the 1970s to the early part of the 1990s based on this latter evidence which has examined job 
tenure retention rates which have changed very little over time. 
From other evidence, Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) explore the secular changes in elapsed job 
tenure via multivariate regression analysis. Their reported results are displayed by table 3.2, 
where control variables are employed to account for individual and job related characteristics 
and for the business cycle to examine the changes from three different job tenure bands per 
year over time. 
Table 3.2: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients from Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) Paper 
LFS Data: 1985-2000 GHS Data: 1975-1998 LFS Data: 1985-2000 
Tenure<lyr Tenure >=5 yn Tenure >=10 yn 
All Workers -0.10 (0.17) -0.14 (0.06) -0.20 (0.03)·· 
Men 0.09 (O.lS) -0.29 (0.06)·· -0.36 (0.04)·· 
WNC 0.11(0.20) -0.24 (0.07) -0.26 (O.OS)·· 
we -0.76 (0.14)·· 0.40 (0.09)·· 0.42 (0.06)·· 
wes -1.32 (0.12)·· 0.58 (0.10)··8 0.47 (0.06)·· 
~ : : Table compded by the author. Asterisks are assumed to Indicate Significant time-trend 
coefficients. Identification Key: WNC = women with no dependent children; we .. women with 
dependent children and WCS .. women with dependent children under the age of 5 years. Time-trend 
coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 50 the time-trend coefficients can be read as 
yearly percentage point changes. Bootstrapped standard errors are presented within the parentheses. 
8 For women with children under 5 years, the analysis commences from 1979-1998 for the GHS. 
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At a glance, these estimated time-trend coefficients show for job tenure less than 1 year, 
there are significant per year declines for women with dependent children/children under the 
age of 5 years. For job tenure greater than or equal to 5 years there is a significant decline for 
men and a rise for women with dependent children/children under the age of 5 years. For job 
tenure greater than or equal to 10 years, their results show significant declines across all 
workers, for men and women with no dependent children, but there are gains for women with 
children/children under the age of 5 years. Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) attribute this rise in 
job tenure to the introduction of maternity legislation9• 
To sum up the empirical evidence: the evidence from table 3.2 indicates there has been a 
small decline in job security from the 1970s to 2000. For example, job tenure greater than or 
equal to 5 years for men declined by 0.29 per cent per year (table 3.2). This translates to 
6.96% [0.29 x 24] fall for the period 1975-1998. It is hard to quantify what this figure means 
in terms of what impact this has had on average elapsed job tenure. This is because we are 
looking at what happens to the number of workers who have at least 5 years of job tenure or 
more. The negative time-trend coefficient simply illustrates that there are fewer people each 
year who have at least 5 plus years of job tenure. One could argue that if on average elapsed 
job tenure is at most 60 months (or 5 years), elapsed job tenure declined by at most 4 months 
- which is a very small fall over 24 years. 
There has also been a secular decline in long term job tenure shares and a secular rise in the 
short term job tenure shares under one year for men and for women with no children 10. The 
evidence also shows a slight decline in average job tenure for men and women from the mid 
9 From the analysis of ale and education specific regressions (results not shown here) their paper finds evidence of a rise in short 
term job tenure «1 year) shares across all education IrouPS for men and with similar secular trends for women with no children. 
Across ale groups, there was some evidence of a secular rise in job tenure less 1 year for the 16-24 age group for both men and 
women with no children. For women with children/children under the ale of S years there were declines across all age and 
education IrouPS for elapsed job tenure <1 year. From the analysis of tenure shares greater than or equal to 10 years, there were 
significant declines across all age and education groups for men and for women with no children, whilst there were increases for 
women with dependent children across many education and age specific regressions. 
10 These are results from table 3 from GI'eII & Wadsworth (2002); the reported results refer to estimated results from the GHS 
which are not presented within table 3.2 from this literature review. 
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1970s to the early 1990s [evidence from figure 3.3: Burgess & Rees, 1996]. These results also 
reaffirm the findings reported by figure 3.4. Part of the reason for this fall may relate to the 
changing industrial structure, with the decline in the manufacturing industries and the rise in 
the services industry along with the advancements in ICT, where these factors have 
contributed towards a changing employment relationship between workers and firms in the 
domestic labour market. Other reasons relate to a rise in the number of job-to-job transitions 
that may result from a decline in the number of staff contracts that are offered to workers and 
replaced by flexible job contracts. In my opinion these changes have affected job tenure, but 
they have not lead to a substantial change in job security over time. They do not signify that 
workers have increasing become worse off over time by having to continually search for new 
jobs such that the rates of job tenure under one year have risen by 30-40% over the last 30 
years. However this empirical evidence does show a secular decline in job security from the 
1970s to 2000, for men and women with no dependent children. But many of the reported 
results from median elapsed job tenure and the changes observed from the raw data job 
tenure proportions fail to account for personal and job characteristics along with the business 
cycle, which makes many of the observed changes to elapsed job tenure untenable bar results 
from multivariate regression analYSis. 
3.2.1.1 Recent Trends in Job Security in Britain: 1985-2009 
Faggio et 01., (2011) explore an array of job security measures: the median, short and long 
term job tenure, trends from temporary jobs and the inflow and outflow rates from 
employment and non-employment over the period 1985 to 2009 using the LFS. They note that 
whilst aggregate job tenure has largely remained unchanged over the last 30 years, the 
aggregate trends disguise important compositional effects that have changed over time. Their 
analysis notes that average median job tenure is much lower for men (a fall of approximately 
18 months) than for women where average job tenure rose over the time frame. Reported 
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figures show that in 1985, the average median job tenure was approximately 7 years for men 
and 4 years for women. In 2009, the figure for men was 5.s years and 5 years for women. 
These average tenure trends depend on long term and short term job tenure trends over time. 
They found the share of long term jobs (defined as jobs that have lasted at least 10 years) fell 
over time as a share of all employees aged 35 years and over: In 1985, the share of long term 
jobs among all employees aged 35 plus years was 46.1% and by 2009 this share had fallen to 
38.3%. This fall is concentrated entirely among men: In 1985 this share was 56.5% and by 
2009 this share had fallen to 40.7%. This fall was greater for younger men aged less than 50 
years than for those aged over 50 years. Long term job shares among men aged 35-44 years 
fell by 16 percentage points to 41%; whilst long term job tenure for workers aged 55-64 years 
was 49% in 2009. These results suggest that there is a lower chance for younger male workers 
to move into longer term jobs compared to the past. Long term jobs rose for women with 
young children: In 1985 their share was 9.2% and by 2009 this share was 17%. This rise is 
primarily attributed to maternity leave legislation and family friendly policies (Burgess et al., 
2008). 
Short term job shares defined as jobs that last less than one year as a percentage of all 
employees show little change over time. In 1985, this share among all employees was 18.5% 
and in 2009 this share had fallen slightly to 14.9%; this suggests there is matching efficiency. 
Amongst men and women, more women have had short term jobs over time than men. But 
the difference among men and women has narrowed over time. The marked decline has been 
the greatest for women with young children under the age of five years: in 1985 this share was 
40% and in 2009 this share was 17%. There is little trend by education groups but younger 
workers aged 16-24 years have a higher share of short term job tenure (around 40%) than 
workers aged 55-64 years (under 10%). 
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There is no rise in the share of temporary jobs over the last 25 years. And from their final 
measure of job security - they examine the movements into and out from employment. They 
find a fall in the flow out of employment which suggests a fall in the rate of job loss over time. 
The inflow rate is found to be higher in bad times (around 8%) than during goods time (around 
6%). There is also a difference amongst men and women. For men, the outflow rate from 
employment is pro-cyclical, where these trends have been quite high over the most recent 
recession; and for women there is a downward trend over time. Overall, the employment 
inflow rate shows little change over time. 
The authors' conclusion from their results suggests that job tenure for men has fallen over 
time because of a rise in job-to-job moves. This conclusion does seem plausible as the 
employment inflow rate from non employment has changed little for all employee during the 
time frame, where for men especially there appears to be a general downward trend. But it is 
unclear what proportion of this trend is accounted for by the inflow rate into employment 
from unemployment as these trends are not presented. And the rise in long term job tenure 
for women is due to a fall in the rate of job loss and fewer job-to-job moves. 
3.2.2 North American Evidence 
The North American literature reviews the empirical results from the U.S. and from Canada. 
The U.S. literature for job security has typically sought to establish whether media concerns 
regarding the disappearance of life-time jobs can be merited. A summary of the main findings 
from the North American literature review are displayed by table 3.3, which are now discussed 
briefly. 
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Jaeger & Huff Stevens (1999)11 find a statistically significant rise in the fraction of male workers 
with job tenure of less than 10 years. They also find the share of men aged 40 years and older 
with job tenure of less than ten years began to rise in the mid 198Os. They report no evidence 
of a similar rise for workers with less than one year of job tenure from 1976-1996 using the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This evidence suggests there has been no fall in job 
security for the U.S. for the period 1976-1996 analysed by the authors'. However, although 
their multivariate regression results accounts for individual and job level characteristics, their 
analysis does not account for the business cycle which does make the evidence less tenable. 
But their results are supported by the findings from other papers' which are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
Hall (1982) provides one of the first papers for the U.S. empirical literature, analysing the 
importance of lifetime jobs. From table 3.3, part (a), the analysis from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) across all U.S. workers back in 1978 shows median job tenure was 3.6 years with 
eventual job tenure12 of 7.7 years. Around 40% of workers held jobs for over 5 years, whilst 
eventual job tenure calculations suggest that approximately 60% of workers would go on to 
have jobs which would have eventual tenure of 5 plus years. These numbers indicate stable 
and long-tenured employment over time. Similarly, Ureta (1992) finds comparable evidence 
to Hall (1982) when accounting for potential biases in Hall's (1982) methodology13. 
11 They also provide a review of the U.S. evidence and the Issues associated with conflicting evidence from differing data sets; see 
their paper for further details. 
12 Eventual job tenure refers to projections of how long workers will remain employed In their current jobs. 
13 Ureta (1992) utilises the methodology used by Hall (1982) to establish whether there are any potential biases that could signify 
the method used by Hall (1982) could lead to unreliable results for actual and obserwd job tenure calculations in 1978. Ureta's 
(1992) analysis show Hall's calculations underestimate the true job retention rates for job tenure levels below 20 years and they 
over estimate job retention rates over 20 years. This underestimation Is due to the secular rise In the arrival of women to the 
labour force during the 19605 and 19705. Whereas the over estimation is associated with men. Ureta (1992) notes the 
partidpation rate for men declined over the 19705 and 19805. But the over estimation Is likely to be associated with men who 
remain In the labour force are on average more likely to have high levels of job tenure and more stable jobs. However, 
calculations from Ureta (1992) show when these biases are corrected for, persons with actual job tenure for 5+ years remain 
marginally unchanged between each paper. But estimates for actual job tenure of 20+ years show corrected estimates are much 
lower than from Hall (1982). However, the underlying results do show with the corrections, there remain high percentages of s+ 
and 20+ years of eventual job from Ureta's (1992) calculations using CPS from 1978. 
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Farber (1995) similarly explores whether there is evidence for the disappearance of lifetime 
jobs over the period 1973 to 1993. The results [presented in table 3.3, part (b)) show from the 
exploration of the median and the 0.9 quantile of all jobs in duration were stable and long-
tenured if not near life-time jobs. From the median regression, the coefficient for employed 
males represents an average decline over the 20-years period of 0.358 years in the median, 
whilst for women there was an average increase of 0.664 years in the median. Similar 
patterns are also shown by the 0.9 quantile regression, where these results show there to be a 
small increase on average in the 0.9 quantile of job durations for males by approximately 0.3 
years. For women there was a substantial and significant increase of around 1.5 years on 
average in the 0.9 quantile, which is a larger rise than from the median. The overall results 
suggest there to be no evidence for the disappearance of life-time jobs in the U.S. 
Other research has explored 4-year and 8-year job retention rates over time. The objective is 
to view whether these job retention rates at similar pOints along the business cycle, but at 
different points in time have changed over time. Swinnerton & Wial (1995) explore changes in 
job security via 4-year job retention rates for the 1980s: 1983-1987 and 1987-199114• Their 
results indicate lower job retention rates over the latter part of the 1980s than for the early 
part of the 1980s (the average annual unemployment rate in the U.S. in 1983 was 9.6%) for a" 
workers. Their results by gender also show lower job retention rates for men than for women, 
who had seen a very sma" decline. Swinnerton & Wial (1995) interpret these results as, 
"suggesting a secular decline in job stability during the 198Os". 
Diebold et 0/., (1997) also explore 4-year job retention rates over the same period of the 1980s 
as Swinnerton & Wial's (1995) paper and their results only indicate a small decline of 0.01 or 1 
percent for a" workers. Their results by gender also show a modest decline for men. Diebold 
et 0/., (1997) report that the large decline in job security reported by Swinnerton & Wial (1995) 
14 If the unemployment rate is taken to be a measure of the business cycle, these two sets of periods comprising of 4 years reflect 
similar stages In the US business cycle. 
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are to a large extent accounted for by (1) inconsistent classification of the self-employed (by 
Swinnerton & Wial (1995)) and (2) the failure to account for non-responses to the tenure 
questions. Their disaggregated results by job tenure show stable job retention rates for those 
with 9+ years of job tenure; whilst by age, workers aged over 40 years showed no statistically 
significant decline in job retention rates. These results seem to present very little evidence for 
the end of life-time jobs. 
Neumark et 01., (1999) explored 8-year job retention rates from the early 1980s to the mid 
1990s. Some of the results are reported in table 3.3, part (t). In contrast to Diebold et 01., 
(1997), calculations from 8-year job retention rates reveal evidence of a decline in job security 
through to the mid-1990s. Diebold et 01., (1997) reported 4-year job retention rates that were 
roughly stable over the 1980s; but the results for the 8-year job retention rates from Neumark 
et 01., (1999) reveal a significant difference of around -0.02 15 or 2 per cent, with significant 
declines for men and for women. The disaggregated results showed a decline in job retention 
rates by age (although there was no change for those aged 55+ years) and by job tenure there 
were significant declines in job security for more tenured workers (those with 2-9 and 9-15 
years of job tenure) with increases in job security for those with two years of job tenure or 
less. Although the 8-year job retention rates show a significant decline, this decline is however 
quite small. 
Many workers believe that large corporations can be footloose if they are able to transfer jobs 
to other divisions overseas or to outsource them domestically. Allen et 01., (1999) find little 
evidence to show jobs were less secure in large private corporations in the U.S. in the 1990s. 
Their data sample consisted of 51 firms that were clients of Watson Wyatt Worldwide. Their 
results [presented in table 3.3, part (e)] show stable jobs in the private sector over the early 
part of the 1990s: average job tenure for the sample in period t-5 was 12.6 years with an 
15 This figure refers to column 3 from table 3.3, part (f) from this chapter. 
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estimated average rise of 0.8 years over the next 5 years. There were over 50% and over 25% 
of employees with job tenure over 10 and 20 years respectively, where approximately 61% of 
employees in period t-S would be with the same employer 5 years later. 
Huff Stevens (2005) explored snap shots of job tenure taken at the end of workers careers 
(specifically men) from 1969 to 2002. Table 3.3, part (g) presents a few of the main findings 
from measures of average and median job tenure. These findings show stability in the 
prevalence of long-term relationships for men in the U.S. In 1969, average job tenure in the 
longest job for males aged 58-62 years was 21.9 years; in 2002, the comparable figure was 
21.4 years. Similar trends were also observed by median job tenure figures. For all years, it 
was found more educated men had higher job tenure than less educated men. Among non-
white men, average job tenure remained below measures comparable to white men. Long 
term relationships were found to be an important feature of the U.S. labour market in 2002 as 
much as it was in 1969. But, an important limitation with this study is that it examines job 
tenure from the experiences of men at the end of their careers. As evidence from Neumark et 
al., (1999) show a small decline in 8-year job retention rates from the 1980s to the early 
1990s, it is likely that younger workers from this present time will have different labour 
market experiences by the time they are 60 years old compared to the Huff Stevens's (2005) 
sample (Winship, 2009). 
Finally, Brochu (2009) documents the trends for one year job retention probabilities for 
Canada; these trends are presented within table 3.3, part (h). From this table, the job 
retention probabilities show little change post 1990 for all groups. At the start of the period, 
men had higher one year retention probabilities compared to women; but after 1989, women 
continued to have slightly higher one-year job retention rates, where these rates stabilised. 
This estimated stability in the one year retention rates after 1989 is interpreted by Brochu 
(2009) to be a rise in job security as over this very same period the unemployment rate 
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continued to decline. From other results reported by Brochu (2009), there were stable trends 
for the one year job retention rates by age groups and there were no changes in the one year 
job retention rates over the sample period. Evidence of job security was also found by Heisz 
The empirical evidence from the U.S. literature suggest there is no end to the existence of life-
time jobs; they show stable job retentions rates over the 1980s (4-year job retention rates) 
and there is some evidence of a decline in job retention rates over the 1990s (a-year job 
retention rates) for men and for women and for more tenured workers. The literature also 
shows workers employed in large corporation in the private sector had secure jobs over the 
1990s, and there is the existence of long-term job tenure spells in 1962 and 2002 for men 
reported by Huff Stevens (2005). However, much of this research compares cross sections of 
data, where average job tenure or job retention rates are compared at particular snap shots in 
time - at similar points along the business cycle. Most of this evidence also fails to take 
account the individual or job characteristics that might influence job security over time as well 
as for the business cycle17• Research by Battu et 01., (2002) show individual and job 
characteristics are factors that can influence the potential accumulation of job tenure over 
time. Battu et 01., (2002) report that gender and the presence of dependent children can 
influence the type of job contract workers may be offered by their employers. These factors 
have not been incorporated into much of the literature on job retention rates at particular 
points in time and therefore due to these reasons, it is difficult to assess whether job security 
16 Heisz (2005) also finds similar evidence. Uslna the Canadian Labour Force Survey for the 1976 to 2001 period, Helsz found no 
evidence of a fall In job security. There was some evidence of a decline in one year job retention rates over the 19805 for youna 
workers and for workers with high school level education or less, but this rose over the 19905. Overall the evidence from Canada 
suggests there has been little chan.e In job security as there Is no evidence of any inereasln. or decreaslna trends from the one 
job retention probabilities coverln. the 19905. 
17 Marcotte (1999) is the exception to this case. He estimates one year job retention rates for men over the period 1976-1992 
usina the PSID. These rates were then used to estimate a series of job retention probability models that account for individual 
and job characteristics and also the unemployment rate for economic conditions. He finds that job security declined for black 
men and for men who dropped out of hlah school and for wortcers with some post secondary education but no coIleae education. 
From Marotte's paper and the reported results it is not dear whether job security declined over the 1976-1992 period for all 
workers as the analysis from Marcotte (1999) focuses on the chanaes to job security for specific education, a.e and race IfOUPS. 
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has declined over time18• However, the incidence of job loss rates may shed light on the 
security of jobs in the U.S. over the 1970s to year 2000. 
The incidences of job loss are also important to the job security debate. If job loss rates have 
changed very little over time, this may corroborate the story told by the job retention rate 
literature. If however, the incidence of job loss has increased over time, this evidence may be 
at odds with the job retention rate literature. However, the job loss literature does tell a 
similar story to the job retention rate literature, which is job loss rates have not grown over 
the last 40 years. Gardner (1995) found the incidence of job loss in 1981-1982 period were 
comparable to the 1991-1992 periods using the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS). But other 
results from Gardner (1995) show the incidence of job loss by industry and occupations had 
changed over this period. She found there was a decrease in the incidence of job loss among 
blue collar workers in manufacturing industries and a rise in the incidence of job loss amongst 
white collar workers and workers employed in the non-manufacturing industries. Additionally, 
older workers had a higher incidence of job loss in the 1990s compared to the previous 
decade. 
Farber (1996, 1998, 2001, 2003, & 2009) provides an extensive array of evidence which has 
explored the incidence of job loss rates and costs associated with job displacement using the 
DWS over time. From earlier papers, Farber (1996, 1998) does find the incidence of job loss 
was higher during the 1990s than for the 198Os, where the incidence of job losses was higher 
for older and more tenured workers. Similarly, research by Aaronson & Sullivan (1998) found 
the incidence of job loss through job displacement was 0.3 percentage points higher during 
the 1990-1991 recession compared to the 1982 recession. But this percentage change is less 
18 Valletta (1999) finds that the relationship between employers maintaining general employment contracts for woricers that 
account for performance incentive problems for workers and firms with Imperfect monltorllll changed over the 1976-1993 period 
for the U.s. Valletta (1999) finds that this relationship Is also responsive to economic conditions. Using the PSID, he finds the 
negative relationship between job tenure and probability of job dismissal weakened over time - meaning firms appear not to 
maintain general employment work contracts and even long-tenured workers may face the rIsIc of job loss. However, the fourth 
comllll paragraphs from the job loss literature show that although job loss rates inaeased In the U.S. during the 19905, they have 
not increased In magnitude over time. Thus, these results may have been relevant durilll the 19905, but they are not consistent 
with more recent evidence that examines the changes In job security beyond the 19905. 
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than a half a percentage point and this does not signify a rise over time. Farber (2003) 
suggests the higher incidence of job loss in the 1990s were due to a slower decline in the job 
loss rates during the early 1990s expansion relative to the decline in the expansion of the 
1980s. 
In later a paper, Farber (2005) finds the evolution of job loss rates to be counter cyclical to the 
business cycle, but these job loss rates did not show that they had increased over time. The 
evidence shows that these rates fluctuated between 8 and 13 percent between 1981 and 
2003. Farber (2005) did find that the aggregate job loss rate masks the patterns of job loss 
rates over time for different groups of workers. He finds job loss rates were higher for less 
educated workers (workers with less than 12 years of education) compared to other education 
groups but these job loss rates did not show a rise over time. Additionally, although highly 
educated worker with 16+ years of education had lower job loss rates compared to other 
workers with lesser years of education, the job loss rates for this group of workers has been 
rising over time: for the 1981-1983 period, the job loss rate for highly educated workers was 
approximately 7%; for the 1989-1991 period the job loss rate was 8%; by the 2001-2003 
period their job loss rate had increased to 10% - although this rate is still quite small. 
Additionally, Farber (2005) found workers aged 20-29 years had higher job loss rates 
compared to other age groups; and workers aged 50-64 years had lower job loss rates. But 
the job loss rates by age once again do not show there has been a rise for the different age 
groups over time. 
From a more recent paper, Farber (2009) interprets the rise in job loss rates and the fall in long 
term job retention rates over the 1990s as a rise in job insecurity for that period. When these 
rates are examined over the period 1984 to 2008 using the DW5, Farber (2009) finds there has 
not been an increase in job loss rates over this time frame that would account for a decline in 
job tenure and long-term employment rates. Farber (2009) finds the decline in job tenure and 
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long-term employment is restricted to the private sector with evidence of a rise in job tenure 
and long-term employment for public sector workers over the period 1984-200819• There is 
also no evidence of changes in job loss rates for either sector that could account for the 
observed results. A probable explanation for the fall in long-term job tenure rates may rest 
with the fact that whilst job loss rates have not increased over time, there is evidence which 
shows job tenure from long-term employment is falling and this may be due to higher job loss 
rates for high-tenured workers relative to low-tenured workers in the private sector. Second, 
Farber (2009) suggests that job loss rates may not be captured by the DWS because the scope 
to establish changes from the survey questions is limited and they are not able to capture the 
observed trends. 
From other research exploring the quality of jobs following job loss, Farber (1997) finds the 
quality of jobs available for less skilled workers declined over the 1979-1996 period. However 
the quality of jobs available to higher skilled workers changed very little. And there is little 
evidence of a rise in the rate of part-time jobs within new and old jobs. Gottschalk & Moffitt 
(1999) find no evidence for job endings to be increasingly followed by a non-employment 
spell. And Hamermesh (1987) reported the present value of social loss attributed to the 
workers' share of firm specific human capital to be around $7,000 (1980 dollars). 
In summary, I interpret the empirical evidence from the North American literature to show 
that job security has not declined over the last 40 years. The U.S. literature on job loss shows 
there has not been a rise in the incidence of job loss from the early 19805 to the early 20005. 
What this literature does show is job retention rates have been stable and job loss rates are 
counter cyclical to the business cycle. Although the job retention literature does suggest there 
has been a decline in 8-year job retention rates over the 199Os, the differences between the 
job retention rates from the 19805 and the 1990s are small (see table 3.3, part (f) for the 
19 These results contrast with the findings from Allen et 01., (1999) who found evidence of job security In larse private 
corporations during the 19905. 
112 
details). Overall, the findings from the job loss literature show there is no evidence for the 
disappearance of life-time jobs; on the contrary job retention rates have been stable over time 
and the incidence of job loss has not increased over the last 40 years. 
But changes to the length of employment spells may reflect elements of voluntary job 
separations where workers try to seek better opportunities to improve their within job 
benefits. However, concerns regarding the end of lifetime jobs may in part reflect the 
anxieties of labour market changes (partly related to the movements to the business cycle, 
changes in expectations of economic conditions or concerns of globalisation) that may only be 
partially related to changes in the overall length of employment spells. This anxiety may in 
part reflect concerns of how long jobs will last, which is likely to stem from concerns of firm-
initiated (involuntary) job separations. Neumark & Polsky (1998) suggest the distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary job separations is important as workers who quit their jobs 
are likely to improve their welfare but involuntary job separations may make workers worse 
off. Thus, their argument is, if the proportion of involuntary job separations has risen over 
time but overall job separations have remained stable, this may make workers feel less secure 
and more anxious about their jobs; hence reflecting concerns for job insecurity. The job 
security literature for the U.K. provides no evidence of a rise in firm-initiated quits. Partly this 
is due to lack of data that allows for this distinction. For the U.S., evidence from Davis (2008) 
finds there has been a fall in the uptake of Federal unemployment assistance for workers who 
become involuntarily separated from their jobs (see next section for further details). 
In summary, the analysis of the British and North American literature reviews have been 
examined from the view of establishing whether the length of an employment spell or time 
individuals spend within their current employment has declined over time. This chapter 
interprets the empirical findings as providing some evidence of a decline in job security at the 
aggregate level for the U.K. has been small; though recent evidence analysing the period 1985-
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2009 by Faggio et 01., (2011) suggests that long term (short term) job tenure has fallen (rose) 
over time for men (women with young children). For North America, there is evidence of a fall 
in job security during the early 1990s, but over time, there is no evidence of a decline in job 
security. 
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Table 3.3: North American Estimates for Changes in Job Security 
a) Hall (1982): Eventual & Actual job tenure distribution estimate for all U.S. workers' in 1978 
Years 
0-2 
2-5 
5-20 
20+ 
Eventual Tenure ('" 
23 
18.5 
29.9 
28 
Median Tenure: 3.6 years 
Median EventualTenure: 7.7 years 
Actual Tenure ('" 
39.9 
20.2 
30.4 
9.5 
b) Farber (1995): Annual change in median job tenure for all employed individuals aged 21-64, 1973-
1993 
Median Regression: Males: -0.0179 years 
0.9 Quantile Regression: Males: +0.0138 years 
Females: +0.0332 years 
Females: +0.0734 years 
c) Swinnerton & Wial (1995): Changes in 4-year job retention rates, 1983-87 vs. 1987-91 
All workers 
Men 
Women 
1983-1987 
0.547 
0.586 
0.501 
1987-1991 
0.488 
0.504 
0.471 
-0.059 
-0.082 
-0.03 
d) Diebold, Neumark & Polsky (1997): Changes in 4-year job retention rates, 1983-1987 vs. 1987-1991 
1983-1987 1987-1991 ChalJ· 
All workers 0.537 0.527 -0.010· 
Men 0.578 0.554 -0.024· 
Women 0.487 0.494 0.007 
Tenure Groups: 
Oto<2 0.335 0.346 0.011· 
2to<9 0.568 0.522 -0.046-
9to<15 0.806 0.805 -0.001 
15+ 0.671 0.712 0.041-
Ace Groups: 
16-24 0.290 0.254 -0.036-
25-39 0.577 0.558 -0.019-
40-54 0.685 0.675 -0.010 
55+ 0.487 0.486 -0.001 
Results reported are corrected for heaping and business cycle. Estimated changes statistically 
significant at the 5" indicated by •. 
e) Allen, Clark & Schieber (1999): Tenure in the early 1990s in period t-5 
Average Tenure 
% of employees with 10+ yrs of tenure 
% of employees with 20+ yrs of tenure 
5 year retention rate 
Period t-5 Growth per year for 5 m 
12.6 yrs 0.8 yrs 
54.5% 4.1 percentage points rise 
25.6% 0.6 percentage points rise 
60.796 of employees in the same firm stayed with 
the same employer 5 years later 
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f) Neumark, Polsky & Hansen (1999): Changes in 8-year job retention rates, 1983-91 vs. 1987-95 
1983-1991 1987-1995 Chanp 
All workers 0.386 0.370 -0.016-
Men 0.420 0.379 -0.041-
Women 0.345 0.325 -0.020-
AaeGroups: 
16-24 0.190 0.154 -0.036-
25-39 0.454 0.404 -0.050-
40-54 0.527 0.484 -0.043-
55+ 0.188 0.188 0.000 
Tenure Groups: 
Oto<2 0.183 0.216 0.034-
2to<9 0.433 0.384 -0.049-
9to<15 0.650 0.617 -0.033-
15+ 0.485 0.477 -0.008 
Results reported are corrected for heaping. Estimated changes statistically 
significant at the 5% indicated by _. Information displayed in this table is taken 
form tables: 3 and 5. 
g) Huff Stevens (2005): Tenure on longest job for men aged 58-62 years; Completed tenure in years 
1969-2002 
--------------------------------------------
Mean 
Median 
1969 
21.9 
21 
1975 
23.8 
24 
1980 
24.1 
24 
1992 
22.8 
23 
2002 
21.4 
21 
h) Brochu (2009): One year job retention rates for canada; Period analysed is 1977-2003 
1977 1983 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 
All 0.79 0.81 0.775 0.82 0.815 0.82 0.825 
Men 0.81 0.82 0.78 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.825 
Women 0.77 0.80 0.77 0.82 0.82 0.815 0.82 
Source: Table compiled by the author. Part of the table has been adapted from Neumark & Polsky (1998). 
3.2.3 Recent Evidence for Job Security 
2003 
0.83 
0.815 
0.83 
Steven J. Davis (2008) asserts there is considerable evidence from the American empirical 
literature which suggest recent job loss rates (for the post 2000 periods) are considerably 
lower compared to the 1990s, the 1980s or even the 19705. His paper explores new evidence 
from a selective set of 'unwelcome' job separations which are, "employer-initlated separations 
that lead to unemployment, temporary or persistent drop in earnings, and other significant 
costs of job loss". This new evidence has been gathered from five different indicators of 
'unwelcome job losses' using various data sources. The first source of evidence comes from 
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the Federal-State Unemployment Insurance Program, which is a form of benefit that is 
provided to experienced workers who may become involuntarily unemployed and meet 
various other requirements to receive the benefit. Davis (2008) examines this data for new 
claims for unemployment benefits from the Federal State Unemployment Insurance Program 
from January 1967 to January 2007. The evidence from new claims post January 2002 shows 
there has been a downward trend in the uptake of this benefit. Prior to the 1980s there was a 
rising trends in new claims for the insurance benefit. Other indicators that are also explored 
provide support for this view and are briefly discussed below. 
Evidence from studies which explore unemployment inflow rates for the U.S. provides 
unanimous evidence in support for a fall in job loss trends with similar percentage pOint drops. 
Davis et 01., (2008) assess evidence from monthly unemployment inflow, outflow and escape 
rates for the period 1976 to 2006. They find the unemployment inflow rate fell from a peak of 
approximately 4 percenfO of employment in 1983 to approximately 2.3 percent of 
employment by 2006. Shimer (2007) examines the employment exit probability and the 
employment-to-unemployment (EU) transition probability over time. Both of these 
probabilities present similar fluctuations over time, where prior to 1980, both sets of 
probabilities rose over time. But after the early 1980s period there has been a continued 
decline in these probabilities. Elsby et 01., (2007, 2009) explore the ins and outs of cyclical 
unemployment for the U.S. They find declining inflow probabilities for the post 1980 period. 
At its peak, the inflow rate was approximately 5 percent in 1982; by 2005 the inflow 
probability had fallen to approximately 2.7 percent. 
Whilst the above papers present support for declining trends at the aggregate level, there is 
also support from results at the disaggregated level. Fujita & Ramey (2006) examine the 
cyclicality of job loss (job-to-unemployment flows) and hiring flows (unemployment-to-
20 The monthly inflow rate into unemployment was 3.15 percent of employment in 1976. 
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employment flows) for the u.s. They examine the trends for job loss and hiring flows using 
CPS short panels from 1976 to 2006. They examine: (a) total job loss trends and (b) net job 
loss trends with four interest groups, which are (1) all workers aged 16+ years; (2) the young 
aged 16-24 years; (3) prime-age (aged 25-54) and (4) prime aged males aged 25-54 years. 
Fujita & Ramey (2006) found young workers have higher total and net job loss flows compared 
to the other interest groups. They also found over the post 1980 period there had been a 
gradual decline in the job loss flows for a" interest groups. Their results from the hiring flows 
also show a downward trend over time for a" interest groups; although this flow does rise 
during NBER recessionary periods21• These results also reaffirm Davis's (2008) assessment of 
fewer job loss flows during the most recent decade that has passed compared to the 1980s 
and the early to mid-1990 period. They also support the findings from the job loss literature 
which was discussed in the last sub-section. 
Fina"y, Stewart (2000, 2002) explored trends in job security using the March CPS data. 
Stewart (2000) found men tend to have higher job-to-unemployment (EU) transitions 
compared to women and there were lower trends for all workers. A" trends show there was 
an avera" decline in EU job loss trends after 1983 where there was a clear downward trend, 
whilst prior to 1983 there were rising EU job loss trends. 
For the U.K., the evidence from other indicators is quite sparse, but Petrongolo & Pissarides 
(2008) explore the ins and outs of European unemployment studying the contribution of 
inflows and outflows to the dynamics of unemployment. For the U.K. their paper finds the 
unemployment inflow rate was a big factor that accounted for the unemployment dynamiCS 
during the 1980s, but its contribution to unemployment has had little effect for the late 1990s 
or for the post 2000 period. In other words, with a declining unemployment rate over the post 
1993 period, there is little evidence that points to a rising inflow rate that contributes to the 
21 See appendix 3 for details about the NBER dated recession periods. 
unemployment dynamics over this period. Hence, one could say that with the inflow rate into 
unemployment accounting for very little change over the late 1990s and post 2000 time 
frame, this lack of inflow would suggest that job security has changed very little if fewer jobs 
are ending and resulting in a state of unemployment. Another angle through which job 
security trends can also be assessed is from the job creation and job destruction literature. 
The most recent paper that has explored job creation and destruction rates for the U.K. has 
been by Hijzen et 0/., (2007). They explore the job creation and job destruction rates from 
firm-level evidence for the services and manufacturing sectors. Viewing the job creation and 
job destruction rates (table 2 from their paper) on the whole show little evidence of rising job 
destruction rates for the period 1998-2005. Their results show these rates have declined over 
time; see chapter 2, section 2.4.1 for further details. 
Figure 3.5: Claimant Count Trends 
1983q1 1986q1 11l88q1 1982q1 199C5q1 tllll8q1 2001q1 2004q1 2007q1 201Oq1 
v .. 
Source: Author's own compilation. Appendix 2 provides the details for the data source used to 
construct this graph. 
The final evidence for the U.K. is presented by figure 3.5. This figure plots the claimant count 
from the third quarter of 1983 to the first quarter of 2010, where the number of claimants 
that are registered to claim job seekers allowances following job loss. This figure loosely 
provides an indication for the number of claimants seeking assistance following involuntary 
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job loss22. This graph shows after the early 1990 recession, the number of claimants declined 
between 1993 and the early 2008 period. There has only been a rise over the most recent 
economic downturn. This evidence shows there is no rising tendency for becoming 
unemployed or for job insecurity. 
To sum up, the recent evidence shows there is no evidence of a rise in job insecurity for the 
U.S. over the last two decades. This recent evidence is limited for the U.K., but from this 
limited evidence there is no increasing tendency for becoming unemployed. Additionally, this 
evidence shows job retention rates and unemployment inflow rates have not become volatile 
over this time frame. 
3.3 Trends In Income Volatility 
Income volatility refers to the variance of income and whether this variance is changing over 
time (Jensen & Shore, 2008). The variance can become bigger or smaller over time. If the 
variance is getting bigger, this means that income volatility is increasing over time; but if the 
variance is getting smaller, this implies income volatility is declining over timeD, Income 
volatility can be affected by the business cycle and by forces associated with globalisation, 
such as international trade, product market competition, the dynamic nature of comparative 
advantage, advancements in telecommunication technology, offshore outsourcing activities 
and out ward FOI can all put pressure on the wage levels of domestic labour. But to date there 
has been little empirical research to establish conclusively whether these forces have 
Influenced income volatility over time (Gottschalk & Moffitt, 2009). 
Income volatility can be affected by transitory shocks and by permanent shocks. These shocks 
can have a transitory or a permanent impact on income levels over time. The transitory 
22 The reform after 1995 restrict the eligibility to claim allowances for a period of 6 months if workers have (a) voluntarily left paid 
employment; (bl discharge for misconduct; (c) refusal of suitable work; and (d) because of labour disputes. The trends from this 
graph after 1996 do not show a rising trend. See Wu (2000) for further details. 
23 It is important to note here that rising Income volatility is not necessarily a bad thing. What Is Interesting is whether this trend 
is Increasing or decreasing over time. 
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change to income can result from a change in the number of hours that are worked where the 
loss or gain in income may not go away immediately by the next time period. The worker's 
earnings level may take three or four years to reach their natural income level. They can also 
change temporarily because of the business cycle and from forces associated with 
globalisation. For example, the increase in the variance of transitory earnings could result 
from skill-biased technological change which may temporarily increase income inequality. 
From a theoretical model developed by Violante (2002) concludes that advancements in 
technology can make it more difficult for workers to transfer their skills to more recent 
'vintages' of capital. Thus, workers can experience transitory wage losses within jobs that can 
differ amongst workers (Gottschalk & Moffitt, 2009). Through calibrations, Violante (2002) 
shows this mechanism can account for a 30% transitory surge in residual inequality in the u.s. 
One of the implications from this theory is that this technology mechanism can also lead to 
large wage losses through job dislocation which can lead to permanent wage losses over time. 
A permanent income change can imply an income change that may never go away even after a 
number of years (Gottschalk & Moffitt, 2009). Permanent changes to income can also be 
associated with globalisation. For example, consider the job polarization hypothesis, where 
advancements in technology can replace job tasks completed by workers that are routine and 
codifiable in nature. These job tasks are also the most offshorable because routine job tasks 
can be delivered from offshore foreign locations via telephone or via the internet. Consider a 
call centre manager aged 45 years, who has spent 15 years working for a firm for the most 
part of his/her life, is laid off as the firm decides to permanently downsize their operations in 
the U.K. and offshore the call centre operations to India. As a result of the downsizing, the 
worker may have to transition to another industry. At the age of 45, to seek employment in 
another industry is not easy as he/she will require re-training. Empirical evidence from Autor 
& Oorn (2009) found older college educated workers were most likely to transition to jobs 
located at the bottom end of the skill distribution. The earnings level from these jobs will be 
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lower compared to the old job. In terms of the example, the worker used to earn say, £30,000 
and he/she may probably never be at that level of income after job loss. With a new job, the 
worker may earn £24,000. This new income level may climb to £26,000, but the permanent 
loss of income is £4,000, which may never be recovered (Gottschalk & Moffitt, 2009). 
The impact of transitory and permanent income shocks which cause income volatility has been 
presented in a theoretical model by Gamber (1988) which explores income volatility resulting 
from firm level volatility. The model is a long-term contracting model with bankruptcy 
constraints. Firms and workers must decide on a two-period wage contract, where the firms 
face both transitory and permanent shocks to its revenue function. The objective of the 
contract is to smooth workers incomes. The model predicts that there is an asymmetric 
response of the wage to permanent and tranSitory shocks. If the risk neutral firms are insuring 
risk-averse workers, the model predicts the real wage responds more to a given permanent 
shock than to a temporary shock of the same size. Firms appear to absorb transitory shocks 
but try to insure against permanent shocks. Permanent shocks are assumed to persist for two 
periods, whilst temporary shocks persist for only one period. Gamber (1988) finds that real 
wages respond more to permanent shocks than to transitory shocks24• 
Income volatility can lead to consumption volatility and volatility in household income levels. 
Households and individuals may not be able to maintain their standards of living or economic 
status to which they are accustomed to because of income uncertainty and this may cause a 
rise in precautionary savings2S. Hacker & Jacobs (2008a) note increased income instability can 
reduce individual and household welfare. Additionally, many households may borrow money 
24 • Gulso et 01., (2005) find evidence In support of these predictions for Italy. 
25 Use (2006) develops a model which examines on-the-job-search and precautionary savinp. This model suaests that the 
decision to save money depends on the dynamics of the wale ladder resulting from the search process. The model assumes there 
is an important asymmetry between the incremental wage increases lenerated by on-the-job-search (cllmblnl the ladder) and 
the drop in income associated with job loss (fallin, off the ladder). The model assumes that low wage workers are more likely to 
dis-save If expected wale lrowth is not much higher than unemployment benefits. As workers wages rise, the Incentive to save 
Increases; and the potential for wage loss In the future makes It Inaeas/ngly Important to Insure against larse Income losses In the 
future. Hlah-waae workers are more likely to save for the future as this mode of behaviour Is driven by the prospect of fallin, of 
the work ladder. 
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to insulate their spending patterns from earnings volatility (Milberg & Winkler, 2009). There 
has been a rise in unsecured debt (credit card finance) to supplement lost earnings, which 
many household utilise during transitory periods of low income (Sullivan, 2002). This raises 
concerns over indebtedness, bankruptcy, home repossessions with household expenditure 
and consumption volatility. See Hacker & Jacobs (2oo8b), Dynan et 01., (2008), Winship (2009) 
and Nichols & Zimmerman (2008) for empirical trends in household income volatility; and for 
household consumption volatility see Gorbachev (2009) and Davis & Kahn (2008). Whilst 
these are important implication from income instability, these factors are not the focus of this 
of this review. 
Winship (2009) provides a vast review of the literature for income volatility, income mobility 
and income disperSion for the U.S. at the individual level and at the household level. The main 
findings from this review are discussed below. The literature for income volatility has focused 
on transitory and permanent income volatility trends. For income mobility, this literature has 
tried to assess the non-directional and directional movement of the income variance along the 
income distribution over time26• It determines how well off individuals are over time, whether 
they are becoming well off (moving up the income distribution) or becoming worse off 
(moving down the income distribution) because of changes in the permanent and transitory 
variances of income. And the literature for income dispersion examines whether the standard 
deviation of income as a whole is increasing over time. 
26 Income mobility is defined as a, 'change In the relative rank, or relative position, In the income distribution' (Gottschalk" 
Moffitt, 20(9). this strand of the literature examines the movements of Income from one period to the next for each IndiYldualln 
the population. It tries to determine the changes In their rank or to determine the probability of such changes in the relative 
position. For example, an increase in the variance of transitory Income can lead to an Increase in short-term income mobility. 
this increases the chance that an individual will chanle their relative position with someone else - both upwards and downwards. 
But as the effect on income Is temporary, In the IonS-run there Is no effect on the chance that an Individual will change their 
relative position in the distribution of income. A permanent change on the other hand has a permanent impact on Income where 
this Increases the prospects of long-term rnobnlty of moving upwards or downwards along the lonl-run Income distribution. But 
If permanent changes to income have occurred, this diminishes the chances for Individuals to change their relative position In the 
future because the permanent and temporary shocks to eamlnss can cause Individuals to be further away from their qlnal 
poSition in the distribution (Gottschalk" MoffItt, 20(9). 
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3.3.1 Permanent & Transitory Income Volatility Trends 
The question this literature tries to establish is whether permanent and transitory income 
volatility has increased over time (can make individuals worse off) or has it decreased over 
time (can make individuals better off) and can this be attributed to forces associated with 
globalisation. 
From the income volatility literature, research by Gottschalk et al., (1994) find the dispersion 
of growth in permanent earnings variance for males grew by 41% from 1970 to the 1980s, 
where the transitory variance also grew by 42% over the same period for the U.S. Prior to the 
1990s, the authors' note that whilst the compositional changes from the labour force 
accounted for a 12% rise in transitory earnings, the aggregate data suggested that the 
increased variability had nothing to do with increased instability from the labour market or 
from industry. Shin & Solon (2008) extended the period of analysis using the PSID for men and 
found that whilst earnings volatility was counter cyclical to the business cycle, their evidence 
was consistent with Gottschalk et al., (1994): they found a secular rise in earnings volatility 
during the 1970s. Post 1970, their paper found little evidence of any form of change in 
earnings volatility however, post 1998, they note there be a slight rise in earnings volatility. 
Most recent research carried out by Gottschalk & Moffitt (2009) found increasing earnings 
instabilit'/7 during the 1970s and 198Os, with little change in the 199Os; but there is evidence 
of slight rise over the most recent decade. 
Part of the reason why there may have been no trend in earnings during the early 1990s is due 
lack of wage growth during this period. The analysis from Aaronson & Sullivan's (1998) paper 
suggest that an increase in job displacement rates during the early 1990s recession, along with 
rising anxiety over job security may have limited wage growth by about three tenth to seven 
27 Gottschalk & Moffitt (2009) interpret Income Instability to refer to transitory income volatility. 
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tenths of a percentage point per year during the 1990s. This evidence is consistent with their 
being little evidence of rising income volatility over the early 1990s. 
Yet, Jensen & Shore (2008) report income volatility may be related to risk. They note that 
research which has examined income volatility trends over time have failed to take into 
account individual heterogeneity, where this research has effectively been estimating an 
increase in average income volatility over time. Their research accounts for individual 
heterogeneity when they decompose the increase in average income volatility over time. 
Their analysis agrees with previous research which shows using the PSID, the permanent and 
transitory variances of average income have increased for all individuals all along the income 
distribution. They found the mean of the permanent and transitory variances increased by 73 
and 93 percent over the sample. The most important findings from their paper show average 
volatility of incomes is driven by sharp changes in income by those with the most volatile 
incomes. These changes are attributed to the 'right tail' of the income distribution. They 
found self-employed workers and workers with very high tolerances for risks have the most 
volatile incomes in the population. They found the permanent and transitory variances at the 
right tail (the 95th percentile) increased by 71 and 154 percent respectively. For all other 
individuals along the income distribution, from the 1st to the 75th percentile, their results show 
the permanent and transitory income variances were stable over the 1970s to the early 2000 
time frame. They also found individuals with more years of education and married male 
workers were less likely to have more volatile income over time. But older individuals were 
more likely to have volatile incomes. Jensen & Shore's (2008) research shows average income 
volatility has not Increased for the vast majority of individuals and this implies average income 
volatility has not increased over this time frame, but has effectively remained stable for most 
individuals. 
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What these results suggest is that the impact from any form of policy changes to labour 
market institutions or from changes to industry trading conditions appears to have had little or 
no impact on the volatility of income for the vast majority of individuals in the U.S. However, 
forces associated with globalisation could have raised the income volatility for those who are 
self-employed or for those individuals who identify themselves with high risk tolerances are 
prone to having their income levels being more volatile over time. This is a supposition that 
has yet to establish empirical support, but this may be a plausible explanation as to why their 
income levels may be more volatile over time. 
To establish whether transitory income volatility can be caused by the volatility from firms' 
trading enVironment, Comin et of., (2009) explore whether transitory earnings volatility is 
linked to the volatility in firm performance for publically traded companies. The authors' find 
firm-level volatility in sales has caused wage levels to be volatile over time if firms tie wage 
levels to firm performance. Comin et of., (2009) find the rising turbulence in firm sales over 
the past three decades in the U.S. had raised wage volatility. The transitory volatility of wages 
along with sales were strong during the 1980s within large companies that were service 
oriented compared to manufacturing oriented firms. The authors' suggest there is a causal 
relationship between firm sales and wage volatility which may be the result of large firms not 
being able to monitor the work tasks completed by workers as they become more complex. 
Firms may therefore tie wages to firm performance such as sales, which may cause wage 
levels to be more volatile over time. 
Davis et of., (2006) also find firm level volatility of publicly traded firms had increased by three 
quarters from 1978 to 1999. But they also found the volatility for privately held firms (which 
are typically small firms) declined by one third from 1978-2001. Pistaferri (2009) comments 
that the research by Comin et 01., (2009) may not be capturing wage volatility at the individual 
level as their analysis simply regresses the transitory variance of average wages in the firm 
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against the transitory variance of firm sales. Pistaferri (2009) also notes the data used for the 
analysis (COMPUSTAT data) was not ideal and therefore this is one of the reasons why there 
has been little evidence to date exploring the link between income volatility and firm-level 
volatility. Thus, this evidence signifies that transitory income volatility being linked to firm-
level volatility is questionable and it does not show that workers have become worse off over 
time due to forces associated with globalisation. More research is required to establish a link. 
The empirical evidence from industry level studies is still in their infancy, but from the 
research that is available, it does suggest that the forces associated with globalisation have 
had little impact on income volatility. Bach (2008) finds the unconditional volatility of labour 
and capital incomes had declined for European countries where the transitory component of 
income volatility changed very little over time. Bach (20OS) finds that the volatility of labour 
income did not change much during the 1980s or 1990s. But there was some evidence to 
suggest the relative volatility of incomes for low-skilled workers had increased in some 
industries and countries. Income volatility was found to be associated with variables 
measuring bargaining power of workers; but the impact from the trade variables appeared to 
have no impact on the volatility of income or capital over time. 
Krishna & Senses (2009) find trade leads to income risk for the U.S. The authors' found import 
penetration had a statistically significant association with labour income risks. Their paper 
reports that a 10 percentage point increase in import penetration was associated with an 
increase in the standard deviation of persistent income shocks of about 10-20%. The 
persistent income risk was estimated to account for a 4-11% decline in life-time consumption. 
Finally, another explanation for the rise in income volatility can be due to job displacement. 
For workers who become displaced, the transitory variance of their income can be more 
volatile in the immediate aftermath following job displacement. Huff Stevens (2001) finds job 
displacement did raise the variance of transitory earnings during the 1970s and 1980s. This 
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means displaced workers had a higher variance of transitory earnings than non-displaced 
workers. However, little is known about the transitory variance trends over the last two 
decades - over the 1990s and 2000s. Additionally, Huff Stevens (2001) acknowledges that 
rising job displacement can only explain part of the overall rise in earnings instability as 
displaced and non-displaced workers experienced a rise in earnings instability during the 
1980s. 
For the U.K. there are no papers available to my knowledge which have explored the trends in 
tranSitory income fluctuations or have distinguished between the permanent and transitory 
variance of income. But, Nickell et 01., (2002) find the probability of substantial year on year 
real hourly pay reduction (of 10% or more) for continuously employed men rose by 20-30% 
from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s. Devereux & Hart (2006) find income volatility for the 
U.K. may be the result of changing employers. They find the wages for external job movers 
exhibited high wage cyclicality that was 30-40% more than job stayers (10-15%). They also 
reported internal wage cyclicality did exist but was not as great as for external job movers. 
To sum up, has income volatility increased over time - the answer to this question is yes and 
no. Average income volatility has not increased over time for the vast majority of individuals 
with income between the 1st and 75ft! percentiles; but it has increased for individuals with the 
most volatile income above the 90ft! percentile. Secondly, can the rise in income volatility be 
attributed to forces associated with globalisation - the answer to this question is no. This is 
because this literature is still in its infancy and it does not provide conclusive results which 
agree income volatility has increased over time because of forces associated with 
globalisation. At present the existing literature suggests their impact has been negligible. 
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3.3.2 Income Mobility and Income Dispersion 
Another strand of the literature examines income mobility. This literature tries to establish 
whether individuals have moved up the income distribution (they have become better off) or 
whether changes in transitory and permanent components of income volatility have moved 
them down the income distribution (that is they have become worse off) over time. To gage 
the change in income mobility, this strand of research estimates the probability that 
family/individual incomes have experienced a 20-50 percent drop (or a gain) in their income 
levels over time. This is taken to be a measure of downward (upward) mobility. Non-
directional income mobility examines the absolute share of upward and downward mobility 
changes to income over time to assess the overall absolute change in income mobility. And 
the literature on income dispersion looks at changes in the dispersion of absolute income 
mobility - that is the spread or the standard deviation over time. All studies which have 
examined these measures of income volatility for the u.s. have been reviewed by Winship 
(2009). 
Winship (2009) finds the changes in income mobility are inconclusive as the empirical 
evidence cannot conclusively find that individuals have become better off or have become 
worse off over time. His review of this literature does suggest that absolute income mobility-
non-directional, downward and upward income mobility increased during the 1970s. But 
there is difficulty with trying to reconcile the estimates from various data sets that have been 
used to measure income mobility over the post 1970s. Some of these findings are outlined 
below. 
Hacker (2006) examines downward income mobility using the PSID and finds the predicted 
probability of a 20 percent drop in income between two years increased from 4 percent to 11 
percent between 1970 and the early 2ooos. Similar findings are also reported by Jacobs 
(2007), Hacker & Jacobs (2008), Gosselin (2008), Dynan et 01., (2008), Rose & Winship (2009) 
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and Gosselin & Zimmermen (2008). But research by Orszag (2008) for the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), reports downward income mobility has changed very little over time and 
Acs et al., (2009) report adults experiencing a 25% drop in their income between successive 
four month waves over the course of a year rose from 40 percent in 1996 to 46 percent in 
2001 and then fell to 36 percent in 2004. Similar rate changes are reported with a 50% and a 
75% drop in income over time. 
The differences amongst the results may be explained by the use of three different data sets 
amongst the different papers that are mentioned. Research by Jacobs (2007), Hacker & Jacobs 
(2008), Rose & Winship (2009), and Gosselin & Zimmerman (2008) have all used the PSID. 
Whereas papers by Orszag (2008) have used the social security administrative data on 
continuous work history sample (CWHS); Dahl et al., (2008) and Acs et al., (2009) use SIPP -
Survey of Income and Program Participation panels which are maintained by the CBO. The 
differences between the results may relate to the fact that the administrative data are not 
subject to recall bias from respondents with survey data such as the PSID. Secondly, 
administrative data has income for individuals who have very high incomes that may not be 
present in survey data. However, the disadvantage of using survey data is it does not have 
data for all individuals - namely individual who are not part of the social security system, the 
self-employed and unreported income. But Dahl et al., (2008) note this may relate to less than 
10 percent of the sample which may make little difference to the overall results which show 
using administrative data, income mobility has changed very little over time. 
Most of the research that has examined upward income mobility agrees there has been a rise 
in upward income mobility during the 1970s and the 19805, but it fell during the early 2000s 
(Gosselin (2008), Dahl et aI, (2008), Orszag (2008)). But Rose & Winship (2009) find little 
evidence of any change in upward income mobility over time using the PSID. Similarly, 
research that has examined non-directional mobility (this refers to the share of upward and 
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downward mobility) from the 1960s to the early 1990s has roughly remained the same 
(Duncan et aI, 1993). Other papers show absolute income mobility has changed little over the 
1990s to the post 2000 time frame compared to the early 1980s to 1990s (Hertz (2006, 2007); 
Dahl et al., (2008); Nichols & Zimmerman (2008) and Orszag (2008)). 
The review of literature relating to income dispersion is equally inconclusive. Research by 
Dynan et a/., (2008) finds the standard deviation from two-year percent changes in income 
increased by 30 percent from the 1970s to the early 2000s. But other studies disagree there 
has not been a continuous increase in income dispersion over time. The empirical research 
agrees that income volatility did increase over the 1970s, it changed little over the 1980s and 
rose slightly over the 1990s and post 2000 periods. See Orszag (2008), Nichols & Zimmerman 
(2008), Gundersen & Ziliak (2008) Blundell et al., (2008) for further details. 
The literature for income volatility suggests there has been a rise in income volatility over the 
last decade based on u.S. data, but little is known as to why the transitory and permanent 
income trends have increased. There is recent evidence which suggests income instability may 
result from trade, job displacement and firm-level sales associated with business cycle 
movements to some extent. But there is no conclusive evidence which shows that the forces 
associated with globalisation are responsible for this volatility over time. The most plausible 
explanation from the income volatility literature suggests average income volatility has not 
increased for all individuals (those with income from the 1st to the 7SfJI percentile); but 
permanent and transitory income volatility has increased for those with income above the gofJI 
percentile, who may be self-employed and have high tolerances for taking risks. Equally, there 
is very little evidence that shows these changes to income mobility and income dispersion has 
made individuals worse off over time. 
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3.4 Job Displacement Costs 
This final section presents the empirical evidence which explores the earnings losses that may 
result from job displacement and spells of unemployment. 
3.4.1 Unemployment Scarring & Wages 
The incidents of unemployment can be scarring for future employment spells and for 
employment earnings between jobs. A worker can become displaced from employment 
through firm closure or from firm downsizing which can be the result from forces associated 
with globalisation. Job displacement can lead to a number of adjustment costs; Fallick (1996) 
notes job displacement disrupts the lives of displaced workers, it diminishes hard-earned 
expectations and it leads to a waste of human capital. Job displacement can have two 
potential costs: (1) unemployment scarring and (2) a lower trajectory of earnings following re-
employment. 
Job displacement can cause unemployment scarring as spells of unemployment can lead to 
future unemployment spells. An individual's future risk of unemployment may be related to 
their past history of unemployment (Arulampalam et 01., 2001). The cycle of unemployment 
followed by re-employment into temporary and possibly unstable jobs may occur as job loss 
leads to a loss of firm-specific human capital. Unemployment can lead to the loss of general 
work skills and it can prevent the accumulation of human capital. BOheim & Taylor (2002) find 
post-unemployment jobs in the U.K. have shorter survival times where only one half of jobs 
last for 12 months and the incidence of unemployment is found to be scarring such that it 
increases the future incidence of unemployment. 
The incidence of unemployment can lead to lower re-employment earnings because the range 
of jobs to which workers skills are transferable is an important question for displaced workers 
(Fallick, 1996). The less transferable are the skills towards future jobs, the greater will be the 
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loss of wages upon re-employment if human capital is specific to a particular industry or 
following the change of industries from job displacement. Indeed, from the perspective of job 
signalling, the past incidence of unemployment may be interpreted by an employer as low 
productivity (Phelps, 1972; Lockwood, 1991; Pissarides, 1992; Blanchard & Diamond, 1994). 
Thus, less secure jobs with low re-employment wages may be offered by an employer to 
prospective employees to better ascertain the quality of the job match. Many of these jobs 
may be temporary and may lead to further cycles of unemployment with no pay and re-
employment with low pay. Pissarides (1992,1994) notes that unemployed workers are more 
likely to enter 'bad' jobs which have low start up costs, low pay, low productivity and have 
higher rates of job destruction. Alternatively, Arulampalam et 01., (2000) suggest the 
unemployed may experience future incidence of unemployment as unemployed workers 
lower their reservation wages with the passage of time; they are more willing to accept lower 
quality jobs which are more likely to be destroyed. But Arulampalam et 01., (2001) find that 
although interruptions to spells of employment with unemployment can lead to a loss of 
labour income, this may also lead to longer term 'scars' from future unemployment spells and 
re-employment within unstable jobs. A higher incidence of future unemployment may lead to 
longer spells of job search but workers may also drift into economic non-activity. This may 
potentially exacerbate future inequality through poverty and social exclusion. 
3.4.1.1 Empirical Evidence 
The evidence from unemployment scarring has primarily focused on men, where little is 
known how unemployment scarring affects the earnings level for women. One possible 
reason for this lack of research may be because women have career interruptions to start 
families which may affect the quality of data that is available for analysis. From the literature, 
Arulampalam et 01., (2000) find strong evidence of state dependence effects with respect to 
previous unemployment incidence for mature men. Roughly 40% of the observed perSistence 
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in the unemployment probability was by state dependence. In other work, Arulampalam 
(2001) reports the wage scars for men re-entering employment following unemployment face 
a wage penalty of 5.7% during the first year of unemployment. 
The first spell of unemployment and the duration of unemployment can be very damaging to 
wage levels in future employment spells. The impact from unemployment on earnings levels 
occurs in two parts, which relates to the incidence and the duration. Gregory & Jukes (2001) 
examine the impact of unemployment scarring on British men for the period 1984-1994. They 
report the incidence of unemployment merely has a temporary average impact upon earnings 
following re-employment. This earnings set back is estimated to be 10% on initial 
engagement, which is largely eroded away after two years of continuous re-employment. The 
first spell of unemployment causes the most damage on the earnings levels for men; this wage 
scar is estimated to be 21.5%. The duration of unemployment is found to have the most 
damaging impact on earnings levels which can have a permanent long lasting impact. The 
authors' find that a one year spell of unemployment adds a further 10 percentage point 
penalty upon wages. These costs are most significant for older and high seniority workers. 
Youth unemployment can also lower earnings levels in adulthood employment. Gregg (2001) 
and Gregg & Tominey (2005) examine how the experiences of youth unemployment and 
repeated spells can impact the earnings level on re-employment in adulthood and the role of 
education in preventing or promoting the wage recovery. Gregg (2001) found men, who 
experienced an extra 3 months of unemployment in youth before the age of 23, experienced 
an extra 2 months out of employment between the ages of 28-33. Gregg & Tominey (2005) 
also find unemployment experienced in early youth can result with a wage scar with a 
magnitude of 13-21% by the age of 42. Wages scars of 9-11% can persist for up to 20 years 
later even without further spells of unemployment. This study also lends further support to 
the fact that extensive youth unemployment can lead to further incidences of unemployment 
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risk up to the age of 33, which further inhibit wages. The authors' report upgrading education 
qualifications can enhance earnings recovery, but they are not frequently undertaken28• 
The literature on unemployment scarring predominately features British empirical evidence 
and some evidence from Europe. This evidence shows that the incidence of unemployment 
can lead to lower earnings levels post unemployment and where the incidence of 
unemployment can increase the future occurrences of unemployment spells. The earnings 
losses that can result from unemployment can cause wage scars that can be big during the 
first year. And additionally, the length of time spent unemployed can further lower earnings 
levels post unemployment. Youth unemployment can also have a detrimental effect on the 
earnings levels of workers in adulthood. Yet, it is unclear from this literature whether the 
impact on the earnings level and the subsequent wage scars that can result from re-
employment following a spell of unemployment have grown over time. This is because most 
of the findings from the British empirical literature are based on a small number of papers that 
were published during the first half of the 2000s. I call this literature the first wave of findings. 
There is currently no new empirical evidence from a second wave of research to determine 
whether workers who have lost their jobs over recent time, have experienced wage scars that 
have increased in magnitude over time compared to earlier estimates. 
There is no empirical evidence from the U.S. literature that has examined the impact of 
unemployment scarring on wage and earnings levels. Much of the research has tended to 
focus on the long-term earnings losses that can result from job displacement. The job loss 
literature has already shown the incidence of job loss has not increased over time. But the 
28 Evidence from the European evidence shows the Impact of unemployment scarring Is not limited to experienced labour or 
men; Gartell (2009) finds a wage scar of 30% for graduates who registered as being unemployed five years after graduation 
compared to those graduates who did not register as being unemployed upon graduation for Sweden. Lupl & Ordlne (2002) find 
the Impact of unemployment scarring on wages was greater for Southern and more developed regions of Italy compared to the 
Northern and less developed regions. Other research also shows that unemployment Insurance benefits can mltipte the Income 
losses that can be caused by unemployment by encouraging workers to seek and search for better jobs that are not unstable 
(Gangl. 2004; M o o i - R ~ . . 2(09). Additionally. M o o i - R ~ I I (2009) finds unemployment scarring was more persistent amongst 
women for the Netherlands. 
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question is whether the earnings losses from job displacement have increased over time to 
signify that workers have become worse off. The forth coming section tries to establish this 
fact. 
3.4.2 The Earnings Losses from Job Displacement 
The earnings losses for displaced workers are well established; for earlier reviews see Fallick 
(1996) and Kletzer (1998). From a more recent review, Couch & Placzek (2010) re-examine the 
U.S. literature on the earnings losses from job displacement and note that the estimates from 
a number of high quality studies agree job displacement can lead to sustained income losses 
for many years following job displacement. Yet they note the magnitude of the earnings 
losses from the empirical research can vary by the data sets used for analysis, whether a 
comparison group is employed in the analysis, whether demographic groups are examined, or 
whether comparisons are made of workers switching industries to find post-displacement re-
employment, among other factors. Table 3.4 has been taken from Couch & Placzek (2010); 
this table summarises the main findings from papers which have used a range of different data 
sets from the U.S. literature. A few of these papers are discussed below along with other 
papers not featured within table 3.4. 
Studies which have used the DWS agree the impact of job loss on earnings levels can be 
substantial, which may typically reflect the loss of firm specific human capital from the 
employment relationship. This impact is substantial for older and high seniority workers. 
Topel (1990) finds the earnings level for blue collar workers fell by 40 percent in the short run, 
caused by a fall in labour suppll9. Topel (1990) additionally finds the loss of labour income in 
the first year amounts to 17 percent. And four years after job displacement, the earnings 
levels are still 16 percent lower, and where the long run costs can have substantial effects on 
life-time wealth among older and experienced workers. Farber (1993,1995) finds the costs of 
29 This is a fall in the number of hours that are worked and because of unemployment 
136 
job displacement can cause post displacement income to be 11%-12% lower after 1-3 years 
following job displacement. Research by (arrington (1993) finds the earnings losses can be 
substantial following job loss if workers switch industries. Similar findings are also reported by 
Huff Stevens (1997) and Couch et 01., (2009). The impact is less if workers are re-employed 
within the same industrial sector (Neal, 1995). 
Figure 3.6 plots the earnings losses reported by table 3.4. For each data set, the graph shows 
the period of coverage used by each study and the percentage of long-term earnings losses 
that are reported following job displacement. This graph is an attempt by this chapter to 
reconcile whether the magnitude of the earnings losses following job displacement, have 
increased or remained unchanged over time from the use of different data sets reported by 
the literature. This figure shows the reported earnings losses from studies that have used the 
DWS can amount to 8-16% following job displacement after 1-5 years from data covering the 
period 1979 to 1998. 
Studies that have used the PSID report earnings losses that are of a similar magnitude to 
papers that have used the DWS. Ruhm (1991) finds earnings levels were 14-18 percent lower 
in the first year after job loss and workers who were out of work an additional week continued 
to earn 10-13% less than non-displaced workers 4 years after job displacement. Huff Stevens 
(1997) finds the effects of job displacement can be quite persistent resulting with earnings and 
wage levels being approximately 9% below their expected levels more than six years after job 
loss because of additional job loss in years following the initial incidence of job displacement. 
The costs can also be substantial in the short run, where earnings levels can be 30 percent 
lower in the first year. If workers avoid additional spells of job displacement, the earnings 
losses are only 1-4% lower six years after job loss. Overall, figure 3.6 shows that the earnings 
losses following job loss according to the PSID data covering the period 1968-1986 can amount 
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to 10-13% after 4-6 years following job displacement; these estimates are similar in magnitude 
to the DWS estimates. 
Couch (1998), Chan & Huff Stevens (1999) and Chan & Huff Stevens (2004) examine the effects 
of job displacement for older workers using the Health and Retirement Surveys (HRS). They 
find the earnings losses can be larger on average for older workers than for prime-aged 
workers reported from the DWS and PSID. The earnings levels can be 19-34 percent lower in 
the first year and they can be 23-47 percent lower over six years after job displacement. 
Figure 3.6 shows that these earnings losses are above average compared to the earnings 
losses reported by the DWS covering a similar period of data analysis. However, one of the 
reasons why these estimates are above average compared to the PSID and the DWS is because 
this survey relates to older individuals whom may have had near life-time jobs at some stage 
during their employment. 
Using the National Longitudinal Survey for Youth (NLSY), Kletzer & Fairlie (2003) find the 
earnings losses for young workers are short term. The short run fall in annual earnings 5 years 
after job displacement were found to be between 8-13% for men and 7-12% for women. But 
the earnings losses of younger displaced workers in the long-term can be similar to those with 
greater labour market experience (Couch & Placzek, 2010). These estimates also show from 
figure 3.6, the earnings losses are comparable and consistent in magnitude with the PSID and 
the DWS. 
Figure 3.6 and table 3.4 show the earnings losses following job displacement from the DWS, 
PSID and the NLSY have similar magnitudes which lay in the region of 7-16% following job 
displacement after 1-6 years from 1968 to 1998. They have not increased in magnitude over 
time. These estimates suggest that workers who became displaced during the 1990s were no 
more worse off compared to workers who had become displaced during the 1970s or 1980s 
according to the estimates from these three data sets. 
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Table 3.4: Studies of Job Displacement, Mass Layoffs and Earnings Losses 
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Source: This is table 1 from Couch & Placzek (2010). Notes: '+' denotes a larger impact and '- ' an equivocal result. UI indicates the 
data sample was used to calculate earnings losses from records that are kept by states to calculate unemployment insurance 
benefits if a worker loses employment. 
However, many of the studies that have used administrative data sets to examine the earnings 
losses for workers from specific states in the U.S. show the estimated earnings losses can be 
sensitive to the economic cycle and whether each of the states were heavily industrialised and 
had a disproportionate number of job losses from the manufacturing sector. The type of job 
displacement (a mass-layoff or a plant closure) can also affect the magnitude of earnings 
losses in the long run. For example, Gibbons & Katz (1991) develop an asymmetric 
information model about layoffs. This model suggests that workers displaced from 
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employment because of mass-layoffs experience larger post-displacement earnings losses 
compared to workers displaced from employment because of plant-closure. This is because 
when firms are able to choose which workers they lay-off, they tend to lay-off workers who 
are less productive and have low ability. But with plant closures, all workers are laid-off 
regardless of the productivity or ability levels. As lay-off rates tend to be greater during a 
recession, workers who become displaced from mass-layoffs tend to have lower productivity 
and therefore their earnings losses should be larger in poorer economic conditions than during 
favourable economic conditions (Couch et 0/., 2009). 
Figure 3.6: Comparison of Earnings Losses from U.S. Studies 
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Source: Graph compiled by the author. The information used to compile this graph was taken from table 3.4. 
To reconcile the findings from the existing literature that have used administrative data sets, 
figure 3.1A located in appendix 3 shows a rising national civilian unemployment rate during 
the late 1970s to the mid 1980s. When Jacobson et 0/., (1993a, b; 2005a) carried out their 
analysis, the average unemployment rate for the state of Pennsylvania was 8.6% for the period 
1976-1985 and for the state of Washington, the average unemployment rate was 6.4% for the 
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period 1987-1995. And during the late 1980s to the early 1990s there was a falling national 
unemployment rate when Schoeni & Dardia (1996) carried out their analysis for the state of 
california, although the unemployment rate was high during the early stages of the 1990s. 
The average unemployment rate for the state of California was 7.7% for the period 1989-1994. 
Additionally, figure 3.2A from appendix 4 compares the unemployment rates across each of 
these states with the national average civilian rate in the U.S. This graph shows for the states 
of Washington and Pennsylvania, both of these states had higher unemployment rates 
compared to the national average for the civilian work force during the mid 1970s and late 
1980s. And the state of California had a higher unemployment rate during the early 1990s 
compared to the national average. These figures show there were unfavourable economic 
conditions during the time when Jacobson et 01., (1993a, b; 2005a) and Schoeni & Dardia 
(1996) carried out their analysis to establish the earnings losses for displaced workers. 
From these studies that have used administrative data sets, Jacobson et 01., (1993a) found 
tenured workers (skilled labour) suffered long-term income losses averaging 25% per year of 
pre-displacement earnings levels six years after job displacement for the state of Pennsylvania. 
The impact on the earnings levels is even larger for the state of Washington; Jacobson et 01., 
(2005a,b) report post-displacement earnings levels can be 29-33% lower than their pre-
displacement levels, four years after job loss. Schoeni & Dardia (1996) found the long run 
wage losses for displaced workers was estimated to be 17-25% relative to non-displaced 
workers, 4 years after job displacement for the state of california for the period 1989 to 1994 
30,31 
The earnings losses from the states of Pennsylvania (Jacobson et al.,1993a,b), Washington 
(Jacobson et 01., 2005a) and california (Schoeni & Dardia, 1996) appear to be very large in the 
30 Schoenl & Dardia (1996) also find the short run decline In Income amounted to 60%. This was attributed to reductions In weeks 
and hours of work. 
31 Research by Morissette et at (2007) find income losses followl", job loss can be bia for Canada, consistent with U.S. findinss. 
They find high seniority displaced male workers experienced long-term earnlnss losses that ranged between 18%-35" of their 
pre-dlsplacement earnings. For females, they find the income losses ra",e between 25" and 35". 
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long-term based on data from the early 1980s and 1990s. These periods had higher 
unemployment rates compared to the national average during the time frame these papers' 
carried out their analysis, which can be classed as unfavourable economic conditions. Couch & 
Plazek (2010) argue that the Igeneralisability' of these results is called into question as they 
cannot be generalised to all periods of economic conditions. This point in illustrated by 
research carried out by Wachter et al., (2009) who find the long-term earnings losses were 
smaller during the latter period of the 1990s. Their research used administrative wage data 
for the state of California that were matched with the DWS for the period 1994 to 2000 where 
economic conditions were favourable32• Their results show the longer-term earnings losses 
following job displacement were 12%-16% lower than pre-displacement income levels. These 
estimates are in line with papers which have used the PSID, DWS and the NLSY. 
Additionally, Couch et al., (2009) examine the earnings losses for displaced workers from 
mass-layoffs at different points along the business cycle. They use administrative data for the 
state of Connecticut spanning the period 1993 to 2004. They find the long-term earnings 
losses for workers displaced from employment because of a mass layoff during a recessionary 
period were 1.7 and 3.9 times larger than for those workers observed in a period of sustained 
economic growth. To quantify these figures, if a worker losses their job in a mass layoff in an 
economic expansion, their earnings losses in the sixth year after job displacement amount to 
7.2 percent. But if the job loss occurs during poor economic conditions, the earnings losses 
equate to 18.2 percent. Regardless of gender, age and firm size, their results show workers 
experience larger long-term earnings losses when a mass layoff event occurs during poor 
economic conditions. 
The second issue relating to whether the results from administrative studies can be 
generalised over time relates to the fact that many states have increasingly seen the 
32 Figure 3.2A from appendix 4 shows a falling unemployment rate for the state of califomla over the 1994 to 2000 period. The 
average unemployment rate was 6.6" for the period 1994-2000. 
142 
expansion of employment in the service sector since the 1970s. These changes to the 
composition of employment may influence the estimated earnings losses in the u.s. over time 
(Couch & Placzek, 2010)33. Previous research reports the long-term earnings losses are 
significantly less for workers displaced from the services sector than from the manufacturing 
sector (Carrington & Zaman 1994; Jacobson et 01., 1993a). 
Couch & Placzek (2010) address these issues and examine the earnings losses from job 
displacement for the state of Connecticut from 1993 to 2004. Figure 3.2A from appendix 4 
shows the state of Connecticut has had a lower unemployment rate compared to the national 
average over time, where the average unemployment rate for Connecticut was 4.4% for the 
period 1993 to 2004. The state of Connecticut's unemployment rate has also been lower over 
time compared to the states of Washington, california and Pennsylvania. And the 
unemployment trends from figure 3.2A also signify that over this period the economic 
conditions were much more favourable and more robust for the state of Connecticut 
compared to the other three states. 
Their analysis reports the estimated earnings losses were half the magnitude of the 
Pennsylvania study by Jacobson et 01., (1993a). They found initial earnings losses resulting 
from mass-layoffs ranged from 32-33 percent in the first year of job displacement. The 
earnings losses from mass layoff remained 12-15 percent lower six years after job 
displacement. They also found the earnings losses were substantial for women, for older and 
more experienced workers, and these estimates are in line with findings from the DWS, PSID 
and NLSY. The difference between the reported magnitudes of earnings losses between the 
Connecticut study and the Pennsylvania study may relate to the fact that Connecticut has a 
more robust economy compared to Pennsylvania which has a higher unemployment rate 
n . For Jacobson et 01., (1993a) - table 1, panel A from their paper shows the total number of separators from the manufactu"", 
sector was twice as big compared to the non-manufacturing sector In Pennsylvania. From Jacobson et QI., (2005a) - the state of 
Washington represents a large number of Individuals were employed within manufacturing sectors. Schoeni & Dardla (1996) 
examine the earnings losses of displaced workers who worked for the durable goods manufacturing sector and were affected by 
recent downsizln8. 
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compared to Connecticut. Secondly, the Connecticut study analysed the earnings losses 
during favourable economic conditions compared to the Pennsylvania study which analysed 
the losses during unfavourable economic conditions. This could account for the difference in 
the magnitudes from each of the papers. Another possible explanation for the bigger 
estimated magnitude from the Pennsylvania study may simply reflect the skill mismatch 
amongst workers that were trying to regain employment following job displacement (Couch & 
Placzek, 2010). 
To sum up, the earnings losses following job displacement after one year can be substantial. 
But reconciling the earnings losses from studies which have used administrative data sets 
suggest the magnitude of the earnings losses are sensitive to economic conditions, the type of 
job displacement from employment and to the changes in the composition of the labour force 
over time. When these factors are taken into consideration, the results from the literature 
show that the earnings losses can be substantial during unfavourable economic conditions and 
smaller over favourable economic conditions. Additionally, the earnings losses are larger for 
workers who become displaced from employment because of a mass layoff event compared 
to plant closure events. On the whole, the magnitude of the earnings losses following job 
displacement over the long-term has not become bigger over time. The magnitude of the 
earnings losses suffered by workers who became displaced over the last decade has been 
similar to the survey data estimates for those workers who became displaced over the 1970s, 
1980s and the 199Os. 
From other research, the estimated wage losses from job displacement are consistent with the 
literature that has quantified the level of earnings losses over time. Polsky (1999) finds the 
odds of receiving a large wage cut rose from 9% for the 1976 to 1981 period to 17% for the 
1986 to 1991 period. Farber (2005) found full-time job losers with new full-time jobs earned 
13% less on average on their new jobs than on their lost jobs. Full-time job losers who find 
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new full-time jobs earned up to 17% less on average on their new jobs than they would have 
had, had they not been displaced. And Abbring et al., (2002) find no evidence of a decline in 
mean wages for workers in the U.S. following job displacement using the DWS. They suggest 
that workers who become displaced may have tried to seek immediate employment to avoid 
earnings losses and therefore their results may reflect slower wage growth over time. 
Moving on to the job displacement literature from the U.K. and Europe, this literature is not as 
well established as the U.S. Yet the research from the U.K. and Europe suggests the size of the 
earnings losses following job displacement can be large and small. 
The U.K. evidence suggests the earnings losses are quite smaller compared to the U.S. Gregg 
& Wadsworth (2000) find the average hourly wage gap between entry and continuing jobs 
rose by 15 percentage pOints from 1980 to 1990 and by 8 percentage points between 1994 
and 1997. This evidence show the wage losses were higher during the 1980-1990 period 
where the unemployment rate was higher and there were unfavourable economic conditions 
compared to the 1994-1997 period, where the unemployment rate was lower and economic 
conditions were favourable (see figure 3.2 for details for the U.K. unemployment rate). Booth 
et al., (2002) note that labour market flexibility comes at a cost, as many temporary job holder 
have lower levels of job satisfaction, with less job-related training and lower wage levels. 
However, temporary jobs are found to be stepping stones towards permanent jobs. Nickell et 
al., (2002) find the real wage losses resulting from job loss for men rose by around 40% from 
the early 1980s to the early 199Os. The wage losses were found to increase for older workers 
and for the higher skill group - consistent with the findings reported by the U.S. literature. 
Borland et al., (2002) found there were large wage penalties experienced by displaced workers 
with longer seniority and for those workers who were out of work for 12 months or more 
using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the period 1991-1996. Comparing income 
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before and after job loss, they estimate the weekly wage losses for re-employed workers were 
approximately 14%. The earnings losses for full time workers was 10%. These wage losses are 
quite similar to the reported figures by the u.s. studies during favourable economic 
conditions. But longer-term estimates are not available because of a small sample in 
comparison to the administrative data sets from the U.S. (Hijzen et 01., 2010). 
Finally, Hijzen et 01., (2010) examine the earnings losses for displaced workers using the New 
Earnings Survey for the period 1994 to 2003 for the U.K. This period of analysis relates to 
favourable economic conditions. They find the income losses five years after job displacement 
were in the range of 18%-35% per year for workers displaced through firm closure, and the 
income losses were in the range of 14%-25% for workers displaced through mass layoff. These 
results contrast with the findings from the U.S. literature which finds the earnings losses 
associated with mass-layoffs are much larger compared to displacement associated with firm 
closure events. But this evidence is consistent with the evidence from Europe. Their 
estimates are associated with periods of non-employment. The authors' note the extent of 
income loss depends on how long it takes displaced workers to re-enter employment. Other 
notable results from their paper show that older workers, more tenured workers, men, skilled 
labour and workers employed by manufacturing sectors have higher earnings losses 
associated with job displacemenf". 
For Europe, the empirical evidence suggests the costs from job displacement can be big and 
small. For the latter evidence, Huttunen (2005) finds the earnings levels of displaced workers 
in 1991 were on average 2.5% lower in the first year of displacement and only 1-2% lower on 
average seven years after job displacement for Norway. Appelqvist (2007) reports re-
34 Older workers lose 39% of their pre-displacement earnings per year compared to 32" for younger workers. More tenured 
workers lose 38% of their pre-dlsplacement earnings per year compared to less tenured workers (13"). Male workers lose 39% of 
their pre-displacement earnings per year compared to only 29" for females. Making a distinction between the types of Industry 
workers are displaced from; workers lose 39% of their pre-dlsplacement earnings per year If displaced from the manufacturing 
sector compared to 33" for workers displaced from service orientated Industries - consistent with findings from the u.s. And 
skilled labour loses 36" of their pre-dlsplacement earnings per year compared to 31" for less skilled labour. 
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employed workers displaced in 1992 suffered an 8 - 9 ~ % % fall in monthly wages after job 
displacement for Finland. In comparison, workers who became displaced in 1997, their 
monthly re-employment wages were unaffected. Appelqvist (2007) suggests the impact of job 
displacement on earnings levels for Europe may depend on the sensitivity to subsequent 
macroeconomic shocks. 
For the former evidence, Bender et 01., (1999) find evidence of large wage losses for Germany 
and France. Workers who remained unemployed more than a year after job loss earned 5% 
less in France and around 13-20% less in Germany upon re-employment. Couch (2001) finds 
annual earnings declined by 13.5% during the first year of job displacement, with post-
displacement earnings 6.5% lower than pre-displacement earnings for German workers. 
Similarly, Carneiro & Portugal (2003) found the average hourly earnings for men and women 
to be 11% and 9% below the expected counter factual level had displacement not occurred in 
Portugal. The average hourly earnings for workers, who had experienced non-employment, 
experienced an additional average hourly wage penalty of 4-6 percentage points. The 
earnings differentials between displaced and non-displaced workers were found to be largely 
associated with the loss of job tenure within the firm. 
In summary, the earnings losses from job displacement are somewhat smaller in magnitude 
from the U.K research compared to the U.S. The U.K. research suggests the earnings losses 
can be big and small35• However, it is unclear whether the magnitude of the earnings losses 
have grown or remained unchanged over time. This is because it is difficult to reconcile the 
estimates from survey data that have explored wage changes at hourly and weekly intervals 
compared to estimates by Hijzen et 01., (2010) that have used an administrative data set to 
examine the earnings losses post 1990 at annual intervals. 
35 The losses are big in the sense that the earnings losses from plant closures are laraer during a favourable economic climate. 
They are small in the sense that the earnings losses in the first year are somewhat smaller. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined whether there is empirical evidence to support claims there has been a 
rise in labour market insecurity over time. The empirical evidence from three components of 
labour market security comprised of (a) job security), (b) income volatility within jobs Gob 
stability) and (c) the earnings losses between jobs resulting from job displacement were 
reviewed by this chapter. From this literature review, I find there is little evidence to suggest 
there has been a rise in labour market insecurity for the U.K. or for the U.s. over the last four 
decades. Further details regarding this conclusion are provided below. 
From the first component of labour market security - job security, this review found there has 
been a secular decline in job security from the 1970s to the 1990s for the U.K. The empirical 
evidence shows a la Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) there has been a secular fall in medium Gob 
tenure greater than or equal to 5 years) and long term Gob tenure greater than or equal to 10 
years) job tenure shares for men and for women with no children. But this fall has been small 
over time. And recent evidence from Faggio et al., (2011) note that long term (short term) job 
tenure has continued to fall (risen) for men (women with young children) over the 1985-2009 
time frame. From the North American literature, there was no evidence of a decline in job 
retention rates over the period of the 1970s to the latter 1990s. Recent evidence by Davis 
(2008) also shows there has been a decline in job loss rates over the last decade compared to 
the 1970s, 1980s or the 1990s; a decline in state assistance for displaced workers and a decline 
in the unemployment inflow rates. Additionally, research by Farber (2001, 2005 & 2009) 
shows job loss rates have not increased over the last four decades. The empirical evidence 
suggests there are stable job that can be thought of as life-time jobs that have not become 
shorter over time. 
The second component of labour market security explored income volatility within jobs over 
time. This component of labour market security examined three strands of empirical research 
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based on U.S. findings. These three strands of research related to (1) changes in the 
permanent and transitory variances of individual income levels over time; (2) changes in 
income mobility over time and (c) changes in the dispersion of income levels over time. The 
empirical evidence from the first strand showed there has been a rise in the permanent and 
transitory variances of individual level income from the 1970s to 1990, with little change of 
over the 1990s with a rise once again after 1998 over the most recent decade. The overall 
change in income volatility suggests that permanent and transitory variances of income have 
increased over time. But this rise cannot be interpreted as a rise in average volatility for the 
vast majority of individuals. When the average income volatility accounts for individual 
heterogeneity, the rise in the average volatility is driven by the changes in the income levels 
from those with the most volatile incomes at the right tail of the income distribution. These 
individuals are most likely to be self-employed and they may have high tolerances to take 
risks. They have experienced greater changes to their income levels than compared to the 
average population. There is also little conclusive empirical evidence which shows that the 
rise in income volatility is associated with forces with globalisation. Further empirical research 
is required to provide clarity. The evidence from the second and third strands of research 
show the changes to income mobility and income dispersion are not conclusive. This empirical 
research disagrees as to whether they have increased or declined over time. 
Finally to the last component, there are substantial costs associated with unemployment 
scarring in the event of job loss for the U.K., where the re-employment wages can be 
substantially lower than the pre-employment wage levels. Unemployed workers are more 
likely to be re-employed within jobs that are shorter in duration and very few jobs after job 
loss last for up to 12 months. The post-displacement earnings losses can be substantial in the 
long-run following job displacement, where the earnings losses can be greater from plant 
closures than from mass-layoff events for the U.K. The oppOSite conclusion is reached from 
the U.S. literature. The evidence from the U.K. suggests the magnitude of the earnings losses 
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depends on the length of time spent out of employment. But as this literature is in its infancy 
and is not as well established as the u.s. evidence, it is unclear whether the earnings losses 
from job displacement and from unemployment scarring have increased over time to signify 
that workers have become worse off over time. 
The evidence from the U.S. literature shows the post job displacement income losses can be 
substantial in the long-run and the short-run. They can be substantial during recessionary 
periods of the business cycle and somewhat less during favourable economic conditions. The 
earnings losses are found to be larger for workers displaced during mass-layoff events than 
from plant closures. The earnings losses can be substantial for older and high-seniority 
workers. But this literature does show that the magnitude of the earnings losses have not 
become bigger over the last four decades. 
To sum up, the empirical evidence signifies that life time jobs may not be getting shorter for 
u.s. or for U.K. workers. Income volatility has grown for risk tolerant individuals over the last 
10 years but has remained unchanged on average for workers who do not have highly volatile 
income levels in the U.s. And the costs of job loss can be substantial in the short-run and long-
run that are the result from mass-layoffs. The earnings losses can be larger during 
recessionary conditions than during favourable economic conditions. This literature suggests 
that the magnitude of the earnings losses following job displacement ranges between 8-16%, 
4-6 years after job loss; this magnitude has not increased over the last four decades and thus 
workers have not become worse off over time. Thus, my conclusion from this review is there 
is no evidence that signifies there has been a rise in labour market insecurity for the U.s or for 
the U.K. over the last four decades. 
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3.6 Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Data Sources 
list of data sources used to create figure 3.2 were obtained from the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) from the U.K. The names of data series that have been used are as follows: 
• Output per Worker: Series A4YN; Output per worker for the whole economy; % 
change per annum, seasonally adjusted. 
• GOP Growth Rates: Series IHYN; GOP quarter on quarter growth, seasonally adjusted. 
• Redundancy Rate: Series BEIR; LFS ILO Redundancy rate, seasonally adjusted. 
• Unemployment Rate: Series MGSX; LFS Unemployment rate for U.K., aged 16 and 
over, seasonally adjusted. 
• Employment Rate: Series MGSR; lFS Employment rate for U.K., aged 16 and over, 
seasonally adjusted. 
• Retail Price Index: Series CZBH; Quarterly index of numbers; Percentage change in RPI 
over 12 months. 
Appendix 2 
Data Sources 
This appendix provides the data source used to construct figure 3.5. The data for this graph 
was obtained from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) from the U.K. The name of the data 
series used is the following: 
• Total Claimant Count; NSA in thousands. Data series name: BCJA. 
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Appendix 3 
u.s. Unemployment Trends 
Figure 3.1A: U.S. National Average Unemployment Rate for Civilian Labour Force 
o 
... 
N 
1946 1956 1966 1976 
Year 
1986 1996 2006 
Source: Figure compiled by the author. Data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The national 
average unemployment rate for the civilian labour force consists of persons aged 16 years and over. 
For the periods of recession noted by the U.S. economy over time in relation to figure 3.1A 
relate to: 
1948-1949 1953-1954 1957-1958 1960-1961 1969-1970 1973-1975 
1980 1981-1982 1990-1991 2001 2007-2009 (estimate) 
The NBER provides details of the peak to trough recession dates. These are available from 
http://www.nber.org/cvcles.html. 
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Appendix 4 
U.S. Unemployment Trends for California, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Washington 
Figure 3.2A: U.S. National Average & State Unemployment Rate for Civilian Labour Force 
o 
U.S. National Average 
Connecticut 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Year 
Source: Figure compiled by the author. Data was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The national 
average unemployment rate for the civilian labour force consists of persons aged 16 years and over. The 
unemployment rate for each of the states relates to state wide unemployment rates. 
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4 
An Analysis of the Effects of Offshoring & Task Biased-Technological 
Change on Wages: Evidence for the U.K. 
4.1 Introduction 
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2007) cite the work of David Ricardo (lS17), which illustrates the 
principle of comparative advantage. This principle illustrated almost two hundred years ago 
the exchange of one good (wine) for another (cloth) between England and Portugal. Goods 
were completed at a single location and were traded once completed. Fragmentation of the 
production process was expensive during that time as monitoring and co-ordination of 
workers' activities were costly. Two hundred years later, improvements in technology, 
telecommunications and transportation have reduced co-ordination costs and they have 
allowed the production process and the specialisation of job tasks to become fragmented. 
Domestic firms from developed countries have taken advantage of this opportunity to 
offshore production stages to developing countries. Traditionally, the purchase of 
intermediate inputs took place in domestic markets. But with the fragmentation of the 
production process, offshoring and outsourcing allow domestic firms to purchase inputs from 
foreign markets and more importantly to have access to wider markets around the world, not 
just for inputs but also for labourl. Offshoring can affect the rate of job creation and job 
1 A recent example of frqmentatlon of the production to take place in the U.K. relates to a wave of strikes that took place in 
February 2009 at the Undsey Oil Refinery located in North Uncolnshire. The dispute centred upon a contract to extend the diesel 
refining capacity at the refinery owned by oil giant Total. The contract was awarded to a Californian-based engineering group 
Jacobs In June 2006 for completion in 2009. Jacobs subcontracted to an Italian firm, IREM after a tender process. The terms of 
the contract between Jacobs and IREM stated IREM would be using Its existing Italian and Portuguese workforce for the job. 
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destruction through structural shifts in labour demand that may result from changes in tastes 
and technology (Mortensen & Pissarides, 1994). Offshoring allows firms the flexibility to 
allocate their work activities more efficiently that maximise their profits (Jabbour, 2010). This 
process enables firms to offshore job tasks that they lack comparative advantage and 
expertise to produce and maintain and inshore those job tasks they have a comparative 
advantage and expertise to produce. 
The consequences of offshoring have received much attention from the media. Amiti & Wei 
(2005) and Mankiw & Swagel (2006a,b) show the number of press references to outsourcing 
steadily increased throughout the 1990s and the early 2000 period for the u.s. and the U.K. 
Responses for the u.s. heightened during the 2004 u.s. presidential election, where offshoring 
became synonymous with the public debate on job loss which was a hotly debated issue [see 
Mankiw & Swage I (2oo6a,b) for further details on the political and economic issues on 
offshoring and Bhagwati et 01., (2004) and Baldwin (2006) for a summary of the offshoring 
debate]. 
The attention from the media references reflects the anxiety felt by many workers. That is, 
offshoring parts of the production process to developing countries can lead to adjustment 
costs, particularly for less skilled workers. There is also the fear that offshoring raises labour 
market insecurity because domestic labour may be substituted by foreign labour. A rise in 
offshoring to foreign labour markets can raise the rate of job destruction, assuming this is 
greater than the rate of job creation. The fall in demand for domestic labour can exert 
downward pressure on wage levels. This downward pressure can also culminate from the 
threat of offshoring made by firms during wage negotiations. Thus, offshoring can lower job 
security and job stability and it can raise job reallocation rates. With a rise in the number of 
British workers and unions were unhappy about this aspect of the contract as they felt key infrastructure projects at power 
stations and oil refineries were in a long line of key projects that were being awarded to foreign workers. EU law states nationals 
of member states are automatically allowed to live and work In Britain. This strike lead to wave of sympathy strikes across the 
U.K. More details of this story can be found at the following links: http://news.bbc.co.uk/lIhi/business0860622.stm: and 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk politics0866614.stm. 
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jobs that may be at risk from being offshored, many workers may become unemployed. The 
post-displacement costs of unemployment on future employment and income can potentially 
be substantial in the long run. But the empirical evidence does show these costs are 
somewhat less for the U.K. than they are for the U.S. Chapter 3 from this thesis provided a 
review of this literature. This review found that although the magnitude of the earnings losses 
associated with job displacement can be substantial during recessionary economic conditions 
and less during favourable economic conditions, this magnitude has not increased over time. 
See chapter 3 for further details of this review. 
Traditionally, offshoring has reflected the transfer of assembly jobs completed by low skilled 
labour employed within the manufacturing industries. The prime motivation for firms has 
been to lower the costs of production by substituting domestic workers for cheaper foreign 
workers. This offshoring strategy is possible because domestic firms from developed countries 
may not have a comparative advantage in the production of goods that are labour intensive 
compared to developing countries (Deardorff, 2005). The scope for savings is greater with 
transferring low-skill production stages because less-skilled labour in developed countries are 
scarce and more expensive compared to developing countries which have an abundance of 
labour but less capital (Crina, 200gb). 
The international transaction of services may also be inputs in the production process and 
they are a recent innovation that has taken place over the last 20 years. Service offshoring has 
often been equated to call centres in the U.K. where jobs have been offshored to India. The 
most recent fears about job loss reflect the loss of high-skilled white collar jobs from the 
service sector. Many high-skilled jobs were previously considered impervious to international 
competition (Amiti & Wei, 2005). But more recently, highly skilled jobs such as radiologists, 
architects and even accountants are occupations that are at risk of being offshored with the 
improvements in telecommunications and technology. Many of the services provided by 
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these occupations can be delivered remotely via the internet as some of these occupations do 
not require face-to-face contact with the customer (Blinder, 2007). More recently for the U.K., 
in July 2009 the British Council announced a number of jobs in IT and finance areas would be 
cut and replaced by local staff in India where the civil service hoped to locate jobs. Many 
workers had felt civil service jobs would be unaffected as these were jobs in Government that 
may present potential national security risks if performed by other organisations other than 
British nationals2• 
The potential number of jobs that could be destroyed because of offshoring has been well 
documented by the literature. Published reports by the OECD (2007a) and the National 
Academy of Public Administration (thereafter referred to as NAPA) (2006) summarise details 
of papers which provide upper and lower estimates for the total number of jobs that could be 
destroyed within the U.S. economy and worldwide. The reported numbers for potential job 
losses from service offshoring vary widely amongst the reported papers [see OECD (2oo7a) 
and the NAPA (2006) for further details]. Blinder (2006, 2007) refers to service offshoring as 
the third industrial revolution and estimated approximately 28-42 million jobs were potentially 
at risk from being offshored; for the manufacturing sector, Blinder estimates roughly 14 
million jobs could potentially be lost. That represents 20%-30% of total U.S. employment in 
2004. Whereas research by Jensen & Kletzer (2005), Garner (2004), van Welsum (2004) and 
Bardhan & Kroll (2003) estimated between 9 and 23 million jobs could be offshored from the 
U.S. McKinsey Global Institute (2005) reported 160 million jobs worldwide were potentially at 
risk of being offshored to developing countries. But the actual number of job losses to date 
has been small. Bronfenbrenner & Luce (2004) find there were 48,000 job losses for the first 
quarter of 2004 for the manufacturing sector in the U.S., whilst Brown (2004) finds the total 
number of job losses for the year 2004 was 16,073 for the service and manufacturing sectors 
2 The full details for this story can be found at the followlnllink to The TImes News paper: 
http:Uwww.timesonline.co.uk/tollnews/politics/artide6731151.ece: and 
http:Uwww.timesonllne.co.uk/tol/news/politics/artide6731114.ece. 
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for the u.s. This amounts to less than one percent of total job losses due to offshoring. 
Similarly, McKinsey Global Institute (2005) found the total number of job losses due to 
offshoring of service activities amounted to 565,000 job losses worldwide for 2005. For 
Europe, the evaluation of jobs lost due to offshoring was conducted by the European 
Restructuring Monitor (ERM) and was published in 2006 by the European Foundation for 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. This report finds job losses due to offshoring 
represented a small fraction from total job losses. Total job losses for the U.K. in 2005 was 
over 200,000, where the number of jobs lost due to offshoring was a fraction of the total, at 
6,764 job losses or 3.38%3.4. 
There is a comprehensive review of the literature which has examined the effects of offshoring 
on the employment level, job security, wage inequality, the wage level and more recently the 
skill composition of domestic emplovment. Reviews exploring the impact from material 
offshoring activities, service offshoring activities and the foreign activities of MNEs have been 
provided by Feenstra & Hanson (2003) (material offshoring); Crina (2009a) (for material and 
service offshoring) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) (for foreign activities from MNEs) 
and more recently by Bottini et 01., (2007). These reviews show material offshoring has lead to 
a fall in domestic demand for less skilled workers. The effects of material offshoring have 
lowered the employment level and the wage bill shares of less skilled labour in the U.s. and 
Europe (Anderton et 01., 2002; Falk & Wolfmayr, 2005; Ekholm & Hakkala, 2008; Harrison & 
McMillan, 2006). These job losses have been small and the evidence from other studies 
indicate that material offshoring has had little impact on the employment level (Castellani et 
3 These results are reported from table 7, page 42 from the ERM report. 
4 There are however a number of methodological shortcomings with the ERM research that must be mentioned. The ERM 
database for measuring offshoring is based on daily monitoring of press reports (general and specialist) in different EU countries. 
Monitoring of press reports relate to reviews of newspapers reporting indiscriminately on current offshorlng processes, offshorlng 
that is being performed and announcements of possible layoffs that may relate to offshoring. This monitoring by ERM only relates 
to businesses restricting operations that satisfy the following criteria: 
1. Offshoring affects at least one EU-27 member country; 
2. Offshoring announcements relate to the elimination (announced or actual) job losses of at least 100 jobs; 
3. Offshoring relates to firms employing at least 250 workers - that is at least 10% of the work force. 
These criteria may underestimate the actual number of jobs that may be lost due to offshorlng and this may provide an inaccurate 
picture of offshoring related implications for job loss in the EU (Escaionilla & Peralta, 2009). 
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al., 2008; Marin, 2004; Hijzen & Swaim, 2007; Ando & Kimura, 2007). Bottini et 01./ (2007) and 
(rino (2009a) find service offshoring has had a small impact on the total employment level as 
the impact essentially depends upon the skill intensities within service jobs. But the shift in 
the composition of the work force has benefited highly skilled labour (Crino 2007, 2009c & 
2010). 
The empirical literature also shows offshoring has had a positive impact on the wages for 
skilled labour. There have two approaches that have taken by the empirical literature to 
examine the impact that offshoring in intermediate inputs (materials and services) can have 
on wages. The first approach takes an industry level approach to test the implications of the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem from the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade. This 
literature relates to the trade vs. technology debate about the causes for the change in the 
wage structure that could explain the increase in the demand for more skilled workers which 
may have contributed significantly towards the growing inequality in wages between skilled 
and non-skilled workers over the last 30 years. The impact of technology relates to the skill 
biased technological change hypothesis which notes that new technology is complementary 
with skilled labour than with non-skilled labour who may lack the necessary skills to adapt to 
the changes. To test the impact that trade and technology can have on wage inequality, the 
empirical literature has taken product prices (the trade approach) and the relative wages 
between skilled and non-skilled workers (the technology approach) as the dependent variables 
and have estimated either product price regressions or mandated wage regressions to 
examine the impact offshoring and technology can have on the wage bill shares of production 
workers at the industry level over time. This approach has been taken by Feenstra & Hanson 
(1996, 1999, and 2003), Machin (2010) and others authors - see chapter 2 for further details. 
The second approach uses individual level data to examine the impact offshoring intermediate 
inputs can have on individual wage levels by estimating Mincer wage regressions. This latter 
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approach has traditionally been used to determine the magnitude of the positive returns to 
wages from education noted by human capital theory (Becker, 1962, 1994; Mincer, 1958, 1962 
and 1974), job search theory (Jovanovic, 1979), screening and signalling theories (Arrow, 1973; 
Spence, 1973). In brief, each of these theories explains why there is a positive relationship 
between education and earnings. Human capital theory advocates that education contributes 
to an individual's productivity. Hence, firms will hire skilled labour to maximise profits and in 
return they will pay higher wages to the more productive workerss. Geishecker & Gorg 
(2008a,b), Hummels et 01., (2009) and Munch & Skaksen (2009) have take this latter approach. 
Feenstra & Hanson (1995, 1996 & 1999) for the U.S. and Geishecker & Gorg (2oo8a,b), 
Hummels et 01., (2009) and Munch & Skaksen (2009) for European countries find material 
offshoring increases the wage bill share for skilled labour but it lowers the wage levels for less-
skilled labour. However, the impact from offshoring on the wage levels for skilled labour 
depends on whether offshoring takes place to high income countries or low income countries. 
Offshoring to high income countries tends to have a negative effect on the wage levels for 
skilled labour than for non-skilled labour. But if offshore outsourcing takes place to low-
income countries, there is a negative impact on the wage levels for less-skilled labour 
(Hummels et 01., 2009; Geishecker et 01., 2007). 
One of the important reasons why skilled labour has benefited from increased employment 
and a rise in wage levels has resulted from an outward shift in the demand for skilled labour 
5 The latter explanation for the positive relationship relates to screening. job search and slgnallinl theories. The screeni", 
argument is that though the price (the waae) and years of education are information that are available in the labour market. 
employers have imperfect information about the potential productivity of prospective employees and therefore it may take time 
to find the right employer-employee match. This theory notes that If potential employees have the potential ability to be 
productive. they will have high levels of education. Thus. employers use education as a 'screen' to increase the probability of 
hiring workers who have the rilht education level that employers wish to hire to maximise profits. Able workers will realise that 
employers have imperfect information about the potential productivity of workers and they will acquire hiah education 
qualifications to signal to employers' their ability. The underlyi", point from these theories is that high ability workers will 
succeed with further education whilst Iow-skilled workers with low ability will not be able to succeed past the screeni", process. 
The difference between the theories for the positive relationship between wages and education is that the human capital theory 
advocates that education is a sl,nal of productivity thus higher education leads to hlBher wages. But the job search. screeninl and 
Signalling theories all note that it is not schooling that leads to any productivity enhandng skills, but in a world with imperfect 
information, schooling allows employers to identify which workers are potentially the most productive. 
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from within industry demand changes. Crino (2oo9a) notes that the relative demand for 
skilled labour shifted outwards because industries raised the relative skill intensities of 
production. They did not gain skilled labour from the expansion of skilled-intensive sectors at 
the expense of lower employment shares for less-skill intensive sectors (Berman et 01., 1994, 
1998; Machin, 1996; Bernard and Jensen, 1997; Dunne et 01., 1997; Osburn, 2001). 
Advancements in technology tend to complement skilled labour because they have general 
and specific human capital accumulation that can more easily be applied to new jobs. This is 
because the 'general' skills they have are more adaptable to new jobs that encompass the 
latest technology. Less skilled labour are not the beneficiaries because they have specific 
human capital accumulation that is more specific to particular types of jobs (Ritter, 2009). 
This chapter makes three contributions to the empirical literature. For the first contribution, I 
follow Geishecker & Garg (2oo8b), to examine the impact of material and service offshoring 
intensities, measured at the industry level, on wages using the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS). My analysis differs with the work by Geishecker & Garg (2oo8b) on two fronts: First, I 
extend the analysis period from 1992-2005 to 1992-2007; second, they examine the effects of 
material and service offshoring on the wage levels for men only. This chapter examines the 
impact of the service and material offshoring intensities for men and women throughout this 
period. The gender dimension is important because offshoring can affect men and women 
differently. Munch & Skaksen (2009) find foreign outsourCing in Demark had a significant 
negative impact on the wage levels for women but no significant impact on the wage levels for 
men. Although, Geishecker & Garg (2008b) find that foreign outsourcing can have a significant 
and negative impact on wage levels for men in the U.K. 
This chapter takes the Mincer wage regression approach to examine the impact of offshoring 
on wage levels and departs from the method that has been employed by the empirical 
literature that has examined the trade vs. technology debate to explain the rise in wage 
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inequality between skilled and non-skilled workers. This latter approach has used industry 
level data to estimate product price regressions, mandated wage regressions and relative 
wage regressions to help explain the observed trends in wage inequality through the changes 
in the wage bill shares between skilled and non-skilled workers over time. The Mincer wage 
regression approach simply tries to quantify the magnitude of the impact on wage levels when 
firms engage in the offshoring of intermediate inputs. 
My second contribution to the empirical literature is a British version of an occupation 
tradability index created by Blinder (2007) for the U.S. Blinder (2007) identifies occupations 
which are able to deliver their services remotely, are not tied to specific labour market 
locations and do not require face-to-face contact with the customer are potentially tradable 
occupations. Workers who may occupy the most tradable occupations may face competition 
from foreign workers and domestic firms may demand fewer workers from the most tradable 
occupations, if parts of their domestic operations are outsourced abroad. With less demand 
for workers in the most offshorable occupations, this should lead to a fall in the wage level for 
these workers. Since this index has not been used with British data, this chapter is the first to 
examine the wage penalty experienced by the most tradable occupations in the U.K. 
Additionally, this contribution is important as this index can potentially be a useful resource 
that could be made available to other researchers. 
Finally, my third contribution to the literature examines the impact of the 'routinisation' 
hypothesis6 (Autor et 01.,2003) upon wage levels. Specifically, I follow Autor et 01., (2003) and 
Goos et 01., (2009a,b) and construct four job task variables using data from O*NET, where 
these variables measure the importance of different types of job tasks completed by 
occupations. These variables are used to examine the impact of technology substituting away 
job tasks completed by workers on the wage level. This is an alternative exploration of how 
6 This hypothesis Is also known as the ALM hypothesis and the Task BIased Technological Change hypothesis (TBTe). 
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the composition of job tasks completed by occupations may affect the wage levels of workers 
over time. To my knowledge, there is only one other paper that has explored how the type of 
job tasks performed by occupations can have an impact on wage levels; this is a working paper 
by Hummels et 01., (2009) using Danish matched employer-employee data. This chapter would 
be the first to explore the impact of the task biased technological change (TBTe) hypothesis on 
individual level wages for the U.K. Additionally, the techniques and data that are used may 
also potentially be a useful resource for other researchers. 
Few papers have explored the gender differences with the TBTe hypothesis. Black & Spitz-
Oener (2007, 2010) are one of the few papers to examine the implications of the TBTe 
hypothesis in explaining gender pay differences. Their analysis for Germany for the period 
1979 to 1999 finds job polarization was more pronounced for women than for men. They 
found the employment share in middle skill occupations shrunk by 52% for females compared 
to 23% for men; similar changes are also documented by Acemoglu & Autor (2010 & 
forthcoming). This is explained by a change in the work content of job tasks performed by 
women and men. Women experienced larger relative increases in non-routine interactive 
tasks and non-routine analytical tasks, but also a marked decline in routine tasks, with little 
change for men over this period. These changes to the composition of work tasks completed 
by women are the key to explaining the narrowing of the gender pay gap in the recent 
decades in Germany. The empirical analysis from this chapter differs somewhat from the 
methodology that was undertaken by Black & Spitz-Oener (2007, 2010) in that I do not seek to 
explore the change in work tasks completed by men and women on the pay gap. But my 
analysis seeks to explore the impact that these job tasks may have on the wage levels at the 
individual level. To preview these results, table 4.8 from this chapter shows that female 
workers are more likely to have lower wage levels from work tasks that are intensive in 
routine and non-routine manual job tasks. The impact from non-routine abstract job tasks and 
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service job tasks exert a positive impact on wage levels, though the estimated coefficients are 
not statistically significant. These results suggest that if female workers compute fewer 
routine and non-routine manual job tasks as part of their work tasks, this could explain the 
narrowing of the wage gap between men and women found by Black & Spitz-Oener (2007, 
2010). 
This chapter has the following structure: Section 4.2 provides details of the data used to 
measure service and material offshoring intensities; how to construct the Binder (2007) 
occupation tradability index and how to create the task biased technological change job task 
variables proposed by the Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003) hypothesis. Section 4.3 outlines the 
data and the estimation strategy. Section 4.4 provides the results and section 4.5 provides the 
concluding remarks. 
4.2 Measuring Offshorlng, Occupation Tradability and T8TC 
This section defines offshoring and provides details of the four variables that will be used to 
measure occupation tradability, service offshoring intensity, material offshoring intensity and 
TBTe. 
4.2.1 Defining Offshoring 
O/fshoring is a term that is often used quite interchangeably with outsourcing. Offshoring 
refers to the relocation of production stages abroad either through arm's length supply 
through market transactions (international outsourcing) or within the boundaries of the firm 
(vertical FDI) (Jabbour, 2010). This relocation can be the material and immaterial stages of 
production. Material of/shoring refers to the offshoring of manufacturing tasks e.g. assembly 
and intermediate production goods. Immaterial offshoring or services offshoring refers to the 
offshoring of business services e.g. front office services such as call centres and customer 
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services, back office services such as human resources, IT services (Roland Burger Strategy 
Consultants, 2005). Outsourcing does not imply that production stages are relocated to 
another country. It could imply outsourcing to an external firm which is located within the 
same developed country. 
4.2.2 Blinder (2007) Occupation Tradability Index 
To identify the most tradable occupations, Blinder (2007) creates a subjective offshorability 
index which measures the potential tradability for U.S. occupations. The aim for creating this 
index was to provide an estimate for the future numbers of jobs that could be lost due to 
offshoring over the future 10-20 years. 
To create this index, Blinder (2007) assumes that there is extrapolating normal technical 
progress, meaning there are no significant or sudden improvements to technology7. Blinder 
(2007) creates an occupation tradability index for a total of 817 occupations that are examined 
from the O*NET databaseS. This index is an ordinal scale where values assigned to 
occupations range from 0-100, where increasing values indicate a high degree of occupation 
tradability. 
When exploring which occupations mayor may not be offshorable, Blinder (2007) keeps in 
mind two key characteristics: 
1. Whether jobs must be performed at a specific U.S. labour market location (e.g. 
working on a farm or at an amusement park). 
2. Whether jobs require face-to-face personal communication and/or contact with the 
end user of the service (e.g. taxi driver or a surgeon). 
7 With little change in technolOlY. the index categorises each occupation according to an offshorabillty aiterlon which 
distinguishes between the most and least offshorable job. This assumption allows the index to remain unchanged over time and 
allows there to be little change in the composition of occupations available in the U.S. This index therefore enables Blinder (2007) 
to estimate the number of jobs that could be offshored according to the identification criteria that is used to identify the index; 
details of this criterion follow. If this assumption was not made, the index would have to be continually adjusted to account for 
new technol08ical developments to lale the potential number of jobs that could be lost. 
S Further details regarding the O-NET database can be found in appendix 3. 
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The main principle behind creating the index is the more personal a service is and for which 
the job requires significant face-to-face contact to prevent a degraded quality of service, these 
jobs are the least likely to be offshored abroad. To identify which occupations may be more 
tradable compared to others, Blinder (2007) follows the identification criterion shown by 
figure 4.1 below bearing these two characteristics in mind. 
Using O*NET data, Blinder views the task content and work activities for each occupation. 
Based upon their descriptions, figure 4.1 provides a series of questions that enable a route to 
categorise each occupation title into one of four categories which assign the degree of 
offshorability. 
From figure 4.1, there are four categories for the most to the least offshorable occupations. If 
workers are employed within occupations that are not required to be physically present at 
specific work locations or units, this signifies highly offshorable occupations. category I 
describes these highly offshorable class of occupations with index values in the range of 76-
100. If however workers are employed within occupations which have to be physically close to 
specific work locations, these are highly non-offshorable occupations. category IV describes 
these highly non-offshorable occupations with index values in the range of 0-25. 
There are two further intermediate classes for defining potential occupation offshorability. 
category" describes the offshorable class of occupations with index values in the range of 51-
75. These occupations do require a worker employed within an occupation to be physically 
close to U.S. work locations, but they do not require the job to be at a work unit at a specific 
U.S. location. The final category for offshorable occupations is category III. This category 
describes the non-offshorable class of occupations with index values in the range of 26-50. 
These occupations do require the job to be physically close to a work unit located at specific 
U.S. locations. Blinder (2007) identifies 291 potentially offshorable occupations with values in 
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the range of 25-100. The large remainder of the occupations with values in the range of 0-24 
are discarded from analysis. 
Figure 4.1: Decision Tree: Identifying Tradable & Non-Tradable Occupations9 
T I I ~ ~ Tom' Bl'oad Occupadoll.1 (' . I ~ o o rlt \ 
4.2.2.1 Blinder (2007) Index using British Data 
To create an occupation tradability index using British data, 1 mapped the Blinder (2007) index 
onto the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) using a crosswalk between U.S. SOC codes and 
ISCO-88 codeslO. From mapping the U.S. SOC codes to ISCO-88 codes identifies 219 potentially 
offshorable occupations for the British version of the offshorability indexll. The complete list 
of occupations is presented in table 4.1A in appendix 1. 
9 This is figure 1 taken from Blinder (2007), page 18. 
10 The crosswalk between U.S. soc and ISC0-88 codes was provided by the National Cross Walk Center, Oes Moines, Iowa. The 
file provides a detailed crosswalk between U.S. soc codes at the 6-digit level to ISCO-88 codes at the 4-digit level. The crosswalk 
can be obtained from the following link: ftp://ftp.xwalkcenter.org/DOWNLOAD/xwalks/. 
11 The British version of the index provides 219 occupations compared to 291 occupations that Blinder (2007) identifies from the 
U.S. version of this index. The reason for there being fewer occupations within the British index is there are some occupation 
codes in the U.S. soc classification system that are represented by a single ISC0-88 occupation group. For example, consider 
table FN1 below' 
OCcu .... tIon soc code Rank Offshorability Index tsCOIIII ISCOII o.scrtptlon 
Computer Systems Analysts 151051 21 93 2131 Computer systems designers and analysts 
Database Administr.1ltOfS 151061 60 75 2131 Computer systems designers and analysts 
Networlt and Computer Systems Administrators 151071 211 50 2131 Computer systems designers and analysts 
Network Systems and Data Communations Analysts 1Sl081 27 92 2131 Computer systems designers and analysts 
Computer Specialists. All Other 151099 30 90 2131 Computer systems designers and analysts 
ThiS table details the U.S. SOC codes for a list of 5 different computer related occupations. When the crosswalk was applied, thiS 
list of 5 occupations relate to one single ISCO-88 occupation group. With mUltiple occupations, the offshorability index value from 
the original index was averaged to generate a new index value for the ISe0-88 occupation group. This is one example of many 
that exist within the mapping. This process therefore reduces the number of occupations within the British version of this index. 
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Table 4.1 provides details for the 10 most and least offshorable occupations from the British 
index. From the list, the least offshorable occupations include medical doctors, nursing 
associate professionals, psychologist, carpenters and joiners among others which require 
workers to be at specific locations to perform their work tasks. Among the most offshorable 
list, there are many computer related occupations. All of these occupations do not require 
significant face-to-face contact with the customer and many of these occupations' work tasks 
could be provided remotely from abroad. 
Table 4.1: The 10 Least & Most Offshorable Occupations 
10 Least 0ffsh0rabIe Occu 
College, University & Higher Education Teaching Professionals 
Nursing Associate Professionals 
Psychologists 
Medical Doctors 
Senior Government Officials 
Philosophers, Historians & Political Scientists 
Special Education Teaching Professionals 
Carpenters & Joiners 
Child-care Workers 
Religious ProfesSionals 
Source: Author'S own compilation from the BHPS data. 
10 Most 0ffshcnbIe 
Data Entry Operators 
Computer Programmers 
Statisticians 
Ooor-to-Ooor & Telephone Salespersons 
Stenographers & Typists 
Bookkeepers 
Word-Processor & Related Occupations 
Draughtspersons 
Social Work Associate Professionals 
Computln Professionals not elsewhere classified 
A major point from Blinder (2005, 2006) is that occupations which are and are not offshorable 
can be found all along the skill spectrum. Figure 4.2 illustrates this point in graphical form. 
Taking the highest education qualifications reported by respondents from the BHPS survey as 
a measure for skill, this figure shows offshorable and non-offshorable jobs lay all along the skill 
distribution. The implication from this graph is the correlation between skill and offshorability 
should therefore be low. Blinder (2007) argues the relationship between skill and 
offshorability should be zero as it is not obvious which, "skill or education level that typifies a 
job and its vulnerability to offshoring"12. Estimates from table 4.2A in appendix 2 shows the 
correlation between wages and the index are close to zero. 
12 Table 4.2A from appendix 2 presents the estimates for the Spearman's Rank correlation coefficients for the period 1992-2007. 
Three different variables are used to measure skill. These variables are: wages, years of education and average years of 
education. The Spearman's Rank correlation tests the null hypothesis of independence between the offshorabillty Index and skill; 
the alternative hypothesis states the relationship between the offshorability index and skill does not equal to zero. From the 
table, skill measures years of education and average years of education provide estimates that are very c\ose to zero, where few 
coefficients are significant for skill measure years of education. And from the average years of education skill measure, there are 
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Figure 4.2: Potential Occupation Tradability & Skill13 
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Source: Authors own compilation from the BHPS. The skill measure is taken to be the highest 
education qualification reported by respondents. The index values range from 25-100. See 
footnote 13 for details relating to the highest education categories from the graph. 
4.2.3 Offshoring Intensity 
For the second measure of offshoring, two measures of industry level offshoring intensity are 
created. These two measures capture the idea that workers who are employed in jobs within 
industries that engage in offshoring may be more likely to lose their jobs and/or have lower 
wage levels compared to workers employed within industries that do not engage in offshoring 
related activities. The two measures of offshoring intensity are outlined below. The first is 
service offshoring intenSity and the second is material offshoring intensity. 
quite a few more significant coefficients. The estimated coefficients from these skill measures do suggest there is no relationship 
between offshorability and skill for some years; but for other years, the estimated results reject the null hypothesis. With wages 
as a measure of skill, there are significant coefficients for all years, where the size of the estimated correlation coefficient 
increases in size every year. The highest estimate is 0.2279 for 2006. These coefficients are positive which suggest the most 
offshorable jobs have higher pay. These findings contrast with Blinder (2007) who finds no correlation between skill and 
offshorability. However, this conclusion is based on a single year of data, unlike my results which show across a number of cross 
sections of years, this relationship mayor may not exist. 
13 The education classification codes have been taken from BHPS User Manual Volume B Codebook: 1: Higher Degree; 2: First 
degree; 3: Teaching QF; 4: Other higher OF; 5: Nursing QF; 6: GCE A Levels; 7: GCE 0 Levels or equivalent; 8: Commercial OF; 9: 
CSE Grade 2-5, Scot Grade 4-S, Apprenticeship, Other QF, No QF, Still at school - No QF. 
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4.2.3.1 Service Offshoring Intensity 
To measure service offshoring at the industry level, 1 follow Geishecker & Garg (2008b), who 
define service offshoring as a more direct measure of imported service inputs. The definition 
used to measure service offshoring intensity is defined by equation (1): 
ss - IMP1•.t o It---
, YI.t 
(1) 
Equation (1) defines service offshoring intensity as the ratio of imported services from industry 
i in period t, to the value of production in industry i in period t. This is an industry level 
service offshoring measure. Variable IMPt',t measures all imported services from industry i* 
at time t and variable ~ , t t measures industry output from industry i at time t. Data used to 
measure equation (1) is from the annual input-output supply and use tables from the Office 
for National Statistics (ONS) in the U.K. The input-output supply and use tables provide a 
breakdown of information which relate to the transactions of all goods and services between 
industries and final consumers for the U.K. economy for one year. These tables provide details 
for the whole economy by 108 industries and 123 products. From this information, 1 use 2-
digit SIC92 division level information to construct OSSu. At the time of writing this chapter, 
annual input-output supply and use tables are available for the period 1992-2007. 
Figure 4.3 shows the average service and material offshoring 14 intensities across all industries. 
From this figure, service offshoring and material offshoring intensities show rising trends over 
time. The service offshoring intenSity is higher than material offshoring intensity for the entire 
period. 
14 The material offshoring intensity measure is outlined below in section 4.2.3.2. 
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Figure 4.3: Average Services and Material Offshoring Intensity across Industries 
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From 1992-2007 service offshoring intensity rose by approximately 27%; the material 
offshoring intensity rose by approximately 29%. The graph also shows a sharp rise in material 
offshoring post 2003 from 1.9% to approximately 2.3% by 2006. But these average offshoring 
intensities across all industries are quite small over time. 
Figure 4.4 compares the trends in service offshoring intensity by industry groups. From this 
figure, the OSS intensity for industries agriculture, forestry & fishing, mining & quarrying, 
electricity, gas & water supply, construction, public administration & defence, education, 
health & social work have trends that lay below the average offshoring intensity across all 
industries. Whereas for industries: distributions & hotels, transport & communication, finance 
& business services and other services have higher offshoring intensities compared to the 
average. The manufacturing sector also has a higher OSS intensity post 2000 compared to the 
average. 
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Figure 4.4: Service Offshoring Intensity by Division Industry Groups 
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The industry with the highest OSS intensity is transport & communications compared to the 
other industries, fluctuating between the bands of 10-11% for the period 1992-2007. 
4.2.3.2 Material Offshoring Intensity 
To calculated material offshoring intensity, I again follow Geishecker & Gorg (2008b). The 
formula to calculate material offshoring is the following: 
(2) 
Where IMPj·,t represents imported intermediate inputs from the foreign industry i *. fl i,i·,t 
denotes the share of domestic and foreign inputs from an industry i* that is consumed by 
industry i. The material offshoring intensity is calculated using aggregate data on imports of 
manufactured goods; this information is then allocated to their use share in domestic 
industries from the input-output data available from ONS. This is a narrow measure of 
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offshoring in the sense that it represents the transfer overseas of the production activities that 
could be carried out by a domestic firm (Feenstra & Hanson, 1999). 
Figure 4.5: Material Offshoring Intensity by Division Industry Groups 
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Figure 4.5 presents the material offshoring intensities for six industries at the division level. 
From this figure, the manufacturing sector has the highest material offshoring intensity. From 
1992 to 2007, this intensity rose by nearly 5-6 percentage points. The top right graph presents 
trends for three industries which have the lowest material offshoring intensity. The finance & 
business services sector has the lowest trend, which is very close to zero over time, as is the 
trend from the electricity, health & social care sectors. 
4.2.4 Task Biased Technological Change: Concept & Measurement 
An alternative view of exploring the number of jobs that could be offshored, is to think of each 
job as bundles of tasks or activities that are associated with an occupation and completed by 
workers. It is these bundles of tasks that may be broken down into separate components, re-
categorised into new bundles of job tasks where some job tasks are produced cheaper abroad 
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and other job tasks are produced by continuing occupations in the domestic country. It is this 
alternative view of breaking down the production process into a series of job tasks which 
provides an alternative explanation to offshoring 'jobs' abroad. The task biased technological 
change (TBTe) hypothesis explains how the adoption of technology can have an impact on the 
job tasks completed by workers. With improvements in ICT, many of these re-bundled job 
tasks can be replaced by computer capital such as computer programs but many of these job 
tasks are also more likely to be offshored abroad (Acemoglu & Autor, 2010 & forthcoming). 
4.2.4.1 The Task Biased Technological Change Hypothesis 
The TBTe hypothesis refers to the 'routinization' hypothesis introduced by Autor, Levy & 
Murnane [this is also known as the ALM hypothesis] (2003). This hypothesis provides an 
explanation of how the task contents of jobs can be affected by the use of technology. 
The AlM hypothesis is based on three concepts that describe the task content required to 
perform jobs: routine job tasks, non-routine abstract job tasks and non-routine manual job 
tasks. Autor et 01., (2003), Leamer & Stroper (2001), Levy & Murnane (2004) and Grossman & 
Rossi-Hansberg (2008) note the degree to which job tasks can be broken down into a series of 
codifiable job tasks that may be repetitive and routine in nature are most likely to be 
offshored. Routine job tasks require methodical repetition of procedures that can be 
described by a series of written set of rules and procedures (Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 
2007), where such job tasks can be easily monitored; they are also most likely to be replaced 
by computer capital such as software (Acemoglu & Autor, 2010 & forthcoming). Job tasks 
which are non-routine in nature, have a large degree of tacit information and require visual 
and motor processing which cannot be described by a set of rules are least likely to be 
automated at present but they are also least likely to be offshored as monitoring of such tasks 
may not be possible or too costly. 
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The ALM hypothesis does not signify which job tasks are the most offshorable, but indicates 
which job tasks are complements to, or substitutes to the use of ICT. What this hypothesis 
does imply is routine-intensive job tasks are most likely to be replaced by computers. Thus, 
with improved ICT, these job tasks can easily be provided remotely from an offshore location 
domestically or from foreign labour market locations. 
4.2.4.2 The Job Polarization Hypothesis 
Goos & Manning (2003 & 2007) argue the ALM hypothesis has a subtle impact on the demand 
for labour across the skill spectrum. That is occupations that have a high importance for 
completing routine-intensive job tasks are not distributed uniformly across the skill 
distribution. They identify non-routine intensive job tasks compliment technology, which 
include skilled professional and managerial jobs are likely to be situated at the upper end of 
the skill distribution, where there is likely to be a rise in these types of jobs. On the other 
hand, non-routine intensive manual job tasks that account for most unskilled jobs such as 
cleaning and personal help occupations are not likely to be affected directly by technology. 
But they suggest that the impact of technology in other parts of the economy is likely to lead 
to a rise in employment for these unskilled jobs (Manning, 2004). These types of jobs tend to 
occupy the lower end of the skill distribution. Jobs which exhibit routine-cognitive and 
routine-manual job tasks tend to occupy the middle of the wage distribution. These jobs are 
likely to be substituted by technology and are they are also likely to experience a fall in relative 
demand. It is this fall in relative demand for 'middling' jobs the authors' call this process job 
polarization. 
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4.2.4.3 Measuring TBTC: Principal Component Analysis 
To measure TBTC, I follow Goos et 01., (2008, 2009a,b) to construct four variables using data 
from the Occupational Informational Network or O*NET for short.1S•16• O*NET is a database of 
occupation information. It is a career exploration database which provides job seekers, firms, 
students and many other groups, a tool for identifying the relevant skills required by workers 
in each U.S. occupation. The O*NET database provides several hundred task rating scales 
which describe key skills, job tasks and characteristics for approximately 800 occupations 
based on U.S. SOC 2000 codes. This information comes from occupational analysts and 
sampled workers, whom complete a task questionnaire. To use this information, I use a 
crosswalk provided by the National Cross Walk Center, to convert the U.S. SOC codes to ISCO-
88 codes. The four job task variables I construct are: (1) Routine Job Tasks; (2) Non-Routine 
Abstract Job Tasks; (3) Non-Routine Manual Job Tasks and (4) service Job Tasks. 
Each of these job task variables has been constructed from a series of task activities which may 
be completed by occupations. They describe the importance of each job task activity has to 
each US SOC occupation available within the O*NET files. The 'Survey Booklet Locations' file 
which is available within the O*NET file bundle provides details of 419 variables which 
describe job task activity characteristics related to: abilities, work context, work activities, skill 
and knowledge information that relate to specific features of occupations. From this file, I 
selected 95 of these task activity variables. 
From each of the task activity descriptions, each occupation has a task rating scale - which is a 
value from 1-5 to measure the importance each task activity has to each occupation and the 
percentage of time a job activity may play in the work-context of an occupation. A value of 1 
signifies there is low importance or low work context importance of a task activity to an 
15 Appendix 3 provides details for the O-NET database. 
16 I have used O-NET Version 13.0. At the time of writing this chapter. the latest version available is Version 14.0 dated July 2009. 
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occupation; a value of 5 signifies high importance of a task activity to an occupation. Appendix 
4 provides further explanations about the importance rating for a selection of the task activity 
variables that I have selected and how they relate to occupations. 
Appendix 5 provides details of all the task activity variables I have used to construct each of 
the four TBTe variables. To preview some of these variables that has been used: for the 
routine job task measure includes 'arm-hand steadiness', 'importance of repeating same task', 
'clerical' and 'interacting with computers'. For non-routine abstract job tasks, examples 
include 'initiative', 'leadership', 'complex problem solving' and 'making decisions and solving 
problems'. For non-routine manual job tasks, examples of variables used are 'handling and 
moving objects', 'operating vehicles, mechanized devices or equipment' and spend time using 
your hands to handle, control or feel objects, tools, or controls'. Finally for service job tasks, 
examples of task activity variables I have used are 'customer and personal service', 
'establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships', 'service orientation' and 'face-to-
face discussions'. 
The first three of these tasks variables have been discussed in detail in the last section; they 
relate to occupations that may occupy specific positions of the skill distribution. However, 
service job tasks differ from the other job task variables because this job task variable consists 
of activities that are non-routine and they do not relate to one specific part of the skill 
distribution but they may be performed by workers with different levels of education (Goos et 
al.,2oo8). 
To create these four job task variables, I follow Goos et al., (2008, 2009) and Autor et al., 
(2003) to construct a single principal componene7 across each SOC in O*NET, which has been 
17 Principal component analysis is a multivariate technique which linearly transforms an original set of variables which may 
possibly be correlated with each other into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables. This smaller set of uncorrelated variables Is 
called principal components. The smaller set of uncorrelated variables Is much easier to understand and to use in further analysis. 
The first principal component accounts for much of the variability in the data as possible whilst the succeedlna components 
account for much of the rest of the variability. This technique was originally proposed by Karl Pearson In 1901 and independently 
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collapsed to the ISeO-88 level. Each principal component has been weighted by u.s. 
employment in each soe ce1l18. Each of the principal components is extracted as the 
eigenvectors of the correlation matrix. This method is the equivalent to calculating the 
principal components from the original variables after each of the task variables have been 
standardized to have unit variance (Everitt & Dunn, 2001)19. Tables' 4.4A - 4.7A in appendix 6 
presents the principal component eigenvalues (also known as component loadings) and the 
proportion of the variance accounted for by each componeneo. 
Table 4.2a and figure 4.6 provide a more insightful picture of how each of the TBTe variables is 
distributed across occupations as shown by the wage distribution and table 4.2b shows the 
mean for each TBTe measures for each one digit ISeO-88 occupation groups. Table 4.2a 
presents the mean ranked hourly wage for each ISeQ-88 2-digit level occupations deflated to 
1995 prices. Additionally, following Goos et al., (2008), figure 4.6 presents four lowess 
smoothing plots for each of the job task variables distributed across the wage distribution. 
The mean ranked hourly wage from table 4.2a should provide a picture for which job tasks 
have more importance for each occupation group according to figure 4.6 above the zero Iine21• 
developed by Hotelling (1933) (Dunteman, 1989). This technique has also been used In regression analysis to solve multi-
collinearity problems between two or more Independent variables. 
18 , have used the May 2008 release from the Bureau of Labor StatistiCS, U.S. 
19 The process of standardizing potential variables to be used as principal components is very important if one has data for 
variables measured In different units. For example, length, temperature, blood pressure and anxiety rating have different units of 
measurements. If these variables are derived from the covariance matrix, the derived components will depend on the arbitrary 
choice of unit measurements. If the unit of measurement of say length Is changed from meters to centimetres, this will alter the 
derived components. Also if there are large differences between the variances of the original variables, those variables with large 
variances will dominate the early components (Everitt & Dunn, 2001). 
20 I have not presented the eigenvectors for each component because there are 19 plus variables that have been used to 
construct each principal component. Table 4.4A presents component loadings for routine job tasks. The first principal component 
has the largest variance of 8.4413 which accounts for (".::13 • 100) 44.43" of the variance from the 19 variables used to measure 
routine tasks. Each subsequent component accounts for less of the variance ran,ln, between 17.03" and 0.14". Table 4.5A 
presents component loadings for non-routine abstract job tasks. The first component accounts for Cu.:;98 • 100) 51.72" of the 
variance from the 36 variables used. Table 4.6A presents component loadings for non-routine manual job tasks. The first 
principal component for manual tasks accounts for (11::-. 100) 57.79% of the variance from the 20 variables used to measure 
non-routine manual job tasks. And finally from table 4.7A, the first component for service job tasks accounts for eo.::28 -100) 
46.66" of the variance from the 23 variables used to measure service job tasks. For each of the job task variables, the first 
components explain 44.43" to 57.79% of the variances. 
21 Figure 4.6 perhaps lacks the finesse shown from a similar figure created by Goos et 01., (2008), but these graphs present the 
main trends from the BHPS data. 
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From figure 4.6, non-routine abstract job tasks appear to be concentrated towards the upper 
and middle portion of the wage distribution. Abstract job tasks are not important at the lower 
end of the distribution. Routine job tasks are required by occupations which occupy the lower 
and middle portion of the wage distribution. This graph verifies routine job tasks are required 
by occupations which are situated in the middle portion of the wage distribution. Service job 
tasks relate to occupations which lay at the bottom and upper portion of the wage 
distribution. The middle portion of the wage distribution signifies a lack of service related job 
tasks required by occupations. Finally, manual job tasks are required by occupations which 
occupy much of the bottom and middle portion of the wage distribution. Manual job tasks are 
not very important towards the upper portion of the wage distribution. 
From all four of these plots, the abstract and service job task graphs show these tasks are 
important to high paid occupations situated towards the middle and upper portion of the 
wage distribution. These occupations appear to be located mainly within the service sector. 
From the routine and manual job task graphs, each of these job tasks is important to 
occupations situated towards the middle portion of the wage distribution. Routine and 
manual job tasks appear to be highly important for occupations located within the 
manufacturing industry. For the lower portion of the wage distribution, the low paid jobs in 
services require more service related job tasks than routine job tasks. These findings are in 
accordance with those reported by Goos et al., (2008). 
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Table 4.2a: Iseo 2-Digit Occupations ranked by Mean Hourly Wage with 
Iseo occupation descriptions 
Rank I$CO 2-Dl--,1t MeanW. I$CO Description 
1 52 4.79 Models, Salespersons & Demonstrators 
2 92 4.98 Agricultural, Fishery & Related Labour 
3 33 5.22 Teaching Associate Professionals 
4 61 5.65 Market-Oriented Skilled Agricultural & Fishery Workers 
5 51 5.92 Personal & Protective Services Workers 
6 74 5.97 Other Craft & Related Trades 
7 91 6.03 Sales & Service Elementary Occupations 
8 42 6.24 Customer Services Clerks 
9 93 6.24 Labourers in Mining. Construction, Manufacturing & Transport 
10 82 6.84 Machine Operators & Assemblers 
11 41 6.96 Office Clerks 
12 83 7.24 Drivers & Mobile Plant Operators 
13 13 7.61 General Managers 
14 73 8.04 PreciSion, Handicraft, Printing & Related Trades Workers 
15 71 8.16 Extraction & Building Trades Workers 
16 72 8.72 Metal, Machinery & Related Trades Workers 
17 81 8.93 Stationary-Plant & Related Operators 
18 32 9.44 Ufe Science & Health Associate Professionals 
19 34 9.54 Other Associate Professionals 
20 31 10.32 Physical & Engineering Science Associate Professionals 
21 23 12.61 Teaching Professionals 
22 24 12.92 Other Professionals 
23 21 13.24 Physical, Mathematical & Engineering Science Professionals 
24 12 13.82 Corporate Managers 
25 22 14.46 Ufe Science & Health Professionals 
26 11 16.45 J.e8islators & Senior Officials 
SOUn:e: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Mean hourly wages are deflated to 1995 prices. Mean 
hourly wages refer to ISCO 2-Dlgit Occupation Groups. 
Figure 4.6: Routine, Abstract, Manual and Service Task Importance for 26 
Occupations ordered by mean hourly wage for UK 
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Source: Author's own compilation. ISCO occupations ranked by Mean Hourly Wage deflated to 
1995 prices. 
Table 4.2b: Mean TBTC Measures for 1-Digit ISCO-88 Occupation Groups 
Occupations Routine Tasks NR-Abstract Tasks NR-Manual Tasks ServIce Tasks 
Legislators, Senior Officials & Managers -1.7319 4.4188 -1.7345 2.9671 
Professionals -1.8265 4.7828 -2.1842 1.6459 
Technicians & Associate Professionals -0.4980 3.0113 -0.7178 1.1471 
Clerks -2.0066 -0.9172 -2.7730 -0.1755 
Service Workers, Shop & Market Sales Workers 0.3624 -0.8018 0.1913 1.5496 
Skilled Agriculture & Fishery Workers 3.2768 -2.1922 4.2452 -2.9924 
Craft & Related Trades Workers 4.4849 -0.5996 5.5930 -3.9185 
Plant & Machine Workers 5.0896 -3.0739 5.2262 -5.5867 
Elementary Occupations 2.7146 -6.0428 2.8909 -4.1439 
Source: Authors own calculations from the BHPS. Note that NR = Non-Routine. 
Table 4.2b shows the mean task values from each of the TBTC variables for each one-digit 
15CO-88 occupation group. The TBTC hypothesis notes that non-routine abstract job tasks 
have more importance in professional occupations such as managers and other professional 
occupations such as scientists and solicitors compared to lower skilled occupations in services 
and clerical workers in offices and in physical manual jobs. This should therefore suggest that 
the mean for non-routine abstract tasks should be larger for the former group of occupations 
than for the latter group. 
Table 4.2b shows that the mean for non-routine abstract tasks are larger for skilled occupation 
groups such as legislators, senior official, managers, professionals and technical occupations. 
Whereas, this mean is smaller for less skilled occupations for clerks, service related 
occupations and for physical manual occupations in plants and agriculture. Similarly, the 
mean for routine tasks are greater for less skilled occupations in service related and physical 
manual occupations than for skilled professional occupations. The estimated means for non-
routine manual tasks tell a similar story to the routine job task means. And the mean for 
service tasks are larger for high-skilled occupations and service related occupations than for 
clerks or physical manual occupations. These calculations are in line with the predications 
from the ALM hypothesis. 
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4.3 Data & Empirical Strategy 
Section 4.3.1 provides details of the data set that has been used to carry out analysis followed 
by section 4.3.2 which provides details of the empirical strategy used in this chapter. 
4.3.1 Data 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data has been used for analysis in this chapter. The 
BHPS is a nationally representative annual survey, carried out by the Institute for Social and 
Economic Research at the University of Essex, of each adult member of a nationally 
representative sample of more than 5,000 private households (with a total of approximately 
10,000 individual interviews) randomly selected south of the caledonian Canal. The first wave 
of the BHPS was conducted during the autumn of 1991, and annually thereafter (Taylor et al., 
2006). For this chapter, I use data covering the period 1992-2007, consisting of individuals 
aged 16-65 years in paid employment. 
The summary statistics for this sample of data are presented within table 4.3. From this table, 
the average age of the sample is approximately 38 years with job tenure averaging less than 
five years per worker. The average hourly wage is over £8.5022• The average service 
offshoring intensity (055) over the sample is 2.17% and the average material offshoring 
intensity is 2.97%. The summary statistics for other variables that are used are presented 
within table 4.3. Further details relating to these variables and their measurement will be 
discussed in more detail in the coming subsections. 
22 This figure may seem quite high for the average hourly wage; however the income data that was used to create hourly pay 
includes income from employment, overtime payments and bonus pay that individuals may have paid. 
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard DevIatIon 
Real Hourly Wage 58978 8.6300 6.2702 
10g(Real Hourly Wage) 58978 1.9995 0.5466 
Age 58978 37.9076 11.6848 
Age Squared 58978 1573.521 922.7971 
White Collar Occupations 58978 0.5894 0.4919 
Ethnicity: White 58978 0.1003 0.3003 
Female 58978 0.5109 0.4999 
Male 58978 0.4891 0.4999 
Married/Cohabitating 58978 0.7259 0.4461 
Single 58978 0.1975 0.3981 
Divorced 58978 0.0604 0.2383 
Separated 58978 0.0162 0.1262 
Dependent Children in HH 58978 0.4095 0.4918 
Job Tenure 53457 4.9834 5.7688 
Job Tenure Squared 53457 58.1129 151.5575 
Experience 58978 19.8390 12.5340 
Experience Squared 58978 550.6832 5n.6714 
High Skill Education Group 58978 0.0282 0.1656 
Medium Skill Education Group 58978 0.5942 0.4911 
Low Skill Education Group 58978 0.3776 0.4848 
Firm Size < 25 58978 0.3322 0.4710 
Firm Size 25-99 58978 0.2601 0.4387 
Firm Size 100-999 58978 0.3005 0.4585 
Firm Size >=1000 58978 0.1053 0.3069 
Private Sector 58978 0.7002 0.4582 
Public Sector 58978 0.2534 0.4350 
Industry Output 58978 188029.4 114733.3 
R&D Expenditure 49290 1538.085 2937.761 
R&D Intensity 58978 0.3694 0.7085 
Hours Worked (Week) 58978 34.5031 10.2608 
Hours Worked (Month) 58978 138.0124 41.0433 
Service Offshoring Intensity (OSS) 58978 2.1766 2.4781 
Material Offshoring (05M) 58978 2.9666 5.8110 
Blinder Offshorability Index 58978 33.7946 33.0357 
Offshorability Dummy (01) 58978 0.2592 0.4382 
Years of Education 58978 13.0866 3.2972 
Years of Education Squared 58978 182.1297 78.3209 
Annual Unemployment Rate 58978 6.7582 1.9063 
Net Exports 58978 -4310.91 17293.3 
Union 58978 0.2492 0.4325 
Routine Job Tasks 58707 0.1461 2.9887 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Tasks 58707 0.6414 3.8309 
Non-Routine Manual Job Tasks 58978 0.0267 3.7444 
Service Job Tasks 58707 -0.0684 3.4650 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 58978 0.4452 0.4970 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 25 58978 0.0129 0.1129 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 26-35 58978 0.0415 0.1995 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 36-45 58978 0.0664 0.2490 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 46-55 58978 0.0758 0.2647 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 56-65 58978 0.1153 0.3193 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 66-75 58978 0.1506 0.3577 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 76-85 58978 0.0473 0.2123 
Offshorin : Blinder Index Values 85+ 58978 0.0449 0.2071 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS: 1992-2007. 
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4.3.2 Empirical Strategy 
This section is composed of two parts. Each section will outline the empirical strategy that is 
undertaken by this chapter to answer each of the contributions outlined in section 4.1. 
4.3.2.1 OLS Cross Section Regression Analysis 
To estimate the impact of offshoring, TBTe and occupation tradability on wage levels over 
time, Mincer wage equations are estimated for each cross section of data. This estimation 
strategy is outlined by equation (3). This equation is estimated separately for each year of 
data to explore the wage loss for the most offshorable jobs and the impact of TBTC on wage 
levels each year over time. This first estimation strategy is pursued because it was noted in 
section 4.1 that the potential number of jobs that could be lost due to offshoring were very 
high estimates compared to the actual number of jobs that have been lost due to offshoring 
related activities to date. These estimates may provide firms with a credible threat point 
where they may able to put downward pressure on the wage levels of workers - assuming 
wage levels are negotiated each year. The time dimension enables one to gather if there are 
continuous negative or positive, increasing or decreasing effects upon wages over time. The 
model that I estimate is outlined by equation (3) below: 
(3) 
Where i = 1, ... ,n; 0 = occupation 0; j = industry j; t = 1992, ... ,2007. The dependent variable 
log(Wage)iJ,t is the log real hourly wage for worker i, in industry j at time t. It is defined as the 
gross real hourly pay deflated to 1995 prices, based on income data which includes overtime 
pay and bonuses over the year. Variable INDIV accounts for individual level variables which 
include age, age squared, three dummy variables for marital status, a child dummy variable, a 
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female dummy and two education dummy variables23• Variable JOB accounts for job 
characteristics such as experience and experience squared; a dummy variable for union 
membership, eight ISCO occupation dummy variables, three firm size dummy variables and a 
dummy variable for public sector employment. Variable INDUS accounts for industry level 
variables which include industry dummy variables, research and development intensiti4 and 
net exports25, which account for potential job creation and job destruction effects that may 
influence wage levels (Kletzer, 2000, 2004; Klein et al., 2004 and Davidson & Matusz, 2005 
highlight the importance of export orientation and international competition as being 
important determinants). Control variables also include regional dummy variables and 
industry level output, lJ,t, measured at the major group level. 01 is a dummy variable which 
has a value of one if the Blinder index has a value greater than or equal to 6526• The estimated 
impact on the wage levels for the most tradable occupations should provide an estimate of 
whether the impact is negative and significant from one year to the next and whether the size 
of the coefficient has changed over time. Variables OSS and OSM are the service and material 
offshoring intensities measured from 1-0 data for the period 1992-2007. Variable Task 
represents the four job task variables which measure routine, non-routine abstract, non-
routine manual and service job tasks. 
The inclusion of the routine job task variable (from the subset of Task variables) enables one to 
explore whether routine job tasks yields a negative impact on wages over time. By 
23 To construct the education groups, I follow Geishecker & 1361'1 (2008b), who follow the international Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED). High-skilled workers are identified with second stage of tertiary education. Medium-skilled workers are 
classified with upper secondary education, post secondary but non-tertiary education and first stale of tertiary education. Low 
skilled workers are Identified with pre-primary education, primary education and lower secondary education. 
24 Research and development intensity is measured as follows: R ~ , , where R&D Is Industry expenditure on research and 
deveiopment and Y is the output level from each industry. Data for R&D was obtained from the U.K. Business Enterprise 
Research and Development (BERO) publication available from ONS. Missing data from BERD was supplemented by data from the 
OECD ANBERD. This data is available by product groups. To obtain R&D expenditure by industry groups, I used an unpublished 
concordance provided by ONS to allocate the R&D expenditure by product groups into industry groups. Data for industry output 
is available from Input-Output supply and use tables available from ONS. 
25 Net exports are measured by subtracting Imports from exports: (exports - imports). This data relates to the export and import 
of goods and services which is available from ONS. 
26 I do not include the index itself as this would include all values for the least and potentially more tradable occupations. I am 
only interested in the impact on wages from the most tradable occupations. But including the index itself may complicate the 
interpretation of the coefficient In relation to the Impact on wages. 
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construction, each task variable does not change over time; if a job requires repetitive motion, 
this will be part of a series of activities performed by a job. If the tasks performed by a job 
changes, this will be a new occupation compared to the old occupation. Hence, as with the 
Blinder offshorability dummy variable (01), the year to year estimates from the routine job 
task variable should provide evidence of whether the impact on wages are negative and 
whether these estimates are negative and significantly increasing in absolute value over time. 
Additionally, the impact of offshoring may vary with individual heterogeneity. The empirical 
literature reports women rather than men are more likely to be employed by tradable 
occupations that have a high importance to complete routine job tasks (Black & Spitl-Oener, 
2007, 2010) 27. Additionally, research by Peri & Sparber (2007) shows the immigration of 
foreign born low-skilled labour specialise in occupations that require manual job tasks such as 
cleaning, cooking or building work. This causes native born workers to reallocate their labour 
supply as they have better knowledge of local networks, rules, customs and language 
proficiency, hence they pursue jobs that require interactive tasks such as coordination, 
organisation, and communication. Thus, being employed within a potentially tradable 
occupation and occupations which complete a high percentage of routine job tasks is likely to 
differ amongst different individual workers. These differences among workers may have a 
different impact on the wage levels of different workers. This is explored with the interaction 
of the offshoring dummy variable 01 with the education dummy variables and with gender, 
race and white-collar worker groups. 
Finally, variable 01 is also interacted with ass and OSM to examine the impact on the wages 
for workers employed within potentially tradable occupations and employed within industries 
that engage in service and material offshoring activities. It is predicted that workers who are 
employed in potentially tradable occupations and within industries that have high service and 
27 They found job polarization was more pronounced for women compared to men; the employment share in middle occupations 
shrunk by 52" for females compared to 23" for men. 
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material offshoring intensities, should have lower hourly wage levels compared to workers 
that are employed within firms and industries that do not engage in offshoring activities. 
Wages for workers employed within the most tradable jobs and employed by firms within 
industries that engage in offshoring activities are more likely to have lower wage levels 
because firms can threaten domestic workers with the potential transfer of jobs to offshore 
locations to prevent higher wage levels. 
For each year equation (3) has been estimated, the standard errors have been clustered by 
four-digit industry SIC codes28• This procedure estimates robust standard errors that are 
corrected for within cluster correlations. This is important, as argued by Moulton (1990) who 
illustrates estimated coefficients may be biased downwards due to the estimation of industry 
level measured variables such as ass and aSM on individual level wages. 
4.3.2.2 Panel Regression Analysis 
A firm's decision to engage in offshoring at any given time may be influenced by technological 
change, wage negotiations and the prevailing labour market and industry conditions over 
time. Firms are more likely to offshore low-skill intensive production activities as these 
activities are cheaper to produce abroad. Additionally, these decisions may be driven by 
technological innovations, which can allow firms the flexibility to offshore those tasks that can 
be provided cheaply from abroad. The impact of offshoring measured at the industry level 
implies ass and OSM may be endogenous because firms may decide to offshore parts of their 
production processes if the cost of producing intermediate or final goods and services are 
more costly to provide in the domestic market compared to employing foreign labour. Hence, 
there may be a problem of reverse causality, meaning the error term is correlated with the 
offshoring intensity variables. Thus, ceteris paribus, the failure to control for this correlation 
will provide estimated coefficients that are inconsistent and they may be biased downwards. 
28 This is Stc80 for the period 1992-2001 and SIC92 for the period 2002-2007. 
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The annual OLS estimates for ass and OSM may not represent the correct specification due to 
these reasons unlike for variable 01 that is fixed over time. The panel model does not control 
for endogeneity, it merely allows one to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
individual and industry level that cannot be measured adequately with observed data. 
Therefore, 1 follow Geishecker & Garg (2008a,b) and Munch & Skaksen (2008) and estimate 
equation (4): 
(4) 
Where i = 1, ... ,n; 0 = occupation 0; j = industry j; and t = 1992-2007. The dependent variable 
10g(Wage);,M is the log real hourly wage for worker i, in industry j at time t. URATE is the 
annual unemployment rate which accounts for the business cycle. Variable INDIV accounts for 
individual level variables which include age, age squared, three dummy variables for marital 
status, a child dummy variable, a female dummy and two education dummy variables. 
Variable JOB accounts for individual job characteristics which include experience and 
experience squared, a union membership dummy, eight Iseo occupation dummy variables, 
three firm size dummy variables and a dummy for public sector employment. The model also 
includes region dummy variables. Variables ass and OSM measure industry-level service and 
material offshoring intensities constructed from 1-0 data for the period 1992-2007. 01 is a 
dummy variable which has a value of one if the Blinder index has a value greater than or equal 
to 65. Variable Task represents the four task variables. Variable INDUS accounts for industry 
level variables which are industry dummy variables, industry level output ~ , t t is measured at 
the major group level is used to account for differences in industry size, research and 
development intensity is used to proxy for technological progress and net exports are used to 
account for potential job creation and job destruction effects from trade. Following 
Geishecker & Garg (2008b), I include variable 1j which controls for Industry specific time 
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trends; Year effects ~ t t and individual specific effects ai are also included in the model. 
Individual specific effects control for potential unobserved individual heterogeneity that 
cannot be measured from available data; for example individual ability may affect the wage 
level and therefore equation (4) is estimated by panel fixed effects to provide consistent 
estimates of the betas29• Variables R&D intensity and industry specific time trends ensure the 
inclusion for industry specific technological progress. Finally, E is a random disturbance term. 
A first point of note with equation (4) as was the case with equation (3) is the combination of 
individual and industry level information may lead to contemporaneous correlations within 
the error term and this may result with bias within the estimated standard errors (Moulton, 
1990). Following the standard approach taken by the literature, I follow Geishecker & Garg 
(2oo8b) and Crino (2oo9b) and adjust the standard errors by clustering on 2-digit industry 
codes common across the sample of data30• As equation (4) includes industry level dummy 
variables, the effects from the impact of the offshoring intensity coefficients are identified 
through within-industry variation over time. 
A second potential problem that may affect the estimation is the potential endogeneity of ass 
and aSM. This problem may arise if wages and offshoring decisions are chosen 
simultaneously or because of time-invariant industry characteristics that may influence both 
variables and hence lead to inconsistent estimates (Crino, 2009b). Geishecker & Garg (2oo8b) 
note this issue should not pose a problem to the results as equation (4) has a large range of 
industry-level data and individual-level wage data that should mitigate offshoring being 
endogenous. And with the inclusion of industry level fixed effects, this allows for the control 
29 The Hausman Specification test was applied to determine whether a fixed effects model was more appropriate or whether a 
random effects model was more appropriate. This test suaests the appropriate model to use for estimation is a fixed effects 
model. 
30 There are two sets of industry SIC codes available within the BHPS data. There is information on SICSO codes for years 1991-
2001 and SlC92 codes available for years 2002-present. There is no standard common conver'lJence criterion that may be used to 
transfer one set of SIC codes to the other. Therefore. I obtained an unpublished convetlence file from the Classifications Division 
at ONS, which provides a convergence index for industries between SICSO and SIC92 codes. This file does not provide a one-to-
one mapping between the two industry classifications; they provide partial correlations based on the title of each industry 
between the two classifications. The file only provides a guide between each SIC classification. Thus. from this index. I 
constructed a common two-digit SICSO classification across the sample of data that would allow the standard errors to be 
clustered in the panel model. 
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of time invariant effects such as production technology within different industries. Following 
Geishecker & Gorg (2oo8b) and Crino (2009b), I test the assumption of exogeneity for OSS and 
OSM using an instrumental variable GMM approach of equation (4) by using the first two lags 
of each offshoring variable OSS and OSM in separate regressions as instruments. 
4.4 Results 
The results from the two specified models from section 4.3.2 are discussed in the following 
order in the forth-coming subsections: Section 4.4.1 provides the OLS results and Section 4.4.2 
presents the panel regression estimates. 
4.4.1 The Wage Levels for Potentially Offshorable Occupations 
Figure 4.7 presents OLS estimates which plot the estimated impact from variables 01, service 
offshoring intensity, OSS and the interactions of 01 and OSS upon wages. Each graph presents 
the estimated average trends from three-year point estimates. Each of the three-year point 
estimates represents the average impact on wages from a group of years. For example, year 
point '1' represents the average estimated impact on wages for the period 1992-1997; year 
point '2' represents the average estimated impact on wages for the period 1998-2002. And 
year point '3' represents the average estimated impact on wages for the period 2003-2007. I 
have plotted the average estimated coefficients from the three year points to examine the 
general trend from 01, OSS and OSM on wage levels over time instead of plotting each 
coefficient for each year. 
From figure 4.7, the top right graph shows the estimated average impact on wages for the 
most tradable occupations as defined by the Blinder (2007) occupation tradability index. The 
estimated trend is negative over time, where workers who are employed within the most 
tradable jobs have become worse off. From the first and second year points, workers earned 
approximately 1.15% less per hour compared to workers not employed in the most tradable 
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jobs for the period 1992-2002. By the third year pOint, workers employed in the most tradable 
jobs earned approximately 2.2% less per hour than workers employed in the least tradable 
jobs. However, table 4.8A from appendix 7 lists the estimated coefficients for each year. 
These estimates show most of these coefficients are insignificant for this particular plot. 
The top left graph shows the impact of OSS intensity on wage levels. The first year point 
illustrates that workers earned approximately 3.5% less per hour on average from a 1% rise in 
OSS intensity. The second year point shows workers earned approximately 1.75% less per 
hour. By the third year point, the average pOint estimate shows that a one per cent rise in 
service offshoring intensity lowered the hourly wage level for workers employed in industries 
that engage in service offshoring by approximately 4%. This graph suggests that workers have 
become worse off over time resulting from the decline in wage levels. Additionally, the 
estimated coefficients from table 4.8A from appendix 7 shows that all of the year estimates 
which make up year point '3' are statistically significant and negative over time. 
This final graph from figure 4.7 plots the estimated impact on wage levels from the interaction 
of OSS and 01: that is workers employed in the most tradable occupations and employed in 
industries that engage in service offshoring. This interaction captures the idea that these 
workers are more likely to have lower wage levels over time. From this graph, year points 1 
and 2 show hourly wages were positive during the 1990s and the early 2000 time frame. For 
the latter part of the 2000s covered by year point 3, hourly wage levels were on average lower 
for workers compared to year points 1 and 2. However, table 4.8A shows that most of these 
estimated coefficients from these regressions are largely insignificant over time, and thus 
signifying that workers employed within the most tradable jobs and within industries that 
engage in service offshoring have not become Significantly worse off over time through having 
lower wage levels. 
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Figure 4.7: Estimated Impact of Blinder Index and ass upon Wages 
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Source: Compiled by the author. Year point indicators: 1 = 1992-1997; 2 = 1998-2002 and 3 = 2003-
2007. See appendix 7. table 4.8A for a list of the estimated coeffidents for each year and their 
significance. 
Figure 4.8: Estimated Impact of Blinder Index and aSM upon Wages 
Source: Compiled by the author. Year point indicators: 1 = 1992-1997; 2 = 1998-2002 and 3 = 2003-
2007. See appendix 7 table 4.9A for a list of the estimated coefficients for year and their significance. 
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Figure 4.8 explores the impact of OSM and 01 over time. The top left graph shows that a rise 
in material offshoring intensity does not have a negative impact on the wage levels for 
workers employed within industries engaging in material offshoring over time. Although the 
graph does show the impact of OSM on wage levels was negative during the 1990s and early 
2000s, year point 3 suggests there has been a positive impact on wage levels post 2000. 
Similarly, the interaction of OSM and 01 show workers employed in the most tradable jobs and 
within industries that engage in material offshoring, their wage levels have not changed 
significantly over time. Additionally, table 4.9A from appendix 7 shows the estimated 
coefficients for each year are largely insignificant from these regressions over time. 
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 examine how the wage levels for the most tradable jobs vary by worker 
and skill heterogeneity such as gender, race, educational attainment and white-collar 
employment over time. From figure 4.9, for female workers employed in the most tradable 
jobs, they have not experienced a fall in their wage levels over time. Although, year points 
one and two do show the wage levels were lower during the 1990s and the early 2000 time 
frame, but this is not shown for most recent year point on average. 
For highly educated workers employed within the most tradable jobs, the top right graph 
shows this group of workers have had lower wage levels over time. And for medium skilled 
workers employed in the most tradable jobs, the bottom left graph shows the average impact 
on their wage levels has been negative for the latter part of the 2000 period shown by year 
point three. But, the estimated coefficients that make up the three year points for all of plots 
from figure 4.9 are presented in table 4.10A in appendix 7. These coefficients show the 
estimated coefficients for females, highly skilled and medium skilled workers are largely 
insignificant over time and they imply workers have not become worse off over time. 
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Figure 4.9: Estimated Impact of Blinder Index on Worker and Skill Heterogeneity 
Source: Compiled by the author. Year point indicators: 1 = 1992-1997; 2 = 1998-2002 and 3 = 2003-
2007. See appendix 7 table 4.10A for a list of the estimated coefficients for each year and their 
significance. 
Figure 4.10 shows white workers employed by the most tradable jobs have had positive wage 
levels that are falling over time - the general trend is negative. Additionally, the impact on the 
wage levels for the most tradable white-collar jobs also shows a negative impact on hourly 
wage levels over time. However, the estimated coefficients for each graph are displayed in 
table 4.11A in appendix 7; they show most of the estimated coefficients are insignificant over 
time. 
Figure 4.11 presents the estimated impact on the hourly wages from the four task variables, 
which explores the impact of the TBTe hypothesis. The two tasks variables which are of 
particular interest are routine job tasks and service job tasks. Routine job tasks are most likely 
to be replaced by technology but are also job tasks that can be offshored abroad. And service 
job tasks relate to activities that can be carried out by occupations situated at the upper and 
lower tails of the skill distribution. The importance of service job tasks for occupations 
situated at the upper tail of the skill distribution were unaffected by the first wave of 
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offshoring which took place during the early 1980s and 1990s. More recently with the 
advancements in ICT, these occupations previously unaffected by offshoring may now face the 
possible risk of job loss and the potential threat of lower wage levels. 
The first graph from figure 4.11, presents estimated coefficients which plot the impact upon 
wages for occupations which necessitate routine job tasks. This graph shows that with a one 
standard deviation increase in the importance of routine job tasks lowered wage levels on 
average by 0.75% and 0.55% during year point one and year point three. The impact on wages 
is negative over time but there are very few estimated coefficients that are statistically 
significant - these coefficients can be viewed in table 4.12A in appendix 7. 
Figure 4.10: Estimated Impact of Blinder Index on White-Collar Jobs and Race 
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Source: Compiled by the author. Year point indicators: 1 = 1992-1997; 2 = 1998-2002 and 3 = 2003-
2007. See appendix 7 table 4.11A for a list of the estimated coefficients for each year and their 
significance. 
For non-routine abstract job tasks, a one standard deviation increase in the importance of 
non-routine abstract job tasks have had a positive and Significant impact on hourly wages over 
the sample period. For occupations which require non-routine manual job tasks, the impact 
has been negative over time but also the magnitude from the impact has been very small and 
195 
many of the estimated coefficients are largely insignificant. Finally to the final graph, a one 
standard deviation increase in the importance of service job tasks has a positive impact on the 
wage levels over time. However, the majority of the estimated coefficients are insignificant -
see appendix 7 table 4.12A. 
To sum up, this section has examined the impact of industry level offshoring intensity, a 
dummy variable which captures the most tradable jobs according to the Blinder's (2007) 
occupation tradability index and the TBTC hypothesis has had on individual level wage each 
year on average over time. The results from this section show industry level service offshoring 
intensity has on average had a negative and significant impact on the wage levels of workers 
who are employed within industries that engage in service offshoring over the three year 
points. Coefficients which measure the impact from material offshoring intensity at the 
industry level (OSM), workers employed in the most tradable jobs (01), and workers employed 
in the most tradable jobs and employed within industries that engage in material and service 
offshoring have not had a significant and negative impact on their wage levels on average over 
time. Also, the effects from being employed within the most tradable jobs are independent of 
race, gender, white-collar employment and educational attainment. What these graph do 
show is that workers who are employed within occupations which have a high importance for 
non-routine abstract job tasks have had a positive and significant impact on their wage levels 
on average over time. The impact from routine and service intensive job tasks are insignificant 
over time; these results suggest that workers employed in jobs that are intensive in these job 
tasks have not significantly become significantly worse off. 
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Figure 4.11: Estimated Impact of Task Biased Technological Change upon Wages 
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S o u ~ : : Compiled by the author. Year point indicators: 1 = 1992-1997; 2 = 1998-2002 and 3 = 
2003 - 2007. See appendix 7 table 4.12A for a list of the estimated coefficients for each year and 
their significance. 
4.4.2 Panel Regression Estimates 
4.4.2.1 Results for Service Offshoring Intensity: OSS 
Table 4.4 presents the results from the estimation of equation (4). Columns (1) and (2) from 
this table presents the baseline model where industry specific time trends are excluded from 
column (1) but are included in column (2). These two columns also exclude variables which 
explore skill heterogeneity. 
From table 4.4, the estimated coefficients from individual level variables have their expected 
signs for all but one variable. From the estimated coefficients, the hourly wage increases with 
age (both variables: age and age squared are significant at the 1% level from all specifications 
of equation (4)), albeit at a decreasing rate reflecting the concave nature of the relationship. 
Being married yields a positive influence on hourly wages compared to the reference group of 
separated individuals. Individuals who are single or divorced earn lower hourly wages 
compared to the reference group (being a window), but these coefficients are not Significant. 
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Having a dependent child lowers hourly pay, but again the estimated coefficient for this 
variable is not significant. Experience yields a concave relationship, where hourly pay rises up 
to a point where the returns to wages yield lower returns with increasing labour market 
experience. 
Education is an important determinant to hourly pay and the results show individuals with a 
high level of education earn approximately 12% more towards their hourly pay than lower 
educated workers. Medium skilled workers earn less than lower educated workers according 
to the estimated coefficients; however these coefficients are small and not statistically 
significant. Female workers tend to earn less than male workers; the estimated coefficients 
for females show their hourly wages are approximately 18% lower. 
Workers who are members of a trade union have higher hourly pay compared to non-union 
workers; the estimated coefficients show union workers have hourly earnings that are 
approximately 10% higher than for non-union workers. Controlling for external labour market 
conditions, the estimated coefficient from the annual unemployment rate has a negative 
influence. This is consistent with the findings from the literature where good economic 
conditions yield a lower unemployment rate and hence higher hourly pay, whilst the converse 
is true during bad economic conditions. 
From the industry control variables, employment within smaller sized firms lead to lower 
hourly wages compared to the reference group for a firm size greater than a thousand. Public 
sector workers have higher hourly wages compared to workers employed within the private 
sector. Variables industry output, research and development intensity and net exports exert 
negligible returns to hourly wages. Crino (2009b) suggests the inclusion of industry control 
variables in Mincer wage equations could be imprecisely estimated, as much of the effects 
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from these variables may be absorbed by the industry and time variables31• The signs from 
these variables show hourly wages increase with industry output and net exports but fall with 
rising research and development intensity. 
Finally, industry level service offshoring intensity (055) is significant and negative from 
columns (1) and (2) at the 10% and 1% significance levels; this result is consistent with OLS 
results reported in section 4.4.1. From column (1), where industry specific time trends are not 
included, a 1% rise in OSS intensity lowers hourly wages by 1.56%. With the addition of 
industry specific time trends, a 1% rise in OSS intensity lowers hourly wages by 1.91%. These 
findings are consistent with those reported by Garg & Geishecker (2008b), but the estimated 
coefficients from this chapter are s m a l l e ~ 2 . .
Moving onto the bottom part of table 4.4 presents the exogeneity test statistics obtained from 
the estimation of equation (4) via the instrumental variable GMM approach using the first two 
lags of OSS as instruments. The Hansen J-statistic presents results for instrument validity 
whilst the C-Statistic presents results for OSS exogeneity. The Hansen J-statistics for 
instrument validity are low, which suggests that lagged values of the current service offshoring 
variable are relevant instruments for present period service offshoring. Secondly, the C-
statistic tests the null hypothesis for the exogeneity of 055; these results show from columns 
(1) and (2), the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected. 
Columns (3), (4) and (5) supplement the baseline model from columns (1) and (2) with the 
addition of interaction variables to explore skill heterogeneity. Columns (3) and (4) 
incorporate the inclusion of variable 01 which is the dummy variable constructed from the 
31 Crino (2009b) includes time dummies, not a linear time trend. 
32 As a robustness check, I examined the Interaction of variables OSS with a linear time trend to explore the impact from these 
coefficients over time. Appendix 15 table 4.2DA provides the estimated coefficients from this exercise. They show from column 
(1) the impact of OSS has a significant and negative impact on wages. When OSS is interacted with a linear time trend, this 
coefficient is very small, positive and statistically Significant. Therefore, the impact of OSS over time is negative but at a 
decreasing rate - signifying that workers are not becoming worse off over time. Additionally, a similar exercise was carried out 
with 01. From column (2) of table 4.20A, variable 01 has no significant impact on wages. The interaction between 01 and a linear 
time trend is also not significant - thus verifying the OLS results. 
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Blinder (2007) occupation tradability index; column (3) excludes industry specific time trends 
and column (4) includes industry specific time trends. The results from columns (3) and (4) 
present similar estimated coefficients which show the potentially most tradable occupations 
earn 3.62% and 3.53% less hourly pay than non-tradable occupations; these results are similar 
to those reported by OLS regressions from the last section. 
With the interaction of OSS and the occupation tradability dummy variable 01, the estimated 
coefficients are positive and significant at the 5% level. These results suggest that individuals 
employed in potentially tradable occupations within industries that engage in service 
offshoring yields a positive impact on hourly pay33. It was predicted that workers employed in 
tradable occupations within industries that engage in service offshoring should experience a 
negative impact on their hourly pay compared to workers employed within industries that do 
not engage in high levels of service offshoring. These estimated results provide no support for 
this prediction. This result appears to support the theoretical literature, where service 
offshoring benefits the economy through higher productivity (erino, 2009a) and thus this 
appears to translate into higher pay. These results also contrast with the OLS results reported 
in the previous section which found workers employed within industries that engage in service 
offshoring and who are employed within the most tradable jobs have lower hour pay over 
time - however the estimated coefficients were largely insignificant over time. 
Column (5) from table 4.4 examines skill heterogeneity and service offshoring. The estimated 
results are presented with the interaction between service offshoring intensity, OSS and 
education dummy variables for high-skilled and medium-skilled workers; the reference 
category is low-skill workers. For high-skilled workers, the estimated coefficient is small and 
positive but not significant. For medium-skilled workers, the estimated coefficient is negative 
and small but not significant. These results suggest that for high skilled workers, service 
33 The Hansen J-Statistic and the C-Statistic results for columns (3) and (4) reach similar conclusions to results for columns (1) and 
(2). 
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offshoring has a positive impact upon hourly wages. For medium skilled workers, service 
offshoring has a negative impact on hourly wages implying that firms offshore medium skilled 
service activities that may be in favour of high skilled labour, but the estimated result is not 
significant. These results differ with respect to the reported results from Gorg & Geishecker 
(2oo8b) who find positive coefficients for both skill groups. 
Table 4.4: Regression Results: Service Offshoring and Skill Heterogeneity 
Dependent Variable: Lot of Real Hourty Employment Wap 
CoefJkJents {l} {Z} (3) {4} (5) 
Age 0.0875 0.0874 0.0876 0.0874 0.0874 
(0.0094)"· (0.0094)··· (0.0094)··· {O.OO(4)··· (0.0095)··· 
Age Squared -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
(0.0001)*" (0.0001)··· (0.0001)··· (0.0001)"· (0.0001)·" 
Married 0.0232 0.0226 0.0231 0.0225 0.0224 
(0.0128)· (0.0128)· (0.0129)· (0.0129)· (0.0127)· 
Single -o.05n -0.0589 -0.0580 -0.0591 -0.0591 
(0.0163)··· (0.0160)·" (0.0164)"· (0.0161)"· (0.0159)·" 
Divorced -0.0190 -0.0193 -0.0187 -0.0190 -0.0194 
(0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0174) 
Child -0.0104 -0.0112 -0.0103 -0.0110 -0.0111 
(0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
Experience -0.0286 -0.0284 -0.0285 -0.0284 -0.0285 
(0.0039)"· (0.0039)"· (0.0039)·" (0.0039)"· (0.0039)"· 
Experience Squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.0000)· (0.0000)· (0.0000)· (0.0000)· (0.0000)· 
Union 0.0972 0.1003 0.0959 0.0991 0.1002 
(0.0184)*-- {O.OI84)"· (0.0178)*·· (0.0177)"· (0.0184)·" 
Unemployment Rate -0.0115 0.0044 -0.0119 0.0037 0.0043 
(0.0038)··· (0.0027) (0.0037)·" (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Edu: High Skill 0.1209 0.1190 0.1196 0.1176 0.1155 
(0.0332)"· (0.0323)·" (0.0333)"· (0.0324)·" (0.0332)"· 
Edu: Medium Skill -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0036 0.0017 
(0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0124) 
Female -0.1818 -0.1817 -0.1807 -0.1807 -0.1817 
(0.0109)··· (0.0110)··· (0.0112)··· (0.0113)··· (0.0111)··· 
Firm Size: <25 -0.1806 -0.1791 -0.1804 -0.1790 -0.1791 
(0.0264)··· (0.0256)··· (0.0270)··· (0.0262)··· (0.0257)"· 
Firm Size: 25-99 -0.0840 -0.0834 -0.0837 -0.0831 -0.0834 
(0.0229)"· (0.0222)·" (0.0233)··· (0.0226)··· (0.0223)"· 
Firm Size: 100-999 -0.0149 -0.0151 -0.0143 -0.0145 -o.OlSO 
(0.0212) (0.0205) (0.0215) (0.0208) (0.0205) 
Firm: Public 0.0479 0.0410 0.0469 0.0398 0.0409 
(0.0214)" (0.0221)· (0.0215)" (0.0220)· (0.0221)· 
Industry: Output 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Industry: R&D Intensity -0.0064 -0.0031 -0.0081 -0.0040 -0.0033 
(0.0169) (0.0092) (0.0175) (0.0096) (0.0091) 
Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Offshoring: 055 -0.0156 -0.0191 -0.0172 -0.0210 -0.0178 
(0.0087)· (0.0063)"· (0.0093)· {O.OO70)"· (0.0070)" 
OffshoriFIfJ: Blinder Index >=65 -0.0362 -0.0353 
(0.0115)"· (0.0123)·" 
Offshoring: OSS*Blinder 1ndex>--65 0.0076 o.oon 
(0.0033)·· (0.0037)" 
Offshoring: High Skill*OSS 0.0028 
(0.0101) 
Offshoring: Medium Skill*OSS -0.0022 
(0.0032) 
Constant 0.4297 0.3007 0.4455 0.3157 0.2985 
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(O.1792)** (O.lS71)* (0.1 789)** (O.lS66)** (O.lS7S)* 
Industry Specific TIme Trends No Yes No Yes Yes 
Region Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 58978 58978 58978 58978 58978 
R2 0.4926 0.4956 0.4927 0.4957 0.4956 
OSS 
H,,: Instrument Validity 
Hansen J-5tatistic 0.538 0.544 0.622 0.586 0.491 
Hansen J-5tatistic {p-value} (O.4631) (O.4607) (O.4302) (O.4439) {O.483S} 
H,,: Regressor Is ExtJflf!n0u5 
C-Statistic 2.176 1.084 2.109 1.057 1.135 
C-statistic {p-volue} {0.1402} {O.2978} {O.1464} (O.3039) {O.2867} 
Nate: All regression models present robust standard errors clustered by the 2-digit SIC level within the 
parentheses. Significance Level: ***p<O.Ol, **p<O.OS and *p<O.lO. 
4.4.2.2 Results for Material Offshoring Intensity: OSM 
Table 4.5 presents the estimated coefficients from the estimation of equation (4) with 
particular focus on the material offshoring intensity, OSM. As with the results from table 4.4, 
most of the estimated coefficients that control for individual, job and industry levels 
characteristics have similar estimated coefficients that were presented by table 4.4. The main 
variables of interest here are OSM and its interactions with 01 and the different education 
groups. 
From table 4.5, the estimated coefficients for the industry level material offshoring intensity 
(OSM) are all negative and insignificant from each of the columns (1) to (5). Additionally, the 
estimated coefficients from the interaction between 01 and OSM are negative from columns 
(3) and (4), although they are all inSignificant. Finally, the interaction of OSM with the high 
education dummy variable shows high-skilled workers employed in industries that engage in 
material offshoring have positive hourly wage levels (column (4)). For medium-skilled workers 
employed in industries that engage in material offshoring, their estimated coefficients are not 
significant, though it is positive (column (5)). These results once again differ with the reported 
results from Gorg & Geishecker (2oo8b) who find a significant and negative impact of OSM 
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intensity for workers with different skill intensities. My results may differ with the reported 
results from Geishecker & Gorg (2oo8b) on three fronts. First, this chapter examines the 
impact of offshoring on the wage levels for men as well as for women; their sample 
concentrates exclusively on men. Secondly, the lack of significance could be due fewer 
women being employed within the manufacturing sector; women are more likely to be 
employed in service sector jobs than in manual blue-collar jobs (Acemoglu & Autor, 2010). 
Third, although the estimated coefficients are insignificant, which could be due to multi-
collinearity, they do show the estimated impact from material and service offshoring have a 
similar impact on the wage levels of skilled and non-skilled workers. The Hansen J-statistics 
for each column accept the null hypothesis for lagged values of the current material offshoring 
intensity as relevant instruments for present period material offshoring. And the C-Statistic 
tests show OSM is exogenous in the estimation of equation (4). 
Table 4.5: Regression Results: Material Offshoring and Skill Heterogeneity 
Dependent Variable: Los of Real Em W 
Coe/fIdertts (l} (Z} {3} 
Age 0.0878 0.0876 0.0877 
(0.0096) ...... (0.0096) .. • .. (0.0096) .. • .. (O.OO96} ...... (0.0096) ...... 
Age2 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
(0.0001) .... • (O.oool} .. • .. (0.0001) ...... (O.oool} ...... (O.oool} ...... 
Married 0.0228 0.0219 0.0226 0.0216 0.0216 
(0.0126)" (O.0126)" (0.0127)" (O.0126)· (o.oU5}" 
Single -0.0585 -0.0603 -0.0589 -0.0606 -O.06OS 
(0.0163) ...... (O.Ol58} ...... (0.0164) .. •• (0.0158) .. • .. (0.0158} ...... 
Divorced -0.0197 -0.0199 -0.0199 -0.0201 -0.0198 
(0.0175) (0.0173) (O.Ol77) (0.0174) (0.0172) 
Child -0.0100 -0.0111 -0.0099 -0.0110 -0.0111 
(0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
Experience -0.0287 -0.0284 -0.0285 -0.0283 -0.0283 
(0.0040) ...... (O.0039} ...... (0.0040) .. •• (O.0039}··· (O.0039}··· 
Experience2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(O.OOOO)· (O.OOOO)· (0.0000)· (O.OOOO)· (O.oool)· 
Union 0.0982 0.1004 0.097S 0.0998 0.1007 
(0.0186}·· .. (0.OlB7}··· (O.01B2)··· (0.0183}··· (O.0IB7}·· .. 
Unemployment Rate -0.0145 -0.0005 -0.0147 -0.0008 -0.0005 
(0.0026}·· .. (O.0036) (0.0025}··· (0.0035) (D.0036) 
Edu: High Skill 0.1186 0.1172 0.1177 0.1163 0.0985 
(0.0332)·· .. (0.0324)··· (0.0332)··· (0.0324}··· (O.0289}··· 
Edu: Medium Skill -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0060 
(O.OO89) (O.OO88) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0085) 
Female -0.1842 -0.1840 -0.1827 -0.1827 -0.1836 
(0.01.14)··· (O.01.14}· .. • (O.01.1B}··· (O.01.1B}··· (0.01.14)··· 
Firm Size: <25 -0.1851 -0.1831 -0.1854 -0.1834 -0.1832 
(0.0230)·· .. (0.0236) .. •• (O.0232}··· (O.0238}··· (O.0235}··· 
Firm Size: 25-99 -0.0853 -0.0845 -O.08S2 -0.0844 -0.0846 
(0.0220)··· (0.0219)··· (O.0223}··· (O.0222}··· (0.021B}··· 
Firm Size: 100-999 -0.0148 -0.0149 -0.0144 -0.0145 -0.0149 
(O.0217) (0.0212) (0.0219) (0.021.3) (0.0212) 
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Firm: Public 0.0604 0.0548 0.0595 0.0541 0.0548 
(0.0313)* (0.0305)* (0.0315)* (0.0305)* (0.0304)* 
Industry: Output 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (O'()OOO) (0.0000)"* (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Industry: R&D Intensity 0.0001 0.0028 0.0005 0.0031 0.0024 
(0.0149) (0.0086) (0.0150) (0.0087) (0.0085) 
Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0,(1000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Offshoring: OSM -0.0009 -0.0053 -0.0007 -0.0049 -0.0058 
(0.0045) (0.0059) (0.0046) (0.0062) (0.0059) 
Offshoring: Blinder Index >=65 -0.0151 -0.0124 
(0.0115) (0.0112) 
Offshoring: OSM*Blinder Index>=65 -0.0007 -0.0008 
(0.0014) (0.0014) 
Offshoring: High Skill*OSM 0.0081 
(0.0025)*" 
Offshoring: Medium Skill*OSM 0.0007 
(0.0014) 
Constant 0.4020 0.3437 0.4132 0.3550 0.3465 
(0.J739)** (0.1632)" (0.1744)" (0. 163J}" (0. 1641}** 
Industry Specific Time Trends No Yes No Yes Yes 
Region Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 58978 58978 58978 58978 58978 
R2 0.4891 0.4932 0.4889 0.4931 0.4936 
Exotenelty Tests for OW 
H.,: IIISfnIIMnt Valldlty 
Hansen J-Statistic 1.113 1.016 1.083 1.026 1.036 
Hansen )-Statistic ( ~ v o l u e ) ) (0.2914) (0.3136) (0.2980) (0.3112) (0.3086) 
H,.: RefllftS(W Is Exogenous 
C-Statistic 0.390 0.025 0.434 0.032 0.034 
C-statistic ( ~ v o l u e ) ) (0.5321) (0.8746) (0.5100) (0.8586) (0.8530) 
Note: All regression models present robust standard errors dustered by the 2-digit SIC level within the 
parentheses. Significance Level: *"p<O.Ol, "p<O.05 and *p<O.10. 
4.4.2.3 Offshorinl & Individual Heterogeneity 
Table 4.6 presents the results from the estimation of equation (4) augmented with variables 
that explore the implications of offshoring for different subsets of worker groups. To explore 
the effects of offshoring on individual heterogeneity, I focus on three characteristics: gender, 
white-collar occupations and race. From table 4.6, the interaction between female and OSS is 
negative and significant at the 10% level. This result shows the impact of service offshoring 
has a more negative impact on the wage levels for female workers. Column (2) presents a 
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positive yet insignificant coefficient for white-collar occupations. Finally, column (3) presents 
a positive and insignificant coefficient from the interaction between OSS and white individuals. 
Although this latter result is insignificant, it is in line with the OLS results from section 4.4.1, 
which found little significance between occupation tradability and race. These results also lay 
in accordance with the literature (e.g. Simister, 2000 and Cancio et 01., 1996) which finds non-
white individuals tend to earn less compared to white individuals employed within similar 
occupations due to a segmented (Bonacich, 1972) or dual (Doeringe & Pione, 1971) labour 
market where non-whites disproportionately occupy less desirable low paying jobs. These 
estimated coefficients show the effects of service offshoring are not important to individual 
heterogeneity. They support the results reported by Crine (2oo9b) who finds service 
offshoring intensity does not vary with individual level heterogeneity; Crine (2oo9b) suggests 
the impact is homogenous across different individual workers. 
Finally, the estimated results in columns (4), (5) and (6) show the impact from material 
offshoring. These results suggest that its impact is homogenous by sex, race and job type. 
Table 4.6: Offshoring and Individual Level Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: 1.01 of Real Howty Em w. 
oss OSM 
CoefIIdents (I) (Z) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Offshoring -0.0173 -0.0209 -0.0126 -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0056 
(0.0064)*** (0.0085)-- (0.0086) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Offshoring*Female -0.0038 
- - - - -
(0.0022) 
- - - - -
Offshoring*White Collar 
-
0.0027 
- -
-0.0009 -
-
{O.OO48} 
- -
{O.OOlS} -
Offshoring*White 
- -
-0.0067 
- -
0.0001 
- -
(O.OO44) 
- -
(0.0025) 
Constant 0.3005 0.3042 0.1988 0.3441 0.3415 0.2573 
(0.1568)* (0.1544)* (0.1627) (D.I634)** (0.1642)** (0.1688) 
Observations 58978 58978 58978 58978 58978 58978 
R2 0.4957 0.4957 0.4961 0.4935 0.4932 0.4937 
&ogenelty Tests /01' 0f/sItDrinfI 
H,,: Instrument VfIIldIty 
Hansen j-Statistic 0.599 0.572 0.329 1.037 1.019 0.993 
Hansen J-Statistic (p-volue) (0.43B9) (0.4494) (0.5663) (O.30B4) (O.3127) (O.6OB7) 
H,,: RI!fII'f!SSOt Is &ofIeItou$ 
C-Statistic 1.023 1.025 1.315 0.031 0.022 0.008 
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C-statistic (p-va/ue) (0.3118) (0.3113) (0.2516) (0.8599) (0.8832) (0.9294) 
Note: All regression models present robust standard errors clustered by the 2-digit SIC level within the parentheses. 
Significance Level: "*p<O.Ol, "p<O.OS and *p<O.10. Each regression controls for industry specific time trends, 
regions, occupation controls, individual fixed effects and industry controls. OSS - Industry level service offshoring 
intensity; OSM - industry level material offshoring intensity. A white collar occupation is a dummy variable equal to 
one for occupations: Legislators, Senior Officials, Managers, Professionals, Technicians, Associate Professionals and 
Clerks. See appendices 8 and 9 which provide the full list of estimated coefficients. 
4.4.2.4 Wages and the Task Biased Technological Change Hypothesis 
Table 4.7 presents the effects from the four job task variables created to measure the TBTC 
hypothesis upon wages. These variables are routine job tasks, non-routine abstract job tasks, 
non-routine manual job tasks and service job tasks. Job tasks may have an important impact 
on wage levels as these job tasks may either be complemented by or be adversely affected by 
technological innovations. The ALM hypothesis finds ICT can substitute for human labour in 
occupations which have a high importance for completing routine job tasks; can be a 
complement with abstract job tasks and is neither a complement nor a substitute for manual 
job tasks. For service job tasks there is a mixture of complementarity and substitutability 
between certain service job task characteristics and technology as technology complements 
'establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships', but will not complement 'face-to-
face discussions'. The reason behind this explanation is that an occupation which is required 
to complete these activities may have to be present at specific labour market locations, e.g. a 
child minder has to be physically present to supervise young children but may use mobile 
technology to inform parents of their children's welfare. For routine job tasks, the impact on 
wage levels should be negative. For abstracts job tasks, the impact should be positive; for 
manual job tasks, it is unclear whether the impact will be positive or negative and finally for 
service job tasks, the impact on wages should be positive34• 
34 Goos et 0/., (2008, 2(09) find service job tasks yields a positive influence on labour demand In Europe. Thus, a positive 
influence on labour demand should transpire to a positive Impact upon the returns to earnings. 
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Table 4.7 presents the estimated coefficients from equation (4). From column (1), routine job 
tasks have a significant and negative impact on wage levels, where a one standard deviation 
increase in the importance of routine job tasks causes hourly wages to fall by 0.52%. 
Column (2) presents the estimated impact from non-routine abstract job tasks. The estimated 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level implying that a one standard deviation 
increase in the importance of abstract job tasks raises hourly pay by 0.92%. For non-routine 
manual job tasks, column (3) presents a positive coefficient indicating a positive impact on 
wages; however the coefficient is not significant. Column (4) presents the impact of service 
job tasks on wages. This estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level, 
implying that a one standard deviation increase in the importance of service job tasks raises 
hourly pay by 0.58%. Finally, column (5) presents the estimated coefficients from equation (4) 
which now includes all job task variables35• From column (5), abstract job tasks continue to 
have a significant and positive impact on wage levels, whilst all other job task variables are not 
significant, with the service job task variable now a negative coefficient. 
Table 4.7: Task Biased Technological Change & Wages 
Variable: Los of Real Hourly Em wap 
Coe/IfderIts (l) (Z) (I) (4} (5) 
Routine Job Task -O.OOS2 -0.0101 
(O.cJ022)** (O.OO94) 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Task 0.0092 0.0087 
(0.0023)*** (0.0042)** 
Non-Routine Manual Job Task o.oOOS 0.0073 
(0.0033) (O.OO82) 
Service Job Task 0.0058 -O.OOIS 
(O.OO22)** (O.OO44) 
Constant 0.3444 0.3964 0.3396 0.3628 0.3899 
(0.1664)** (O.lS77)** (O.1669)** (O.1626)" (O.l584)" 
Observations 58707 58707 58978 58707 S8707 
R2 0.4942 0.4958 0.4933 0.4942 0.4956 
Note: All regression models present robust standard errors clustered by 2-diglt SIC level within the 
parentheses. Significance level: ·**p<O.Ol, **p<O.OS and *p<O.lO. Each resresslon controls for Industry 
specific time trends, regions, occupation controls, individual fixed effects and Industry controls. See 
appendix 10 for the full list of estimated coefficients. 
35 It is important to note here that the task variables are not dummy variables. Thus, there is no reference catetlory that must be 
exciuded from estimation. 
207 
In summary, routine job tasks are associated with occupations that lie in the middle of the 
wage distribution (Goos et 01., 2003, 2007); these results imply that firms are likely to 
substitute routine job tasks with computers, but they are also the most offshorable job tasks 
where a fall in demand for occupations which require routine job tasks may yield a fall in 
wages. Occupations which require abstract job tasks lie at the top end of the wage 
distribution, where firms appear to employ computers to complement occupations which 
require this job task. Occupations which require abstract job tasks are more likely to be 
associated with high-skilled workers and therefore it would appear that industries are more 
likely to reward occupations which require abstract job tasks with higher pay at the expense of 
occupations that require routine job tasks. For occupations which require non-routine manual 
job tasks which lie at the bottom end of the wage distribution, there appears to be little 
change to their wage levels from these job tasks. This result is to be expected as computers 
appear to be neither a complement nor a substitute for human labour at the bottom portion 
of the wage distribution. For occupations which require service job tasks, computers appear 
to complement these job tasks, which therefore has a positive impact on wages. The results 
from table 4.7 show the importance of the type of job tasks completed by occupations are 
important factors that affect the wage levels of workers in addition to service offshoring over 
time. These results are similar to the results reported by the OLS regressions and they support 
the TSTC hypothesis posed by Autor et 01., (2003). 
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4.4.2.5 Wages, Task Biased Technological Change and Individual Heterogeneity 
Next, I examine task bias technological change associated with individual heterogeneity. 
Individual heterogeneity is examined with the interaction of the female, white individuals and 
white-collar occupation dummy variables with the four task variables. Equation (4) was 
estimated with the addition of these interaction variables. The estimated results are 
presented within tables 4.8,4.9 and 4.10. 
From table 4.8, for females, routine job tasks and non-routine manual job tasks have a 
negative and significant impact on wage levels. From abstract and service job task 
interactions, the impact on wages are positive but not significant. These results are not 
consistent with the reported findings from the literature review. Spitz-Oener (2006) and Black 
& Spitz-Oener (2007,2010) found women gradually completed more analytical job tasks than 
routine job tasks compared to men in Germany over time; therefore this should translate to a 
positive impact on their wage levels and hence these changes to the types of job tasks 
performed by women contributed towards narrowing the gender pay gap between men and 
women in Germany. This chapter's job task measures are not dynamic but are fixed over time; 
therefore, my results suggest that if women have jobs that are more intensive in routine and 
manual job tasks as part of their work responsibilities, their impact on wage levels are bound 
to be negative. But if they were dynamic TBTC variables, I believe the results this chapter 
would be in line with the reported findings from Spitz-Oener (2006) and Black & Spitz-Oener 
(2007,2010). 
From table 4.9, for white-collar occupations, the interaction between white-collar jobs and 
non-routine manual job tasks yields a small and significant negative impact on wages. The 
interactions between other job task variables are not significant. 
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The results from this section show the impact from the job task variables are important 
determinants of wages and they also vary across different individual workers. This evidence 
supports the findings reported by Autor & Handel (2009) who found female workers carried 
out far fewer analytical job tasks and far more interpersonal and routine job tasks than equally 
educated male workers. 
Table 4.8: Task Biased Technological Change and Individual Characteristics - Gender 
Dependent Variable: Loc of Real Hourly Employment W. 
~ n t s s (l} (Z} (3} (4} 
Routine Job Task 0.0035 
(O.OO3S) 
Female-Routine Job Task -0.0151 
(O.OO4O} ...... 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Task 0.0077 
(0.0029)··· 
Female-Non-Routine Abstract Job Task 0.0027 
(O.0027) 
Non-Routine Manual Job Task 0.0064 
(0.0051.) 
Female-Non-Routine Manual Job Task -0.0121 
(0.0033) .. •• 
Service Job Task 0.0041 
(O.OO24)" 
Female·Service Job Task 0.0035 
(0.0028) 
Constant 0.3198 0.3936 0.3153 0.3604 
(0.1.669)· (0.1.581.)·· (0.1.664)· (0.1.630)"· 
Observations 58707 58707 58978 58707 
Rl 0.4958 0.4959 0.4947 0.4945 
Note: All regression models present robust standard errors clustered by the 2-digit SIC level within 
the parentheses. Significance Level: ···p<O.01., ··p<O.OS and "p<O.1.0. Each regression controls for 
industry specific time trends, regions, occupation controls, individual fixed effects and industry 
controls. See appendix 11 for the full list of estimated coefficients. 
Lastly, table 4.10 presents the interactions from the job task variables with race. The 
estimated coefficients show there is little significance between job tasks and white individuals. 
Although the estimated coefficient from column (4) shows white workers employed in 
occupations that have a high importance for service related job tasks can have a negative 
impact on their wage levels. 
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Table 4.9: Task Biased Technological Change and Individual Characteristics - White Collar Jobs 
Dependent Variable: 1.01 of Real Hourly Employment Waae 
~ ~ ~ r - ~ ~ ~ ) ~ ~__ ~ ( ' ~ ~ ~ ~____ ~ P ~ J J______ ~ ~ ~ } }__ _ 
Routine Job Task -0.009 
White-collar*Routine Job Task 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Task 
White-collar*NR-Abstract Job Task 
Non-Routine Manual Job Task 
White-collar'"NR-Manual Job Task 
(0.0077) 
0.0058 
(0.0128) 
0.0092 
(0.0043)·· 
0.0000 
(0.0062) 
0.0079 
(0.0033)" 
-0.0126 
(0.0037)*'" 
Service Job Task 0.0055 
(0.0053) 
White-collar· Service Job Task 0.0004 
(0.0067) 
Constant 0.3549 0.3963 0.3134 0.3623 
(0.1526)·· (0.1477)'"· (0.1627)'" (0.1537)·· 
Observations 58707 58707 58978 58707 
R2 0.4944 0.4958 0.4936 0.4942 
Note: All regression models present robust standard errors clustered by the 2-digit SIC level 
within the parentheses. Significance level: ...... p<O.Ol, ··p<O.05 and ·p<O.10. Each regression 
controls for industry specific time trends. regions. occupation controls. individual fixed effects 
and industry controls. See appendix 12 for the full list of estimated coefficients. 
Table 4.10: Task Biased Technological Change and Individual Characteristics - Race 
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4.4.2.6 TBTC & Blinder (2007) Occupation Tradability Index 
This penultimate section examines whether workers employed within the most tradable jobs 
earn lower pay than other least tradable jobs as defined by the Blinder (2007) occupation 
tradability index. Following Blinder (2007), I create nine dummy variables which take a value 
of one for specific values from the job tradability index. These dummy variables were added 
to equation (4), where table 4.11 presents the results; the reference category relates to 
category IV, which relates to the highly non-offshorable jobs. See section 4.2.2 and figure 
4.2.1 for a reminder of the index and the categories. 
From the top half of table 4.11, workers employed within highly offshorable jobs with index 
values in the range 76-85 earn 15.05% less per hour compared to highly non-offshorable jobs. 
This figure is very close to a figure reported by Blinder (2007) using a single year of data for the 
U.S. Similarly, non-offshorable jobs with index values 26-35 earn almost 8% less than highly 
non-offshorable jobs and workers employed within occupations which have an index value of 
25 earn 6.23% more than the reference group. 
The second half of table 4.11 examines whether the most tradable jobs are the most 
offshorable because these jobs have a high degree of importance for completing routine-type 
job tasks. For this exercise, I simply interact each of the Blinder index dummy variables with 
the routine job task variable that was created via principal component analysis. From the 
bottom half of table 4.11, the estimated coefficients show for the most offshorable jobs with 
index values of 86+ and 76-85 interacted with routine job task variable have hourly wages that 
are lower. These results demonstrate that routine job tasks completed by workers employed 
within highly tradable job are more likely to have lower wage levels. The estimated 
coefficients from the interactions with the routine job task variable with the lesser offshorable 
job dummy variables are not significant. 
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Table 4.11: Blinder Index & Task Biased Technological Change 
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Hourty Employment Wap 
CM/fIdents EstImated CoeffIcIents 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 2S 0.0623 
(0.0336)* 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 26-35 -0.0795 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 36-45 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 46-55 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values S6-65 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 66-75 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 76-85 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 86+ 
Routine Tasks 
Blinder Index Values 2S*Routine Job Task 
Blinder Index Values 26-3S*Routine Job Task 
Blinder Index Values 36-4S*Routine Job Task 
Blinder Index Values 46-5S*Routine Job Task 
Blinder Index Values 56-65*Routine Job Task 
Blinder Index Values 66-7S*Routine Job Task 
Blinder Index Values 76-SS*RoutineJob Task 
Blinder Index Values 86+* Routine Job Task 
Constant 
(0.0362)** 
0.0258 
(0.0293) 
0.0042 
(0.0310) 
0.0045 
(O.OlSO) 
-0.0110 
(0.0254) 
-0.1505 
(0.0400)*** 
-0.0385 
(0.0259) 
0.0000 
(0.0033) 
0.OS21 
(0.0312) 
0.0060 
(0.0131) 
-0.0229 
(0.0078)*" 
0.0102 
(0.0107) 
0.0109 
(0.0043)** 
-0.0030 
(0.0059) 
-0.0560 
(0.0088)*" 
-0.0205 
(0.0063)*** 
0.3749 
(0.1645)*** 
Observations 58707 
R2 0.4961 
Note: All regression models present robust standard errors dustered by the 2-digit 
SIC level within the parentheses. Significance level: ***p<O.Ol, **p<O.05 and 
*p<O.10. This regression controls for industry specific time trends, regions, 
occupation controls, individual fIXed effects and industry controls. Reference 
group for the Blinder Index are all occupations that have a value of zero; these are 
the non-tradable occupations. See appendix 14 for the full list of estimated 
coefficients. 
4.4.2.7 Monetary Magnitudes 
Finally, table 4.12 provides a simple exercise to estimate the monetary impact from service 
offshoring intensity (055), the most tradable occupations (01) and the importance of 
completing routine job tasks has on the wage level per hour, over one week, one month and 
one year. To estimate the monetary impact, the estimated coefficients have been taken from 
tables 4.4 and 4.7. For service offshoring, a 1% rise in service offshoring intensity lowers 
hourly wages by 1.91%-2.10%; the estimated monetary fall in the average hourly wages over 
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the sample at 1995 prices ranges from £0.16- £0.18, if the average hourly pay is £8.63. 
Assuming the average number of hours worked per week is 37.s hours, the monetary loss in 
pay over one week is £6.18-£6.80. Over one month, the monetary loss is £24.72- £27.20. 
Annually, a 1% rise in service offshoring lowers annual pay by £321.36-£326.40. 
For the most tradable occupations, the monetary loss is slightly bigger. According to the 
estimated coefficient from table 4.4, hourly pay is lower by 3.53% compared to the least 
tradable occupations. Per hour, this translates to a £0.30 fall if the average hourly pay rate is 
taken to be £8.63. Per week, this is a fall of £11.42 and per month the fall in pay amounts to 
£45.70. Annually, the fall in pay for the most tradable occupations is estimated to be £548.35. 
Table 4.12: Monetary Estimates 
Averap Hourty Wapat 1995 Prfc:es: £8.636 
Houn Worked per Week: 37.5 
Service Offshori"llntens/ty Tradable Occupations Routine Tules 
-1.91% - -2.10%° -0.52% 
Fallin Hourly Wap 
£0.16-£0.18 £0.30 £0.04 
Fan In Pay: One Week 
£6.18-£6.80 £11.42 £1.68 
Fallin Pay: One Month 
£24.72-£27.20 £45.70 £6.73 
Fallin Pay: One Year 
£321.36-£326.40 £548.35 £80.78 
~ : : Author's own calculations. a: represents estimated coeffidents taken from table 4.4. II 
represents estimated coeffident taken from table 4.7. 0 - Average hourly wage statistic taken from table 
4.3. 
For occupations which are intensive in routine job tasks, the monetary impact is small from a 
one standard deviation change; however the monetary loss could be big if occupations have a 
very high importance for completing routine job tasks. A one standard deviation increase in 
the importance for routine job tasks lowers hourly wages by 0.52%. Per hour, the fall in the 
hourly wage is £0.04 for an average hourly wage of £8.63. Per week, the fall in pay is £1.68; 
per month this fall in pay translates to £6.73. Annually, the monetary impact from a one 
standard deviation increase in the importance for routine job tasks lower pay by £80.78. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the effects of offshoring and how the advancements of technology 
can affect the wage levels of British workers for the period 1992 to 2007. Using the British 
Household Panel Survey, the estimation of Mincer wage regressions examined how industry 
level material and service offshoring intensity, and the advancements of technology could 
potentially make some jobs previously unaffected by offshoring more offshorable and affect 
individual level wages. The potential threat of engaging in offshoring can provide firms with 
the impetus to lower wage rises because of the potential threat of substituting domestic 
labour with foreign workers. Additionally, the impact from the TBTC hypothesis -technology 
substituting away routine job tasks performed by labour are also job tasks that are most likely 
to be offshored. The results from this chapter show the impact from service offshoring at the 
industry level, the potential threat from the advancements of technology that increasingly 
pose a threat to many more potentially tradable occupations and the threat of TBTC -
particularly from the importance of completing routine job tasks, all have had a negative and 
significant impact on the wage levels of workers. 
The results from this chapter show skilled workers benefit from offshoring (materials and 
services) activities at the expense of lesser skilled labour and where the affects of offshoring 
does not discriminate by gender or race. These findings are consistent with the reported 
results from the empirical literature (Feenstra & Hanson (1995, 1996 & 1999) and Crino 
(2009c) for the U.s. and Geishecker & Gorg (2008a,b), Hummels et 0/ (2009) and Munch & 
Skaksen (2009) for European countries. 
From the preferred specifications, the results show that a one percent rise from industry level 
service offshoring intensity lower hourly wage levels by 1.91%-2.10%. The monetary 
magnitude from this estimation can imply a fall in pay that could amount to £321.36 - £326.40 
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over the course of one year. This fall in pay can be substantial for workers who are employed 
by firms that engage in service offshoring. However, industry level material offshoring 
intensity exerts no significant impact on the wage levels of workers, though the estimated 
coefficients are negative for less skilled workers and positive for skilled workers. These results 
suggest that material offshoring and service offshoring have a similar impact on wage levels 
though they differ by their statistical significance. 
According to Blinder's (2007) occupation tradability index, workers employed within the most 
offshorable jobs earn 3.53% less per hour compared to workers who are employed by lesser 
tradable jobs. The monetary loss over the space of one year can be substantial, amounting to 
£548.35. Finally, from the TBTe hypothesis, a one standard deviation increase in the 
importance of routine job tasks lowers hourly wage levels by 0.52%. The monetary loss can 
amount to £80.78 over twelve months. This loss could potentially be greater for occupations 
which have a very high importance for completing routine job tasks. Finally, workers 
employed within the most tradable jobs, which also have a high importance for completing 
routine intensive job tasks have lower wage levels over time compared to other jobs that are 
not as potentially tradable. 
This chapter has shown that offshoring, being employed in the most tradable jobs and 
completing routine intensive job tasks can lower job stability but can they lower job security? 
The forth coming chapter examines whether these forces have raised job insecurity by 
increasing the probability of becoming unemployed over the last two decades. 
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4.6 Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Table 4.1A: Complete List of Offshorable Occupations 
ISC088 ISC088 I5CO otrshcnbllity Index Number 
2141 Architects, town and traffic planners 25 1 
2453 Composers, musicians and singers 25 2 
3415 Technical and commercial sales representatives 25 3 
4142 Mall carriers and sorting clerks 26 4 
7311 Precision-Instrument makers and repairers 26 5 
7414 Fruit. vegetable and related preservers 27 6 
8271 Meat- and flsh-processlng-machlne operators 27 7 
82n Tea-, coffee-, and cocoa-processing-machlne operators 27 8 
8155 Petroleum- and natural-gas-reflnlng-plant operators 29 9 
8161 Power-production plant operators 29 10 
8229 Chemical-products machine operators not elsewhere classified 29 11 
8274 Baked-goods, cereal and chocolate-products machine operators 29 12 
9333 Freight handlers 29 13 
3472 Radio, television and other announcers 30 14 
4131 5tock clerks 31 15 
8275 Frult-, vegetable- and nut-processlng-machlne operators 31 16 
3228 Pharmaceutical assistants 32 17 
2432 Ubrarlans and related Information professionals 33 18 
3139 Optical and electronic equipment operators not elsewhere classified 34 19 
3224 Optometrists and opticians 34 20 
8340 Ships' deck crews and related workers 34 21 
3132 Broadcasting and telecommunications equipment operators 35 22 
7112 Shotflrers and blasters 35 23 
8222 Ammunition- and explosive-products machine operators 35 24 
7111 Miners and quarry workers 36 25 
7113 Stone splitters, cutters and carvers 36 26 
7121 Builders, traditional materials 36 27 
7129 Building frame and related trades workers not elsewhere classified 36 28 
8111 Mining-plant operators 36 29 
8113 Well drillers and borers and related workers 36 30 
4115 Secretaries 38 31 
1226 Production and operations department manqers In transport. storage and communications 39 32 
1233 Sales and marketing department managers 40 33 
8224 I'hotoIraphlc-products machine operators 41 34 
8163 Incinerator, water-treatment and related plant operators 42 35 
1316 General managers In transport, storage and communications 43 36 
3111 Chemical and physical science technicians 43 37 
4141 Ubrary and filing clerks 43 38 
7421 Wood treaters 43 39 
8112 Mlnerai-ore- and stone-processlng-plan operators 44 40 
3213 Farming and forestry advisers 44 41 
2412 Personnel and careers professionals 46 42 
3133 Medical equipment operators 46 43 
7344 photographic and related workers 47 44 
3113 Electrical engineering technicians 47 4S 
3114 Electronics and telecommunications engineering technicians 47 46 
3116 Chemical engineering technicians 47 47 
3211 ute science technicians 4B 4B 
3212 Agronomy and forestry technicians 4B 49 
1142 Senior officials of employers', workers' and other economlc-lnterest orpnlsatlons 49 SO 
1232 Personnel and Industrial relations department 49 51 
1235 Supply and distribution department managers 49 52 
3422 Clearl". and forwardl". apnts 49 53 
2419 Business professionals not elsewhere classified SO 54 
3414 Travel consultants and orpnlsers SO 55 
3417 Appraisers, valuers and auctioneers SO 56 
4133 Transport clerks 51 57 
2421 Lawyers 51 58 
3141 Ships' engineers 52 59 
1317 General managers of business -w:es 52 60 
3131 Photographers and Image and sound recordl". equipment operators 52 61 
1234 AdvertIsIng and public relations department managers 53 62 
3119 Physical and engineering science technicians not elsewhere classified 53 63 
245S Film, stage and related actors and directors 54 64 
3439 Administrative associate professionals not elsewhere dasslfied 54 6S 
4214 Pawnbrokers and money-lenders 54 66 
2111 PhysIcists and astronomers 54 67 
1227 Production and operations department mallllllelS In business services 55 68 
1228 Production and operations department managers In personal care, c1eanl". and related seMce SS 69 
1236 Computing services department managers 55 70 
1237 R ~ a r c h a M d e w m p m e n t d e p a r t m e n t m ~ ~ SS 71 
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1311 General managers In agriculture, hunting, forestry/ and fishing 55 72 
1313 General managers In construction 55 73 
1314 General managers In wholesale and retail trade 55 74 
1315 General managers of restaurants and hotels 55 75 
1318 General managers In personal care, cleaning and related services 55 76 
1319 General managers not elsewhere classified 55 n 
3416 Buyers 55 78 
7415 Food and beverage tasters and graders 55 79 
8162 Steam-engine and boiler operators 55 80 
7423 Woodworking machine setters and setter-operators 57 81 
7437 Upholsterers and related workers 57 82 
8141 Wood-processing-plant operators 57 83 
8285 Wood and related products assemblers 57 84 
8251 Printing-machlne operators 58 85 
1222 Production and operations department managers In manufacturing 58 86 
3419 Finance and sales associate professionals not elsewhere classified 59 87 
6142 Charcoal bumers and related workers 59 88 
7331 Handicraft workers in wood and related materials 59 89 
7341 Compositors, typesetters and related workers 59 90 
7342 Stereotypers and electrotypers 59 91 
7343 Printing engravers and etchers 59 92 
7345 Bookbinders and related workers 59 93 
8121 Ore and metal furnace operators 59 94 
8252 Bookblndlng-machlne operators 59 95 
1312 General managers In manufacturing 59 96 
2149 Architects, engineers and related professionals not elsewhere classified 60 97 
3152 Safety, health, and quality Inspectors 60 98 
4190 Other office clerks 60 99 
8240 Wood-products machine operators 61 100 
4223 Telephone switchboard operators 62 101 
7422 Cabinet makers and related workers 63 102 
3421 Trade brolters 64 103 
4132 Production clerks 64 104 
8281 Mechanical-machinery assemblers 64 105 
2143 Electrical engineers 64 106 
7313 Jewellery and preclous-metal workers 64 107 
8171 Autornated-assembly-llne operators 64 108 
8286 Paperboard, textile and related products assemblers 64 109 
9321 Assembling labourers 64 110 
4215 Debt-collectors and related workers 65 111 
7211 Metal moulders and coremakers 65 112 
7241 Electrical mechanics and fitters 65 113 
3432 l.epl and related business associate professionals 65 114 
2113 Chemists 66 115 
2114 Geologists and geophysicists 66 116 
7424 Basketry weavers, brush makers and related workers 66 117 
8282 Electrical-equlpment assemblers 66 118 
8283 Electronic-equipment assemblers 66 119 
4222 Receptionists and Information clerks 67 120 
8290 Other machine operators and assemblers 67 121 
3123 Industrial robot controllers 68 122 
3411 Securities and finance dealers and brokers 68 123 
7141 Painters and related workers 68 124 
7224 Metal wheel1lrinders, polishers and tool sharpeners 68 125 
7323 Glass engravers and etchers 68 126 
7324 Glass, ceramics and related decorative painters 68 127 
7413 Dairy-products makers 68 128 
8122 Metal melters, casters and roIllng-m1ll operators 68 129 
8124 Metal drawers and extruders 68 130 
8139 Glass, ceramics and related plant operators not elsewhere classified 68 131 
8142 Paper-pulp plant operators 68 132 
8143 Papermaklng-plant operators 68 133 
8151 Crushing-, grindlng- and chemical-mixing machinery operators 68 134 
8153 Chemical-filterlng- and separatlng-equlpment operators 68 135 
8154 Chemical-stili and reactor operators (except petroleum and natural gas) 68 136 
8159 Chemlcal-processlng-plant operators not elsewhere classified 68 137 
8172 Industrlal-robot operators 68 138 
8211 Machine-tool operators 68 139 
8212 Cement and other minerai products machine operators 68 140 
8221 Pharmaceutical- and toIletry-products machine operators 68 141 
8223 Metal flnlshlng-, platlng- and coatlng-machlne operators 68 142 
8253 Paper-products machine operators 68 143 
8272 Dalry-products machine operators 68 144 
8273 Grain- and Spice-milling-machine operators 68 145 
8276 Sugar production machine operators 68 146 
8278 Brewen-, wine and other beverage machine operators 68 147 
2147 Mining engineers, metallura!sts and related professionals 69 148 
8131 Glass and ceramics kiln and related machine operators 69 149 
8284 Metal-, rubber- and pIastic-products assemblers 69 150 
3431 Administrative secretaries and related associate professionals 69 151 
7212 Welders and flarnecutters 69 152 
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7321 Abrasive wheel formers, potters and related workers 69 153 
7322 Glass-makers, cutters, grinders, and finishers 69 154 
8231 Rubber-products machine operators 69 155 
7222 T ool-makers and related workers 69 156 
8232 Plastic-products machine operators 70 157 
2145 Mechanical engineers 70 158 
7213 Sheet-metal workers 70 159 
8123 Metal-heat-treating-piant operators 70 160 
8152 Chemical-heat-treating-plant operators 70 161 
9322 Hand packers and other manufacturing labourers 70 162 
7223 Machine-tool setters and setter-operators 70 163 
4114 calculating-machine operators 71 164 
2146 Chemical engineers 72 165 
2411 Accountants 72 166 
3115 Mechanical engineering technicians 72 167 
3442 Government tax and excise officials 72 168 
4221 Travel agency and related clerks 72 169 
8261 Flbre-preparlng-, spinning- and winding machine operators 73 170 
2144 Electronics and telecommunications engineers 73 171 
7434 Furriers and related workers 73 172 
2112 MeteorologiSts 74 173 
2451 Authors, journalists and other writers 74 174 
2211 Biologists, botanists, zoologists, and related professionals 74 175 
7435 Textile, leather and related pattern-makers and cutters 75 176 
1231 Finance and administration department managers 75 In 
7332 Handicraft won:ers In textile, leather and related materials 75 178 
7346 Silk-screen, block and textile printers 75 179 
7431 Fibre preparers 75 180 
7432 Weavers, knitters and related workers 75 181 
7433 Tailors, dressmakers and hatters 75 182 
7436 Sewers, embroiderers and related workers 75 183 
7441 Pelt dressers, tanners and fellmongers 75 184 
7442 Shoe-makers and related workers 75 185 
8262 Weaving- and knitting-machine operators 75 186 
8263 Sewing machine operators 75 187 
8264 Bleachlng-, dve1ng- and cleanlng-machlne operators 75 188 
8265 Fur and leather-preparlng-machine operators 75 189 
8266 Shoemaklng- and related machine operators 75 190 
8269 Textile-, fur- and leather-products machine operators not elsewhere classified 75 191 
4122 Statistical and finance clerks 75 192 
3122 Computer equipment operators 76 193 
2452 Sculptors, painters and related artists 78 194 
2121 Mathematicians and related professionals 80 195 
3121 Computer assistants 80 196 
4121 Accounting and bookkeeping clerks 80 197 
2131 Computer systems designers and analysts 81 198 
3471 Decorators and commercial designers 83 199 
2212 Pharmacologists, pathologists, and related professionals 83 200 
3433 Bookkeepers 84 201 
3434 Statistical, mathematical and related associate professionals 84 202 
3412 Insurance representatives 85 203 
2148 cartographers and suM!yOl'S 86 204 
5113 Travel guides 86 205 
2441 Economists 89 206 
2139 Computing professionals not elsewhere classified 90 207 
3460 Social work associate professionals 90 208 
2444 Philologists, translators and Interpreters 93 209 
4112 Word-processor and related operators 94 210 
3118 Oraughtspersons 94 211 
4144 ScrIbes and related workers 94 212 
4211 CashIers and ticket clerks 94 213 
4111 Stenographers and typists 95 214 
4143 Coding, proof-readlng and related clerks 95 215 
9113 Door-to-door and telephone salespersons 95 216 
2122 Statisticlans 96 217 
2132 Computer programmers 100 218 
4113 Data entry operators 100 219 
Source: Author's own compilation from mapping Blinder's (2007) job tradability Index on BrItish data. 
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Appendix 2 
Table 4.2A: Spearmen's Rank Correlation Coefficients between Three Skill Measure and 
Blinder's Index 
Appendix 3 
Sldll Measures 
Wales Years of Education 36 Year Ava. Years of Education 
1992 0.0816 ••• -0.0010 -0.0317 •• 
1993 0.0758 ••• -0.0062 -0.0408 •• 
1994 0.1055 ••• -0.0049 -0.0318 •• 
1995 0.1194 ••• -0.0031 -0.0175 
1996 0.1133 ••• -0.0081 -0.0298 • 
1997 0.1265 ••• 0.0001 -0.0202 
1998 0.1235 ••• -0.0228 -0.0430 ••• 
1999 0.1454 ••• -0.0166 -0.0371 •• 
2000 0.1247 ••• -0.0154 -0.0368 •• 
2001 0.1194 ••• -0.0333 •• -0.0471 ••• 
2002 0.0838 ••• -0.0061 -0.0232 
2003 0.1451 ••• 0.0182 0.0018 
2004 0.1243 ••• -0.0098 -0.0232 
2005 0.1008 ••• 0.0247 0.0103 
2006 0.2279 ••• 0.0573 • •• 0.0426 •• 
2007 0.2090 ••• 0.0474 •• 0.0311 
SoufCe: Results complied by the author. Spearman's Rank Correlation coeffiCIents are 
presented. Significance Level: ***p<O.Ol; **p<O.05; *p<O.10. The null hypothesis 
tests the independence between the skill measures and the Blinder Occupation 
Tradability Index; that is there is no correlation. Data used Is the BHPS data. 
O·NET Database 
O·NET stands for the 'Occupational Information Network'. It is a project that was created by 
the U.S. Department of Labor, through the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) to 
provide a successor to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) which had provided details 
of occupations since the 1930s. The objective for the O·NET project is to maintain and 
develop occupation descriptions that are available from the system. The O·NET project is a 
database which provides public standard descriptions of occupations in the U.S. 
The database contains details of 949 occupational titles37 of which at least 812 occupations 
have or will have data available for the titles. Missing information for some occupation titles 
36 Average Years of Education are defined as follows from Blinder (2007): El = Fraction with high school qualifications or less; E2 
= fraction with some college; E3 = fraction with a bachelor's degree or higher. Additionally two scalar measures for average years 
of education are constructed: E4 = E3-El and ES = 10Et +14E2+18E3. Measures ES is used in this estimation. 
37 The version of O·NET that I have used Is Version 13.0, but the latest version available is July 2009 is Version 14.0. 
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are due to there being no information available for the titles as information may not have 
been collected or the information may not be possible to be collected because some of the 
titles were created using O*NET-SOC classifications. The O*NET-SOC classifications are based 
upon the U.S. SOC system, however there may be some occupation titles that provide a little 
more detail compared to the available U.S. SOC titles. 
O*NET Occupation Information 
The occupation information available from O*NET is based on a Content Model, which 
provides common occupation descriptions for each occupation and allows for a comparison 
across occupations. Figure 4.1A formalises the idea behind the O*NET database. The outer 
ring of the content model encapsulates 4 main themes that provide the basis for O*NET which 
are: worker, job, occupation and cross occupation characteristics. From these four outer 
characteristics, the content model has six major domains illustrated by the six different square 
boxes. Some of these domains are job oriented and others are worker oriented. 
Figure 4.1A: O*NET Content Model 
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Source: O*NET Occupations Reference Guide 
Each of these domains is made up of a series of elements that refer to a series of worker, job, 
occupation and experience characteristics which may influence the domain. For example, the 
Worker Characteristics domain consists of four elements which are Abilities, Occupational 
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Interests, Work Values and Work Styles. Each of these elements refers to characteristics or 
work activities that may influence the performance and capacity to acquire knowledge and 
skills required to carry out effective work performance. 
For each element, O*NET provides 11 rating scales which provide a measure for a number of 
characteristics/work activities that describe how these characteristics/work activities relate to 
each O*NET-SOC. From these 11 rating scales, I use the importance level and the context 
level required to perform jobs to construct four variables that relate to the Task Bias 
Technological Change Hypothesis proposed by Autor et 01., (2003). These variables measure 
routine job tasks, non-routine abstract job tasks, non-routine manual job tasks and service job 
tasks. 
The context level measures the percentage of time a job task activity may relate to an 
occupation and is measured from a rating scale of 1 to S. For example, the percentage of time 
may relate to how much time an occupation may engage in face-to-face discussions within the 
context of an occupation. If a high percentage of time is spent engaging in face-to-face 
discussions, then the context level score will be at the top end of the rating scale near to S. If 
a small percentage of time is spent engaging in face-to-face discussions, the context rating will 
be towards the bottom end of the rating scale near to 1. 
The importance level provides a rating for the importance of a job task activity. For example, 
the importance level may seek to measure how important manual dexterity may be to the 
performance of a job. The importance level is measured from a five point scale, where 1 
denotes the item (manual dexterity) is not important and 5 which is extremely importanes. 
From the O*NET occupation database, I have selected elements from three of the six domains. 
These domains are worker characteristics, worker requirements and occupational 
38 The following link is one of many resources that are available which provides greater depth of details of the O·NET database: 
ftp :Uftp,xwalkcenter,org/download/onetlOIONETlOUserGuide,pdf 
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requirements. From each of these domains, I have used the elements which provide the 
importance level and the context level rating scales for selected job task activity descriptions. 
Appendix 5 provides details of each work task activity that has been used to perform principal 
component analysis. 
Appendix 4 
Explaining the O*NET 'Importance Rating' 
Table 4.3A lists the importance scale ratings for five occupations in relation to the four job task 
variables I have constructed to measure TBTe. Each of the job task variables are constructed 
from a list of potential job task activities which are associated with routine, non-routine 
(manual and abstract) and service job tasks. For each occupation there is an importance rating 
in the range of 1-5 to indicate the importance each activity has to each occupation. 
Table 4.3A: Task Importance from O*NET Classifications 
Mining & Quarrying Computer Domestic ISCO-88 O(;cupations Medical Doctors Economists Helpers & Labourers Programmers Cleaners 
Routine Tasks 
Manual Dexterity 4.13 4.00 1.00 2.13 2.50 
Spend Time Making Repetitive 3.42 2.38 2.03 3.47 4.31 Movements 
Clerical 1.69 2.52 2.25 2.61 2.17 
Abstract Tasks 
Analytical Thinking 2.83 4.57 4.80 4.27 2.86 
Attention to Detail 4.09 4.96 4.62 4.27 4.27 
Leadership 3.18 4.06 3.90 3.03 2.99 
Manual Tasks 
Performing General Phvsical 
3.04 2.64 1.17 1.66 3.00 Activities 
Multi-limb Co-ordination 4.38 3.38 1.00 1.00 2.38 
Handling & Moving Objects 3.67 3.84 1.16 1.64 2.69 
Service Tasks 
Face-to-Face Discussions 4.24 5.00 4.59 4.84 3.87 
Service Orientation 2.79 4.20 2.87 2.54 2.53 
Selling & Influencing Others 1.84 2.44 2.71 2.43 1.42 
Source: Author's own compilation. 
For example, the medical profession is a high skilled profession where routine, abstract, 
manual and service related job task activities are important functions that are required to be 
performed by this occupation group. The importance ratings for medical doctors are quite 
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high for the majority of the job task activities listed by this table. For instance, medical doctors 
are required to use their medical training to prescribe medicines, make diagnosis and perform 
operations to aid patient welfare. Many of these functions require analytical thinking to try to 
diagnose illnesses; they need to have attention to detail to make sure the correct doses of 
medication are prescribed to patients. Many of these activities are listed under abstract job 
tasks have an importance scale rating greater than 4. Doctors also have face-to-face 
consultations (service related job activities) with patients; they use their limbs (manual job 
tasks) to check the physical welfare of patients and are required to fill out forms to keep a 
record (clerical related job task activities) for patients' medical histories. It must be noted that 
the importance scale rating is specific to each occupations and cannot be compared to other 
occupations. 
In comparison to medical doctors, computer programmers perform a number of abstract 
related job task activities. This is reflected by all job task activities listed under abstract job 
tasks in table 4.3A to have an importance scale rating greater than 3. There are few routine 
related job tasks performed by computer programmers, and there is little importance for 
manual dexterity or clerical related job task activities. There is also little need for manual job 
tasks such as multi-limb co-ordination or service tasks related to service orientation or selling 
and influencing people. 
For mining and quarrying labourers, manual job tasks such as performing general physical 
activities, multi-limb co-ordination and handling and moving physical objects have a greater 
importance rating for this occupation compared to economists or computer programmers. 
Thus, many of these job task activities related to manual job tasks have an importance scale 
rating greater than 3. 
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Appendix 5 
Selection of Variables used to construct the Job Task Variables 
For each TBTC variable, I have selected the following task activity variables from the following 
domains: Worker Characteristics, Worker Requirements and Occupational Requirements. 
Variables selected from these domains are available from the O*NET database bundle. From 
these files I have selected 9S task activity variables, where some variables are used more than 
once. All variables that I have used to construct each task measure are listed below: 
Routine Tasks 
Arm-hand steadiness; Manual dexterity; Finger dexterity; Control Precision; Wrist finger 
speed; Reading Comprehension; Operation Monitoring; Operation and Control; Repairing; 
Clerical; Estimating the quantifiable characteristics of products, events or information; 
Processing Information; Interacting with Computers; Documenting/Recording Information; 
Performing administrative activities; Spend time making repetitive motions; Degree of 
automation; Importance of repeating same task; Pace determined by speed of equipment. 
Number of Variables: 19. 
Non-Routine Abstract Tasks 
Originality; Deductive reasoning; Inductive reasoning; Mathematical reasoning; Memorization; 
Speed of Closure; Flexibility of closure; Selective attention; Achievement/Effort; Persistence; 
Initiative; Leadership; Stress tolerance; Adaptability/Flexibility; Attention to detail; 
Independence; Innovation; Analytical thinking; Reading comprehension; Mathematical skills; 
Critical thinking; Active learning; Monitoring; Complex problem solving; Judgment and decision 
making; Management of personnel resources; Administration and management; Mathematical 
knowledge; Evaluating information to determine compliance with standards; Making decisions 
and solving problems; Thinking creatively; Developing objectives and strategies; Interpreting 
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the meaning of information for others; Communicating with supervisors, peers or 
subordinates; Coordinating the work activities of others; Dependability. Number of Variables: 
36. 
Non-Routine Manual Tasks 
Multi-limb coordination; Response orientation; Rate control; Reaction time; Static strength; 
Dynamic strength; Peripheral vision; Depth perception; Equipment selection; Performing 
general physical activities; Handling and moving objects; Operating vehicles, mechanized 
devices or equipment; Deal with unpleasant or angry people; Spend time standing; Spend time 
climbing ladders, scaffolds or poles; Spend time walking and running; Spend time kneeling, 
crouching, stooping or crawling; Spend time keeping or regaining balance; Spend time using 
your hands to handle, control, or feel objects, tools, or controls; Spend time bending or 
twisting the body. Number of Variables: 20. 
Service Tasks 
Speech clarity; Cooperation; Social orientation; Self control; Active listening; Speaking; Social 
perceptiveness; persuasion; Service orientation; Management of material resources; sales and 
marketing; Customer and personal service; Communication and media; Judging the qualities of 
things, services, or people; Communicating with persons outside the organisation; Establishing 
and maintaining interpersonal relationships; Assisting and caring for others; Selling or 
Influencing others; Resolving conflicts and negotiating with others; Performing for or working 
directly with the public; Face-to-face discussions; Deal with external customers; Concern for 
others. Number of Variables: 23. 
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Appendix 6 
Table 4.4A: Principal Component Eigenvalues and Proportion of Explained Variance for 
Routine Job Tasks 
Prlndpal ProportIon of Cumulative 
EiJenvalue Variance explained explained Component Individually Variance 
1 8.4413 0.4443 0.4443 
2 3.2354 0.1703 0.6146 
3 2.5019 0.1317 0.7462 
4 1.0245 0.0539 0.8002 
5 0.8091 0.0426 0.8427 
6 0.5988 0.0315 0.8743 
7 0.5042 0.0265 0.9008 
8 0.4028 0.0212 0.9220 
9 0.3176 0.0167 0.9387 
10 0.2267 0.0119 0.9506 
11 0.2013 0.0106 0.9612 
12 0.1716 0.0090 0.9703 
13 0.1420 0.0075 0.9777 
14 0.1375 0.0072 0.9850 
15 0.0934 0.0049 0.9899 
16 0.0613 0.0032 0.9931 
17 0.0553 0.0029 0.9960 
18 0.0488 0.0026 0.9986 
19 0.0265 0.0014 1.0000 
Source: Author's own calculations using the BHPS data. This table presents 
un-rotated eigenvalues for each component. As there are 19 variables used 
to create a single component for routine tasks. the principal component 
loadings or eigenvectors are not presented. Eigenvalues. proportion of 
individually explained variance and cumulative explained variance present 
values adjusted to 4-decimal places. 
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Table 4.5A: Principal Component Eigenvalues and Proportion of Explained Variance for 
Abstract Job Tasks 
Principal ProportIon of Cumulative 
Component Elaenvalue Variance explained explained 
Individually Variance 
1 18.6198 0.5172 0.5172 
2 4.3243 0.1201 0.6373 
3 2.9573 0.0821 0.7195 
4 1.8605 0.0517 0.7112 
5 1.4093 0.0391 0.8103 
6 1.1796 0.0328 0.8431 
7 1.0566 0.0293 0.8724 
8 0.6197 0.0172 0.8896 
9 0.5126 0.0142 0.9039 
10 0.4360 0.0121 0.9160 
11 0.4171 0.0116 0.9276 
12 0.3552 0.0099 0.9375 
13 0.2816 0.0078 0.9453 
14 0.2576 0.0072 0.9524 
15 0.2357 0.0065 0.9590 
16 0.2003 0.0056 0.9645 
17 0.1569 0.0044 0.9689 
18 0.1364 0.0038 0.9727 
19 0.1193 0.0033 0.9760 
20 0.1084 0.0030 0.9790 
21 0.1026 0.0028 0.9819 
22 0.0890 0.0025 0.9843 
23 0.0866 0.0024 0.9868 
24 0.0687 0.0019 0.9887 
25 0.0598 0.0017 0.9903 
26 0.0550 0.0015 0.9918 
27 0.0529 0.0015 0.9933 
28 0.0500 0.0014 0.9947 
29 0.0374 0.0010 0.9957 
30 0.0325 0.0009 0.9966 
31 0.0299 0.0008 0.9975 
32 0.0230 0.0006 0.9981 
33 0.0206 0.0006 0.9987 
34 0.0182 0.0005 0.9992 
35 0.0148 0.0004 0.9996 
36 0.0142 0.0004 1.0000 
Source: Author's own calculations using the BHPS data. This table presents un-
rotated eigenvalues for each component. As there are 36 variables used to create 
a single component for non-routine abstract tasks, the principal component 
loadings or eigenvectors are not presented. Eigenvalues, proportion of 
individually explained variance and cumulative explained variance present values 
adjusted to 4-decimal places. 
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Table 4.6A: Principal Component Eigenvalues and Proportion of Explained 
Variance for Manual Job Tasks 
PrIncipal Proportion of Cumulative 
Component E1pnvalue Variance explained explained Individually Variance 
1 11.5588 0.5779 0.5779 
2 2.6894 0.134S 0.7124 
3 1.6332 0.0817 0.7941 
4 0.9374 0.0469 0.8409 
S 0.7766 0.0388 0.8798 
6 0.6025 0.0301 0.9099 
7 0.4512 0.0226 0.9325 
8 0.2855 0.0143 0.9467 
9 0.2360 0.0118 0.9585 
10 0.2042 0.0102 0.9687 
11 0.1700 0.0085 0.9772 
12 0.1241 0.0062 0.9835 
13 0.0890 0.0044 0.9879 
14 0.0715 0.0036 0.9915 
15 0.0535 0.0027 0.9942 
16 0.0342 0.0017 0.9959 
17 0.0276 0.0014 0.9972 
18 0.0258 0.0013 0.9985 
19 0.0171 0.0009 0.9994 
20 0.0122 0.0006 1.0000 
Source: Author's own calculations using the BHPS data. This table presents 
un-rotated eigenvalues for each component. As there are 20 variables used to 
create a single component for non-routine manual tasks, the prindpal 
component loadings or eigenvectors are not presented. Eigenvalues, 
proportion of Individually explained variance and cumulative explained 
variance present values adjusted to 4-declmal places. 
Table 4.7A: Principal Component Eigenvalues and Proportion of Explained 
Variance for Service Job Tasks 
Prlndpal Proportion of Cumulative 
Component Eigenvalue Variance explained explained Indlvldual!l Variance 
1 10.7328 0.4666 0.4666 
2 2.9327 0.1275 0.5942 
3 2.4895 0.1082 0.7024 
4 1.6873 0.0734 0.7758 
5 0.9932 0.0432 0.8189 
6 0.7256 0.0315 0.8505 
7 0.6382 0.0277 0.8782 
8 0.5397 0.0235 0.9017 
9 0.4725 0.0205 0.9222 
10 0.2983 0.0130 0.9352 
11 0.2697 0.0117 0.9469 
12 0.1954 0.0085 0.9554 
13 0.1739 0.0076 0.9630 
14 0.1586 0.0069 0.9699 
15 0.1257 0.0055 0.9754 
16 0.1041 0.0045 0.9799 
17 0.0989 0.0043 0.9842 
18 0.0888 0.0039 0.9880 
19 0.0666 0.0029 0.9909 
20 0.0639 0.0028 0.9937 
21 0.0577 0.0025 0.9962 
22 0.0500 0.0022 0.9984 
23 0.0369 0.0016 1.0000 
Source: Author's own calculations using the BHPS data. This table presents un-
rotated eigenvalues for each component. As there are 23 variables used to 
create a single component for service tasks, the principal component loadings or 
eigenvectors are not presented. Eigenvalues, proportion of Individually 
explained variance and cumulative explained variance present values adjusted 
to 4-declmal places. 
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Table 4.8A: OLS Results for Single Year Regressions 
Year 055 01 055xOI 
1992 -0.0235 -0.0385 0.0220 
(0.0128) (0.0181)" (0.0087)" 
1993 -0.0474 -0.0337 0.0017 
(0.0135)"·" (0.0176)" (0.0076) 
1994 -0.0236 -0.0056 0.0158 
(0.0133) (0.0186) (0.0091)" 
1995 -0.0131 -0.0138 0.0105 
(0.0114) (0.0165) (0.0073) 
1996 -0.0468 0.0093 0.0151 
(0.0123)"·" (O.OlSO) (0.0056)""" 
1997 -0.0427 0.0136 0.0144 
(0.0129)""" (0.0182) (0.0069)"" 
1998 -0.0065 -0.0076 0.0112 
(0.0092) (0.0142) (0.0067)" 
1999 -0.0327 0.0035 0.0118 
(0.0112)"·" (0.0158) (0.0061)" 
2000 -0.0197 -0.0115 -0.0052 
(0.0109)" (0.0202) (0.0072) 
2001 -0.0084 -0.0061 0.0144 
(0.0089) (0.0164) (0.0060)" 
2002 -0.0219 -0.0402 -0.0229 
(0.0116)" (0.0169)"" (0.0162) 
2003 -0.0367 -0.0117 -0.0026 
(0.0140)""" (0.0174) (0.0184) 
2004 -0.0229 -0.0105 -0.0097 
(0.0131)·" (0.0173) (0.0237) 
2005 -0.0248 -0.0535 -0.0539 
(0.0136)"" (0.0219)"" (0.0319)" 
2006 -0.0576 -0.0171 -0.0321 
(0.0126)""· (0.0219) (0.0376) 
2007 -0.0538 -0.0180 0.0068 
(0.0163)""" 0.0255) (0.0304) 
Source: Complied by the author. All regression models present robust standard errors dustered by the 2-digit 
SIC level within the parentheses. Significance Level: ""·p<O.01, ""p<O.05 and "p<O.10. Each regresSion 
controls for industry specific time trends, regions. occupation controls, individual fixed effects, industry 
controls, job characteristics, individual characteristics and industry level variables. OSS = Industry level service 
offshoring intensity; 01 = Dummy variable equal to one if occupations have a value greater than or equal to 65 
according to the Blinder (2007) offshorability index. 
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Table 4.9A: OLS Results for Single Year Regressions 
Year OSM OSMxOl 
1992 -0.1336 -0.0007 
(0.0984) (0.0029) 
1993 -0.3749 0.0019 
(0.1082) .... (0.0028) 
1994 0.0120 -0.0001 
(0.0102) (0.0030) 
1995 -0.0920 0.0024 
(0.1038) (0.0025) 
1996 -0.5074 -0.0059 
(0.1437)·" (0.0022) .... 
1997 -0.0002 -0.0052 
(0.0077) (0.0026) .... 
1998 -0.0404 -0.0019 
(0.0913) (0.0023) 
1999 -0.3626 -0.0001 
(0.1305} ...... (0.0025) 
2000 -0.2184 -0.0013 
(O.ll60r (0.0026) 
2001 0.0072 0.0004 
(0.0062) (0.0021) 
2002 0.0075 -0.0001 
(0.0098) (0.0021) 
2003 0.0036 -0.0010 
(0.0087) (0.0025) 
2004 0.0169 0.0013 
(0.0087)" (O.0025) 
2005 0.0142 -0.0012 
(0.0111) (0.0022) 
2006 0.0041 -0.0008 
(0.0069) (0.0028) 
2007 0.0052 0.0044 
(0.0094) (0.0030) 
Soutu: Compiled by the author. All regression models present robust standard errors clustered by 
the 2-dlglt SIC level within the parentheses. Significance Level: .... p<O.Ol. "p<O.05 and "p<O.lO •• 
Each regression controls for industry specific time trends. regions. occupation controls. Individual 
fixed effects. Industry controls. job characteristics. Individual characteristics and Industry level 
variables. OSM = Industry level material offshoring intensity; 01 = Dummy variable equal to one If 
occupations have a value greater than or equal to 65 according to the Blinder (2007) offshorability 
index. 
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Table 4.10A: OLS Results for Single Year Regressions 
Year Female x 01 H xOI MedlumxOI 
1992 -0.0447 0.0560 -0.0804 
(0.0336) (0.1809) (0.0312)--
1993 -0.0729 -0.0044 -0.0061 
(0.0349)" (0.1477) (0.0315) 
1994 -0.0685 0.1723 -0.0057 
(0.0356)- (0.1084) (0.0314) 
1995 -0.0681 -0.0469 -0.0025 
(0.0280)" (0.1101) (0.0326) 
1996 -0.0489 0.0723 0.0344 
(0.0332) (0.1583) (0.0293) 
1997 -0.0175 -0.1172 0.0224 
(0.0317) (0.1137) (0.0292) 
1998 -0.0546 0.1397 0.0283 
(0.0269)-- (0.0733)- (0.0277) 
1999 -0.0849 0.0577 0.0433 
(0.0288)--- (0.1066) (0.0293) 
2000 -0.0570 -0.1177 0.0203 
(0.0308)- (0.0657)- (0.0296) 
2001 -0.0086 -0.1043 0.0223 
(0.0300) (0.0851) (0.0283) 
2002 -0.0385 -0.1672 0.0107 
(0.0350) (0.0858)- (0.0302) 
2003 -0.0056 -0.2357 0.0173 
(0.0293) {O.l096r· (0.0319) 
2004 -0.0082 -0.0365 -0.0132 
(0.0338) (0.1249) (0.0366) 
2005 0.0502 -0.0844 -0.0566 
(0.0392) (0.1220) (0.0347) 
2006 -0.0402 0.1345 -0.0063 
(0.0417) (0.1160) (0.0397) 
2007 0.0098 0.1152 -0.0645 
(0.0424) (0.1291) (0.0466) 
Source: Complied by the author. All regression models present robust standard errors dustered by the 2-digit SIC 
level within the parentheses. Significance Level: ·--p<O.Ol, --p<O.05 and -p<O.10. Each regression controls for 
industry specific time trends, regions, occupation controls, individual fixed effects, industry controls, job 
characteristics, individual characteristics and industry level variables. 01 = Dummy variable equal to one if 
occupations have a value greater than or equal to 65 according to the Blinder (2007) offshorability index. High = 
Dummy variable equal to one for college level of education. Medium = Dummy variable for intermediate level of 
education. 
232 
Table 4.11A: OLS Results for Single Year Regressions 
Year White Ethnldty White Ethnlclty x 01 White Collar Jobs x 01 
1992 0.0407 0.1038 ~ . 0 0 7 7 7
(0.0289) (0.0571)" (0.0366) 
1993 0.0295 0.0806 ~ . 0 4 2 8 8
(0.0377) (0.0756) (0.0390) 
1994 0.0277 0.0842 0.0261 
(0.0360) (0.0650) (0.0390) 
1995 0.0796 0.0991 ~ . 0 1 4 2 2
(0.0299)""" (0.0584)" (0.0395) 
1996 0.0504 0.1635 0.0319 
(0.0304)" (0.0602)""" (0.0369) 
1997 0.0519 0.0572 0.0236 
(0.0381) (0.0658) (0.0405) 
1998 0.0636 0.0930 0.0008 
(0.0307)"" (0.0644) (0.0384) 
1999 0.0906 ~ . 0 5 8 3 3 0.0112 
(0.0386)"" (0.0713) (0.0374) 
2000 0.1084 ~ . 0 0 4 7 7 0.0004 
(0.0355)""" (0.0691) (0.0403) 
2001 0.0533 0.0545 ~ . 0 2 5 3 3
(0.0344) (0.0642) (0.0330) 
2002 0.1306 0.1401 ~ . 0 4 8 3 3
(0.0448)""" (0.0876) (0.0321) 
2003 0.0830 O.lSOl ~ . 0 4 0 7 7
(0.0480)" (0.0927)" (0.0398) 
2004 0.0973 0.0218 ~ . 0 1 5 3 3
(0.0384)"" (0.0850) (0.0373) 
2005 0.1000 0.0281 ~ . 0 5 5 2 2
(0.0357)""" (0.0717) (0.0419) 
2006 0.0557 ~ . 1 3 6 6 6 ~ . 0 1 9 7 7
(0.0435) (0.0887) (0.0527) 
2007 0.0517 ~ . 0 5 9 9 9 ~ . 0 0 8 1 1
(0.0450) (0.1150) (0.0536) 
Source: Compiled by the author. All regression models present robust standard errors clustered by the 2-digit SIC level within 
parentheses. Significance Level: """p<O.Ol, ""p<O.05 and "p<O.10. Each regression controls for industry specific time trends, 
regions, occupation controls, individual fixed effects, industry controls, job characteristics, individual characteristics and 
industry level variables. 01 = Dummy variable equal to one if occupations have a value greater than or equal to 65 according 
to the Blinder (2007) offshorability index. A white-collar occupation is a dummy variable equal to one for occupations 
legislators, Senior Officials, Managers, Professionals, Technicians, Associate Professionals and Clerks. 
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Table 4.12A: OLS Results for Single Year Regressions 
Year Routine Tasks Non Routine Abstract Tasks Non Routine Manual Tasks Service Tasks 
1992 -0.0111 0.0119 -0.0005 0.0145 
(0.0041)"" (0.0027)""" (0.0042) (0.0037)""" 
1993 -0.0005 0.0087 0.0032 0.0075 
(O.0052) {O.0035)*" (O.0051) (O.00(2)" 
1994 -0.0056 0.0128 0.0011 0.0077 
(O.0056) (0.0044)""" {O.0049} (0.0037)"" 
1995 -0.0018 0.0098 0.0005 0.0016 
(0.0056) (0.0037)""" (O.00(6) (0.0042) 
1996 -0.0098 0.0077 -0.0056 0.0054 
{O.00(9)"" {O.0032)"" (O.00(3) (O.00(1) 
1997 -0.0136 0.0171 -0.0046 0.0081 
(0.0048)""" {O.0036)""" (O.00(2) (0.00(2)" 
1998 -0.0053 0.0140 -0.0020 0.0043 
(0.0041) (0.0032)""" (0.0033) (0.0030) 
1999 -0.0052 0.0152 0.0000 0.0054 
(0.0044) (0.0026}"· (O.0037) (O.OO34) 
2000 -0.0008 0.0092 0.0018 0.0039 
(0.0038) {O.0031)"·· (0.0036) (0.0035) 
2001 -0.0044 0.0117 -0.0031 0.0064 
(0.0049) (0.0037)··· (0.0037) (0.0039) 
2002 -0.0025 0.0159 0.0021 0.0067 
(0.0049) (0.0040}··· {O.0039} (0.0035)· 
2003 -0.0001 0.0128 0.0033 0.0090 
(O.00(9) (0.0040)··· (0.0037) (0.0037)" 
2004 -0.0030 0.0130 -0.0012 0.0064 
(0.0059) (0.0031)··· (0.0043) {0.0034}· 
2005 -0.0065 0.0078 -0.0013 0.0088 
(0.0047) (0.0035)·· (0.0041) (0.0032)··· 
2006 -0.0101 0.0008 -0.0028 0.0013 
(0.0056)· (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0042) 
2007 -0.0090 0.0029 -0.0039 0.0031 
(0.0064) (0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0044) 
Source: Compiled by the author. All regression models present robust standard errors clustered by the 2-dlgit 
SIC level within the parentheses. Significance Level: "·p<O.Ol, ··p<O.05 and ·p<O.10. Each regression controls 
for industry specific time trends, regions, occupation controls, Individual fixed effects, Industry controls, job 
characteristics, Individual characteristics and Industry level variables. See appendix 3 for further details about 
the O·Net database; appendix 4 explains the Importance ratings and appendix 5 provides a list of the variables 
used to create the job task variables via principal component analysiS. 
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Table 4.13A: Offshoring (OSS) and Individual Level Characteristics 
De ndent Variable: 
Coe/fIdents 
Age 
(0.0095)· ... (0.0094}"· (0.0095)· ... 
Age2 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
(0.0001}"· (0.0001}· ... (0.0001)"· 
Married 0.0221 0.0227 0.0225 
(0.0118)· (0.0118)- (0.0119)-
Single -0.0596 -0.0587 -0.0582 
(0.0161)"· (0.0160}· ... (0.0158)··· 
Divorced -0.0199 -0.0191 -0.0192 
(0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0173) 
Child -0.0113 -0.0111 -0.0099 
(0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
Experience -0.0283 -0.0284 -0.0286 
(0.0039)"· (0.0039)· ... (0.0039)·" 
Experience2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.0000)· (0.0000)- (0.0000) 
Union 0.1004 0.1003 0.0999 
(0.0184}· ... (0.0183)·_· (0.0186)"· 
Unemployment Rate 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Edu: High Skill 0.1198 0.1191 0.1243 
(0.0323)"· (0.0324)· ... (0.0326)"-
Edu: Medium Skill -0.0031 -0.0034 -0.0024 
(0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0087) 
Female -0.1731 -0.1816 -0.1815 
(0.Oll3} ... • (O.Ol09}"· (O.Olll}"· 
Firm Size: <25 -0.1792 -0.1793 -0.1785 
(0.0257)··· (0.0156)"''''''' (0.0158)··'" 
Firm Size: 25-99 -0.0836 -0.0837 -0.0827 
(0.0112)"'·'" (0.021O}·""" (0.0224)"''''· 
Firm Size: 100-999 -0.0151 -0.0153 -0.0140 
(0.0205) (0.0203) (0.0106) 
Firm: Public 0.0402 0.0407 0.0416 
(0.0214)- (0.0110)· (0.0112)-
Industry: Output 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (O.OOOO) (0.0000) 
Industry: R&D Intensity -0.0045 -0.0022 -0.0023 
(0.0093) (0.0087) (0.0091) 
Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Offshoring:OSS -0.0173 -0.0209 -0.0126 
(0.0064)-" (O.OOBS)-- (0.0086) 
Offshoring: Female-OSS -0.0038 
(0.0021)-
White Collar Job 0.2902 
(0.0219)---
Offshorlng: White Collar·OSS 0.0027 
(0.0048) 
White 0.0799 
(0.0144)---
Offshorlng: White-OSS -0.0067 
(0.0044) 
Constant 0.3005 0.3042 0.1988 
(0.1568)- (0.1544)- (0.1627) 
Observations 58978 58978 58978 
R2 0.4957 0.4957 0.4961 
Tests ass 
H.: IIIStnImerrt VIIIIdIty 
Hansen J-Statistic 0.599 0.572 0.329 
Hansen J-Statistic (".volue) (0.4389) (0.4494) (0.5663) 
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H.,: Regff!SSOl" Is Exogenous 
C-Statistic 
C-statistic (p-volue) 
1.023 
(0.3118) 
1.025 
(0.3113) 
1.315 
(0.2516) 
Note: All regression models present robust standard errors clustered by the 2-digit SIC level within the 
parentheses. Significance level: ...... p<O.Ol, .... p<O.OS and "p<O.10. Each regression controls for industry 
specific time trends, regions, occupation controls, individual fixed effects and industry controls. OSS = Industry 
level service offshoring Intensity. A white-collar occupation is a dummy variable equal to one for occupations 
Legislators, Senior Officials. Managers, Professionals. Technicians, Associate Professionals and Clerks. 
236 
Appendix 9 (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0084) 
Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 4.14A: Offshoring (OSM) and Individual Level Characteristics (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Offshoring: OSM -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0056 
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Offshoring: Female·OSM -0.0022 
(0.0011)· 
(0.0096)··· (0.0096)··· (0.0096)··· White Collar Job 0.3034 
Age2 I -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 (0.0282)··· 
(0.0001)··· (0.0001)··· (0.0001)··· Offshoring: White Collar·OSM -0.0009 
Married I 0.0219 0.0220 0.0217 (0.0018) 
(0.0126)· (0.012S)* (0.0127)· White 0.0646 
Single -0.0602 -0.0602 -0.0597 (0.0146)*·· 
(0.0157)··· (0.0158}··· (0.0156) Offshoring: White·OSM 0.0001 
Divorced I -0.0196 -0.0197 -0.0197 (0.0025) 
(0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0172) Constant 0.3441 0.3415 0.2573 
Child -0.0114 -0.0110 -0.0098 (0. 1634}·· (0. 1642}·· (0.1688) 
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
58978 Experience I -0.0283 -0.0284 -0.0286 Observations 58978 58978 
(0.0039)··· (0.0039)·" (0.0039}··· R2 0.4935 0.4932 0.4937 
Experlence2 I 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 E x ~ n e l t y y Tests for OSM 
(0.0000)· (0.0000)· (0.0000)· 
Union 0.1001 0.1000 0.1000 H,,: IrtStrllmellt Validity 
(0.0188)··· (0.0186)··· (0.0189)··· 
Unemployment Rate -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 Hansen J-Statistic 1.037 1.019 0.993 
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035) Hansen J-Statlstic (p-llalue) (0.3084) (0.3127) (0.6087) 
Edu: High Skill I 0.1173 0.1173 0.1220 
(0.0322)··· (0.0323)··· (0.0327)··· H,,: Retlrasot" Is Exotlftnous 
Edu: Medium Skill I -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0028 
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0087) C-Statlstlc 0.031 0.022 0.008 
Female I -0.1781 -0.1843 -0.1840 C-statlstlc (p-value) (0.8599) (0.8832) (0.9294) 
(0.0123)··· (0.0113)··· (0.0114}··· 
Firm Size: <25 I -0.1833 -0.1831 -0.1826 Note: All regression models present robust standard errors clustered by the 2-digit 
(0.0236)··· (0.0236)··· (0.0238)··· SIC level within the parentheses. Significance Level: ···p<O.Ol, ··p<O.OS and 
Firm Size: 25-99 I -0.0845 -0.0845 -0.0838 ·p<O.10. Each regression controls for Industry specific time trends, regions, 
(0.0219) (0.0220)··· (0.0222) occupation controls, individual fixed effects and Industry controls. OSM = Industry 
Firm Size: 100-999 -o.OlSO -o.OlSO -0.0139 level material offshoring Intensity. A white collar occupation is a dummy variable 
(O.0213) (0.0212) (0.0214) equal to one for occupations legislators, Senior OffIcials, Managers, ProfeSSionals, 
Firm: PubliC 0.0550 0.0548 0.0555 TechniCians, Associate Professionals and Clerks. 
(0.0304)· (0.0304)· (0.0305)· 
Industry: Output 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) w 
...., Industry: R&D Intensity 0.0026 0.0027 0.0034 
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Table 4.15A: Task Biased Technological Change & Wages 
Dependent Variable: loI of Real Hourly E m , , " ' Y " ~ " "Wace 
CoefIklents (1) (Z) (3) (ot) (S) 
Age 0.0879 0.0870 0.0876 0.0877 0.0869 
(0.0097)"· (0.0095)·" (0.0095)"· (0.0097)*" (0.0092)*·· 
Age2 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
(0.0001)"· (0.0001)"· (0.0001)"· (0.0001)·" (0.0001)·" 
Married 0.0198 0.0185 0.0219 0.0197 0.0185 
(0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0125)· (0.0127) (0.0130) 
Single -0.0621 -0.0626 -0.0603 -0.0622 -0.0625 
(0.0154)·" (0.0155)·" (0.0157)·" (O.015S}·" (O.01S7}·" 
Divorced -0.0216 -0.0231 -0.0198 -0.0210 -0.0229 
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0166) 
Child -0.0104 -0.0109 -0.0111 -0.0113 -0.0107 
(O.0076) (O.0078) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0079) 
Experience -0.0285 -0.0279 -0.0284 -0.0283 -0.0278 
(0.0039)"· (0.0038}·" (0.0038)·" (0.0039)"· (0.0036}·" 
Experience2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.0000)· (0.0000)· (0.0000)· (0.0000)· (0.0000)· 
Union 0.1015 0.0994 0.1000 0.0979 0.0977 
(0.0186)··· (0.0179)·" (0.0168)··· (0.0181)··· (0.0148)·" 
Unemployment Rate -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0004 
(0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0033) 
Edu: High Skill 0.1114 0.1137 0.1175 0.1147 0.1153 
(0.0329}··· (0.0318}·" (0.0322)·" (0.0312)·" (0.0312)"· 
Edu: Medium Skill -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0037 
(0.0089) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0089) (0.0086) 
Female -0.1859 -0.1809 -0.1837 -0.1861 -0.1790 
(0.0112)··· (0.0112)··· (0.0114)··· (0.0110)··· (0.0105)"· 
Firm Size: <25 -0.1828 -0.1812 -0.1832 -0.1842 -0.1814 
(0.0240)··· (0.0246)"· (0.0234}··· (0.0239)·" (0.0244)··· 
Firm Size: 25-99 -0.0838 -0.0841 -0.0845 -0.0850 -0.0847 
(0.0226)··· (0.0225)"· (0.0218)·" (0.0229}··· (0.0219}··· 
Firm Size: 100-999 -0.0145 -0.0145 -0.0149 -0.0145 -0.0149 
(0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0213) (0.0225) (0.0212) 
Firm: Public 0.0561 0.0539 0.0551 0.0559 0.0514 
(0.0302)· (0.0293)· (0.0301)· (0.0312)· (0.0266)· 
Industry: Output 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (O.OOOO) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Industry: R&D Intensity 0.0021 0.0033 0.0018 0.0023 0.0035 
(0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0084) 
Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (O.OOOO) (0.0000) (O.OOOO) 
Routine Task -0.0052 - - - -0.0104 
(0.OO22)·· - -
· 
(0.0094) 
Non-Routine Abstract Task 
-
0.0092 
- -
0.0089 
-
(0.0023)··· 
- -
(0.0042)·· 
Non-Routine Manual Task . - 0.0005 · 0.0074 
- -
(0.0033) 
· 
(O.OO83) 
Service Task 
- - -
0.0058 -0.0019 
. 
- - (0.0022)·· (0.0045) 
Constant 0.3444 0.3964 0.3396 0.3632 0.3893 
(0.1664)*· (O.1577)" (0.1669)" (0.1626)** (0.1S83)** 
Observations 58707 58707 58978 58707 58707 
RZ 0.4942 0.4958 0.4933 0.4942 0.4956 
Note: All rqresslon models present robust standard errors dustered by the 2-diatt SIC level within 
the parentheses. Slanlficance Level: "·p<O.Ol, ·*p<O.05 and ·p<O.10. Each rqression controls for 
Industry specific time trends, regions, occupation controls, Individual fixed effects and Industry 
controls. 
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Table 4.16A: Task Biased Technological Change and Individual Characteristics - Gender 
Dependent Variable: lDI of Real HouIty Employment Waae 
CH/Ifdents (1) (l) (3) 14} 
Age 0.0885 0.0870 0.0882 0.0878 
(0.0097)·" (0.0094)·" (0.0096)"· (0.0097)"· 
Age2 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
(0.0001)··· (0.0001)·" (0.0001)··· (0.0001)··· 
Married 0.0193 0.0185 0.0219 0.0198 
(0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0125)· (0.0126) 
Single -0.0621 -0.0632 -0.0595 -0.0623 
(0.0151)··· (0.0153)"· (0.0157)"· (0.0154)"· 
Divorced -0.0213 -0.0231 -0.0195 -0.0209 
(0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0172) (0.0169) 
Child -0.0100 -0.0105 -0.0109 -0.0111 
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0078) (0.0077) 
Experience -0.0287 -0.0279 -0.0287 -0.0282 
{0.0040,·" (0.0037)··· (0.0039,··· (0.0039)··· 
Experience2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.0000)· (0.0000)· (0.0000,* (0.0001)· 
Union 0.1005 0.0988 0.0999 0.0973 
(0.0183)··· (0.0176)"· (0.0165)·" (0.0179)"· 
Unemployment Rate 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 
(0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0036) 
Edu: High Skill 0.1118 0.1142 0.1176 0.1148 
(0.0327)·" {0.0317)"· {0.0325)*·· (0.0312)·" 
Edu: Medium Skill -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0028 -0.0034 
(0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0088) 
Female -0.1910 -0.1836 -0.1911 -0.1874 
(0.0102)··· (0.0101)·" (0.0107)·" (0.0106)"· 
Firm Size: <25 -0.1834 -0.1814 -0.1840 -0.1843 
(0.0242)·" (0.0245)··· (0.0232)··· (0.0240)··· 
Firm Size: 25-99 -0.0842 -0.0843 -0.0852 -0.0850 
(0.0223)··· {0.0224}··· {0.0214)··· (0.0230}·" 
Firm Size: 100-999 -0.0143 -0.0145 -0.0153 -0.0143 
(0.0216) (0.0218) (0.0208) (0.0225) 
Firm: Public 0.0557 0.0534 0.0556 0.0557 
(O.0296)· (0.0293)· (0.0294)· (0.0312)-
Industry: Output 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(O.OOOO) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Industry: R&D Intensity 0.0018 0.0033 0.0018 0.0022 
(0.0088) (O.OO84) (O.OO89) (0.0087) 
Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (O.OOOO) (O.OOOO) 
Routine Task 0.0035 - - -
(0.0035) 
- - -
Female-Routine Task -0.0151 
- - -
(0.0040)··· 
- - -
Non-Routine Abstract Task 
-
o.oon 
- -
-
(O.OO29}·-· 
- -
Female-Nan-Routine Abstract - 0.0027 - -
-
(0.0027) 
- -
Non-Routine Manual Task - - 0.0064 -
- - (0.0051) -
Female-Non-Routine Manual 
- -
-0.0121 
-
- -
(0.0033)··· 
-
Service Task 
- - -
0.0041 
- - -
(0.0024)· 
Female-Service Task 
- - -
0.0035 
- - -
(0.0028) 
Constant 0.3198 0.3936 0.3153 0.3604 
(0.1669)· (0.1581)-· (O.l664)· (O.l630)·· 
Observations 58707 58707 58978 58707 
R2 0.4958 0.4959 0.4947 0.4945 
Note: All regresslOll models present robust standard errors dustered by the 2-dlglt SIC 
level within the parentheses. Silnlficance Level: ···p<O.Ol, ··p<O.05 and ·p<O.10. 
Each resression controls for industry specific time trends, regions, occupation controls, 
individual fixed effects and Industry controls. 
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Appendix 12 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Industry: R&D Intensity 0.0022 0.0033 0.0022 0.0023 
(0.0087) (O'()O84) (0.0089) (0.0085) 
Table 4.17A: Task Biased Technological Change and Individual Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Characteristics - White Collar Jobs (0.0000) (O'()OOO) (0.0000) (O.OOOO) 
Routine Task -0.0090 
YarbIbIe: Lot of RHI :=z Employment WI!! (0.0077) 
£3) (41 Non-Routine Abstract Task 0.0092 C«/IkIMts I 1) £Zl 
Ase 0.0879 0.0870 0.0874 O.08n (0.0043)*" 
(0.0095)··· (0.0095)··· (0.()097}· ... Non-Routine Manual Task 0.0079 
Ase2 I -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 (0.0033)* 
(0.0001)··· (0.0001)··· (0.()()()1,··· (0.0001)··" Service Task 0.0055 
Married I 0.0202 0.0185 0.0210 0.0197 (0.0053) 
(0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0127) White-collar 0.2798 0.4141 0.3169 0.4558 
Sin,le I -0.0616 -0.0626 -0.0611 -0.0622 (0.0272)··" (0.0644'·· .. (0.0343) .... • (0.0310) .. • .. 
(0.0157)· ... (0.0156}··· (0.0158}··· (0.0156}··· Whlte-collar*Routlne Task 0.0058 
Divorced I -0.0212 -0.0231 -0.0206 -0.0211 (0.0128) 
(0.0170) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0170) White-collar" NR-Abstract 0.0000 
Child -0.0104 -0.0109 -0.0109 -0.0113 (0.0062) 
(0.0076) (0.0077) (0.OO77) (0.0077) White-collar"NR-Manual -0.0126 
Experience I -0.0285 -0.0279 -0.0283 -0.0282 (0.0037) 
(0.0039}· ... (0.0038,··· (O.0038}··· (O.0039}··· Whlte-collar·Service Task 0.0004 
Experlence2 I 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 (O.0067) 
(0.0000)· (0.0000)" (0.0000) (0.0000)· Constant 0.3549 0.3963 0.3134 0.3623 
Union 0.1012 0.0994 0.1018 0.0978 (0. 1526}" (0. 1477}"· (0.1627)" (0.1537)·· 
(O.OlSO}··· (O.OlSO}··· (0.0164)··· (0.0186}··· Observations 58707 58707 58978 58707 
Unemployment Rate I -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 Rl 0.4944 0.4958 0.4936 0.4942 
(0.0036) (0.OO33) (0.0035) (0.0035) Note: All regression models present robust standard errors dustered bV the 2-digit SIC level 
Edu: High Skill I 0.1120 0.1137 0.1154 0.1147 within the parentheses. Si,nificance Level: ···p<O.Ol, ··p<O.05 and "p<O.10. Each resresslon 
(0.0323)··· (0.0316) ... • (0.0334) .. •• (0.0312)··· controls for industry specific time trends, re,ions, occupation controls, Individual fixed effects 
Edu: Medium Skill I -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0033 -0.0036 and Industry controls. 
(O.OO9O) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0091) 
Female I -0.1855 -0.1809 -0.1821 -0.1861 
(0.0111)·· .. (O.Oll3}··· (0.0116} .... • (0.0109}··· 
Firm Size: <25 I -0.1822 -0.1812 -0.1842 -0.1843 
(0.02SO}··· (0.0245)··· (0.0230)··· (0.0246)· .. • 
Firm Size: 25-99 -0.0836 -0.0841 -0.0849 -0.0851 
(0.0230)··· (0.0224)··· (0.0212)"·· (0.0236)"·· 
Firm Size: 10Q-999 -0.0142 -0.0145 -0.0160 -0.0145 
(0.0223) (0.0216) (0.0203) (0.0228) 
Firm: Public 0.055S 0.0539 0.0562 0.0559 
~ ~ (0.0293," (O.0290)· (0.0287)· (0.0312)· 8 Industry: Output 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Appendix 13 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Industry: R&D Intensity 0.0027 0.0039 0.0023 0.0030 
Table 4.18A: Task Biased Technological Change and Individual (0.0088) (0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0087) 
Characteristics - Race Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
White 0.0644 0.0670 0.0659 0.0630 
~ ~ (0.0141)··· (0.0131)··· (0.0133)·" 
(0.0146) .... 
0.0877 0.0878 
Routine Job Task -0.0097 
(0.0097)· .. • (0.0094)··· (0.0095)·· .. (0.0097)··· (0.0063) 
Age2 I -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Task 0.0121 
(O.OOlJlr .... (0.0001)··· (0.0001)··· (0.0001)··· (0.0042)··· 
Married I 0.0199 0.0185 0.0220 0.0197 Non-Routine Manual Job Task -0.0027 
(0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0125r (0.0127) (0.0065) 
Sinsle -0.0611 -0.0618 -0.0593 -0.0614 
Service Job Task 0.0128 
(0.0154)·· .. (0.0155)··· (0.0156)··· (0.0155)··· (0.0049)·· 
Divorced -0.0213 -0.0227 -0.0195 -0.0206 
White"Routlne Job Task 0.0048 
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0052) 
Child -0.0093 -0.0098 -0.0101 -0.0101 
White"NR-Abstract Job Tasks -0.0030 
(0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0033) 
Experience I -0.0287 -0.0282 -0.0286 -0.0285 Whlte"NR-Manual Job Tasks 
0.0034 
(0.0039)··· (0.0037)··· (0.0038)· .. • (0.0039)··· (0.0045) 
Experlence2 I 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Whlte"Servlce Job Task -0.0074 
(0.0000)· (O.oooo)" (0.0000)" (0.0000) (0.0040)· 
Union I 0.1014 0.0992 0.0999 0.0977 
Constant 0.2794 0.3297 0.2732 0.2991 
(0.0188}··· (O.OlSO}··· (o.0170}··· (0.0183)·" (0.1690) (0.1596}"" (0.1680) (0.1647) 
Unemployment Rate I -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0004 Observations (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0035) 58707 58707 58978 58707 
Edu: Hish Skill I 0.1141 0.l1S7 0.1202 0.1166 
Rl 0.4949 0.4965 0.4940 0.4950 
(0.0333)··· (0.0321)··· (0.0326)··" (0.0317)··· Note: All resresslon models present robust standard errors clustered by the 2-dlgit SIC level 
Edu: Medium Skill I -0.0042 -0.0039 -0.0036 -0.0036 within the parentheses. Slsnlflcance Level: ···p<O.Ol, ·"p<O.05 and ·p<O.lO. Each resression 
(OlJ09O) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0089) controls for Industry specific time trends, regions, occupation controls, Individual fixed effects 
Female I -0.1859 -0.1811 -0.1837 -0.1859 and Industry controls. 
(0.OU3)··· (0.OU2)··· (0.0114)··· (0.OU1) 
Firm Size: <25 I -0.1829 -0.1813 -0.1833 -0.1844 
(0.0241)··· (0.0246)··· (0.0234)"·· (0.0239) 
Firm Size: 25-99 I -0.0837 -0.0839 -0.0844 -0.0848 
(0.0227)··· (0.0226)··· (0.0220)··· (0.0230)··· 
Firm Size: 100-999 I -0.0142 -0.0142 -0.0147 -0.0143 
(0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0214) (0.0225)·· .. 
Firm: Public 0.0564 0.0542 0.0553 0.0564 
IV (0.0302)· (0.0293)· (0.0302)· (0.0312)· 
~ ~
.... 
Industry: Output 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 4.19A: Blinder Index & Task Biased Technological Change 
De ndent Variable: Em W 
Coe/fIdetrts EstImated CoeffIcIents 
Age 0.0873 
{0.0095)·" 
Age2 -0.0007 
(0.0001)·" 
Married 0.0175 
(0.0127) 
Single -0.0627 
(0.0156)··· 
Divorced -0.0219 
(0.0166) 
Child -0.0103 
(0.(073) 
Experience -0.0281 
(O.0039}··· 
Experience2 0.0001 
(O.OOOO)· 
Union 0.1027 
{0.0163)·" 
Unemployment Rate -0.0018 
(0.0036) 
Edu: High Skill 0.1030 
(O.0313}·" 
Edu: Medium Skill -0.0068 
(0.0091) 
Female -0.1900 
(0.0112)··· 
Firm Size: <25 -0.1851 
{0.0230)··· 
Firm Size: 25-99 -0.0833 
(O.0221}··· 
Firm Size: 100-999 -0.0125 
(0.0214) 
Firm: Public 0.0599 
(0.0301)· 
Industry: Output 0.0000 
(O.OOOO) 
Industry: R&D Intensity 0.0026 
{0.0093} 
Net Exports 0.0000 
{O.OOOO} 
Offshorlng: Blinder Index Values 25 0.0623 
{0.0336}· 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 26-35 -0.0795 
(0.0362)*· 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 36-45 0.0258 
(0.0293) 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 46-55 0.0042 
(0.0310) 
Offshoring: Blinder Index Values 56-6S 0.0045 
{O.OlSO} 
Offshorlng: Blinder Index Values 66-75 -0.0110 
(0.0254) 
Offshorlng: Blinder Index Values 76-85 -0.1505 
{0.0400}··-
Offshorlng: Blinder Index Values 86+ -0.0385 
(O.02S9) 
Routine Tasks 0.0000 
(0.0033) 
Blinder Index Values 2S-Routlne Task 0.0521 
(0.0312) 
Blinder Index Values 26-35*Routlne Task 0.0060 
(0.0131) 
Blinder Index Values 36-45*Routlne Task -0.0229 
(0.0078)*** 
Blinder Index Values 46-55*RoutIne Task 0.0102 
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Blinder Index Values s6-6s*Routine Task 
Blinder Index Values 66-7s*Routine Task 
Blinder Index Values 76-8s*Routine Task 
Blinder Index Values 86+*Routine Task 
Constant 
(0.0107) 
0.0109 
(0.0043)** 
-0.0030 
(0.0059) 
-0.0560 
(0.0088)*--
-0.0205 
(0.0063)---
0.3749 
(0.1645)---
Observations 58707 
R2 0.4961 
Note: All regression models present robust standard errors dustered by the 2-digit SIC level within the 
parentheses. Significance Level: "-p<O.Ol, **p<O.05 and *p<O.lO. This regression controls for industry specific 
time trends, regions, occupation controls, Individual fixed effects and Industry controls. Reference group for the 
Blinder Index are all occupations that have a value of zero; these are the non-tradable occupations. 
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Table 4.20A: Regression Results for Service Offshoring, Occupation Tradability and the 
interaction with a linear time trend. 
w ... 
(lJ (2) 
0.0872 0.0876 
(O.OO94}··- (0.0096)·_· 
Age2 -0.0007 -0.0007 
(0.0001)--· (o.ooeJl)"· 
Married 0.0222 0.0217 
(0.0129)- (0.0126)-
Single -0.0594 -0.0606 
(0.0161)--- (0.0158)---
Divorced -0.0194 -0.0200 
(O.Oln) (0.0174) 
Child -0.0114 -0.0109 
(0.0076) (0.0076) 
Experience -0.0284 -0.0283 
(0.0039)--- (0.0039}---
Experience2 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.0000)- (0.0000)-
Union 0.1011 0.0995 
(O.01B9}--- (0.0184)---
Unemployment Rate 0.0103 -0.0010 
(0.0026)--- (0.0035) 
Edu: High Skill 0.1192 0.1164 
(0.0324)"- (0.0325)---
Edu: Medium Skill -0.0036 -0.0034 
(0.0088) (0.0088) 
Female -0.1810 -0.1829 
(0.0111)-·- (O.OllB)"-
Firm Size: <25 -0.1786 -0.1834 
(0.0256)--- (0.0237)---
Firm Size: 25-99 -0.0833 -0.0844 
(0.0221)-·· (0.0221)··· 
Firm Size: 10G-999 -0.0151 -0.0146 
(0.0205) (0.0213) 
Firm: Public 0.0402 0.0544 
(0.0225)· (O.0310)-
Industry: Output 0.0000 0.0000 
(O.OOOO) (o.oooo) 
Industry: R&D Intensity 0.0021 0.0020 
(0.0092) (0.0089) 
Net Exports 0.0000 0.0000 
(O.OOOO) (O.OOOO) 
Offshoring: OSS -0.0418 
(0.0055)·--
Offshorfng: OSS·TIme Trend 0.0024 
(0.0004)·--
Offshoring: Blinder Index >=65 -0.0129 
(0.01'") 
Offshorlng: Blinder Index >=6S*TIme Trend -0.0004 
(0.0010J 
TIme Trend 0.0021 -0.0029 
(0.0049) (0.0067) 
Constant 0.2799 0.3518 
(0.1634)- (0.1649)--
Observations 58978 58978 
RZ 0.4956 0.4933 
NoW: OWn calculations from BHPS data. Standard errors are presented In 
the parentheses and are clustered by the 2-digit Industry classifications. 
Significance level key: ·--p<O.OI, ·-p<O.05 and ·p<O.10. This resresslon 
controls for Industry Specific time trends. resJons. occupation controls, 
individual fixed effects and Industry controls. 
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5 
Offshoring, Task Biased Technological Change & Job Insecurity: Evidence 
from the U.K. 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the impact of service offshoring (measured at the 
industry level), the potential threat from the advancements of technology that increasingly 
pose a threat to many more potentially tradable occupations from the application of Blinder's 
(2007) job tradability index and the threat from the routinization hypothesis (Autor et al,. 
2003) - particularly from the importance of completing routine intensive job tasks, have all 
had a negative and significant impact on the wage levels of workers over time. The previous 
chapter also found service and material offshoring to benefit skilled labour whereas the 
potential wage losses for workers employed by jobs that are potentially tradable and which 
have a high importance for computing routine intensive job tasks could be large over time. 
From this chapter, I examine whether these forces associated with globalisation: - the impact 
from offshoring (material and services), the potential tradability of jobs that may result from 
the improvements in Information technology and the routinization hypothesis have all 
contributed towards lowering job security over the last two decades. 
There is a belief among many workers in developed countries that the impact from 
globalisation [through trade, offshoring and through the advancements in leT] destroys many 
more jobs than it creates (Eurobarometer 69) and this therefore raises the fear of job loss and 
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lowers the potential for job security over time. But many economists argue that globalisation 
and the improvements from ICT can lead to a structural change in the composition of 
employment rather than to change the employment level. The process of creative destruction 
ensures economic prosperity and growth from structural changes in tastes and technology 
that can emanate from globalisation (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2006), where old jobs are bid away 
by new and more productive jobs which encapsulate the latest technology. Thus, firms must 
decide which stages of production are best produced abroad or in the domestic economy to 
be able to compete with rival firms in a global market place. However, the job creation and 
destruction literature reviewed in chapter 2 found the job creation and destruction rates for 
most developed countries have observed the 15 percent rule over time (Davis et 01., 1997; 
cahuc & Zylberberg, 2006). What this means is 15 percent of old jobs are roughly destroyed 
each year and roughly 15 percent of new jobs come into being as a share of jobs. This implies 
there should be very little change to the employment level and thus implying that the forces 
associated with globalisation can create and destroys similar number of jobs over the most 
recent phase of globalisation that has occurred over the last two decades; see chapter 2 for 
further details. 
Technology advancements can also affect job security. Technological advancements can in 
theory allow firms to raise the demand for skilled labour as newly created jobs embody the 
latest technology (Mortensen & Pissarides, 1994, 1999). However, the decision to update 
existing capital and to train the existing workforce to be able to use the new technology 
depends on the size of the renovation costs, the growth in productivity and the rate of 
technological progress. If the rate of technological progress is slow and there is potential for 
growth, firms may decide to continually undertake investment into capital and train their 
workforces, thus implying job separations could be low. However, if renovation costs are high 
and technological progress is not slow then firms may decide not to undertake the cost of 
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updating existing capital or train their workforces. This can lead to job separations and a fall in 
job security. Theoretically, it is unclear whether the advancements in technology could raise 
job separations or lower job separations and its impact on the unemployment level is equally 
unclear; this is matter to be determined empirically. 
Not all workers are likely to be affected equally by the structural changes. Economic theory 
from the HOS model of international trade suggests output in one industry will fall and rise in 
another. And when trade takes place, theory predicts that firms are most likely to scale back 
production of the goods that are labour intensive in the domestic market; these stages are 
produced more efficiently by developing countries. These are production stages that firms in 
developed countries do not have a comparative advantage to produce. This can potentially 
lower job security for less skilled workers as their jobs are lost to foreign labour. Although the 
theory of job creation and destruction suggests that it is less costly to destroy less skilled jobs 
than it is to destroy skilled jobs (Mortensen & Pissarides, 1999); theoretical models examining 
the impact of offshoring on the labour market implications are not conclusive and the impact 
on labour depends on the assumptions made about the nature of comparative advantage 
enjoyed by domestic firms and the size of the open economy. Deardorffs (2005) model 
predicts that less skilled workers are more likely to suffer job and wage losses compared to 
skilled labour because firms offshore those stages of production in which they lack 
comparative advantage. 
However, Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008) find that offshoring of 'L-tasks' (these are job 
tasks that are performed by workers with little education or training in comparison to 'H-tasks' 
that must be performed by workers who have greater educational accomplishments and 
training) may actually benefit less skilled workers if the productivity effect from a fall in 
offshoring costs, dominates the relative price effect and the labour supply effect. However, if 
the relative price and labour supply effects dominate, less skilled workers are worse off as they 
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may suffer a fall in relative wage levels and possibly job loss. These outcomes are based on 
the assumption that the developed country is small; it is unclear what the implications could 
be if the size of the open economy were large. 
It has also been suggested that the ICT advancements may cause some service activities 
performed by high-skilled occupations that were previously not at risk from being offshored, 
may now be at risk (Amiti & Wei, 2005, 2(06). Markusen (2005) suggests that skilled workers 
may suffer job loss if knowledge capital can be invested in developing countries; but this may 
happen in the longer term. These recent concerns relate to the 'great unbundling' of job tasks 
(Baldwin, 2(06). The 'great unbundling' refers to the greater tendency to trade in tasks 
through outsourcing and offshoring1 certain job tasks instead of trading final goods and 
services to other countries and even locally where they can be provided at low cost. This 
process has applied to information-based job tasks that have become costless and 
instantaneous to transport (Acemoglu & Autor, 2010 & forthcoming). Blinder (2007), 
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2007) and Autor et 01., (2003) suggest job tasks that are routine 
and codifiable in nature, which can be easily replaced by computer technology, that require 
little face-to-face contact with customers and where job tasks do not have to be performed at 
specific work locations are job tasks that can be easily offshored abroad. These job 
characteristics can relate to low-skilled jobs such as machinists and call centre workers as well 
as high-skilled jobs such as accountants, computer software programmers and car plant 
assembly workers. Although the empirical evidence has shown material and service offshoring 
have had a positive impact on the employment levels for skilled labour; see chapter 2 for 
further details. This may be because skilled workers have more firm-specific and general 
human capital accumulation that is valued and retained by firms over and beyond than that is 
received by less skilled labour (Ritter, 2009). 
1 See section 5.2.1 below for the definitions for offshorlrw and outsourclna. 
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The empirical literature which has examined the impact of technology and offshoring on job 
security is still in its infancy. From the few papers that have examined this area, the research 
has shown technology and offshoring raise job reallocation rates and reduce job security; but 
this impact has been small and limited to less skilled labour. 
From the U.S., Zavodny (2003) examines how the usage of technology can affect job turnover. 
Zavodny (2003) uses a number of variables to measure technological intensity at the industry 
level: These are: (1) computer usage rates; (2) the number of scientists and engineers 
employed as a fraction of total employment in all sectors; (3) research and development 
expenditure as a fraction of sales; (4) computer investment as a fraction of new investment 
and (5) the annual growth rate of total factor productivity. She finds a negative relationship 
between job separations and technology for young adults, where many of the job separations 
account for voluntary job separations over the 1980 to 1998 time frame. Other results from 
Zavodny (2003) also suggest less skilled workers are more likely to experience a non-voluntary 
job separation in technology intensive industries than more educated workers. Skilled labour 
are found to be more likely to quit technology intensive sectors because they have more 
general human capital accumulation that allows them to easily switch employers within 
industries than other workers. 
Similarly, Aaronson & Housinger (1999) find industry specific technological innovation affects 
the probability of job displacement and re-employment. They find job displacement due to 
the elimination of job poSitions were more likely in high-tech industries. But there is little 
evidence to suggest there is a positive correlation between technology and plant closings. And 
there is also no support for the displacement-technology relationship having a 
disproportionate impact on less skilled labour or older workers. 
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Job security also differs among men and women classed by their skill intensity. Royalty (1998) 
reports job security transitions, defined as staying on in current employment among more 
educated men and women were similar for the U.S. But these transitions differed amongst 
women with less education. 
From Europe, Geishecker (2008) and Bachmann & Braun (2008) find a 1% rise in material 
offshoring intensity from the manufacturing sector raises the probability of non participation 
in the labour market by 6% and 2.6% respectively for Germany. For Denmark, the impact of 
international outsourcing on job displacement is smaller compared to Germany. Munch 
(2009) finds that a 1% rise in material offshoring raises the job separation probability by 
0.451% over 12 years. Similarly, Hummels et al., (2009) find doubling the material offshoring 
intensity increased the job separation probability by 5-10%, but this varied little by skill 
groups. These empirical estimates suggest the impact from material offshoring intensity has 
had a small impact on raising the probability of becoming unemployed/out of the labour force. 
This chapter makes three contributions to the empirical literature. First, I follow Geishecker 
(2008) and Munch (2009) and analyse the effects of international offshoring on job security for 
the U.K. Job security is measured by different employment transitions. To my knowledge, this 
is the first paper from the U.K. to analyse the effects of offshoring (materials and services) on 
job security using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Additionally, this chapter is one 
of the first papers to examine the impact of service offshoring on job security; the empirical 
literature has so far only examined the impact of material offshoring on job security. My 
second contribution to the empirical literature examines the impact of the task biased 
technological change (TBTC) hypothesis on job security. The existing literature has focused on 
exploring the impact from industry level measures of technology which have been merged 
with Individual level data to examine the relationship between technology and job security. 
This chapter is the first to examine whether the importance of the type of job tasks performed 
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by workers can have an impact on job security. My third contribution to the empirical 
literature is the application and the creation of a British version of Blinder's (2007) job 
tradability index to job security. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 provides a brief outline of the variables 
that will be created to measure offshoring intensity, the potential tradability of jobs and task 
biased technological change. Section 5.3 provides details of the data set that will be used for 
analysis and the empirical strategy that will be used to examine the impact of offshoring, TBTe 
and the potential tradability of jobs on job security. Section 5.4 provides the results and 
section 5.5 provides the concluding comments. 
5.2 Measuring Offshoringlntensity, Job Tradability & Task Biased Technological Change 
5.2.1 DefIning Offshorlng 
Offshoring and outsourcing are terms that were defined in chapter 4. To reiterate these 
definitions, this thesis defines these terms as follows: Offshoring refers to the relocation of 
production stages abroad either through arm's length supply through market transactions 
(international outsourcing) or within the boundaries of the firm (vertical FOI) [Jabbour, 2010]. 
Offshoring can relate to material stages of production such as intermediate production stages 
in the manufacturing process such as car assembly; and offshoring can also refer to service 
related job tasks in business services. For example, they can refer to front office services such 
as call centres and customer services or back office services such as human resources and IT 
services (Roland Burger Strategy Consultants, 2005). Outsourcing on the other hand does not 
imply that these production stages in manufacturing and business services are relocated to 
another country. It could imply outsourCing to an external firm which is located within the 
same developed country. 
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5.2.2 Offshoring, Blinder's (2007) Occupation Tradability Index & TBTC 
Section 4.2.2 to 4.2.4 from chapter 4 provided a detailed synopsis of how each of these 
variables: offshoring (materials and services), the most tradable jobs defined by Blinder's 
(2007) occupation tradability index and the four job task variables from the routinization 
hypothesis (Autor et 01., 2003) are measured and the sources of data that are used to measure 
them. Rather than to repeat this process again, please refer to sections 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 
which provides the details of how each of the variables are measured. All of these variables 
are measured and incorporated into the data in the same way; the only difference is the 
analysis period. This chapter examines the changes to job security (the probability of 
becoming unemployed) from 1992 to 2005; chapter 4 examined how these variables affected 
wage levels (job stability) over the 1992 to 2007 time frame. 
It is predicted that if job security has fallen over the last two decades, then one should find 
that offshoring (material and services) and the advancements in technology should make 
many more jobs potentially more tradable and jobs that are routine intensive are more likely 
to have a higher probability of a job-to-unemployment transition over time. 
5.3 Data & Estimation Strategy 
5.3.1 Data 
To explore the impact of offshoring (measured at the industry level), the impact from Blinder's 
(2007) occupation tradability index and the impact from the TBTe hypothesis on job security, I 
use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS is a nationally representative annual 
survey, carried out by the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of 
Essex, of each adult member of a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 private 
households (with a total of approximately 10,000 individual interviews) randomly selected 
south of the caledonian canal. The first wave of the BHPS was conducted during the autumn 
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of 1991, and annually thereafter (Taylor et 01., 2006). Although the BHPS first commenced in 
1991, the availability of data used from Input-Output Supply & Use tables to measure industry 
level service and material offshoring intensity is only available from 1992 onwards. Therefore, 
the availability of this data has a bearing on the sample that is used for analysiS by this 
chapter. 
For this chapter, I use data covering the period 1992-20052, whereas chapter 4 used data 
covering the period 1992-2007. An additional difference to the data sample used by this 
chapter and the previous chapter relates to its composition: the previous chapter only 
considered workers in employment to examine how offshoring, potential occupation 
tradability and the TBTe hypothesis could affect wage levels. This chapter consists of all 
workers aged 16 to 65 years, who are in employment, who are unemployed, who are self-
employed and not in the labour force. This sample is bigger because I focus on three types of 
job transitions over time. I explore whether the probability of job-to-unemployment 
transitions have increased over the last two decades or whether the probability of new job 
transitions which can result in new employment have also increased over time and whether 
the probability of job spells with the same employers has declined over time. But the j o ~ t o o
self employment transitions and job-to-non activity transitions are also important because 
they are competing risks to the event of becoming unemployed or remaining in employment 
in year j. 
Each of these job transitions are identified as the fraction of workers making a given transition 
in year j, given that the sample of individuals survive in employment up until year j -1. That 
is they transition to: (a) employment (continued employment with current employer or new 
2 The use of the BHPS data In this chapter differs with respect to chapter 4 IS I have excluded data for years 2006 Ind 2007. For 
years 2006 and 2007 there is a key variable: -wcjsten- which Is a derived variable that had quite a lot of mlsslns values. this Is a 
variable that Is required to accurately measure job tenure In present employment at the time of writlns this chapter. WIth a lal'le 
number of mlsslnK values. I am unable to accurately measure job tenure with the present employer for years 2006 and 2007. A 
notice announced In May 2009 from ISER, noted that the latest wave of BHPS data released In March 2009 were found to contain 
corrupted data for some variables. The advice was to download data from the UKDA for corrected data deposited from ISER. this 
newly deposited data makes no difference to the results I obtain for job tenure at the time of wrltlna this chapter. As job tenure Is 
a key variable that Is required In the estimation process. I exdude these two years of data. 
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jobs from one year to the next); (b) unemployment through job loss (although non-voluntary 
job separations that can occur through redundancies and firm closures cannot be identified 
with this data set directly); (c) non-activity, where workers leave the labour market due to ill 
health or to start a family among other reasons for not participating in the labour market and 
(d) self-employment, where workers may leave employment as an employee and start to work 
for themselves by starting their own business in time period j. Each of these job transitions 
are annual job transitions. 
This chapter measures job security by exploring the probability of experiencing job-to-
unemployment transitions over time. If the probability of job-to-unemployment transitions is 
rising over time, this reflects a fall in job security as more workers have a higher probability of 
becoming unemployed. However, the other job transition states are also important as lower 
job security may also reflect a rise in the probability of new job transitions as well as not 
participating in the labour force or to start to work as a self-employed worker in time period j. 
Figure 5.1 presents four graphs which depict the change in probability for the four job 
transition states over time; these are job-to-job transitions, job-to-unemployment transitions, 
job-to-non activity transitions and job-to-self employment transitions. Each graph plots the 
fitted job transition probability relative to the base year of 1992 with a 95 percent confidence 
interval. These graphs were obtained by simply estimating probit models with year dummy 
variables representing each year of data minus year 1992; no other explanatory variables were 
included in the estimation. The marginal effects from these estimated regressions were then 
evaluated at zero to obtain the change in the probability. These estimates were then plotted 
to examine the trend changes over time. 
From figure 5.1, the top left graph shows the change in the job-to-job transition probability 
relative to year 1992. Over time, this job transition probability has risen, implying that most 
individuals in the sample have been in paid employment with very little evidence to show 
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there has been fall. The top right graph plots the change in the job-to·unemployment 
transition probability relative to year 1992. This graph shows a downward trend in this 
probability over time, though from 1997 there has been a rise in this job transition probability 
which is very small. From the bottom row of graphs, the j o ~ t o · n o n n activity transitions and 
job·to·self employment transition probabilities show they have risen over the time frame, 
although these job transition probabilities are still relatively small in comparison to the 
number of individuals who are in employment. 
Figure 5.1: Job Transitions over Time 
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Figure S.2 further examines the changes to the job-to-job transition probability. It is further 
split into new job transitions for Individuals who are in employment as employee but change 
employers from time period j -1 to time period j; these job transitions are identified by 
individuals having less than one year of job tenure. The second category of j o ~ t o - j o b b
transitions relates to workers who are in employment and continue to work for their current 
employer from time period j -1 to time period j; these workers are identified with having 
more than one of job tenure. 
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The first graph on the left hand side shows the change in the jOb-to-job transition probability 
for workers who change employers and transition into new jobs in time period j. This graph 
shows there has been a rise for this probability relative to the base year of 1992, although 
after 2001 this probability has continued to fall. The second graph on the right hand side from 
figure 5.2 shows the probability of workers who continue to work for their current employers 
from time period j - 1 to time period j to be rising over time relative to the base year. These 
graphs indicate that workers in this sample of data have a higher probability to remain in 
employment over time. 
Figure 5.2: Job to Job Transitions over Time 
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Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics and a list of the variables that will be used in 
estimation; many of the explanatory variables will be discussed in further detail in the next 
section. From table 5.1, the average age of individuals in this sample is 38 years where 
roughly 53 percent of the sample is female. Roughly 42 percent of individuals have dependent 
children in their households, where 23 percent of females have dependent children. Turning 
to employment duration or job tenure, approximately 22 percent of workers have job tenure 
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of less than one year and greater than nine years. Far more workers - roughly 26 percent 
have job tenure of between one to three years, whilst fewer workers have job tenure of 7 to 9 
years. From the job transition states, roughly 53 percent of the sample is in employment; this 
can be with the same employer or by remaining in employment but changing employers from 
one time period to next period. Roughly 1.2 percent of the sample have experienced job to 
unemployment transitions over the sample time frame and three percent of the sample have 
transitioned into non-activity from employment. By far the lowest job transition state is job-
to-self employment transitions which only accounts for roughly one percent of the sample 
over time. Approximately 55 percent of the sample has A-level qualifications and a university 
degree (a medium level education level) if not higher. And other variables show, the average 
unemployment rate over the sample is 7 percent and roughly 15 percent of the sample are 
members of a trade union. The average service offshoring intensity is lower than the average 
material offshoring intensity and roughly 18 percent of the individuals in this sample are 
employed in potentially the most tradable jobs as defined by Blinder's (2007) occupation 
tradability index. 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics 
Transition: Job-ta-Job (E-E) 
Transition: Job-ta-Unemployment (E-U) 
Transition: Job-ta-Non-Actlvfty (E-N) 
Transition: Job-to Self-Employment (E-S) 
Transition: New Job Transition 
Transition :Contlnued Employment with current Employer 
Aie 
Age Squared 
Dummy: Female 
Employment Duration: < 1 Year 
Employment Duration: 1-3 Years 
Employment Duration: 4-6 Years 
Employment Duration: 7-9 Years 
Employment Duration: > 9 Years 
Dependent Children In HH 
Dummy: Married 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 
Dummy: Married Females 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 
Dummy: Firm Size 1()()'999 
Dummy: Firm Size >or 1000 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 
Dummy: White 
Occupation: t.eaislators, Senior OffIcIals, Manqers 
M-. Std. Dew. 
0.5285 
0.0127 
0.0305 
0.0116 
0.0683 
0.4198 
38.7511 
1683.1090 
0.5322 
0.2175 
0.2610 
0.1180 
0.0607 
0.2184 
0.4193 
0.6848 
0.2337 
0.3648 
0.2240 
0.1687 
0.1892 
0.0643 
0.1642 
0.9608 
0.1128 
0.4992 
0.1120 
0.1720 
0.1071 
0.2522 
0.4935 
13.4708 
1084.2950 
0.4990 
0.4126 
0.4392 
0.3226 
0.2387 
0.4132 
0.4934 
0.4646 
0.4232 
0.4814 
0.4169 
03745 
0.3917 
0.2452 
0.3704 
0.1940 
0.3163 
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Occupation: Professionals 
Occupation: Technicians & Associate Professionals 
Occupation: Clerks 
Occupation: Shop Worker & Shop/Market Sales 
Occupation: Skilled Agricultural & Fishery 
Occupation: Craft & Related Trades 
Occupation: Plant, Machine Operators, Assemblers 
Occupation: Elementary Occupations 
Education: High 
Education: Medium 
Education: Low 
National Unemployment Rate - " 
Dummy: Member of Union 
Research & Development Intensity 
Net Exports/l000 
Industry Level Output/l000 
Service Offshoring Intensity - OSS 
Material Offshoring Intensity - OSM 
Dummy: Most Tradable Jobs from Blinder Index >= 65 
Routine Job Tasks 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Tasks 
Non-Routine Manual Job Tasks 
Service Job Tasks 
Year Dummy: 1992 
Year Dummy: 1993 
Year Dummy: 1994 
Year Dummy: 1995 
Year Dummv: 1996 
Year Dummy: 1997 
Year Dummy: 1998 
Year Dummy: 1999 
Year Dummy: 2000 
Year Dummy: 2001 
Year Dummy: 2002 
Year Dummy: 2003 
Year Dummy: 2004 
Year Dummy: 2005 
Region: NW & NE 
Region: Yorks & Humber 
Region: EM & WM 
Region: East 
Region: London 
Region: SE 
Region:SW 
Region: Wales 
Region: Scotland 
Industry: Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 
Industry: Mining & Quarrying 
Industry: Manufacturing 
Industry: Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 
Industry: Construction 
Industry: Distribution & Hotels 
Industry: Transport & Communications 
Industry: Finance & Business Services 
Industry: Public Admin & Defence 
Industry: Education, Health & Social care 
Indust : Other Services 
Observations: 
SI:Jwa: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. 
5.3.2 estimation Strategy 
0.0946 0.2926 
0.0926 0.2899 
0.1207 0.3257 
0.1194 0.3243 
o.oon 0.0875 
0.On6 0.2675 
0.0581 0.2339 
0.0506 0.2192 
0.0244 0.1542 
0.5300 0.4991 
0.4456 0.4970 
6.9754 1.9650 
0.1538 0.3607 
0.3506 0.6812 
-2.5123 12.6875 
142.3049 124.0568 
1.7590 2.3828 
1.9538 4.8479 
0.1750 0.3800 
0.1132 3.0008 
0.8206 3.9193 
0.0859 3.7910 
-0.0332 3.5784 
0.0782 0.2686 
0.0752 0.2637 
0.0752 0.2638 
0.0731 0.2604 
0.0761 0.2652 
0.0758 0.2648 
0.0734 0.2608 
0.0724 0.2591 
0.0710 0.2568 
0.0695 0.2544 
0.0669 0.2499 
0.0653 0.2471 
0.0633 0.2436 
0.0644 0.2454 
0.1689 0.3747 
0.0955 0.2939 
0.1742 0.3793 
0.0415 0.1995 
0.0959 0.2945 
0.1947 0.3959 
0.0911 0.2878 
0.0520 0.2221 
0.0862 0.2806 
0.0112 0.1051 
0.0029 0.0535 
0.1350 0.3417 
0.0060 o.ono 
0.0410 0.1983 
0.1514 0.3584 
0.0448 0.2069 
0.1083 0.3108 
0.4095 0.4917 
0.1397 0.3466 
0.0483 0.2144 
99,967 
To model the affects off5horing, the potential tradabi\lty of jobs and the TBTC hypothesiS 
might have on job security, I follow the contributions of Munch (2009), Geichecker (2008) and 
Egger et al., (2007) and use yearly job spell data from the BHPS to analyse individual level job 
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transitions via discrete time survival analysis. The analysis from this chapter departs from 
these papers on a number of fronts. First, Geishecker (2008) and Munch (2009) explore the 
impact of material offshoring intensity on individual level job transitions. My analysis explores 
the impact of material and services offshoring intensity, which has so far not been examined 
by this literature. It is interesting to examine the impact that service offshoring intensity might 
have on job security because the current wave of globalisation has been aided by the 
advancements of ICT. This has made many more service related jobs at risk of job loss which 
may lower job security by raising the probability of job-to-unemployment and job-to-new 
employment transitions over time. This could also affect those workers who have continued 
to work with their present employers over time. 
Second, I also examine the impact of the routinization hypothesis on job security; this 
application has so far not been examined in this context, but there is research that has 
explored this hypothesis's impact on employment (see Goos et 01., 2009a,b) and wages (see 
chapter 4 from this thesis). Third, Geishecker (2008) examines a single job transition state, 
which is monthly work-to-non-employment transitions. This job transition is identified if the 
respondent ceases to work and reports having become unemployed or engages in house work. 
His paper is unable to identify monthly job-to-job transitions due to lack of information on 
these spells. Munch (2009) concentrates on two job spell states: job-ta-job spells and job-to-
out of employment spells. For this chapter, I examine three yearly job transition states: job 
transitions into new employment, job-to-unemployment transitions and the annual Job-
transitions that show the continuous employed with present employers. 
5.3.2.1 Modelll.,. the Duration out of Employment 
To model the duration out of employment to other destination states, this chapter specifies a 
discrete time hazard model which accounts for duration dependence and unobserved 
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heterogeneity. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity (or 'frailty' as it is referred to in the 
bio-medical sciences) is important as this accounts for omitted variables that may not be 
observable (e.g. innate ability is a trait that cannot be observed by data or be measured) and 
because of measurement error in the regressors (Jenkins, 2005). These omitted variables only 
matter if they are correlated with the offshoring intensity variables measured at the industry 
level, the potential tradability of occupations according to Blinder's (2007) index and in 
particular from the four job task intensity variables which examine the impact of the 
routinization hypothesis. 
Jenkins (2(05) suggests that a model which does not take account for frailty can over (under) 
estimate the degree of negative (positive) duration dependence in the hazard. And one can 
get an under-estimate of the true response of the hazard to a change in a regressor Xk from a 
non-frailty model (Jenkins, 2(05). To account for frailty in discrete time models, there are two 
types of approaches that can be taken: (I) a parametric approach or (2) a non-parametric 
approach. 
For a model with no frailty, the hazard function can be of the following form, assuming it has a 
complementary log-log specification: 
(1) 
where Po is an intercept, et is an error term and P' Xi,} is a linear function of covariates, where 
i denotes each individual and j denotes the time. With a parametric approach to model the 
frailty distribution, the error term can be modelled by assuming a Normal (Gaussian) 
distribution with a zero mean. The hazard function takes the following form: 
(2) 
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Where frailty is assumed to be distributed by: Ui ..... N(O,uJ). With this assumption, Jenkins 
(2005) notes there to be no closed form expression for the survivor function because the 
survivor function is a product of the complements of the period-specific hazards. And with 
frailty, these hazard rates also depend on the unobserved error term. With the error term 
following a Normal distribution, numerical quadrature techniques are used to 'integrate out'. 
The most common empirical approach to this problem in practice has been to calculate 
survivor functions conditioning on a particular error term value, by using the estimates of 
covariate coefficients from the frailty model but setting the error term equal to its mean3• 
For the non-parametric approach to characterise the frailty distribution was developed by 
Heckman & Singer (1984). Instead of assuming a parametric form for the frailty distribution, 
this approach fits an arbitrary distribution using a set of parameters representing a set of 
'mass points' for a number of different types, z and the probabilities, Pz that a person is 
located at each of the mass points4• The hazard function for an individual belonging to type z 
is given by: 
At,i = 1-exp[-exp(mz +Po+P'Xt,i)l (3) 
Where m = the number of mass points and z = 1, ... , Z is the number of types. This is a 
random intercept model where the randomness is characterised by using a discrete 
distributions. In practise these models are difficult to estimate using large data sets as these 
models can be slow to converge because the programs use numerical derivatives. Additionally 
3 For this first approach, built in programs in STATA can be used to estimate these models depending on the form of the hazard 
function. If the error term has a gamma distribution. one can estimate this model using the 'pgmhoz8' program written by Jenkins 
(2005). For models which assume the error term is distributed by following a Normal distribution, the 'xtIogit' model can be 
estimated or an 'xtcloglog' model can be estimated for loglt and cIoglog models where the data must be organised in person-
period form - this concept will be discussed shortly. 
4 Note that the number of mass points to be estimated is unobserved; Jenkins (2005) sUllests that the number of mass points 
that are estimated is decided by the researcher. Usually the standard procedure is to estimate two. But Geishecker (2008) and 
Munch (2009) estimated four mass points. Geishecker (2008) estimates two mass points and then subsequently adds additional 
mass points holding all parameters constant at their previous maximum level until the log-likelihood falls to increase significantly. 
5 Heckman & Singer type models can be estimated In STATA by using the 'hshoz' program written by Jenkins (2005) or by using 
the 'g/lamm' program written by Sophia Rabe-Hesketh. For other types of models see Jenkins (2005). 
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these models may not converge if the likelihood surface is not globally concave or in some 
cases the maximisation process may get stuck on a flat surface (Jenkins, 2005). 
I estimate a discrete time hazard model with a parametric form for the frailty distribution as a 
starting point. These models will provide a starting point to obtain estimates that will provide 
an indication of whether frailty matters in the sample of data or not. If it does not matter, 
then the non-parametric models may be very difficult to estimate with a large data set 
(Jenkins, 2005). 
To estimate a discrete time single risk model of leaving employment with right censoring, I 
follow the methodology outlined by Jenkins (2005): First it is assumed that each interval is a 
year long. We observe person i's spell from year k = 1 through to the end of the /h year, 
where at this point, person i's spell is either complete (et = 1: meaning this person 
experiences the event of transitioning out of employment and into unemployment) or the 
spell is right censored. Right censoring can occur when the event at risk (in this chapter, this is 
the event of becoming unemployed) is not observed. This can occur when workers experience 
other competing events during each interval. For example, instead of becoming unemployed, 
workers may find another job without an intervening spell of unemployment; or they may 
become self-employed by starting their own business or they leave the labour force 
altogether. 
The discrete time hazard is defined by the following equation: 
(4) 
(5) 
From equation (5), the discrete time hazard is defined as the conditional probability that the 
event of unemployment occurs at time j, given there is survival up to time j - 1. From 
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equation (5), Xi,j is a vector of individual, job and industry level characteristics; this vector also 
includes time dummy variables as well as the variables that measure offshoring intensity, the 
potential tradability of jobs and the job task intensity variables and Yt,j represents the set of 
interval dummy variables for employment duration. And finally, Utrepresents a time-invariant 
error component. A parametric form for the random error component is assumed to account 
for the frailty distribution, where ul-N(O, O ' ~ ) . .
The likelihood contribution for a censored spell is given by the following discrete time survivor 
function: 
(6) 
(7) 
And the likelihood contribution for each completed spell is given by the following discrete time 
density function: 
(8) 
= it· . x s· U - 1) [,} [ 
(9) 
The likelihood function for the whole sample is given by: 
(10) 
Substituting (7) and (9) into (10): 
(11) 
263 
(12) 
From equation (12), ci is the censoring indicator, where ci = 1 if the spell is completed (that is 
the event at risk is becoming unemployed) and Ci = 0 if the spell is right censored (that is the 
transition into unemployment does not happen in the /h interval or following the completion 
of the/h cyele). From equation (12), the log likelihood function can be given by the following 
expression: 
(13) 
Next, defining Yi,k to be a binary indicator variable, which takes a value of Yi,k = 1 if person i 
makes a transition into unemployment in year k and Yi,k = 0 otherwise. That is: 
C. = {1 ~ ~ Yi,k = 1 lor k = Ti; Yi,k = 0 otherwise 
, 0 ~ ~ Yi,k = 0 lor all k (14) 
Following equation (14), equation (13) can be re-written as follows: 
(15) 
Choosing a complementary log-log (eloglog) specification for the hazard function6: 
(16) 
Substituting (16) into (15): 
Lo £ = 1:n 1:i . Lo [l-exp(-exp(p'Xt.k+Yt.k+ u/»] + 
B i=l k=lY"k B exp(-exp(p'xt.k+Yt,k+Ut}) 
l:f=l l:'=1 log (exp (- exp(p' Xi,k + Yt,k + Ut))) (17) 
6 Clog-ioe models represent a third alternative model specification after 'oelstic and probit analysis for binary response variables. 
The complementary Iog-Ioe models are frequently used when the probability of an event is very small or very large. 
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To estimate equation (17), the data must first be organised into person-year form before 
proceeding to estimation (Jenkins, 2005). What this means is there is one observation for 
each year each person is at risk from becoming unemployed in the data7• If the interval was 
defined to be a month, then the data would have to be expanded to be in person-month form; 
this would mean each person would have an observation for each month of data they are at 
risk of becoming unemployed. 
5.3.2.2 Competing Risks Model 
The discrete time hazard model has so far assumed there is a single state process, where a rise 
in the offshoring intensity, or the advancements in technology can potentially raise the 
tradability of an occupation or TBTC can only lead workers to experience the risk of one event 
at anytime - namely a job-to-unemployment spell. But, workers may experience the risk of 
multiple states of labour market activity. For example, workers may experience a job 
transition to a new job or become self employed in addition to experiencing unemployment, 
or workers could leave the labour market altogether and transition into non-activity. All of 
these transitions can happen at time j are competing risks to the event of becoming 
unemployed assuming workers remain in employment up until year j - 1. Thus, a competing 
risks model is a model for multiple destinations states. Multiple destinations can be observed 
from being in a state of employment at time j - 1 to: (a) new employment, (b) self 
employment, (c) unemployment or even (d) non-activity at time j. 
Formally, the individual sample likelihoods contribute to an independent competing risk model 
with two destination states, where there are three types. We have the following multiple 
destination states: 
7 This can be difficult in practice as Individuals may not take part In each survey if they are not available. For example, if 
respondents' die or they leave the country to take a job overseas. 
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£A: Destination A - Individual transitions to new employment; 
£B: Destination B - Individual exits to unemployment; 
£c: Destination C - The spell is right censored - meaning workers do not transition to a new 
job or unemployment but may continue to remain in employment and work for their current 
employers; they may start their own business and work for themselves; or they simply leave 
the labour market and transition into non-activity. 
Following the methodology set out by Jenkins (2005), the discrete hazard rate for exit at time j 
to any destination is the sum of the destination specific discrete hazards: 
(18) 
As survival times are discrete, if there is an exit to one of the destinations at a given survival 
time, then there cannot be an exit to other destinations at the same time. The overall 
likelihood contribution for an individual with an observed spell into one of two destinations 
with an observed spell length of j cycles (the cycle refers to the time frame) is: 
(19) 
Where destination specific censoring indicators are defined as: 
{jA = {1 if person i exits to A 
o otherwise (exit to B or censored) (20) 
{jB = {1 if person i exits to B 
o otherwise (exit to A or censored) (21) 
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Jenkins (2005) notes there are no neat separability results in the discrete case; but it is still 
straight forward to estimate an independent competing risks model. Allison (1982) 
demonstrates that the trick is to assume a particular form for the destination-specific hazards: 
A (k) - [ exp ( P ~ x + y ) ) ] 
A - 1 + e x p ( p ~ x + + y)+ exp < p ~ x + y ) ) (22) 
A (k) - [ exp (PBX+ y) ] 
B - 1 + e x p ( p ~ X X+ y)+ exp (PBx + y) (23) 
[ 1] l-A k -A k = A() B() 1 + e x p ( p ~ x + y ) + e x p < p B x + y ) ) (24) 
With destination-specific censoring indicators 8A and 8B, the likelihood contributions for each 
person with spell length j is written as: 
6A 88 [, _ [ exp(PAX+ y) ] [ exp(p;,X+ y) ] 
- 1 + e x p ( p ~ x + + y)+exp(pBx+ y) 1 + e x p ( p ~ X + + y)+exp(P8x+ y) 
(25) 
As Allison (1982) notes, the likelihood of equation (25) has the same form for a multinomial 
logit model, which can be estimated in four steps: The first step is to expand the data into 
person-period form; for this chapter the data must be in person-year form as I am examining 
annual job transitions in the time interval U - 1,j]. The second step is to construct a 
dependent variable for the data, which takes a value of 0 for all censored observations. For 
persons exiting to destinations state A, the dependent variable is equal to 1 and for those in 
destination state B, the dependent variable is equal to 2. The third step is to create other 
additional variables that are required for analysis. The final step is to estimate the model with 
a multinomiallogit program, where the base group category is set equal to o. 
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5.3.3 Control Variables & Estimation Issues 
For each estimation strategy outlined above, the following control variables are included. 
First, it is important to account for duration dependence (ri,l)' as this might have important 
implications for the probability of exit out of employment and into unemployment in year j. I 
choose to include a number of discrete job tenure dummy variables defined as: 001: less than 
one year; 002: 1-3 years; 003: 4-6 years; 004: 7-9 years and DDS: > 9 years. These dummy 
variables capture the potential length of employment spells. They capture the potential cost 
of firing workers, which can increase with workers' skill levels (e.g. Mortensen & Pissarides, 
1999); the probability of ending an employment spell will decline with job duration if workers 
accumulate general and specific human capital (Ritter, 2009); see chapters 2 and 3, for a 
review of the literature on job security. little is known a priori, regarding the exact form that 
duration dependence takes; but, I take a non-parametric form for duration dependence, 
where for each respondent, the hazard rate is freely determined in a specified time interval, 
but there are no further constraints that are applied to the functional form. Job transitions 
occur in continuous time, but the precise date of the transition is not observed in the data 
(e.g. the date or the month when workers transition out of employment). Instead, these 
events occur at some point in time between the annual interview dates. Job transition data of 
this nature are grouped or interval censored. For the competing risks model, I exclude these 
discrete bands and include a variable that measures job tenure. This is because modelling the 
risk of new job transitions in year j causes the job tenure dummy variables for one to nine plus 
years to drop out of estimation. 
Each model also includes a range of individual and work related characteristics which capture 
a range of time-varying and non-varying level characteristics which are accounted for by the 
vector Xi,}. These variables include controls for age, dependent children, gender, union 
membership, education level, firm size, the unemployment rate, industry and regional dummy 
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variables to control for unobserved industry and region heterogeneity and year dummy 
variables. Accordingly, I follow Geishecker (2008) and Munch's (2009) analysis, where I do not 
control for the frequency and duration of past employment spells. Geishecker (2008) argues 
that the inclusion of these variables in addition to the set of individual level variables may give 
rise to multi-collinearity and this may not improve the fit of the model as other explanatory 
variables such as education, occupation and industry may determine them. 
Additionally, I do not include the real hourly wage rate as an explanatory variable. Royalty 
(1998) and Geishecker (2008) are two paper which have included this variable. But Zavodny 
(2003) and Bernhardt et 01., (1999) exclude this variable as there is the potential that the real 
hourly wage could be endogenous. That is, the explanatory variables that are used to explore 
individual job separations are also variables that were used to determine the hourly wage (see 
chapter 4 for the model used to estimate Mincerian wage regressions). 
To examine the impact of offshoring intensity (material and services) on job security, I merge 
in data from the annual input-output supply and use tables from the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) in the U.K. Additionally, to examine the TBTC hypothesis on job security, I 
create four job task variables measuring service, routine, non-routine manual and non-routine 
abstract tasks using data from O*NET to estimate a single principal component across each 
SOC in O*NET, which has been collapsed to the ISeO-88 level; see section 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 
from chapter 4 for a reminder of the details. 
Additional control variables are also included in estimation (many of these variables are the 
same control variables that were included in the Mincerian wage regressions); the following 
paragraphs provide a recap: Research and development intensity and net exports are 
included in estimation. Research and development intensity is measured by: R ~ , , where R&D 
is industry expenditure on research and development and Y is the output level from each 
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industry. Data for R&D was obtained from the U.K. Business Enterprise Research and 
Development (BERD) publication available from ONS. Missing data from BERD was 
supplemented by data from the OECD ANBERD. This data is available by product groups. To 
obtain R&D expenditure by industry groups, I used an unpublished concordance provided by 
ONS to allocate the R&D expenditure by product groups into industry groups. Data for 
industry output is available from Input-Output tables available from ONS. Net exports are 
measured by subtracting imports from exports: (exports - imports). This data relates to the 
export and import of goods and services which is available from ONS. The inclusion of 
research and development intensity accounts for technological progress and along with 
industry dummy variables and net exports account for the potential job creation and job 
destruction effects that may have important affects on raising or lowering job security 
(Kletzer, 2000, 2004; Klein et 01., 2004 and Davidson & Matusz (2005) highlight the importance 
of export orientation and international competition as being important determinants). 
The inclusion of micro-level individual data combined with industry level aggregate data could 
give rise to contemporaneous correlations in the error term which can result with biased 
estimates for the standard errors (Geishecker, 2008). This issue has been stressed by Moulton 
(1986, 1990); he suggests remedying this issue by multiplying the standard errors with a 
common factor that reflects the average intra-cluster residual correlation. But, Angrist & Lavy 
(2002) note that this method imposes an equi-correlated error structure on the standard 
errors which is inappropriate in the context of models with binary outcomes. They suggest 
instead applying the Generalised Estimation Equation Method (GEE)8, which multiplies the 
standard errors by a factor reflecting the intra-cluster residual correlation, which varies 
between clusters. However, Geishecker (2008) notes that whilst clustering the standard errors 
has become a standard in the literature, the problem with this approach is that the number of 
clusters needs to be large relative to the number of within cluster observations (Wooldridge, 
8 This was a framework that was devised and developed by Ualll & Zeler (1986). This Is basically the duster option In STATA. 
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2002). Thus, I follow Geishecker (2008) and Munch (2009), who do not cluster the standard 
errors in their combined micro- and macro-level data within their models. But they reduce 
this contemporaneous error with the inclusion of industry and region variables to account for 
the correlation within the clusters due to time constant unobserved heterogeneity. This 
should estimate a within industry (fixed effects) model. 
5.4 Results 
The estimated results are presented in two parts. Section 5.4.1 presents the estimated results 
from the discrete time hazard model where the frailty distribution is assumed to follow a 
Normal distribution. And, section 5.4.2 presents the results from the competing risks model. 
5.4.1 Single Risk Model Results 
This section provides the estimated results from the single risk model where the frailty 
distribution is assumed to be normally distributed. Ten versions of this single risk model have 
been estimated and the results are presented within tables 5.2a to 5.4a accompanied by 
tables 5.2b to 5.4b which provide likelihood ratio tests for frailty. Each of these tables 
presents the impact of offshoring (services and materials), the potential tradability of jobs 
(Blinder's (2007) index) and the impact from the job task variables from routinization 
hypothesis have had on the probability of transitioning into unemployment in year j over 
time. 
First, from eight of the ten estimated versions of the single risk model (with frailty) which looks 
at the impact of offshoring and the potential tradability of occupations from Blinder's (2007) 
occupation tradability index on job security (or the risk of becoming unemployed), the 
likelihood ratio tests for frailty presented in tables 5.2b to S.4b are not statistically Significant. 
What this means is that frailty is not important in these models. A second way to check 
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whether frailty is not important in these models is to compare the estimated coefficients in 
models where frailty is accounted for in estimation with models that do not account for frailty. 
If the estimated coefficients between the two types of models are the same, then frailty is not 
important; but if the estimated coefficients differ, then frailty does matter. The estimated 
results presented in tables s.lA to s.3A located in appendix 1 show that when frailty is not 
taken into account, the estimated coefficients from these single risk models are the same as 
the estimated coefficients from the single risk models that account for frailty in most cases. 
The only differences between the results from models that account of frailty (tables s.2a to 
S.4a) to those that do not (tables S.lA to s.3A in appendix 1) are the estimated standard 
errors. But frailty is important in two versions of the single risk models; these models relate to 
the impact from the four job task variables from the routinization hypothesis (located in 
column (4) in table s.2a and column (2) in table s.4a). Second, from all ten versions of the 
single risk model, the estimated baseline parameters show the probability of becoming 
unemployed is most likely to occur during the first year of employment. This probability 
declines with job tenure; these results are also shown by the single risk models that do not 
account for individual heterogeneity (see tables s.lA to s.3A in appendix 1). 
Table s.2a provides the estimated coefficients from the affects of offshoring (material and 
services) on the probability of transitioning into unemployment in year j. The estimated 
coefficients from these four versions of the model show the probability of becoming 
unemployed increases non-linearly with age. Being married, having dependent children and 
female workers who are married are less likely to become unemployed, though many of these 
estimated coefficients are not significant. Females who have dependent children are also less 
likely to become unemployed. These findings contrast with findings reported by Geishecker 
(2008) and Royalty (1998). Geishecker (2008) finds married females and females who have 
dependent children have a higher probability of leaving employment; but the dependent 
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variable in his paper incorporates individuals who leave the labour force altogether in addition 
to those workers who lose their jobs and become unemployed. This could account for the 
significant coefficients for females who have dependent children. Additionally, the results 
from this chapter show females and females who are also married do not have a higher 
probability of becoming unemployed compared to male workers who are also not married. 
Being a member of a trade union reduces the probability of becoming unemployed and in 
contrast to the expected results, a rise in the national unemployment rate does not raise the 
probability of becoming unemployed. This result is surprising because one would expect the 
probability of becoming unemployed to rise as the national unemployment rate increases. But 
if one takes another look at the probability of becoming unemployed from figure 5.1, one can 
see that over the period 1992-2005, this probability has declined over this time frame and 
additionally, if one recalls the national unemployment rate trends from figure 3.2 from 
chapter 3 showed a falling unemployment rate over this very period. This could explain the 
positive relationship. 
There is a positive relationship between firm size and the probability of becoming 
unemployed. The estimated results show workers employed by smaller firms have a lower 
probability of becoming unemployed compared to being employed by larger firms with over a 
thousand employees. Other results show workers are less likely to become unemployed when 
employed by the public sector and coefficients from education which proxy for workers' skill 
intensities show that workers who have a medium-level of education (workers who have 
completed their A-levels or equivalent qualifications with a first university degree) are 
approximately 18% less likely to become unemployed. A rise in the research and development 
intensity raises the probability of becoming unemployed and net exports and industry level 
output lowers the probability of becoming unemployed, though these variables do not have a 
statistically significant impact. 
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Moving onto the variables of interest, the results from column (1) show a one percent rise in 
service offshoring intensity lowers the probability of becoming unemployed by approximately 
22% [exp(-O.2435)-1]. Similarly, the estimated results from column (3) shows a one percent 
rise in material offshoring intensity lowers the probability of becoming unemployed by 21% 
[exp(-O.2377)-1]. These results seem quite surprising as they disagree with the reported 
findings from Geishecker (2008) and Munch (2009); both of these papers find material 
offshoring intensity at the industry level raises the probability of a job separation in Germany 
and Denmark. However, these results reflect the fall in the job-to-unemployment transition 
probability shown by figure 5.1; from this graph and the results, they suggest that a rise in 
material and service offshoring intensity has not raised the risk of becoming unemployed but it 
appears to lower this risk and it thereby suggest there is no higher risk to become 
unemployed. 
The estimated coefficients from columns (2) and (4) present the interaction of service and 
material offshoring intensity with the high and medium education dummy variables. These 
estimated coefficients show service offshoring has not had a statistically significant impact. 
But medium skilled workers employed within industries that engage in material offshoring are 
less likely to become unemployed compared to less skilled workers. 
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Table S.2a: Single Risk Model Results: ass, OSM & Education 
Pr(Job to Unemployment) {l} {2} {3} {"} 
Age 0.2375 0.2364 0.2348 0.2342 
(O.0256}"· (O.0256}··· (O.0256}·" (O.0256}··· 
Age Squared -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0031 
(O.OOO3}··· (O.OOO3}··· (O.OOO3}··· (O.OOO3}·" 
Dummy: Married -0.0493 -0.0554 -0.0541 -0.0603 
(O.1625) (O.1626) (O.1627) (O.1628) 
Dummy: Female -0.0161 -0.0147 -0.0322 -0.0346 
(0.1700) (0.1700) (0.1702) (0.1701) 
Dummy: Married Females -0.1536 -0.1502 -0.1480 -0.1397 
(0.2140) (0.2140) (0.2138) (0.2139) 
Dependent Children in HH -0.0329 -0.0320 -0.0308 -0.0278 
(0.1501) (0.1501) (0. 1499} (O.15OO) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children -1.1167 -1.1223 -1.1074 -1.1114 
(0.2197)··· (0.2198)·" (0.2195)"· (0.2196}·" 
Employment Duration: < 1 Year 2.9999 2.9906 3.0030 2.9918 
(0.2170)·" (0.2171)··· (0.2170)··· (0.2171)··· 
Employment Duration: 1-3 Years 0.9902 0.9843 0.9938 0.9902 
(O.2599}··· (0.2599)··· (O.2598}··· (0.2598)··· 
Employment Duration: 4-6 Years 0.2757 0.2716 0.2760 0.2714 
(0.3915) (O.3915) (O.3915) (O.3914) 
Employment Duration: 7-9 Years -0.6836 -0.6868 -0.6714 -0.6771 
(0.7362) (0.7362) (0.7362) (0.7362) 
Dummy: Member of Union -0.6596 -0.6738 -0.6510 -0.6849 
(0.3856)· (0.3861)· (0.3850) (0.3852)· 
National Unemployment Rate -0.2968 -0.2978 -0.4463 -0.4464 
(0. 1341}" (0.1341)·· (0.1292)·" (O.1295}·" 
Education: High 0.0940 0.3717 0.1194 0.3285 
(0.3533) (0.3691) (O.3536) (O.3593) 
Education: Medium -0.1999 -0.1422 -0.1888 -0.1230 
(0.1086)· (0.1218) (0.1086) (0.1130) 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 -0.3441 -0.3498 -0.5112 -0.5145 
(0.2127) (O.2127) (0.2003)·· (O.2(07)*· 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 -0.5382 -0.5397 -0.6803 -0.6814 
(0.2405;-· (0.2403)·· (0.2317)··· (0.2321)··· 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 -0.8651 -0.8681 -0.9808 -0.9792 
(0.2710)··· (0.2708)··· (0.2650)··· (O.2650}·" 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector -0.7262 -0.7424 -0.6459 -0.6698 
(0.3OBS)·· (0.3089)·· (O.3049)·· (0.3049)·· 
Research & Development Intensity 0.3720 0.3818 0.4588 0.4707 
(0.3973) (0.3976) (0.3946) (0.3947) 
Industry Level Output/1ooo -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0019 
(0.0025) (0.D025) (0.0024) {0.D024} 
Net Exports/1000 -0.0126 -0.0138 -0.0189 -0.0205 
(O.0159) (O.0159) (O.Olll) (0.0177) 
Race: White -0.0208 -0.0192 -0.0280 -0.0211 
(0.22lS) (0.2279) (0.2279) (0.2281) 
Service Offshoring Intensity: OSS -0.2435 -0.2043 - -
(0.0683,··· (0.0738)··· 
- -
Material Offshoring Intensity: OSM - - -0.2377 -0.2061 
- -
(0.1125)·· (O.ll38)· 
Education: Hlgh·OSS 
-
-0.8299 
- -
-
(O.B334) - -
Education: High·OSS 
-
-0.0722 
- -
-
(0.0644) 
- -
Education: High·OSM 
- - -
-23.0553 
- - -
(42.3017) 
Education: Medium·OSM 
- - -
-0.0694 
- - -
(0.0315)" 
Constant -5.2394 -5.2769 -4.5240 -4.5351 
(1.4217}··· (1.4235)··· (1.3627)··· (1.3693)··· 
Observations 77545 77545 77545 77545 
Log Ukelihood -1612.0573 -1610.0874 -1618.2433 -1614.3052 
Source: Own estimates from the BHPS. Significance Level: ···p<O.01. ··p<O.05 and ·p<O.lO. Each model 
includes Industry, occupation, regional level control variables and time dummy variables. Robust standard 
errors are presented within the parentheses. 
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Table 5.2b: Likelihood Ratio Test for Frailty for Table 5.2a 
Ukellhood Ratio Test (II (ZI (31 ("I 
au
e 0.0066 0.0066 0.0065 0.0065 
(0.0370) (0.0367) (0.03701 (0.03641 
Rho 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(O.OOO3) (O.OOO3) (O.OOO3) (O.OOO3) 
r 0.00045 0.00045 0.00044 0.00046 
(0.492) (0.492) (0.492) (0.4911 
Evidence Not Significant Not Significant Not Significant Not Significant 
.... : Frailty Is equal to zero Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted 
• ••• •• • ... Source. Own estimates from the BHPS. Significance Level. P<O.Ol, P<O.OS and P<O.10. au IS the standard 
deviation of the heterogeneity variance. Rho is the ratio of the heterogeneity variance to one plus the 
heterogeneity variance. Standard errors are presented within the parentheses. 
Table 5.3a presents the estimated coefficients which examine the impact from being 
employed in a job that is highly tradable (defined by Blinder's (2007) occupation tradability 
index) and the impact from the routinization hypothesis (Autor et 01., 2003). The estimated 
results from column (1) show being employed within the most tradable occupations (defined 
by jobs having an index value of 65 or more from Blinder's (2007) index) does not have a 
statistically significant positive impact on the probability of becoming unemployed. The 
estimated coefficient is negative which implies a fall in the probability of becoming 
unemployed. Similarly, the estimated coefficients from columns (2) and (3) shows being 
employed within highly tradable jobs within industries that engage in material and service 
offshoring does not have a statistically significant impact on the probability of becoming 
unemployed, although both of the estimated coefficients are positive. Finally, the estimated 
coefficients from column (4) show none of the job task variables have a statistically significant 
impact on the probability of becoming unemployed. These estimated coefficients show being 
employed in jobs that have a high importance for completing routine intensive job tasks 
lowers the probability of becoming unemployed as does being employed in jobs that have a 
high importance for non-routine abstract job tasks. But being employed in jobs that have a 
high importance for non-routine manual jobs tasks and service job tasks does have a positive 
impact on the probability of transitloning into unemployment in year j. 
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Table 5.3a: Single Risk Model: ass, OSM, Blinder's (2007) Job Tradability Index & TBTe 
Pr(Job to U n e m p ~ n t ) ) {I} (l) {3} (4) 
Service Offshoring Intensity: OSS 
-
-0.2570 -
-
-
{0.0706}---
- -
Material Offshoring Intensity: OSM 
- -
-0.2469 
-
- -
(O.l138)--
-
Blinder Index: Most Offshorable Jobs -0.1487 -0.3626 -0.2606 
-
(O.2103) (O.3355) (O.2590) 
-
Blinder Index • OSS - 0.1074 - -
-
(O.lO23) - -
Blinder Index • OSM - - 0.0282 -
- - (O.0333) -
Routine Intensive Job Tasks 
- - -
-0.1315 
- - -
(O.H08) 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Tasks 
- - -
-0.0512 
- - -
(0.0473) 
Non-Routine Manual Job Tasks - - - 0.1177 
- - -
(O.O733) 
Service Job Tasks 
- - -
0.0237 
- - -
(O.O532) 
Constant -4.6344 -5.2234 -4.5468 -5.3890 
(1.3627}--- (l.4223}--- (l.3653}--- (2.0816)--
Observations 77S45 77S45 77S45 64544 
Log Ukellhood -1619.12 -1611.39 -1617.6535 -794.1267 
Source: Own estimates from the BHPS. Significance Level: ---p<O.01, --p<O.05 and -p<O.1.0. Each model 
indudes industry, occupation, regional level control variables and time dummy variables. The full list of 
estimated coefficients can be found in appendix 2, table 5.4A. Robust standard errors are presented within 
the parentheses. 
Table 5.3b: likelihood Ratio Test for Frailty for Table S.3a 
Ukellhood RatIo Test {I} 121_ {3J {4} 
Ou' 0.0065 0.0066 0.0065 1.0174 
(O.037l) (0.0367) (0.0370) (O.3026) 
Rho 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3862 
(O.OOO3) (O.OOO3) (O.OOO3) (O.l4l0) 
Xl 0.00044 0.00046 0.00044 2.75 
(O.492) (O.491) (O.492) (O.049r-
Evidence Not Significant Not Significant Not Significant Significant 
H.: FraIlty Is equal to zero Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected 
• Source: Own estimates from the BHPS. Significance Level: ---p<O.01, --p<O.05 and -p<O.lO. au Is the 
standard deviation of the hetel'Olenelty variance. Rho is the ratio of the hetel'Olenelty variance to one plus 
the heterogeneity variance. Standard errors are presented within the parentheses. 
Table S.4a examines the interaction between a number of dummy variables taking specific 
values from Blinder's (2007) job tradability Index and the routine intensive job task variable on 
the probability of becoming unemployed. The idea here is to examine if workers who are 
employed in the most tradable jobs, which are additionally jobs that are intensive in routine 
job tasks are more likely to face job loss because they are the most offshorable jobs - there 
should be a positive impact on the probability of becoming unemployed. The results from 
column (1) show no statistically significant coefficients from a series of dummy variables that 
have specific values from Blinder's (2007) job tradability index. These results also reaffirm the 
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results from table 5.3a - column (1), where the most tradable jobs (occupations which have an 
index value of 65+) does not have a significant impact on the probability of becoming 
unemployed. However, the results from column (2) show that when these dummy variables 
are interacted with the routine job task variable, there are two statistically significant 
coefficients. They show that workers who are employed in tradable jobs that have a Blinder 
(2007) index value of 36-45 and 76-85, that are also jobs that are routine job tasks intensive 
have a positive impact on the probability of becoming unemployed over time. 
Table S.4a: Single Risk Model: Blinder (2007) Index & TBTe Variables 
Pr(Job to Unemployment) (1] (2) 
Blinder Index Value: 25 -0.9274 -0.9535 
{U309} {1.8001} 
Blinder Index Value: 26-35 -0.2892 -0.5052 
{0.5120} {0.6806} 
Blinder Index Value: 36-45 0.1607 -0.1105 
{0.4206} {0.47S8} 
Blinder Index Value: 46-55 -0.4859 -1.0668 
{0.S062} {0.7692} 
Blinder Index Value: 56-65 -0.5156 -0.6829 
{0.4236} {0.47B3} 
Blinder Index Value: 66-75 -0.1599 -0.1847 
{0.2704} {0.3546} 
Blinder Index Value: 76-85 -0.1266 0.5648 
{0.4505} {0.5305} 
Blinder Index Value: 86+ -0.8578 -0.9024 
{0.528S} (0.5771) 
Routine Intensive Job Tasks - -0.0487 
- {0.0761} 
Blinder Index Value: 2S-Routine Job Tasks 
-
0.8305 
-
(6.2744) 
Blinder Index Value: 26-35-Routine Job Tasks - 0.2390 
-
(0.2552) 
Blinder Index Value: 36-45* Routine Job Tasks - 0.2316 
-
(0.1286)-
Blinder Index Value: 46-55*Routlne Job Tasks 
-
-0.2523 
-
(0.2540) 
Blinder Index Value: S6-6S*Routine Jobs Tasks - 0.0438 
-
(0.1268) 
Blinder Index Value: 66-75*Routine Job Tasks 
-
0.0741 
-
(0.0934) 
Blinder Index Value: 76-85* Routine Job Tasks 
-
0.3770 
-
(0.1633)·* 
Blinder Index Value: 86+*Routlne Job Tasks 
-
0.1059 
-
(0.2520) 
Constant -4.6341 -S.0964 
{1.3663)*** {2.0828}" 
Observations n545 64544 
Log Ukelihood -1615.9648 -788.4486 
Sourn: Own estimates from the BHPS. Significance Level: ***p<O.Ol, **p<O.05 and *p<O.lO. 
Each model includes industry, occupation. reslonal level control variables and time dummy 
variables. The full list of estimated coeffidents can be found In appendix 3, table 5.5A. Robust 
standard errors are presented within the parentheses. 
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Table 5.4b: Likelihood Ratio Test for Table 5.4a 
Ukellhood RDtio Test {I} {Z} 
a." 0.0065 0.9827 
(0.0377) (0.3092) 
Rho 0.0000 0.3699 
(0.0003) (0.1467) 
X2 0.00042 2.43 
(O.492) (0.060)* 
Evidence Not Significant Significant 
Ho: Frailty Is equal to zero Accepted Rejected 
Source: Own estimates from the BHPS. Significance Level: ***p<O.01, 
**p<O.05 and *p<O.10. Qu2 is the standard deviation of the heterogeneity 
variance. Rho is the ratio of the heterogeneity variance to one plus the 
heterogeneity variance. Standard errors are presented within the 
parentheses. 
5.4.2 Competing Risks Model Results 
The last section provided little evidence showing the impact from offshoring (material and 
services), the potential tradability of jobs and the routine intensive nature of job tasks did not 
have a significant impact on raising the probability of becoming unemployed over time; but 
there was evidence which showed that workers employed in the most tradable jobs which 
were also routine job task intensive did raise their probability of becoming unemployed. One 
of the potential downsides to estimating a single risk model is that it potentially overlooks the 
impact that these variables may have on other competing labour market states. For example, 
if globalisation and technological innovations have potentially enabled many more jobs to be 
offshored to firms located in developing countries that are able to provide goods and services 
at lower cost, domestic workers should lose their jobs and become unemployed or transition 
to a new job with low pay that may be a temporary job in the short-term. Or workers could 
negotiate with their employers to lower their wage levels. This would lower the cost of 
production for firms which would enable firms to keep their current labour force and 
production processes in the developed country. This would also enable workers to remain 
with their current employers rather than to lose their jobs and become unemployed or to 
transition to temporary jobs which may only have a fixed-term contract with low pay in the 
short-run. Additionally, many workers could decide to leave the labour force altogether or 
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start up their own business if they did not want to accept the lower wage levels. The empirical 
evidence from the previous chapter found that service offshoring, the potential tradability of 
jobs and the jobs that are intensive in routine job task had a negative impact on the wage 
levels of workers, but does this mean that workers remain in employment with their current 
employers rather than finding new jobs or becoming unemployed? 
To explore the impact from offshoring, the potential tradability of jobs and the routinization 
hypothesis on competing labour market states, this section estimates a series of competing 
risks models with a distinction between (a) a job transition to a new job (these are job 
transitions with job tenure under one year), (b) a job transition to unemployment and (c) the 
base category which represents right censored observations, consisting of workers who remain 
in employment with their current employers in the time interval (j -l,j]. This base category 
also accounts for workers who transition out of the labour force or start up their own 
businesses and work for themselves. The estimated results are presented in tables 5.5 to 5.9, 
where the estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
First, tables 5.5 and 5.6 present the estimated coefficients from the impact of service and 
material offshoring. From both of these tables, the estimated results show the relative risk of 
becoming unemployed or transitioning to a new job falls with job tenure; more tenured 
workers are less likely to transition to a new job or to become unemployed. The relative risk of 
becoming unemployed or obtaining a new job is non-linear with increasing age and married 
workers are roughly 30% more likely to transition to new jobs relative to non-married workers; 
but they are also less likely to become unemployed. 
Other results show workers who have dependent children in their households are less likely to 
transition to a new job relative to workers who do not have dependent children in their 
households. Female workers with dependent children are less likely to become unemployed or 
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transition to a new job relative to other workers. Workers who are members of a trade union 
are more likely to transition to new jobs relative to workers who are not members of a trade 
union. A rise in the national unemployment rate does not raise the likelihood of transitioning 
to a new job or to become unemployed; these results disagree with Munch (2009) as one 
would expect the transition to unemployment or to a new job to rise with a rise in the 
unemployment rate. But on the other hand, these results could suggest that workers may be 
prepared to remain in employment with their current employers and possibly take a pay cut 
(see the empirical evidence from chapter 4) than to become unemployed or transition to a new 
job that may be temporary. Workers with a medium-level of education are less likely to 
transition to new jobs or become unemployed compared to less skilled workers. And workers 
employed by firms that employ less than a thousand employees are three times more likely to 
transition to new jobs than to become unemployed over time. 
Turning to the variables of interest: from table 5.5, column (1), a one percent rise in service 
offshoring intensity lowers the risk of becoming unemployed by roughly 22 percent; there is no 
significant coefficient for new job transitions. Similarly, from table 5.6 column (1), a one 
percent rise in material offshoring also lowers the risk of becoming unemployed by roughly 20 
percent; there is once again a non significant coefficient for new job transitions. Column (2) 
from tables 5.s and 5.6 both examine the impact offshoring has on workers who have different 
skill levels. The estimated coefficients from table 5.5 show high-skilled workers employed in 
industries that engage in service offshoring are less likely to transition into unemployment 
relative to less skilled workers. But medium-skilled workers employed in industries that 
engage in material offshoring (table 5.6) are less likely to become unemployed relative to less 
skilled workers. 
Table 5.7 examines whether workers employed in the most tradable jobs (these are 
occupations which have a Blinder (2007) index value of 65 and over) are more likely to become 
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unemployed or transition to new jobs over time. The estimated coefficient from column (1) 
shows that workers are 15 percent more likely to make new job transitions over time relative 
to workers who are not employed in the most tradable jobs. They are not more likely to 
become unemployed. These results appear to rest with the view that many workers who are 
employed in the most tradable jobs have specific skills to those jobs. And with job loss, many 
of these workers do not have general human capital skills that can be transferred to new 
employment (Ritter, 2009). Hence, workers may be employed in temporary jobs in the short-
term so that employers can view whether workers have the necessary skills to perform the 
jobs. If workers do not have the necessary skills they lose their jobs and they once again find 
new jobs. In some cases, these new jobs that may be temporary may be stepping stones 
towards permanent jobs. 
Columns (2) and (3) from table 5.7 find no significant evidence showing workers employed in 
the most tradable jobs and employed within industries that engage in service and material 
offshoring are more likely to become unemployed or transition into new employment over 
time. 
Table 5.8a presents the estimated coefficients from the four job task variables. One would 
expect workers employed in jobs that are intensive in routine job tasks to face a higher risk of 
job loss because these job tasks can potentially be replaced by computer capital and these are 
jobs that are most likely to be offshored aboard. The estimated coefficients show workers 
employed in jobs that have a one standard deviation more importance to their jobs for the 
completion of routine job tasks are 4.5 percent less likely to transition to new jobs and are less 
likely to become unemployed, although this latter coefficient is not significant. Similarly, 
workers employed in jobs that have a one standard deviation more importance in service job 
tasks are roughly 6 percent less likely to transition to new jobs; this result is line with the 
empirical evidence which shows jobs that have a high importance for service tasks has had a 
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positive impact on the demand for labour (Goos et al., 2oo9b). But workers who are employed 
in jobs that have a high importance for non-routine abstract job tasks are more likely to make 
new job transitions over time. 
This result could relate to the fact that many high-skilled workers may make new job 
transitions, if these workers remain on fixed-term or temporary employment contracts over 
time. This conclusion is supported by empirical findings from the literature. Gash (2008) finds 
that high-skilled workers in the U.K. employed in temporary employment contracts (in 
academia, consulting or research contracts, etc.) are less likely to make transitions to 
permanent employment compared to the reference group of manual workers. This would 
imply that they have a higher probability of making new job transitions. And previous research 
on temporary workers' transitions in the U.K. by Booth et al., (2002) also find higher grades of 
workers are less likely to transition to permanent jobs. These empirical findings support this 
latter result, but it is counter intuitive to what the ALM hypothesis predicts. 
Table S.8b shows the interaction of the routine task variable with the skill intensity variables: 
high/medium/low education variables proxy for skill. The results from this table try to further 
understand the counter intuitive results from table 5.8a. This is because in relation to the 
results from table 5.8a, one would expect high-skilled workers to have a lower probability of 
becoming unemployed or to make new job transitions because the TBTC hypotheSis suggests 
that computer capital complements non-routine abstract job tasks; however the results shown 
are not in favour of this view. And also this hypothesis suggests that routine jobs tasks are 
more likely to be replaced by computer capital; thus, workers employed in jobs that have a 
high importance for these job tasks should have a higher probability of becoming unemployed 
and to make new job transitions. But again the results from the competing risks model does 
not find in favour of this view. 
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The results from table 5.8b show that skilled workers with routine intensive job tasks are less 
likely to make new job transitions but are more likely to be displaced, although the estimated 
coefficients for both transitions are not significant. The empirical evidence suggests that 
medium-skilled workers are more likely to be employed in jobs that are intensive in routine 
tasks (Acemoglu & Autor, 2010 & forthcoming). The estimated coefficients show these 
workers are more likely to transition to new jobs and become unemployed, although the 
estimated coefficient for the latter transition is not significant. 
Lastly, low skilled workers employed in jobs that are routine job task intensive are significantly 
less likely to make new job transitions. This result makes sense because low skilled workers 
are more likely to be employed in non-routine manual intensive jobs situated at the bottom 
end of the skill distribution. Thus, the results from tables 5.8a and 5.8b show that the skill 
intensity of workers that are interacted with the job task variables are important to the 
analysis to generate intuitive results9• 
9 Similar conclusions are reached and are consistent with the job polarization and TBTC hypothesis when the other remaining job 
task variables are interacted with the skill variables; although some of the results are counter Intuitive (the fuillist of results are 
not • presented in this thesis due to reasons for brevity). Consider table FN2 below which presents the estimated coefficients: 
Skill Intensity H!lhSldI MedlumSkll a-SIdI 
New Job Unem,*",-" New Job U New Job 
RoutIneT .... 0.9533 1.1085 1.0308" 1.0278" 0.9724 0.9662 
.(0.0514) (O.2252) (0.0134)" (0.0650) (o.0127)·· (0.060B) 
ServlceT .... 1.0151 0.9716 o . 9 7 3 ~ ~ 1.0219u 1.0269 0.9812 
(0.3448) (0.1507) (0.0105)" (0.0538) (o.OlJ3)·· (o.0567) 
Non-RoutIne Abstract T .... 1.0348" 1.04sa- 1.0195 0.9689 0.9770 1.0292 
(0.0336) (O.1933) (O.OlOW (0.0479) (0.0104)" (0.0526) 
Non-RoutIne ~ n u a l l T .... 0.9645 1.1000 1.0266 1.0227 0.9756u 0.9721w 
(o.0406) (O.O794) (0.0105)·· (o'JJ5031 to.01Ol)·· (o.0477) 
, The estimated coefficients with 0' appear to be consistent with the job poIanzation (Goss & Manning. 2003, 2007) and TBTC 
(Autor et aL, 2003) hypotheses. Estimated coefficients with 'ft appear to be Inconsistent. For example, the estimated coefficients 
for high-skilled workers interacted with the non-routine abstract task variable show estimated relative risk ratios that are greater 
than one implying these workers are more likely to transition to new jobs and they are more likely to be displaced. This appears 
counter intuitive to the T8TC and job polarization hypotheses because one would expect lower probabilities for transitionlng to 
each of the destination states In year j. This is because hlgh-sldlled workers are more likely to have jobs that have more 
importance for non-routine abstract job tasks, where technology complements these skills and this should therefore have a 
positive impact on staying in employment. Consistent estimates are shown for non-routine manual tasks interacted with low skill 
Intensity. These coefficients are less than one and imply these workers have a lower probability of transltioning to new jobs and 
to become unemployed. This may be because many of these jobs are more likely to be in non-tradable sectors where technolCIIY 
cannot substitute for the job tasks in hairdressing, waiting staff In bars and restaurants and cleaners, etc. For service job tasks 
interacted with the skill Intensity variables, the estimated coefficients appear to be consistent with the hypotheses. Similar 
conclusions are obtained when the competing risks model distinguishes between (1) new job transitions; (2) remaining in 
employment with present employer and (3) unemployment In time period J. Note that these latter results are not presented In 
the thesis. 
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Finally, table 5.9 presents the estimated coefficients from the interaction of dummy variables 
that take specific values from Blinder's (2007) occupation tradability index with the routine job 
task variable. The estimated coefficients from column (1) show jobs with specific values from 
the job tradability index are more likely to transition to new jobs than to become unemployed 
over time. But the estimated coefficients from column (2) shows that workers employed in 
jobs that are also routine job task intensive are more likely to become unemployed than 
transition to new jobs over time. The estimated results from this column show that jobs with a 
Blinder (2007) index value of 25, 36-45 and 76-85 (see figure 4.1 from chapter 4 for a reminder 
of Blinder's (2007) occupation tradability index) and which have a high importance for routine 
job tasks are more likely to become unemployed over time relative to other workers. These 
findings complement the empirical results from chapter 4. The results from chapter 4 found 
workers who are employed in the most tradable jobs that are also routines job task intensive 
can potentially face large losses in their income levels over time. The results from this chapter 
suggest that these workers are more likely to become unemployed where the potential 
earnings losses from being unemployed can be large over time for these workers (see empirical 
evidence from chapter 3). 
5.4.2.1 Robustness Checks 
The results from the competing risks model (from tables 5.5 and 5.6) both showed offshoring 
(services and material intensity) lowers the risk of becoming unemployed in year j, but the 
question is whether workers continue to remain in employment with their current employers 
rather than to lose their jobs or transition to new jobs. As a robustness check, this section 
explores a competing risks model which examines three destination states. These are: (1) to 
remain in employment, but transition to new employment at time j; (2) to remain in 
employment with current employers at time j; (3) to become unemployed at time j and (4) the 
observations are right censored at time j, - this accounts for individuals who leave employment 
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and transition into self-employment or leave the labour market altogether. The estimated 
coefficients from this model are presented in appendix 7 in tables 5.9A to 5.18A. 
The estimated coefficients from this model show workers are more likely to remain in 
employment with their current employers from a rise in offshoring (materials and services) -
see table 5.9A and table 5.11A. The results also show high and medium-skilled workers 
employed within industries that engage in offshoring (materials and services) are also more 
likely to remain in employment with their current employers relative to less-skilled workers 
(see tables 5.10A and 5.12A). And workers employed in potentially the most tradable jobs are 
more likely to remain in employment - this can be with their current employers or in new jobs 
rather than to become unemployed (see tables 5.13A and 5.16A). 
Additionally, workers employed in the most tradable jobs and employed within industries that 
engage in service offshoring are less likely to remain in employment with their current 
employers (see table 5.14A); there are no significant coefficients from material offshoring 
(table 5.15A). From the TBTe hypothesis (table 5.16A) - workers employed in jobs that have a 
high importance for the completion of routine intensive job tasks are more likely to remain in 
employment with their current employers (column (2)) - although this estimated coefficient is 
not significant. But workers employed in jobs that have a high importance for non-routine 
abstract job tasks are more likely to transition to new jobs and remain with their current 
employers. This result is consistent with the evidence presented by Gash (2008) in the last 
section. And finally, table 5.18A shows workers employed in tradable jobs which have an index 
value of 25,66-75 and 76-85 are less likely to remain in employment (transition to a new job or 
remain with their current employers) but they are more likely to be become unemployed over 
time. 
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Table 5.5: Competing Risks Model- OSS & Education 
Competl-"l Risks Model {l} {2} 
New Job Transition Unemployment Transition New Job Transition Unemployment Transition 
Age 1.3204 1.3013 1.3206 1.2999 
(0.0142)· ... (0.0343)··· (0.0142)·" (0.0343)··· 
Age Squared 0.9966 0.9965 0.9966 0.9965 
(0.0001)· ... (0.0003) ... • (0.0001)··· (0.0003)··· 
Dummy: Married 1.3026 0.9853 1.3033 0.9809 
(0.0784)··· (0.1708) (0.0785)··· (0.1699) 
Dummy: Female 0.9306 0.9665 0.9306 0.9714 
(0.0592) (0.1685) (0.0592) (0.1693) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0952 0.8553 1.0948 0.8567 
(0.0823) (0.1920) (0.0823) (0.1922) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7863 0.9682 0.7861 0.9710 
(0.0410)··· (0.1442) (0.0410)"· (0.1446) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.6509 0.2981 0.6510 0.2952 
(0.0469)"· (0.0690)··· (0.0469)*" (0.0684)"· 
Job Tenure 0.0634 0.5865 0.0634 0.5873 
(O'()O20)··· (0.0481)··· (0.0020)··· (0.0481) ..... 
Dummy: Member of Union 1.2728 0.4245 1.2714 0.4175 
(0.0738) .... (0.1552) .... (0.0738),,·· (0.1530)·· 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0121 0.6886 0.0121 0.6897 
(0.0003) ...... (0.0828)· .... (0.0003)*" (0.0829) .. •• 
Education: High 0.9688 1.0637 1.0808 1.4863 
(0.1085) (0.3856) (0.1623) (0.5601) 
Education: Medium 0.9603 0.8085 0.9558 0.8649 
(0.0377)· ... (0.0910)· (0.0517) (0.1087) 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 4.3801 0.8914 4.3809 0.8830 
(0.2760)· .... (0.1596) (0.2761)*·· (0.1589) 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 4.4052 0.7153 4.4077 0.7122 
(0.2927) ... • (0.1574) (0.2930) .... (0.1565) 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 4.6823 0.4790 4.6815 0.4763 
(0.3150)·" (0.1128)··· (0.3150),,·· (0.1122)·· .. 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 1.2291 0.4351 1.2267 0.4289 
(0.0833) ..... (0.1183)·" (0.0832) .... (0.1171) .. •• 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0191 1.4059 1.0197 1.4285 
(0.0757) (0.5940) (0.0757) (0.6058) 
Industry Level Output/1000 1.0004 0.9996 1.0004 0.9998 
(0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0024) 
IV 
~ ~
Net Exports/1000 0.9988 0.9878 0.9987 0.9861 
(0.0029) (0.0143) (0.0029) (0.0141) 
N 
i 
Race: White 
Service Offshoring Intensity: OSS 
Education: High·OSS 
Education: Medium·OSS 
Observations 
Log Ukelihood 
1.2963 
(0.1232)""" 
1.0040 
(0.0149) 
77545 
-12663.854 
0.9600 
(0.2362) 
0.7847 
(0.0465)""" 
1.2971 
(0.1233),""" 
1.0042 
(0.0173) 
0.9441 
(0.0468) 
1.0017 
(0.0146) 
77545 
-12660.953 
0.9564 
(0.2366) 
0.8184 
(0.0558)""" 
0.4367 
(0.2115)" 
0.9240 
(0.0615) 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ···p<O.Ol; ··p<0.05; ·p<0.10. Base group relates to the censored spells. Each 
regression model Includes industry, regional and calendar year variables. Robust standard errors are reported within the parentheses. Estimated 
coeffiCients are relative risk ratios. 
Table 5.6: Competing Risks Model- OSM & Education 
Coml)etina RIsks Model Il} Il} 
New Job Transition Unemployment Transition New Job Transition Unemployment Transition 
Age 1.3206 1.2977 1.3207 1.2970 
(0.01.42)· ... (0.0342)··· (0.01.42)··· (0.0341.)··· 
Age Squared 0.9966 0.9965 0.9966 0.9965 
(0.0001.)··· (0.0003)··· (0.0001.)"· (0.0003)··· 
Dummy: Married 1.3022 0.9777 1.3042 0.9719 
(0.0784)··· (0.1.694) (0.0785)·· .. (0.1.687) 
Dummy: Female 0.9308 0.9544 0.9308 0.9549 
(0.05920 (0.1.659) (0.0592) (0.1.659) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0951 0.8623 1.0931 0.8674 
(0.0823) (0.1.929) (0.0821.) (0.1.942) 
Dependent Children In HH 0.7863 0.9683 0.7855 0.9729 
(0.0410)··· (0.1439) (0.0410)· .... (0.1.448) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.6509 0.3008 0.6518 0.2987 
(0.0469) ... • (0.0694)· ... (0.0469)··· (0.0691)·" 
Job Tenure 0.0634 0.5861 0.0634 0.5875 
(0.0020)··· (0.0481.)··· (0.0020)··· (0.0480)··· 
Dummy: Member of Union 1.2726 0.4227 1.2709 0.4104 
(0.0738)··· (0.1.544)*· (0.0738)··· (0.1504)·· 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0120 0.5978 0.0120 0.5979 
(0.0003)··· (0.0699)··· (0.0003)··· (0.0701)· ... 
Education: High 0.9689 1.0805 1.0243 1.4190 
(0.1085) (0.3918) (0.121.7) (0.5268) 
Education: Medium 0.9600 0.8180 0.9604 0.8826 
(0.0377) (O.O9l0)· (0.041.6) (0.1039) 
Dummy: Firm Size < 2S 4.3932 0.7563 4.3906 0.7490 
(0.2757)··· (0.1288) (0.2755)··· (0.1.274)· 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 4.4167 0.6244 4.4166 0.6189 
(0.2927)· ... (0.1.318)" (0.2927)··· (0.1.31.1)'" 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 4.6951 0.4326 4.6919 0.4292 
(0.3158)··· (0.1.003)··· (0.3155)··· (0.1000)··· 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 1.2254 0.4837 1.2247 0.4722 
(0.0829)··· (0.1279)· ... (0.0828)··· (0.1.251)··· 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0220 1.5398 1.0245 1.5723 
(0.0761.) (0.6456) (0.0763) (0.6595) 
Industry Level Output/1000 1.0004 0.9983 1.0004 0.9982 
(0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0023) 
N 
m 
Net Exports/1000 0.9978 0.9813 0.9977 0.9787 
(0.0032) (0.0147) (0.0032) (0.0146) 
N 
~ ~
Race: White 
Material Offshoring Intensity: OSM 
Education: Hlgh*OSM 
Education: Medlum*OSM 
Observations 
Log Ukellhood 
1.2973 
(0.1.232)*** 
0.9827 
(0.0257) 
77545 
-12669.835 
0.9528 
(0.2341.) 
0.7943 
(0.0438)*" 
1.2959 
(0.1.232)*" 
0.9835 
(0.0261.) 
0.9626 
(0.0241.) 
0.9998 
(O'()066) 
77545 
-12664.075 
0.9530 
(0.2349) 
0.8246 
(0.0472)*** 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.9275 
(0.0302)" 
SouIa: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ***p<O.OI; **p<O.05; *p<O.10. Base group relates to the censored spells. Each 
regression model Includes industry, regional and calendar year variables. Robust standard errors are reported within the parentheses. Estimated 
coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
N 
U) 
~ ~
Table 5.7: Competing Risks Model- 055, OSM & Blinder Index of Occupation Tradability 
Competlna RIsks Model (l) (Z) (31 
New Job Transition Unemployment Transition New Job Transition Unemployment Transition New Job Transition Unemployment Transition 
Service Offshoring Intensity: OSS 
- -
1.0026 0.7746 - -
- -
(0.01.52) (0.0488) ...... 
- -
Material Offshoring Intensity: OSM - - - - 0.9777 0.7860 
- - - -
(0.0257) (0.0462) ...... 
Blinder Index: Most Offshorable Jobs 1.1453 0.8986 1.1285 0.7339 1.1106 0.8008 
(0.051.4)· .. • (0.1.898) (0.071.8)" (0.2337) (0.0584) ..... (0.2051.) 
Blinder Index • OSS - - 1.0056 1.1075 - -
- -
(0.01.70) (0.1.069) 
- -
Blinder Index • OSM - - - - 1.0082 1.0292 
- - - -
(0.0070) (0.0342) 
Observations 77545 77545 77545 
Log Ukelihood -12666.081 -12658.464 -12663.8 
Souml: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ···p<O.OI; ··p<0.05; ·p<O.10. Base group relates to the censored spells. Each regression model includes industry, regional and 
calendar year variables. Robust standard errors are reported within the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. The full set of estimated coefficients are presented in appendix 4, table 
S.6A. 
Table S.Ia: Competing Risks Model-TBTC Hypothesis 
Competlna RIsks Model 
New Job Transition Unemployment Transition 
Routine Intensive Job Tasks 0.9550 0.8781 
(0.0205)'" (0.1.056) 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Tasks 1.0588 0.9546 
(0.01.03r"· (0.0508) 
Non-Routine Manual Job Tasks 0.9918 1.1245 
(0.01.47) (0.0848) 
Service Job Tasks 0.9398 1.0228 
(0.0098) .. •• (0.0555) 
Observations 64544 
loS Ukelihood -10605.02 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ···p<0.01; ··p<O.OS; 
·p<O.10. Base group relates to the censored spells. Each regression model includes Industry, 
regional and calendar year variables. Robust standard errors are reported within the parentheses. 
estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. The full set of estimated coefficients are presented in 
appendix 5, table 5.7 _lA. 
IV 
ID 
N 
Table 5.8b: Competing Risks Model-TBTC Hypothesis and Skill Interactions 
Compedna Risks Model (lJ (Z) {3} 
New Job Transition Unemployment Transition New Job Transition Unemployment Transition New Job Transition Unemployment Transition 
Routine Intensive Job Tasks 0.9434 1.0165 0.9251 1.0066 0.9519 1.0375 
(0.0111)· .... (0.0594) (0.0129) .... • (0.0632) (0.0120) ...... (0.0713) 
High Skill • Routine Job Task 0.9533 1.1085 - - - -
(0.0514) (O.2252) 
- - - -
Medium Skill • Routine Job Task - - 1.0308 1.0278 - -
- -
(0.0134)·· (O.0650) - -
Low Skill • Routine Job Task 
- - - - 0.9724 0.9662 
- - - -
(0.0127)"· (0.0608) 
Observation 64544 64544 64544 
Log Ukelihood -10630.685 -10628.276 -10628.7 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: "·p<O.Ol; "p<O.OS; *p<0.10. Base group relates to the censored spells. Each regression model includes industry, regional and 
calendar year variables. Robust standard errors are reported within the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. The full set of estimated coefficients are presented in appendix 5, table 
5.7_2A. 
IV 
\D 
IJJ 
Table 5.9: Competing Risks Model- Blinder's (2007) Offshorability Index and TBTC 
Pr(Job to Unemployment) {ll {2} 
New Job Transition Unemployment Transition New Job Transition Unemployment Transition 
Blinder Index Value: 25 0.8280 0.4093 0.7515 0.3999 
(0.1615) (0.4595) (0.1527) (0.4732) 
Blinder Index Value: 26-35 1.2721 0.8127 1.3604 0.6009 
(0.1449)-- (0.4359) (0.1820)-- (0.3972) 
Blinder Index Value: 36-45 1.1960 1.1504 1.0804 0.8380 
(0.1039)-- (0.5107) (0.1039) (0.3832) 
Blinder Index Value: 46-55 1.1533 0.6289 1.0844 0.3423 
(0.0922)- (0.2862) (0.1140) (0.2700) 
Blinder Index Value: 56-65 1.1394 0.5896 1.0662 0.4929 
(0.0883)- (0.2447) (0.0935) (0.2215) 
Blinder Index Value: 66-75 1.2663 0.9070 1.1111 0.8378 
(0.0806)--- (0.2396) (0.0792) (0.2794) 
Blinder Index Value: 76-85 1.4108 0.9502 1.2025 2.0059 
(0.1325)·-- (0.4534) (0.2057) (1.0728) 
Blinder Index Value: 86+ 1.0752 0.4384 0.9696 0.3993 
(0.1012) (0.2329) (0.1010) (0.2395) 
Routine Intensive Job Tasks 
- -
0.9597 0.9482 
- -
(0.0159)-- (0.0781) 
Blinder Index Value: 25* Routine Job Tasks 
- -
0.9083 2.4494 
- -
(0.2645) (0.8513)--
Blinder Index Value: 26-35*Routlne Job Tasks 
- -
0.9091 1.2575 
- -
(0.0543) (0.3222) 
Blinder Index Value: 36-4S*Routlne Job Tasks 
- -
0.9480 1.2593 
- -
(0.0283)- (0.1444)--
Blinder Index Value: 46-55*Routlne Job Tasks - - 0.9990 0.7673 
- - (0.0347) (0.1903) 
Blinder Index Value: 56-65*Routlne Jobs Tasks - - 1.0020 1.0460 
- -
(0.0236) (0.1156) 
Blinder Index Value: 66-7S*Routlne Job Tasks - - 0.9467 1.0686 
- -
(0.0180) (0.0967) 
Blinder Index Value: 76-85*Routlne Job Tasks 
- -
0.9306 1.50S3 
- -
(0.0497) (0.2521)--
Blinder Index Value: 86+*Routlne Job Tasks - - 0.9833 1.1288 
- -
(0.0456) (0.2596) 
Observations 77545 64544 
Log Ukelihood -12655.873 -10608.437 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. SIsniflcance Level Key: ***p<O.Ol; **p<O.05; *p<O.10. Base Broup relates to the censored spells. Each 
regression model Includes Industry, reBlonal and calendar year variables. Robust standard errors are reported within the parentheses. Estimated coefficients 
are relative risk ratios. The full set of estimated coefficients are presented In appendix 6, table 5.8A. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined whether offshoring intensity (measured at the industry level), the 
advancements in technology that can make many more jobs potentially tradable (according to 
Blinder's (2007) occupation tradability index), and jobs that are more intensive in routine tasks 
which can according to the ALM hypothesis (Autor et 01., 2003) be replaced by computer 
capital but are also job tasks that are most likely to be traded internationally (Acemoglu & 
Autor, 2010 & forthcoming) can cause job insecurity to rise over time. 
The results from the competing risks models (from section 5.4.2) show that a rise in service 
and material offshoring intensity does not increase job insecurity. Workers are more likely to 
remain in employment rather than to become unemployed over time. Offshoring is also found 
to lower the risk of becoming unemployed for highly-skilled and medium-skilled workers 
which results that are in line with the findings from the empirical literature (Munch, 2009). 
The most tradable jobs (defined as having a Blinder (2007) index value of 65+) have a higher 
probability of making new job transitions over time but these jobs do not have a significant or 
positive impact on the risk of becoming unemployed. And the evidence from the job task 
variables exploring the impact from the ALM hypothesis (Autor et 01., 2003) show workers 
employed in jobs that are intensive in routine job task are more likely to make new job 
transitions over time rather than to raise the risk of the job-to-unemployment hazard. These 
results continue to hold for medium-skilled workers employed in jobs that are more intensive 
in routine job tasks as this group of workers are more likely to be employed in occupations 
that have a high importance for routine intensive job tasks. The estimated results show that 
medium-skilled workers employed in jobs that are intensive in routine job tasks have a higher 
probability of making new job transitions. Additionally, workers who are employed within the 
more potentially tradable jobs that also have a high importance for routine job tasks face a 
higher risk of becoming unemployed over time. Other results suggest that high-skilled 
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workers employed in jobs that have a high importance for non-routine abstract tasks are more 
likely to make new job transitions over time. The evidence from Gash (2008) and Booth et 0/., 
(2002) support this result as they find high-skilled workers are less likely to make transitions to 
permanent jobs as these workers may be employed in fixed-term jobs over time. 
The estimated results from this chapter show job security has not fallen because of an 
increasing likelihood to become unemployed over time that may result from offshoring or 
related to technology substituting domestic labour for computer capital that may deliver job 
tasks from foreign labour markets. Workers are more likely to remain in employment with 
their current employers. This could mean that workers employed by industries that engage in 
offshoring have secure jobs that might not otherwise exist if firms did not engage in offshoring 
or invest in technology. These results contrast with the findings from the literature which 
show material offshoring lowers job and economic security for workers in Germany and 
Denmark. 
The results from this chapter and chapter 4 suggest that workers are more likely to remain in 
employment with their current employers as workers are more likely to have lower real wage 
levels over time rather than to become unemployed. The empirical results from chapter 4 
showed offshoring intensity, the most tradable jobs (defined by Blinder's (2007) occupation 
tradability index) and routine intensive job tasks exert a negative and significant impact on 
wage levels over time. However, the empirical results from this chapter show workers are less 
likely to become unemployed or seek new employment from one year to the next - job 
security is maintained with lower pay rather than to risk becoming unemployed. One possible 
reason for this result is that employers may wish to maintain their workforces during bad 
times and therefore workers may accept shorter work hours and a fall in real pay (this lowers 
job stability) in order to have a job (this raises the probability of job security). The next 
empirical chapter investigates whether job security has changed over time. The results from 
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this chapter show workers are more likely to remain in employment with little impact on job 
security; this would suggest that job security trends should have changed very little over the 
last two decades. 
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5.6 Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Table S.lA: Single Risk Model with No Frailty - 055, OSM & Education 
Pr(Job to Unemployment) (1) {l} {3} {4} 
Age 0.2375 0.2364 0.2348 0.2342 
(0.0238)·" (0.0239)"· (0.0239)·" (0.0239)·" 
Age Squared -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0031 
(0.0003)"· (0.0003)·" (0.0003)"· 0.0003)*·· 
Dummy: Married -0.0493 -0.0554 -0.0541 -0.0603 
(0.1647) (0.1647) (0.1650) (0.1652) 
Dummy: Female -0.0161 -0.0147 -0.0322 -0.0346 
(0.1681) (0.1680) (0.1680) (0.1679) 
Dummy: Married Females -0.1536 -0.1502 -0.1480 -0.1397 
(0.2155) (0.2155) (0.2150) (0.2153) 
Dependent Children in HH -0.0329 -0.0320 -0.0308 -0.0278 
(0.1446) (0.1446) (0.1443) (0.1444) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children -1.1167 -1.1223 -1.1074 -1.1114 
(0.2241)··· {0.224O)··· (0.2234)·" (0.2237)··· 
Employment Duration: < 1 Year 2.9999 2.9906 3.0030 2.9918 
(0.2202)··· {0.2204)··· (0.2204)··· (0.2209)"· 
Employment Duration: 1-3 Years 0.9902 0.9843 0.9938 0.9902 
(0.2613)··· (0.2618)··· (0.2612)··· (0.2614)"· 
Employment Duration: 4-6 Years 0.2757 0.2716 0.2760 0.2714 
(0.3919) (0.3917) (0.3920) (0.3920) 
Employment Duration: 7-9 Years -0.6836 -0.6868 -0.6714 -O.6n1 
(0.7392) (0.7389) (0.7389) (0.7391) 
Dummy: Member of Union -0.6596 -0.6738 -0.6510 -0.6849 
(0.3718)· (0.3726)· (0.3708)· (0.3720)· 
National Unemployment Rate -0.2968 -0.2978 -0.4463 -0.4464 
(0.1213)·· (0.1215)·· (0.1168)"· (0.1172)"· 
Education: High 0.0940 0.3717 0.1194 0.3285 
(0.3554) (0.3611) (0.3564) (O.3573) 
Education: Medium -0.1999 -0.1422 -0.1888 -0.1230 
(0.1094)· (0.1217) (0.1094)* (0.1146) 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 -0.3441 -0.3498 -0.5112 -0.5145 
(0.1788)· (0.1794)· (0.1694)··· (0.1692)"· 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 -0.5382 -0.5397 -0.6803 -0.6814 
(0.2191)·· (0.2189)" (0.2099)··· (0.2104)"· 
Dummy: Firm Size 1()()'999 -0.8651 -0.8680 -0.9808 -0.9792 
(0.2367)"· (0.2366)··· (O.2333}··· (O.2333}··· 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector -0.7262 -0.7424 -0.6459 -0.6697 
(0.2748)··· (0.2762)·· (0.2693)·· (0.2697)·· 
Research & Development Intensity 0.3720 0.3818 0.4588 0.4707 
(0.4224) (0.4238) (0.4201) (0.4199) 
Industry Level Output/1000 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0019 
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0024) 
Net Exports/1000 -0.0126 -0.0138 -0.0189 -0.0205 
(D.0145) (D.0144) (0.0147) {D.0147} 
Race: White -0.0208 -0.0192 -0.0280 -0.0211 
(0.2346) (0.2355) (0.2345) (0.2351) 
Service Offshoring Intensity: OSS -0.2435 -0.2043 - -
(0.0593)··· (0.0687)··· 
- -
Material Offshoring Intensity: OSM 
- -
-O.23n -0.2061 
- -
(0.0540)··· (0.0553)··· 
Education: Hlgh-OSS 
-
-0.8299 
- -
-
(0.5595) 
- -
Education: Hlgh·OSS 
-
-0.0722 - -
- (0.0656) - -
Education: High-OSM 
- - -
-23.0552 
- - -
(23.5340) 
Education: Medium-OSM 
- - -
-0.0694 
- - -
(O.0323)·· 
Constant -5.2394 -5.2769 -4.5240 -4.5351 
(1.3103)··· (1.3166)··· {1.2533)··· (1.2614)··· 
Observations 76663 76663 76663 76663 
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Log Ukelihood I -1612.0570 I -1610.0871 I -1618.2430 I -1614.3049 
Source: Own estimates from the BHPS. Significance Level: ···p<O.Ol, ··p<O.OS and ·p<O.lO. Each model 
includes industry, occupation, regional level control variables and time dummy variables. Robust standard 
errors are presented within the parentheses. 
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Table S.2A: Single Risk Model with No Frailty - ass, OSM, Blinder (2007) Index & TBTC 
Pr(Job to Unemployment) (1) (Z) (3) (ot) 
Age 0.2342 0.2375 0.2350 0.0617 
(0.0239}·" (0.0238}··· (0.0239}··· (0.05OB) 
Age Squared -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0008 
(0.OOO3}··· (0.OOO3}··· (0.OOO3}··· (0.OOO7) 
Dummy: Married -0.0534 -0.0508 -0.0541 -0.6000 
(0.1649) (0.1647) (0. 1649} (0.3257)· 
Dummy: Female -0.0326 -0.0201 -0.0340 0.2874 
(0. 1681} (0. 1682} (0. 1679} (0.3455) 
Dummy: Married Females -0.1473 -0.1510 -0.1477 0.5638 
(0.2151) (0.2155) (0.2150) (0.3907) 
Dependent Children in HH -0.0322 -0.0342 -0.0326 0.4562 
(0. 1443} (0.1446) (0. 1443} (0.2589)· 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children -1.1058 -1.1143 -1.1054 -1.2077 
(0.2234}·" (0.2242}··· (0.2234}··· (0.3966)··· 
Employment Duration: < 1 Year 3.0030 3.0014 3.0033 1.3615 
(0.2204)··· (0.2202)··· (0.2203)··· (0.2986)·" 
Employment Duration: 1-3 Years 0.9946 0.9903 0.9940 0.3562 
(0.2612}··· (0.2614}··· (0.2613}··· (0.3187) 
Employment Duration: 4-6 Years 0.2769 0.2758 0.2773 0.1111 
(0.3919) (0.3918) (0.3920) (0.4233) 
Employment Duration: 7-9 Years -0.6721 -0.6833 -0.6716 -0.5884 
(0.7388) (0.7392) (0. 7388} (0.7473) 
Dummy: Member of Union -0.6547 -0.6648 -0.6618 -0.9831 
(0.3705]* (0.3726)· (0.3731) (0.3944)·· 
National Unemployment Rate -0.4229 -0.2980 -0.4438 -0.2062 
(0.1151)··· (0.1216)·· (0.11 71}··· (0.1458) 
Education: High 0.1200 0.0886 0.1194 -0.0020 
(0.3565) (0.3555) (0.3562) (0.6912) 
Education: Medium 
-0.1858 -0.2007 -0.1892 -0.4236 
(0.1095)* (O.l094)· (0.1095)· (O.2141.)·· 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 -0.5259 -0.3287 -0.5045 0.2260 
(0.1.674)··· (0.1806)· (0.1698)··· (O.27OB) 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 -0.6868 -0.5200 -0.6720 0.1197 
(0.2OB1)··· (0.2209)·· (0.2105)·" (0.3027) 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 -0.9788 -0.8417 -0.9676 -0.3381 
(0.2368)··· (0.2427)··· (0.2385)*·· (0.3284) 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector -0.6414 -0.7230 -0.6506 -0.0900 
(0.2696)·· (0.2757)··· (0.2704)·· (0.3611) 
Research & Development Intensity 0.4174 0.3349 0.4582 0.3322 
(0.4126) (0.4213) (0.4206) (0.4122) 
Industry Level Output/l000 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0016 
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024) 
Net Exports/l000 -0.0032 -0.0108 -0.0188 0.0014 
(0.0143) (0.014S) (0.0148) (D.0149) 
Race: White -0.0329 -0.0204 -0.0269 -0.4768 
(0.234S) (0.2346) (0.2343) (0.4463) 
Service Offshoring Intensity: OSS 
-
-0.2570 
- -
-
(0.0633}*** 
- -
Material Offshoring Intensity: OSM - - -0.2469 -
- -
(0.OS76}··· 
-
Blinder Index: Most Offshorable Jobs -0.1487 -0.3626 -0.2606 
-
(0.2083) (0.3122 (O.2530) 
-
Blinder Index • OSS - 0.1074 - -
-
(O.09SO) 
- -
Blinder Index • 051'01 
- -
0.0282 
-
- -
(0.0329) 
-
Routine intensive Job Tasks 
- - -
-0.1322 
- - -
(0.1188) 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Tasks 
- - -
-0.0485 
- - -
(O.OS33) 
Non-Routine Manual Job Tasks - - - 0.1199 
- - -
(O.07S3) 
Service Job Tasks 
- - -
0.0215 
- - -
(0.0550) 
Constant -4.6344 -5.2233 -4.5467 -4.8986 
(1.2603}··· (1.3088) (1.2588)*·· (1.9654)·· 
Observations 76663 76663 76663 63687 
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Log Ukelihood -1619.12 I -1611.3862 I -1617.6533 I -795.4995 
Source: Own estimates from the BHPS. Significance Level: "·p<O.Ol, "p<O.OS and ·p<O.lO. Each model 
includes industry, occupation, regional level control variables and time dummy variables. Robust standard 
errors are presented within the parentheses. 
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Table S.3A: Single Risk Model with No Frailty -Blinder (2007) Index & TBTC 
Pr(Job to Unemployment) (1) (Z) 
Age 0.2349 0.0608 
(0.0239}--· (O.OSH) 
Age Squared -0.0031 -0.0008 
(0.OOO3}-" (0.OOO7) 
Dummy: Married -0.0509 -0.5694 
(0. l64S} {0.3202}-
Dummy: Female -0.0395 0.2474 
(0.1689) {0.344S} 
Dummy: Married Females -0.1514 0.5165 
(0.21S0) (0.3863) 
Dependent Children in HH -0.0328 0.4661 
(O.l44S) {0.2637} 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children -1.1019 -1.2127 
(0.2237}"- (0.4022}---
Employment Duration: < 1 Year 3.0009 1.3554 
{0.2202}--- {0.2992}---
Employment Duration: 1-3 Years O.990S 0.3530 
{0.26l2}-·· {0.3l83} 
Employment Duration: 4-6 Years 0.2744 0.1124 
(0.3920}--- {0.4223} 
Employment Duration: 7-9 Years -O.6n1 -0.5974 
(0.7389) (O.7468) 
Dummy: Member of Union -0.6935 -0.9765 
(0.3777)- (0.3960)--
National Unemployment Rate -0.4235 -0.1999 
{0.l1S5}-·- (0.1448) 
Education: High 0.1084 -O.06n 
{0.3SS2} (0.69B7) 
Education: Medium -0.1886 -0.4221 
(0.1097)- (0.2160)-
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 -0.5256 0.2242 
{0.1687}··· (O.2737) 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 -0.6759 0.1248 
{0.2096}··· (0.3082) 
Dummy: Firm Size 1 ~ 9 9 9 9 -O.9n1 -0.3515 
{0.Z390}··· {0.3316} 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector -0.6356 -0.0387 
(0.2779)·· {0.3601} 
Research & Development Intensity 0.4253 0.3204 
{0.4127} (O.4080) 
Industry Level Output/1000 -0.0016 -0.0015 
(O.0024) {0.0024} 
Net Exports/1000 -0.0031 0.0018 
(0.0144) (0.01S0) 
Race: White -0.0378 -0.4864 
(O.2347) (O.4405) 
Blinder Index Value: 25 -0.9274 -0.9459 
(1.1192) (1. 1818} 
Blinder Index Value: 26-35 -0.2892 -0.4984 
(0.S320) (O.665S) 
Blinder Index Value: 36-45 0.1607 -0.1224 
(0.445O) (0.4620) 
Blinder Index Value: 46-55 -0.4859 -1.0628 
(0.4608) (0.7946) 
Blinder Index Value: 56-65 -0.5156 -0.6888 
(0.41S7) (0.4503) 
Blinder Index Value: 66-75 -0.1599 -0.1879 
(0.2590) (0.3353) 
Blinder Index Value: 76-85 -0.1266 0.5783 
{0.4739} {0.5274} 
Blinder Index Value: 86+ -0.8578 -0.9041 
(O.S28S) (O.5987) 
Routine Intensive Job Tasks -0.0460 
(O.OBll) 
Blinder Index Value: 25 -Routine Job Tasks 0.8343 
(0.3445)·· 
Blinder Index Value: 26-35* Routine Job Tasks 0.2333 
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-
Blinder Index Value: 36-4S-Routine Job Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 46-SS-Routine Job Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 56-65-Routine Jobs Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 66-7S-Routine Job Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 76-8S*Routine Job Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 86+-Routine Job Tasks 
Constant 
Observations 
Log Ukelihood 
-4.6341 
(1.2675)··-
76663 
-1615.9646 
(0.2577) 
0.2333 
{D. 1139)·· 
-0.2504 
(0.24(4) 
0.0409 
(0.1105) 
0.0734 
(0.0899) 
0.37S3 
(0.1647)·· 
0.1012 
(0.2312) 
-4.6546 
{1.9586)"· 
63687 
-789.6618 
Source: Own estimates from the BHPS. Significance Level: "·p<O.01, ··p<O.05 
and ·p<O.10. Each model Indudes Industry, occupation, regional level control 
variables and time dummy variables. Robust standard errors are presented within 
the parentheses. 
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Table S.4A: Single Risk Model with Frailty: 055, OSM, Blinder (2007) Index & TBTe 
Pr(Job to Unemployment) (I) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.2342 0.2375 0.2350 0.0633 
(0.0256)··· (0.0256)"· (0.0256)·" (0.0531) 
Age Squared -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0008 
(0.0003)"* (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0007) 
Dummy: Married -0.0534 -0.0508 -0.0541 -0.5864 
(0.1627) (0.1625) (0.1627) (0.3197)* 
Dummy: Female -0.0326 -0.0201 -0.0340 0.2888 
(0.1703) (0.1701) (0.1702) (0.3339) 
Dummy: Married Females -0.1473 -0.1510 -0.1477 0.5520 
(0.2138) (0.2140) (0.2138) (0.3959) 
Dependent Children in HH -0.0322 -0.0342 -0.0326 0.4338 
(0.1499) (0.1501) (0.1499) (0.2794) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children -1.1058 -1.1143 -1.1054 -1.1949 
(0.2195)*** (0.2197)*** (0.2195)*** (0.4023)*** 
Employment Duration: < 1 Year 3.0030 3.0014 3.0033 1.3336 
(0.2170}*** (0.2170}*** (0.2170)*** (0.2835)*** 
Employment Ouration: 1-3 Years 0.9946 0.9903 0.9940 0.3413 
(0.2598)*** (0.2599)·** (0.2598)*** (0.3138) 
Employment Duration: 4-6 Years 0.2769 0.2758 0.2713 0.0994 
(0.3915) (0.3915) (0.3914) (0.4229) 
Employment Duration: 7-9 Years -0.6721 -0.6833 -0.6716 -0.5913 
(0.7362) (0.7362) (0.7362) (0.7435) 
Dummy: Member of Union -0.6547 -0.6648 -0.6618 -0.9809 
(0.3852)* (0.3864)* (0.3856)* (0.4037)" 
National Unemployment Rate -0.4229 -0.2980 -0.4438 -0.2049 
(0.1275)*" (0.1343)** (0.1293)*** (0.1591) 
Education: High 0.1200 0.0886 0.1194 -0.0050 
(0.3537) (o.3S34) (o.3536) (0.646S) 
Education: Medium -0.1858 -0.2007 -0.1892 -0.4362 
(0.1086)* (0.1086)* (0.1086)* (0.2086)** 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 -0.5259 -0.3288 -0.5045 0.2114 
(0.1995)*** (0.2U9) (0.2012)** (0.2774) 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 -0.6868 -0.5200 -0.6720 0.1014 
(0.2313)*** (0.2420)** (0.2327}*** (0.2998) 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 -0.9788 -0.8417 -0.9676 -0.3641 
{o.2656}*** {O.2732}*** (0.2670)*** (0.33SO) 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector -0.6414 -0.7230 -0.6506 -0.1035 
(0.3052)** (0.3096)** (O.3OS7)** (0.3765) 
Research & Development Intensity 0.4174 0.3349 0.4582 0.3258 
(0.3922) (0.3977) (0.3947) (0.4006) 
Industry Level Output/l000 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0017 
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
Net Exports/l000 -0.0032 -0.0108 -0.0188 0.0016 
{O.O157} {O.Ol60} (O.Olll) {O.Ol64} 
Race: White -0.0329 -0.0204 -0.0269 -0.4938 
(0.2279) (o.2278) (0.2279) (0.4424) 
Service Offshoring Intensity: oss 
-
-0.2570 - -
-
(0.0706)··· 
- -
Material Offshoring Intensity: OSM 
- -
-0.2469 -
- -
(0.1138)** 
-
Blinder Index: Most Offshorable Jobs -0.1487 -0.3626 -0.2606 -
(0.2103) (0.3355) (0.2590) -
Blinder Index • OSS - 0.1074 - -
-
(0.1023) 
- -
Blinder Index • OSM - - 0.0282 -
- -
(0.0333) 
-
Routine Intensive Job Tasks -
- -
-0.1315 
- - -
(0.1108) 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Tasks 
- -
- -0.0512 
- - -
(0.0473) 
Non-Routine Manual Job Tasks 
- - -
0.1171 
- - -
(0.0733) 
Service Job Tasks 
- - -
0.0237 
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- - -
{0.0532} 
Constant -4.6344 -5.2234 -4.5468 -5.3890 
{1.3627)--- {1.4223)*-- {1.3653}--- {2.0816}--
Observations 77545 77545 77545 64544 
Log Ukelihood -1619.12 -1611.39 -1617.6535 -794.1267 
Source: Own estimates from the BHP5. Significance Level: ---p<O.Ol, --p<O.05 and -p<O.10. Each model 
includes industry, occupation, regional level control variables and time dummy variables. Robust standard errors 
are presented within the parentheses. 
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Table S.SA: Single Risk Model with Frailty: Blinder (2007) Index & TBTe Variables 
Pr(Job to Unemployment) {l} {Z} 
Age 0.2349 0.0621 
(0.0256)· ... (0.0530) 
Age Squared -0.0031 -0.0008 
(0.0003)"· (0.0007) 
Dummy: Married -0.0509 -0.5572 
(0.1625) (0.3189)· 
Dummy: Female -0.0395 0.2449 
(0.1706) (0.3331) 
Dummy: Married Females -0.1514 0.5011 
(0.2138) (0.3956) 
Dependent Children in HH -0.0328 0.4438 
(0.1499) (0.2787) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children -1.1019 -1.1954 
(0.2194)··· (0.4017)··· 
Employment Duration: < 1 Year 3.0009 1.3276 
(0.2170}··· (0.2839)··· 
Employment Duration: 1-3 Years 0.9905 0.3375 
(0.2598)· ... (0.3140) 
Employment Duration: 4-6 Years 0.2744 0.1016 
(0.3915) (0.4229) 
Employment Duration: 7-9 Years -O.6nl -0.6009 
(0.7362) (0.7436) 
Dummy: Member of Union -0.6935 -0.9735 
(0.3876)· (0.4037)·· 
National Unemployment Rate -0.4235 -0.1982 
(0.1276)··· (0.1589) 
Education: High 0.1084 -0.0641 
(0.3538) (0.6528) 
Education: Medium -0.1886 -0.4364 
(0.1087)· (0.2098)·· 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 -0.5256 0.2105 
(0.2011)··· (0.2793) 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 -0.6759 0.1064 
(0.2325}··· (0.3017) 
Dummy: Firm Size 1()()'999 -O.9nl -O.3n6 
(0.2675)··· (0.3369) 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector -0.6356 -0.0567 
(0.3086)·· (O.375B) 
Research & Development Intensity 0.4253 0.3158 
(0.39l8) (0.3995) 
Industry Level Output/l000 -0.0016 -0.0016 
(0.C024) (0.OO25) 
Net Exports/l000 -0.0031 0.0020 
(0.0157) (0.0164) 
Race: White -0.0378 -0.5032 
(O.2280) (O.4419) 
Blinder Index Value: 2S -0.9274 -0.9535 
(1.1309) (1.BOO1) 
Blinder Index Value: 26-35 -0.2892 -0.5052 
(0.5120) (0.6B06) 
Blinder Index Value: 36-45 0.1607 -0.1105 
(O.4206) (0.475B) 
Blinder Index Value: 46-SS -0.4859 -1.0668 
(0.5062) (0. 7692} 
Blinder Index Value: 56-65 -0.5156 -0.6829 
(0.4Z36) (0.47S3) 
Blinder Index Value: 66-75 -0.1599 -0.1847 
(O.Z704) {0.3546} 
Blinder Index Value: 76-85 -0.1266 0.5648 
(0.4505) {0.5305} 
Blinder Index Value: 86+ -0.8578 -0.9024 
(O.5ZS5) (0.5771) 
Routine intensive Job Tasks -0.0487 
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Blinder Index Value: 2S*Routine Job Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 26-3S*Routine Job Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 36-4S*Routine Job Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 46-SS*Routine Job Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 56-65 * Routine Jobs Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 66-7S*Routine Job Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 76-85 * Routine Job Tasks 
Blinder Index Value: 86+*Routine Job Tasks 
Constant 
Observations 
Log Ukelihood 
-4.6341 
{1.3663}*** 
77545 
-1615.9648 
{0.0761} 
0.8305 
{6.2744} 
0.2390 
{0.2552} 
0.2316 
{O.1286}· 
-0.2523 
(O.2540) 
0.0438 
{0.1268} 
0.0741 
{O.0934} 
0.3770 
{0.1633}*· 
0.1059 
{0.2520} 
-5.0964 
{2.0828}** 
64544 
-788.4486 
Source: Own estimates from the BHPS. Significance Level: ***p<O.Ol, **p<O.OS 
and *p<O.lO. Each model includes industry, occupation, regional level control 
variables and time dummy variables. Robust standard errors are presented within 
the parentheses. 
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Table 5.6A: Competing Risks Model- ass, OSM & Blinder Index of Occupation Tradability 
competl"l Risks Model (l) (%) (3) 
New Job Transition Unemployment Transition New Job Transition Unemployment Transition New Job Transition Unemployment Transition 
Age 1.3211 1.2966 1.3211 1.3011 1.3213 1.2975 
(0.OJ42)··· (O.034J)·" (0.OJ42)··· (0.0342)··· (0.0142)··· (0.0342) .. • .. 
Age Squared 0.9966 0.9965 0.9966 0.9965 0.9966 0.9965 
(O.OOOJ)·· .. (0.0003)*" (O.OOOJ)·" (0.0003) .. •• (O.OOOJ) ...... (0.0003) .. • .. 
Dummy: Married 1.3040 0.9772 1.3042 0.9844 1.3052 0.9791 
(0.0785)·· .. (0.J693) (0.0786)·· .. (0.1706) (0.0786)··· (0.J695) 
Dummy: Female 0.9258 0.9545 0.9253 0.9638 0.9254 0.9537 
(0.0590) (0.J659) (0.0590) (O.J68J) (0.0590) (0.J656) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0908 0.8628 1.0906 0.8564 1.0896 0.8613 
(0.0820) (0.J930) (0.0820) (0.J923) (0.0820) (0.J927) 
Dependent Children In HH 0.7872 0.9674 0.7870 0.9682 0.7878 0.9680 
(O.04JO)··· (0.J437) (O.04JO) .. • .. (0.J442) (O.04JO)· .. • (0.J439) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.6489 0.3014 0.6491 0.2987 0.6486 0.3011 
(0.0467)· .. • (0.0696)*·· (0.0467)*·· (0.0692) .... • (0.0467) .... (0.0695) ...... 
Job Tenure 0.0633 0.5865 0.0633 0.5865 0.0633 0.5864 
(0.0020) .. •• (O.048J) ...... (0.0020) .... • (O.048J)·" (0.0020}··· (O.048J) .. • .. 
Dummy: Member of Union 1.2829 0.4221 1.2829 0.4233 1.2799 0.4196 
(0.0743}··· (0.J542}"· (0.0743) ...... (0.J549) .... (0.074J}·" (0.J543)·· 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0121 0.6113 0.0121 0.6872 0.0120 0.5988 
(0.OOO3} .. •• (0.0706} .... • (0.0003) .... • (0.0827} .... • (0.0003} .... • (0.070J) .. • .. 
Education: HISh 0.9730 1.0796 0.9729 1.0591 0.9746 1.0813 
(O.J09O) (0.39J2) (O.J09O) (0.3839) (0.J092) (0.39J9) 
Education: Medium 0.9618 0.8198 0.9616 0.8081 0.9613 0.S1n 
(0.0378) (0.0922)· (0.0378) (O.09JO)· (0.037S) (0.0920)" 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 4.3569 0.7439 4.3525 0.9031 4.3685 0.7604 
(0.273J} .. •• (0.J254)· (0.2745}·· .. (0.J635) (0.274J)* .... (0.J298) 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 4.3626 0.6185 4.3590 0.7259 4.3696 0.6278 
(0.289J) .... (0.J294)·· (0.29OJ}··· (O.J608) (0.2898) .. •• (0.J327)·· 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 4.6213 0.4317 4.6186 0.4875 4.6284 0.4380 
(0.3JJ2)··· (0. lOB}·" (0.3JJ7}· .. • (0.JJ74}··· (0.3J20}· .... (0. J033) .. • .. 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 1.2426 0.4810 1.2440 0.4369 1.2380 0.4813 
(O.084J)··· (0.J288)· .. • (0.0844}··· (0.U9J}· .... (0.0839)·" (0.1275)·· .. 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0171 1.4788 1.0173 1.3586 1.0223 1.5404 
(0.0753) (0.6U2) (0.075S) (0.5732) (O.076J) (0.6467) 
Industry Level Output/1000 1.0004 0.9985 1.0004 0.9994 1.0004 0.9983 9 
w 
i 
(0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0023) 
Net Exports/l000 0.9987 0.9965 0.9988 0.9894 0.9976 0.9813 
(0.0029) (0.0143) (0.0029) (0.0143) (0.0032) (0.0147) 
Race: White 1.3069 0.9494 1.3069 0.9598 1.3096 0.9540 
(0.1245)··· (0.2333) (0.1245) ... • (0.2362) (0.1248) (0.2342) 
Service Offshoring Intensity: OSS 
- -
1.0026 0.7746 - -
- -
(0.0152) (0.0488)··· 
- -
Material Offshorlng Intensity: OSM 
- - - -
0.9777 0.7860 
- - - -
(0.0257) (0.0462)"· 
Blinder Index: Most Offshorable Jobs 1.1453 0.8986 1.1285 0.7339 1.1106 0.8008 
(0.0514)··· (0.1898) (0.0718)· (0.2337) (0.0584)··· (0.2051) 
Blinder Index • OSS 
- -
1.0056 1.1075 - -
- -
(0.0170) (0.1069) - -
Blinder Index • OSM - - - - 1.0082 1.0292 
- - - -
(0.0070) (0.0342) 
Observations 77S45 77S45 77545 
Los Ukelihood -12666.081 -12658.464 -12663.8 
Soutr:e: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ···p<O.Ol; **p<O.05; *p<O.10. Base group relates to the censored spells. Each regression model includes Industry, regional and 
calendar year variables. Robust standard errors are reported In the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
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Table 5.7 _lA: Competing Risks Model-TBTC 
Competlnl Risks Model 
New Job Transition UnemDkMnent Transition 
Age 1.3111 1.0639 
(0.0152)·" (0.0564) 
Age Squared 0.9967 0.9992 
(0.0002)··· (0.0007) 
Dummy: Married 1.3243 0.5436 
(0.0839)··· (0.1744)· 
Dummy: Female 1.0004 1.2875 
(0.0676) (O.448J) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0778 1.7876 
(0.0855) (0.6956) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7821 1.5532 
(0.0425) (O.40J9) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children O.664S 0.2837 
(O.0506}··· (0.1136}··· 
Job Tenure 0.0615 0.8364 
(0.0020)··· (0.0426}·" 
Dummy: Member of Union 1.3352 0.3420 
(O.08OJ)··· (0.J325}··· 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0107 0.7676 
(0.0003)··· (0.1120)· 
Education: High 0.9248 0.9784 
(0.1124) (0.6772) 
Education: Medium 0.9634 0.6339 
(0.0400) (0.136W 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 3.2862 1.3656 
(O.2J35}··· (O.3656) 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 3.2926 1.1958 
(0.2239)··· (0.3563) 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 3.4233 0.7180 
(0.2353)··· (0.2326) 
Dummy: Firm In Public Sector 1.0440 0.9021 
(0.0738) (0.3270) 
Research & Development Intensity 0.9989 1.4147 
(O.0762) (0.5864) 
Industry Level Output/l000 1.0003 0.9983 
(0.0004) (0.0024) 
Net Exports/looo 0.9993 1.0017 
(0.0030) (0.0151) 
Race: White 1.3210 0.6054 
(0.1337}··· (0.2693) 
Routine Intensive Job Tasks 0.9550 0.8781 
(0.0205)·· (o.J056) 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Tasks 1.0588 0.9546 
(0.0103}··· (0.0508) 
Non-Routine Manual Job Tasks 0.9918 1.1245 
(o.OJ47) (o.0848) 
Service Job Tasks 0.9398 1.0228 
(0.0098}··· (0.0555) 
Observations 64544 
log Ukellhood -10605.02 
~ : : Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Silnlflcance Level Key: ---p<O.Ol; -·p<O.OS; 
-p<O.10. Base group relates to the censored spells. Each regression model Indudes Industry, 
regional and calendar year variables. Robust standard errors are reported In the parentheses. 
Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
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Table S.7_2A: Competing Risks Model-TBTC and Skill Interactions 
Competlna RIsks Model (l) (l) (3) 
New Job Transition Unemployment Transition New Job Transition Unemployment Transition New Job Transition Unemployment Transition 
Age 1.3161 1.0568 1.3148 1.0568 1.3147 1.0565 
(0.0152)··· (0.0552) (0.0152)·" (0.0554) (0.0152)··· (0.0554) 
Age Squared 0.9966 0.9993 0.9967 0.9993 0.9967 0.9993 
(0.0002)··· (0.0007) (0.0002)··· (0.0007) (0.0002)"· (0.0007) 
Dummy: Married 1.3291 0.5431 1.3310 0.5433 1.3306 0.5435 
(0.0843)··· (0.1737)· (0.0844)·" (0.1740)· (0.0843)··· (0.1740)· 
Dummy: Female 0.9624 1.2796 0.9643 1.2835 0.9643 1.2834 
(0.0645) (0.4447) (0.0646) (0.4457) (0.0646) (0.4453) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0765 1.7932 1.0739 1.7914 1.0746 1.7915 
(0.0853) (0.6955) (0.0850) (0.6946) (0.0851) (0.6946) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7800 1.5633 0.7815 1.5670 0.7821 1.5683 
(0.0424)·" (0.4057)* (0.0425)·" (0.4067)· (0.0425)·" (0.4070)· 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.6670 0.2826 0.6635 0.2814 0.6631 0.2811 
(0.0507)·" (0.1130)·" (0.0504)·" (0.1126)··· (0.0504)"· (0.1124)··· 
Job Tenure 0.0625 0.8360 0.0624 0.8359 0.0624 0.8358 
(0.0020)··· (0.0427)··· (0.0020)·" (0.0428)*·· (0.0020)·" (0.0428) 
Dummy: Member of Union 1.2823 0.3609 1.2797 0.3601 1.2795 0.3601 
(O.O765}··· (0.1374)·" (0.0763)*" (0.1372)*" (0.0763)"· (0.1372)"· 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0107 0.7689 0.0107 0.7687 0.0107 0.7682 
(0.0003)·" (0.1125)· (0.0003)*·· (0.1119)· (0.0003)··· (0.1119)* 
Education: High 0.8653 1.0664 0.8864 0.9146 0.9795 1.5398 
(0.1269) (0.7399) (0.1093) (0.6526) (0.1142) (1.0238) 
Education: Medium 0.9626 0.6322 0.9497 0.6182 - -
(0.0399) (0.1358)** (0.0396) (0.1383)*· - -
Education: Low - - - - 1.0520 1.6292 
- - - -
(0.0438) (0.3640)*· 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 3.2458 1.3719 3.2480 1.3728 3.2467 1.3746 
(0.2106)"· (0.3676) (0.2109)·" (0.3701) (0.2108)*" (0.3705) 
Dummy: Firm 51ze 25-99 3.2809 1.2008 3.2858 1.2013 3.2851 1.2026 
(0.2233)"· (0.3576) (0.2237)*·· (0.3599) (0.2237)*·· (0.3602) 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 3.4528 0.7173 3.4614 0.7172 3.4597 0.7182 
(0.2375)"* (0.2322) (0.2382)*** (0.2333) (0.2381)·" (0.2337) 
Dummy: Firm In Public Sector 1.0415 0.9450 1.0421 0.9443 1.0417 0.9454 
(0.0733) (0.3346) (0.0733) (0.3338) (0.0732) (0.3340) 
Research & Development Intensity 0.9963 1.4215 0.9974 1.4201 0.9977 1.4202 
(0.0758) (0.5877) (0.0759) (0.5871) (0.0759) (0.5872) 
Industry Level Output/looo 1.0004 0.9983 1.0003 0.9983 1.0003 0.9983 
(0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0024) 
w 
S 
CJJ 
.-
.-
Net Exports/l000 0.9992 1.0016 0.9994 1.0018 0.9994 1.0018 
(0.0030) (0.0151) (0.0030) (0.0151) (0.0030) (0.0151) 
Race: White 1.3084 0.6237 1.3019 0.6148 1.3045 0.6153 
(0.1321)"· (0.2791) (0.1315)··· (0.2732) (0.1317)··· (0.2737) 
Routine Intensive Job Tasks 0.9434 1.0165 0.9251 1.0066 0.9519 1.0375 
(0.0111)··· (0.0594) (0.0129)··· (0.0632) (0.0120)··· (0.0713) 
High Skill • Routine Job Task 0.9533 1.1085 
- - - -
(0.0514) (0.2252) 
- - - -
Medium Skill • Routine Job Task 
- -
1.0308 1.0278 
- -
- -
(0.0134)·· (0.0650) - -
Low Skill • Routine Job Task 
- - - -
0.9724 0.9662 
- - - -
(0.0127)·· (0.0608) 
Observation 64544 64544 64544 
loK Ukelihood -10630.685 -10628.276 -10628.7 
SouI'Ce: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ···p<0.01; ··p<O.05; ·p<0.10. Base group relates to the censored spells. Each regression model includes industry, regional and 
calendar year variables. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
w 
.... 
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Appendix 6 
Table 5.8A: Competing Risks Model- Blinder's (2007) Offshorability Index and TBTe 
Pr(Job to U n e m p ~ n t ) ) (1) 
New Job Transition Unemployment Transition 
Age 1.3200 1.2972 
(0.0142) ...... (0.0342) ...... 
Age Squared 0.9966 0.9965 
(0.0001) .. •• (0.0003)··· 
Dummy: Married 1.3080 0.9804 
(0.0788)*·· (0.1694) 
Dummy: Female 0.9314 0.9497 
(0.0595) (0.1658) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0874 0.8563 
(0.0819) (0.1914) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7857 0.9652 
(0.0410) .... • (0.1436) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.6534 0.3033 
(0.0471)·" (0.0701)·· .. 
Job Tenure 0.0631 0.5866 
(0.0020}··· (0.0481)·" 
Dummy: Member of Union 1.3063 0.4106 
(0.0762}"· (0.1,523)" 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0121 0.6112 
(0.0003)·" (0.0707} .... 
Education: High 0.9728 1.0731 
(0.1,092) (0.3877) 
Education: Medium 0.9640 0.8181 
(0.0380) (0.0921)· 
Dummy: Finn Size < 25 4.3876 0.7460 
(0.2756)·" (0.1264)· 
Dummy: Finn Size 25-99 4.3733 0.6233 
(0.2905)··· (0.1308}·" 
Dummy: Finn Size 100-999 4.6135 0.4321 
(O.3U1,}··· (0.1,021,}··· 
Dummy: Finn In Public Sector 1.2343 0.4873 
(0.0837)··· (0.1.323)·· .. 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0156 1.4904 
(0.0753) (0.61,51,) 
Industry Level Output/l000 1.0004 0.9986 
(0.0004) (0.0023) 
(2) 
New Job Transition Unemployment Transition 
1.3149 1.0634 
(0.0152)··· (0.0568) 
0.9967 0.9993 
(0.0002}·" (0.0007) 
1.3297 0.5597 
(0.0845}·· .. (0.1769)· 
0.9789 1.2268 
(0.0660) (0.4248) 
1.0750 1.7178 
(0.0854) (0.6621) 
0.7nl 1.5652 
(0.0424}·" (0.4124)· 
0.6712 0.2836 
(0.0512)··· (0.1147}··· 
0.0621 0.8370 
(0.0020}·" (0.0426}··· 
1.3042 0.3447 
(0.0791,}·· .. (0.1,342}··· 
0.0107 o.noo 
(0.0003}·" (0.U1,7)" 
0.9407 0.9597 
(0.1146) (0. 6720} 
0.9604 0.6365 
(0.0400) (0.1.387)· 
3.2650 1.3686 
(0.2127)·· .. (0.3697) 
3.2887 1.2078 
(0.2249)"· (0.3655) 
3.4525 0.7142 
(0.2392)·· .. (0.2335) 
1.0468 0.9427 
(0.0742) (0.3422) 
0.9999 1.4210 
(0.0762) (0.5852) 
1.0003 0.9984 
(0.0004) (0.0024) 
w 
~ ~
W 
Net Exports/1000 0.9988 0.9962 0.9992 1.0020 
(0.0029) (0.0144) (0.0030) (0.0151) 
Race: White 1.3044 0.9448 1.3054 0.6002 
(0.1243)*-- (0.2322) (0.1321)--- (0.2634) 
Blinder Index Value: 25 0.8280 0.4093 0.7515 0.3999 
(0.1615) (0.4595) (0.1527) (0.4732) 
Blinder Index Value: 26-35 1.2721 0.8127 1.3604 0.6009 
(0.1449)-- (0.4359) (0.1820)-- (0.3972) 
Blinder Index Value: 36-45 1.1960 1.1504 1.0804 0.8380 
(0.1039)*- (0.5107) (0.1039) (0.3832) 
Blinder Index Value: 46-55 1.1533 0.6289 1.0844 0.3423 
(0.0922)- (0.2862) (0.1140) (0.2700) 
Blinder Index Value: 56-65 1.1394 0.5896 1.0662 0.4929 
(0.0883)* (0.2447) (0.0935) (0.2215) 
Blinder Index Value: 66-75 1.2663 0.9070 1.1111 0.8378 
(0.0806)--- (0.2396) (0.0792) (0.2794) 
Blinder Index Value: 76-85 1.4108 0.9502 1.2025 2.0059 
(0.1325)-** (0.4534) (0.2057) (1.0728) 
Blinder Index Value: 86+ 1.0752 0.4384 0.9696 0.3993 
(0.1012) (0.2329) (0.1010) (0.2395) 
Routine Intensive Job Tasks 0.9597 0.9482 
(0.0159)-- (0.0781) 
Blinder Index Value: 25*Routlne Job Tasks 0.9083 2.4494 
(0.2645) (0.8513)** 
Blinder Index Value: 26-35-Routine Job Tasks 0.9091 1.2575 
(0.0543) (0.3222) 
Blinder Index Value: 36-4S*Routine Job Tasks 0.9480 1.2S93 
(0.0283)- (0.1444)--
Blinder Index Value: 46-SS*RoutIne Job Tasks 0.9990 0.7673 
(0.0347) (0.1903) 
Blinder Index Value: S6-6S-Routine Jobs Tasks 1.0020 1.0460 
(0.0236) (0.1156) 
Blinder Index Value: 66-7S*Routine Job Tasks 0.9467 1.0686 
(0.0180) (0.0967) 
Blinder Index Value: 76-8S*Routine Job Tasks 0.9306 1.5053 
(0.0497) (0.2521)** 
Blinder Index Value: 86+-Routine Job Tasks 0.9833 1.1288 
(0.0456) (0.2596) 
Observations n54S 64544 
Log Ukellhood -126S5.873 -10608.437 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. SI,nlficance Level Key: ***p<O.Ol; **p<Q.OS; *p<Q.10. Base ,roup relates to the censored spells. Each 
rearesslon model Includes Industry. realonal and calendar year variables. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are 
relative risk ratios. 
Appendix 7 
This section of the appendix provides estimates from the estimation of various competing risks 
models as a robustness check. These models estimate the impact of offshoring (materials and 
services), Blinder's (2007) job tradability Index and the routinization hypothesis can have on 
the probability of making a job transition from employment in time period j - 1 to: (a) new 
employment, (b) remain in employment with current employer and (c) become 
unemployment in time period j. 
Table 5.9A: Competing Risks Model - ass 
Competlna RIsks Model New Job Transition CUrrent Unem Transition 
Age 1.5993 1.4155 1.3867 
(0.0197)··· (0.0086)··· (0.0369)··· 
Age Squared 0.9944 0.9960 0.9958 
(0.0002}··· (0.0001)··· (0.0003}··· 
Dummy: Married 1.3736 1.1134 1.0190 
(0.0961)··· (0.0417)··· (0.1746) 
Dummy: Female 1.0522 1.1595 1.0211 
(0.0786) (0.0482)··· (0.1785) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0441 0.9713 0.8222 
(o.o916) (0.0462) (0.1854) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7798 0.9011 0.9860 
(0.0472)··· (0.0290)··· (0.1477) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.4176 0.5072 0.2623 
(0.0352)··· (0.0224)··· (0.0614)··· 
Job Tenure 0.0670 1.0448 0.5990 
{O.OO20)··· (0.0020)··· (0.0481)··· 
Dummy: Member of Union 3.1841 3.1856 0.9386 
{0.2353}··· (0.1381)··· (0.3424) 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0081 0.0077 0.5506 
(0.0002)··· (0.0001)··· (0.0689)··· 
Education: High 1.(1093 1.0776 1.0483 
(O.l404) (0.0862) (0.3829) 
Education: Medium 0.9203 0.9688 0.7914 
(O.0420)· (0.0230) (O.O902)·· 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 16.8671 15.9919 2.4217 
{1.1728)··· (0.5176)··· {0.4208)··· 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 16.8864 15.4363 1.9721 
{1.2334)··· {0.5361)··· {0.4236)··· 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 19.1100 16.6688 1.4301 
{1.4079)··· {0.5776)··· (0.3303) 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 2.6925 3.4508 0.6699 
{0.2225)··· {0.1552)··· (0.1776) 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0854 1.1217 1.4407 
(O.lOO6) (0.0601)·· (0.6156) 
Industry Level Output/l000 1.0005 1.0003 1.0000 
(o.o(05) (O.OOO3) (0.0024) 
Net Exports/l000 0.9963 0.9970 0.9811 
(0.0036) {a. 0021) (0.0142) 
Race: White 1.5771 1.4160 0.9830 
{0.1760)··· {O.OB4O}··· {0.2404} 
Service Offshorina Intensity: OSS 0.9953 1.0129 0.7487 
(O.0171) (0.0090) {O.0437)··· 
Observations 77545 
314 
Log Ukelihood -38519.533 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ···p<O.Ol; up<O.OS; ·p<O.10. Base group 
relates to the censored spells. Each regression model includes industry. regional and calendar year variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
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Table 5.10A: Competing Risks Model- ass & Education 
Competi", Risks Model New Job Transition Current Employer Unemployment Transition 
Age 1.5992 1.4151 1.3861 
(0.0197)*** (0.0086)*** (0.0368)*** 
Age Squared 0.9944 0.9960 0.9958 
(0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0003)*** 
Dummy: Married 1.3738 1.1137 1.0148 
(0.0961)*" (0.0417)"· (0.1739) 
Dummy: Female 1.0535 1.1617 1.0283 
(0.0787) (0.0483)*** (0.1798) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0437 0.9703 0.8231 
(0.0916) (0.0462) (0.1856) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7797 0.9011 0.9873 
(0.0472)*" (0.0290)·" (0.1479) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.4171 0.5066 0.2592 
(0.0352)*" (0.0224)·** (0.0607)*** 
Job Tenure 0.0670 1.0449 0.6001 
(0.0020)"* (0.0020)"· (0.0481)"· 
Dummy: Member of Union 3.1809 3.1800 0.9257 
(0.2352)"· (0.1379)·" (0.3382) 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0081 0.0077 0.5512 
(0.0002)*" (0.0001)*** (0.0689)"· 
Education: High 1.1084 1.0857 1.4187 
(0.2074) (0.1188) (0.5372) 
Education: Medium 0.9589 1.0464 0.8577 
(0.0602) (0.0334) (0.1092) 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 16.8729 15.9875 2.3983 
(1.1734)"· (0.5175)··· (0.4181)*** 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 16.9060 15.4348 1.9620 
(1.2354)·" (0.5363)·" (0.4209)*" 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 19.1295 16.6886 1.4257 
(1..41.00)·" (0.5784)·" (0.3293) 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 2.6797 3.4368 0.6602 
(D.1117}*" (0.1549}*" (0.1759) 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0869 1.1216 1.4643 
(0.1008) (0.0602)" (0.627B) 
Industry Level Output/looo 1.0005 1.0003 1.0002 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0025) 
Net Exports/looo 0.9960 0.9967 0.9795 
(0.0036) (0.0011) (O.0140) 
Race: White 1.5789 1.4155 0.9796 
(0.1.762)*" (O.OIUO)*" (0.2406) 
Service Offshoring Intensity: OSS 1.0046 1.0291 0.7852 
(0.0200) (0.01.03)··· (0.0537)**· 
Education: High*OSS 0.9533 1.0006 0.4584 
(0.0571) (0.0336) (O.2129)· 
Education: Medium*OSS 0.9834 0.9699 0.9156 
(0.0168) (0.008S}*** (0.0617) 
Observations 77545 
Log Ukelihood -38511.126 
Souta!: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ***p<O.Ol; **p<O.05; *p<O.10. Base group 
relates to the censored spells. Each regression model includes industry, regional and calendar year variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
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Table S.l1A: Competing Risks Model- OSM 
Competing Risks Model New Job Transition Current Employer Unemployment Transition 
Age 1.5989 1.4151 1.3819 
(0.0197)··· (0.0086)··· (0.0368)··· 
Age Squared 0.9944 0.9960 0.9958 
(OJJ002}··· (0.0001}··· (O.0003}··· 
Dummy: Married 1.3740 1.1135 1.0078 
(0.0962)··· (0.0417}··· (0.1730) 
Dummy: Female 1.0518 1.1620 1.0033 
(0.0786) (0.0483)· ... (0.1748) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0443 0.9707 0.8352 
(0.0917) (O.0462) (O.1876) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7792 0.9013 0.9826 
(0.0471)··· (0.0290)··· (0.1468) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.4180 0.5068 0.2654 
(0.0353)··· (0.0224r·· (0.0620)··· 
Job Tenure 0.0670 1.0448 0.5984 
(0.0020}"· (0.0020)··· (0.0482}·" 
Dummy: Member of Union 3.1834 3.1829 0.9096 
(0.2353)·" (0.1379)··· (0.3328) 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0081 0.0078 0.4734 
(0.0002)··· (0.0001)··· (0.0579)··· 
Education: High 1.0087 1.0766 1.0627 
(0.1403) (O.0861) (O.3881) 
Education: Medium 0.9207 0.9694 0.8023 
(0.0420)· (0.0230) (0.0912)· 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 16.8458 16.0010 1.9151 
(1.1653)··· (0.5157)··· {0.3179)··· 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 16.8604 15.4203 1.6196 
{1.2277)··· {0.5349}··· (0.3363)" 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 19.1076 16.6367 1.2286 
{1.4066)··· {0.5763)··· (0.2831) 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 2.6896 3.4424 0.7560 
(D.22l4}··· {0.l537}··· (0.l956) 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0914 1.1035 1.5833 
(O.1012) (0.059W (0.6693) 
Industry Level Output/1000 1.0005 1.0004 0.9987 
{0.0005} (0.0003) (0.0023) 
Net Exports/1000 0.9978 1.0014 0.9773 
(0.0040) (0.0024) (0.0148) 
Race: White 1.5791 1.4169 0.9719 
(O.l762}··· (O.OIU1.}··· (O.2373) 
Material Offshoring Intensity: OSM 1.0271 1.0853 0.8173 
(0.0323) (O.0230}··· (O.0449}··· 
Observations 77545 
Log likelihood -38523.033 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ···p<O.Ol; ·*p<O.OS; *p<O.10. Base group 
relates to the censored spells. Each regression model includes industry, regional and calendar year variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
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Table S.l2A: Competing Risks Model - OSM & Education 
Competl.,. Risks Model New Job Transition Current Employer Unem Transition 
Age 1.5987 1.4148 1.3822 
{0.0197)··· {0.0085)··· {0.0368)··· 
Age Squared 0.9944 0.9960 0.9958 
{0.00(2)··· {0.00(1)··· {0.00(3)··· 
Dummy: Married 1.3736 1.1114 1.0013 
{0.0961)··· {0.0416)··· (0.1722) 
Dummy: Female 1.0547 1.1662 1.0054 
(0.0788) {0.0485)··· (0.1750) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0427 0.9706 0.8398 
(0.0915) (0.0462) (0.1888) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7784 0.9004 0.9838 
(0.0471)··· (0.0290)"· (0.1471) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.4183 0.S072 0.2640 
(0.0353)··· (0.0224)··· (0.0617)··· 
Job Tenure 0.0670 1.0449 0.5999 
{0.0020)··· {0.0020)··· {0.0480)··· 
Dummy: Member of Union 3.1948 3.2020 0.8887 
(0.2362)··· (0.1389)··· (0.3260) 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0081 0.0078 0.4747 
(0.0002)··· (0.0001)·" (0.0582)··· 
Education: High 0.9611 0.9435 1.3483 
(0.1407) (0.0798) (0.5035) 
Education: Medium 0.8845 0.9190 0.8533 
(0.0439)·· (0.0232)··· (0.1016) 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 16.8785 16.1054 1.8910 
{1.1676)··· {0.5201)··· (0.3127)· .... 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 16.9409 15.5602 1.5952 
(1.2342)··· {0.5414)··· (0.3328)·· 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 19.1546 16.7590 1.2125 
(1.4099)··· (0.5816)··· (0.2808) 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 2.6990 3.4584 0.7372 
(0.2223)··· (0.1.548)· .. • (0.1.91.5) 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0946 1.1017 1.6137 
(0.1014) (0.0588)· (0.6827) 
Industry Level Output/l000 1.0005 1.0005 0.9986 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0023) 
Net Exports/l000 0.9983 1.0021 0.9756 
(0.00(0) (0.0024) (0.0148) 
Race: White 1.5751 1.4168 0.9738 
(0.1757)··· (0.0840)··· (0.2384) 
Material Offshoring Intensity: OSM 1.0131 1.0663 0.8390 
(0.0326) {0.0231)·" {0.0477)··· 
Education: High·OSM 1.0253 1.0708 0.0000 
(0.0342) (0.0209)··· (0.0000) 
Education: Medium·OSM 1.0198 1.0231 0.9416 
(0.0084)·· (0.0048)··· (0.0310)· 
Observations 77545 
log Ukelihood -38498.592 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Silnificance Level Key: ···p<O.Ol; ··p<O.05; ·p<O.10. Base group 
relates to the censored spells. Each regression model includes industry, regional and calendar year variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
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Table S.13A: Competing Risks Model- Blinder's (2007) Occupation Tradability Index 
Competl.,. Risks Model New Job Transition Current Employer Unemployment Tl'llnsition 
Age 1.6005 1.4158 1.3807 
(0.0198)--- (0.0086)--- (0.0367}-" 
Age Squared 0.9944 0.9960 0.9958 
(0.0002}--- (0.0001)--- (0.0003}---
Dummy: Married 1.3750 1.1134 1.0072 
(0.0963)--- (0.0416)--- (0.1729) 
Dummy: Female 1.0407 1.1500 1.0020 
(0.0779) (0.0479}--- (0.1745) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0401 0.9698 0.8351 
(0.0914) (0.0462) (0.1877) 
Dependent Children in HH O.n96 0.9016 0.9818 
(0.0471)--- (0.0290)--- (0.1467) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.4161 0.5053 0.2660 
(0.0351}--- (0.0224)--- (0.0621)---
Job Tenure 0.0669 1.0447 0.5988 
(0.DOlO}--- (0.D020)--- (0.0481}---
Dummy: Member of Union 3.2111 3.2026 0.9106 
(0.2369}--- (0.1385)--- (0.3336) 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0081 O.oon 0.4849 
(0.0002}--- (0.0001}--- (0.OSS2}---
Education: High 1.0241 1.0971 1.0634 
(0.1425) (0.0877) (0.3882) 
Education: Medium 0.9214 0.9703 0.8041 
(0.0421)- (0.0230) (0.0914)-
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 16.7400 16.0249 1.8858 
(1.1565}··- (0.5168)-·- (0.31OB}---
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 16.6072 15.3223 1.6039 
(1.2089}--- (0.5317}--- (0.3313)--
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 18.6831 16.4378 1.2301 
(1.3760}-·- (0.5697)--- (0.2878) 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 2.7321 3.4622 0.7585 
(0.2251.) (O.1.546}--- (O.1.965) 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0880 1.1137 1.5152 
(0.1004) (0.0594)-· (0.6311) 
Industry Level Output/l000 1.0004 1.0003 0.9988 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0023) 
Net Exports/1000 0.9962 0.9967 0.9914 
(0.0036) (0.0020) (0.0142) 
Race: White 1.5989 1.4332 0.9682 
(0.1789)--- (0.0852)·-- (0.2364) 
Blinder Index: Most Offshorable Jobs 1.2971 1.2556 0.9466 
(0.0709)--- (0.0380)--- (0.1993) 
Observations nS45 
Log Ukelihood -38499.056 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ***p<O.01; **p<O.05; *p<O.10. Base group 
relates to the censored spells. Each regression model includes Industry, regional and calendar year variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
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Table S.14A: Competing Risks Model- Blinder's (2007) Occupation TradabiJity Index & OSS 
Competina Risks Model New Job Transition Current Employer Unemployment Transition 
Age 1.6005 1.4154 1.3860 
(0.0198)*" (0.0086)*** (0.0368)*" 
Age Squared 0.9944 0.9960 0.9958 
(0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0003)*** 
Dummy: Married 1.3746 1.1142 1.0177 
(0.0963)*" (0.0417)"* (0.1744) 
Dummy: Female 1.0418 1.1500 1.0168 
(0.0780) (0.0479)*** (0.1779) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0397 0.9699 0.8230 
(0.0914) (0.0462) (0.1857) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7798 0.9014 0.9866 
(0.0472)"* (0.0290)"* (0.1479) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.4157 0.5054 0.2633 
(0.0351)*" (0.0224)"* (0.0617)*** 
Job Tenure 0.0669 1.0448 0.5992 
(0.0020)"* (0.0020)*** (0.0481)*** 
Dummy: Member of Union 3.2072 3.2018 0.9390 
(0.2366)*** (0.1385)*" (0.3431) 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0081 0.0077 0.5492 
(0.0002)*" (0.0001)*** (O.068B}"* 
Education: High 1.0242 1.0969 1.0460 
(0.1426) (0.0878) (0.3821) 
Education: Medium 0.9214 0.9711 0.7916 
(0.0421) * (0.0231) (0.0902)** 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 16.7585 15.9564 2.4620 
{1.1647)*** (0.5168)*** {0.4333)*" 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 16.6365 15.2995 2.0055 
(1.2156)*** (0.5315)*** (O.4342}*** 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 18.7015 16.4239 1.4586 
{1.3797)*** (0.5693)*" (0.3455) 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 2.7300 3.4848 0.6703 
{0.2259)*** {O.1569}*" (O.1783) 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0884 1.1274 1.3877 
(0.1011) (0.0605)** (0.5920) 
Industry Level Output/looo 1.0004 1.0003 0.9998 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0024) 
Net Exports/1OOO 0.9959 0.9965 0.9828 
(0.0036) (0.0021) (0.01420) 
Race: White 1.5982 1.4325 0.9829 
(0.1788)"* (0.0852}"* (0.2403) 
Service Offshoring Intensity: 0S5 0.9953 1.0162 0.7376 
(0.0175) (0.0092)* (0.0461)*** 
Blinder Index: Most Offshorable Jobs 1.3258 1.3350 0.7742 
(0.1034}*** (0.0584)*** (0.2472) 
Blinder Index * 0S5 0.9920 0.9772 1.1123 
(0.0205) (0.0114)** (0.1087) 
Observations 77545 
Log Ukelihood -38484.077 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: "*pocO.Ol; **pocO.OS; *p<O.10. Base group 
relates to the censored spells. Each regression model includes industry. reaional and calendar year variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
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Table S.lSA: Competing Risks Model- Blinder's (2007) Occupation Tradability Index & OSM 
Competing Risks Model New Job Transition Current Employer Unemployment Transition 
Age 1.6003 1.41S6 1.3814 
(0.019S}--- (0.0086}--- (0.0368}"-
Age Squared 0.9944 0.9960 0.9958 
(0.OOO2}--- (O.OOOl}--- (0.OOO3}---
Dummy: Married 1.3752 1.1125 1.0093 
(0.0963}--- (0.0416}-" (0.1 731} 
Dummy: Female 1.0402 1.1511 l.()()17 
(O.077S) (0.0479}--- (0.1744) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0400 0.9704 0.8336 
(0.0914) (0.0462) (0.lS73) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7802 0.9014 0.9829 
(0.0472}-" (0.029O}--- (0.1468) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.4158 0.5051 0.2659 
(0.0351}"- (0.0224}--- (0.0621}-" 
Job Tenure 0.0669 1.0448 0.5987 
(0.0020)-" (0.0020)"- (0.0481}---
Dummy: Member of Union 3.2007 3.2016 0.9092 
(0.2362)-" (0.1384)--- (0.3346) 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0081 0.0078 0.4739 
{0.OOO2}--- {O.OOOl}--- (O.OSBO}---
Education: High 1.0232 1.0928 1.0645 
(0.1423) (0.0874) (0.3885) 
Education: Medium 0.9215 0.9711 0.8022 
(0.0421)- (0.0231) (0.0912)-
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 16.7523 15.9676 1.9260 
(l.lSSl}--- {0.5151}"- {0.3206}---
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 16.6050 15.2766 1.6263 
{1.2091}--- (0.5302)"- {0.33S2}--
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 18.6902 16.3915 1.2456 
(1.3775)--- (0.5682)--- (0.2926) 
Dummy: Firm In Public Sector 2.7258 3.4827 0.7503 
{0.2247)*" {o.J556)"- (0.1948) 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0913 1.1024 1.5807 
(0.1011) (0.0589)- (0.6690) 
Industry Level Output/1000 1.0005 1.0004 0.9987 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0023) 
Net Exports/1000 0.9974 1.0012 0.9n3 
(O.OO4O) (0.(023) (0.0149) 
Race: White 1.6013 1.4315 0.9726 
(0.1792)--- (0.0851)"- (0.2373) 
Material Offshoring Intensity: OSM 1.0222 1.0855 0.8084 
(0.0320) (0.0226)-·· (0.0474}··· 
Blinder Index: Most Offshorable Jobs 1.2737 1.2853 0.8445 
{0.0802)--- (0.0440)--- (0.2157) 
Blinder Index * OSM 1.0042 0.9935 1.0281 
(0.0088) (0.0049) (0.0346) 
Observations nS45 
Log Ukellhood -38488.222 
Soutre: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ···p<O.01j ·*p<O.OSj ·p<O.10. Base group 
relates to the censored spells. Each regression model Includes industry. resIOnal and calendar year variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported In the parentheses. Estimated coeffldents are relative risk ratios. 
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Table S.16A: Competing Risks Model- Blinder's (2007) Occupation Tradability Index 
Competi"l Risks Model New Job Transition Current Employer Unem Transition 
Age 1.5989 1.4151 1.3813 
(0.0198),,·· (0.0086)··· (0.0369)·" 
Age Squared 0.9944 0.9960 0.9958 
(0.0002)··· (0.0001)·" (0.0003),,·· 
Dummy: Married 1.3778 1.1106 1.0088 
(0.0967)··· (0.0417)··· (0.1729) 
Dummy: Female 1.0461 1.1494 0.9970 
(0.0785) (0.0480)··· (0.1747) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0357 0.9697 0.8305 
(0.0912) (0.0463) (0.1866) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7786 0.9031 0.9793 
(0.0472)··· (0.0291)··· (0.1464) 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.4212 0.5090 0.2679 
(0.0356)"'"* (0.0226)··· (0.0626)··· 
Job Tenure 0.0669 1.0455 0.5989 
(0.0020)··· (0.0020)"· (0.0482)··· 
Dummy: Member of Union 3.2565 3.2120 0.8874 
(0.2411)··· (0.1390)··· (0.3298) 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0081 0.0077 0.4835 
(0.0002)··· (0.0001)"· (0.0581)··· 
Education: High 1.0157 1.0902 1.0518 
(0.1414) (0.0871) (0.3828) 
Education: Medium 0.9219 0.9696 0.802S 
(0.0422)· (0.0231) (0.0913)· 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 16.7585 15.9581 1.8888 
(1.1605)·" (0.5163)··· (0.3127)··· 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 16.5418 15.2089 1.6169 
(1.2075)··· (0.5301)"· (0.3352)·· 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 18.6112 16.3721 1.2418 
(1.3744)··· (0.5706)·" (0.2934) 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 2.6752 3.3837 0.7581 
(0.2207)"· (0.1512)"· (0.2015) 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0811 1.1068 1.5171 
(0.0998) (0.0590)· (0.6298) 
Industry Level Output/1000 1.0004 1.0003 0.9989 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0023) 
Net Exports/1000 0.9963 0.9968 0.9913 
(0.0036) (0.0020) (O.0142) 
Race: White 1.5951 1.4324 0.9620 
(O.1786}·" (O.0855}·" (O.2350) 
Blinder Index Value: 25 0.5786 0.5582 0.3679 
(0.1346)·· (0.0669)*** (0.4134) 
Blinder Index Value: 26-35 1.4662 1.3195 0.8859 
(0.2029),,** (O.0997}*** (0.4646) 
Blinder Index Value: 36-45 1.4180 1.3449 1.2870 
(0. 149O}*** (0.0782)*** (0.5645) 
Blinder Index Value: 46-55 0.9398 0.8114 0.5388 
(0.0860) (0.0377}*·· (O.2475) 
Blinder Index Value: 56-65 1.3435 1.3533 0.6446 
(0.1267)"·· (O.O702}*** (O.267B) 
Blinder Index Value: 66-75 1.4783 1.3874 0.9657 
(0.1125)··· (0.0572}··· (0.2512) 
Blinder Index Value: 76-85 1.7818 1.5084 1.0964 
(0.2050)*** (O.097B}*** (O.5153) 
Blinder Index Value: 86+ 1.0346 0.9918 0.4167 
(O.l146) (O.OS90) (o.2220) 
Observations 77545 
Log Ukellhood -38420.453 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ··*p<O.01; **p<O.OS; *p<O.10. Base group 
relates to the censored spells. Each regression model Includes Industry, regional and calendar year variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported In the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
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Table S.17A: Competing Risks Model- TBTC 
Competing Risks Model New Job Transition Current EmpjOyV Unem Transition 
Age 1.5937 1.4113 1.2731 
(0.0212)"* (0.0092)*** (0.0673)*" 
Age Squared 0.9945 0.9960 0.9972 
(0.0002)*" (0.0001)"* (0.0007)*** 
Dummy: Married 1.3565 1.0679 0.5392 
(0.1004)"* (0.0418)* (0.1718)* 
Dummy: Female 1.1601 1.2271 1.4517 
(0.0923)* (0.0543)*** (0.5002) 
Dummy: Married Females 1.0637 1.0235 1.8557 
(0.0992) (0.0517) (0.7322) 
Dependent Children in HH O.n13 0.9030 1.5627 
(0.0490)"* (0.0302)*** (0.4066)* 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.4219 0.5014 0.1842 
(0.0380)*** (0.0237)*" (0.0745)*** 
Job Tenure 0.0649 1.0459 0.8611 
(0.0021)*** (0.0024)*" (0.0436) 
Dummy: Member of Union 3.2518 3.1857 0.7982 
(0.2490)*** (0.1414)*** (0.3122) 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0075 0.0072 0.5630 
(O.0002r** (0.0001)*** (0.0838)*" 
Education: High 0.9156 1.0140 0.9502 
(0.1363) (0.0841) (0.6661) 
Education: Medium 0.9139 0.9679 0.6036 
(0.0445)* (0.0246) (0.1306)** 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 13.0024 13.3294 4.9627 
(O.9583}*** (O.4613}*** (1.3695)*** 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 12.8498 12.7131 4.3519 
(O.9869}*** (0.4657)"* (1.3075)*** 
Dummy: Firm 5ize 100-999 14.2091 13.6316 2.7808 
(1.0994}*** (O.4982}*" (O.9237}*** 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 1.9983 2.5664 1.6309 
(O.1772r** (0. 1240} u* (0.5925) 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0433 1.0704 1.4625 
(0.0981) (D.0568) (O.6086) 
Industry Level Output/looo 1.0003 1.0001 0.9984 
(D.OOOS) (O.0003) (0.0024) 
Net Exports/1000 0.9971 0.9975 0.9976 
(O.0037) (0.0021) (0.0149) 
Race: White 1.5803 1.3753 0.7113 
(O.l885}*** (O.0863) (O.3177) 
Routine Intensive Job Tasks 0.9665 1.0073 0.8830 
(0.024S) (0.0133) (O.10lD) 
Non-Routine Abstract Job Tasks 1.0991 1.0709 0.9900 
(O.012S}*·* (O.OO6S}··* (0.OS29) 
Non-Routine Manual Job Tasks 0.9636 0.9616 1.0987 
(0.0170)·· (O.OO9O}··· (O.083B) 
service Job Tasks 0.9002 0.9260 0.9811 
(O.OUO}··· {O.OO(8) ••• (O.0536) 
Observations 64544 
Log Ukelihood -33414.61 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance level Key: ···p<O.01; ··p<O.OS; ·p<O.10. Base group 
relates to the censored spells. Each regression model Includes Industry, regional and calendar year variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported In the parentheses. Estimated coefficients are relative risk ratios. 
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Table S.18A: Competing Risks Model - Blinder (2007) Occupation Tradability Index & TBTC 
Competi", Risks Model New Job Transition Current Employer Unemployment Transition 
Age 1.6017 1.4181 1.2n8 
{0.0213}·" {OJ'092)·" {O.068S}·" 
Age Squared 0.9944 0.9960 0.9972 
{0.OOO2}·" {O.OOOl)··· {0.OOO7}··· 
Dummy: Married 1.3540 1.0601 0.5513 
{O.lOOS}"· {0.041.7} (0.1731)· 
Dummy: Female 1.1044 1.1681 1.3501 
(0.0876) {0.OS16)·" {O.463S} 
Dummy: Married Females 1.()650 1.0262 1.7947 
(0.0994) {0.OS19} (0.7008) 
Dependent Children in HH 0.7637 0.8970 1.56n 
{0.0486}··· {0.0302}"· {0.41.S4}· 
Dummy: Females with dependent Children 0.4296 0.5061 0.1846 
{0.0387}··· (0.0239}··· {0.07SS}*·· 
Job Tenure 0.0654 1.0474 0.8624 
(0.0021}"· {0.0024}·" (0.0436)··· 
Dummy: Member of Union 3.1036 3.0439 0.7900 
(O.2391}··· (0.1353)··· (0.3093) 
National Unemployment Rate 0.0074 0.0071 0.5626 
(O.OOO2}·" (O.OOOl}"· (O.083S}·" 
Education: High 0.9412 1.0530 0.9610 
(0.1403) (0.0877) (0.6801) 
Education: Medium 0.9059 0.9637 0.6035 
(0.0442)·· (0.0246) (0.1319)·· 
Dummy: Firm Size < 25 12.7221 12.9896 4.9395 
(O.938S}··· (0.4522)··· (l.3764}· .. • 
Dummy: Firm Size 25-99 12.6411 12.3964 4.3580 
(O.974S}·· .. (0.4S76}·· .. (l.3287}··· 
Dummy: Firm Size 100-999 14.2828 13.5257 2.7822 
(l.1l20} .. •• (0.4982)··· (O.9332}·" 
Dummy: Firm in Public Sector 1.9804 2.5243 1.6842 
(0.1752) ...... (0.1212)··· (0.6118) 
Research & Development Intensity 1.0423 1.06S9 1.4654 
(0.0979) (0.0565) (0.6066) 
Industry Level Output/1000 1.0003 1.0001 0.9985 
(O.OOOS) (0.OOO3) (0.0024) 
Net Exports/1000 0.9971 O.99n 0.9980 
(0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0150) 
Race: White 1.S645 1.3669 0.7071 
(0.1856)·· .. (0.0855)·· .. (0.3119) 
Blinder Index Value: 25 0.4960 0.5223 0.2672 
(O.1216}··· (O.0670}··· (0.3179) 
Blinder Index Value: 26-35 1.6064 1.3023 0.7225 
(0.2666)·" (0.1199)"· (0.4809) 
Blinder Index Value: 36-45 1.2395 1.2071 0.9494 
(0.1419)· (0.0734)··· (O.4352) 
Blinder Index Value: 46-55 0.8629 0.7255 0.2793 
{O.l040} {O.0421} ...... (O.2Z06) 
Blinder Index Value: 56-65 1.2030 1.2018 0.S662 
(0.1272)· (0.0671)·· .. (0.2557) 
Blinder Index Value: 66-75 1.2399 1.1916 0.9506 
(O.1067}··· (0.0S48) (0.3198) 
Blinder Index Value: 76-85 1.3338 1.1528 2.2627 
(0.2620) (0.1078)· (1.2185) 
Blinder Index Value: 86+ 0.9148 0.8878 0.3897 
(O.1118) (O.0559)· (0.2337) 
Routine Intensive Job Tasks 0.9542 0.9840 0.9454 
(O.0182}·" (0.0096)· (0.0776) 
Blinder Index Value: 25·Routine Job Tasks 1.1393 1.3400 3.5281 
(0.3657) (0.1636)" {1.2512)··· 
Blinder Index Value: 26-35·Routlne Job Tasks 0.8690 0.9442 1.1979 
(0.0617) .... (0.0352) (0.3079) 
Blinder Index Value: 36-45·Routlne Job Tasks 0.9236 0.9710 1.2222 
(O.0323)*· (0.0179) (o.l405)· 
Blinder Index Value: 46-55·Routlne Job Tasks 1.0052 1.0148 O.n34 
(0.0390) (O.O173) (0.1923) 
Blinder Index Value: 56-65·Routlne Jobs Tasks 0.9900 0.9859 1.0293 
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(0.0281) (0.0147) (0.1145) 
Blinder Index Value: 66-7S·Routine Job Tasks 0.9220 0.9645 1.0374 
(0.0212) .... (0.0117)·· .. (0.0952) 
Blinder Index Value: 76-8S·Routine Job Tasks 0.8574 0.8882 1.3987 
(0.0525)·· (0.0258)·" (0.2365) 
Blinder Index Value: 86+·Routine Job Tasks 0.9735 0.9950 1.1075 
(0.0532) (0.0281) (0.2557) 
Observations 64544 
Log Ukelihood -33407.523 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Significance Level Key: ···p<O.Ol; ··p<O.OS; ·p<0.10. Base group relates 
to the censored spells. Each regression model includes industry, regional and calendar year variables. Robust standard errors 
are reported in the parentheses. Estimated coeffidents are relative risk ratios. 
325 
6 
Job Security Trends in Britain: 1991-2007 
6.1 Introduction 
The last two decades has seen vast research on the subject of job security and job stability 
with one primary goal: to see whether there is evidence of a secular decline in the security and 
the stability of jobs over time. Research has in part been promoted by medial reports posting 
the following headlines: 'end of a job for life', 'job hopping is now the norm', 'contracts are 
becoming more common than staff jobs', 'the number of part-time jobs has soared' and 'job 
flexibility is key to maintaining employment'. One interesting point made by Green (2003) is 
that concerns about job security were less of a focus during the 1980s. Figure 1, page 4 from 
Green's (2003) paper [see figure 1.3A from appendix 3, chapter 1 from this thesis for visual 
details] presents press references to job security and insecurity from 1980-2002 for the U.K. 
and U.S. From this graph, press references to job security and insecurity during the 1980s 
amounted to approximately 50-200 references per year for the U.K. However, post 1980, 
press references to these terms rose from the onset of the early 1990s recession. They 
reached a peak of approximately 900-1000 press references by 1996. These trends seem 
puzzling since the unemployment rate reached a peak of approximately 12% by 19842, which 
1 Media references were taken from a news paper article printed by The Guardian Newspaper on August 14th, 1999. This article 
was written by Patrick Collinson; title of article: "Now and then: Jobs for life still not dead and buried; Anti-union reaction 
prompted by old-style hard-liners like Red Robbo seemed to signal a thumbs down for security at work as employers pined the 
upper hand. But, youngsters entering the labour market will find that the myths don't always match the reality". This article was 
obtained from Nexis UK. This article talks about the myths and realities relating to job stability and job security. 
2 Series MGSX LFS Unemployment rate for U.K. for all aged 16 and over, seasonally adjusted; from the National Statistics Online. 
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should have heightened workers' concerns about the security of their employment. After 
2000, press references stayed close to around 400 references per year with an unemployment 
rate that had fluctuated between 5-5%% prior to onset of the most recent recession3• 
Concerns about declining job security may relate to a change in the rate of job creation and 
job destruction over time. Job turnover is a necessary part of innovation and growth if the 
jobs which are created are more productive than those which are destroyed. This process of 
creative destruction is necessary for economic prosperity, but unfortunately this process can 
lead to job reallocations which can lower labour market security for some workers. Labour 
market security is defined by a trio of measures: (a) job security; (b) the volatility of income 
within jobs Uob stability) and (c) the earnings losses following job displacement between jobs. 
Labour market security can fall if the rate of job destruction rises over time. The forces that 
can lead to changes to the job creation and destruction rates over time can be caused by 
structural shifts in labour demand between firms, industries, occupations and regions. 
There is a large empirical literature on job security. Chapter 2 explored the theoretical 
explanations that could cause job security and labour market security to change over time. 
This chapter explained that changes in the rates of job creation and destruction could be 
caused by structural shifts in tastes and technology that could be linked to globalisation. 
Forces such as offshoring, outward FOI, product market competition, a fall in transportation 
costs, improvements in telecommunication and technology, the dynamic nature of 
comparative advantage and reforms to labour market institutions encourage labour market 
flexibility and raise job turnover rates. From the empirical evidence accompanying this review, 
I found limited empirical evidence showing these forces have not lowered labour market 
3 Press references have continued to remain high over the last decade. This chapter carried out a simple search on one of the 
U.K.'s leading broadsheet newspaper's websites - the timesonline.com, looking for the search term 'job cuts' over the period 
2000-2010. Results from this search can be viewed from figure 6.3A (appendix 10) shows for the first quarter of 2010 press 
references from the times-online web search yielded 257 references. For the period 2003-2009 press references averaged 
approximately 911 references to the search term 'job cuts' per year. The number of references peaked to a high of nearly 900 
references in 2004 prior to the onset of the most recent recession. 
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security in the U.K. The evidence shows these forces have had a small negative impact on the 
employment and wages levels of workers where this impact has been limited to low-skilled 
labour. See chapter 2 for further details. 
Chapter 3 reviewed the empirical evidence to substantiate if job and labour market security 
had fallen over the 1970s to the 1990s. Evidence a 10 Gregg & Wadsworth (1995 & 2002) and 
Gregg et 01., (2000) found small declines in elapsed job tenure: they found median elapsed job 
tenure fell by 10 percent from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. They also found elapsed job 
tenure shares greater than or equal to 5 years and greater than or equal to 10 years fell by 4-8 
percent for men and for women with no dependent children. But these medium and long 
term job tenure shares for women with dependent children rose from the mid 1980s to the 
1990s. These trends have continued from recently published trends by Faggio et 01., (2011) for 
the period 1985 to 2009. Similarly, Burgess & Rees (1996) reported average elapsed job 
tenure fell for men and for women between 1975 and 1992. And Booth et 01., (1999) found 
job separation hazard rates were higher for recent cohorts of workers than for earlier cohorts 
over the period 1915 to 1990. But Burgess & Rees (1997 & 1998) found men and women 
continued to largely have stable and secure employment from the 1970s to the early 1990s. 
This review concluded there was little evidence showing job security had declined from the 
1970s to the 1990s for the U.K. 
From the U.S. literature, there is no evidence to support claims for 'the end 0/ life-time jobs' 
(Jaeger & Huff Stevens, 1999). There is evidence of stable jobs for workers employed by large 
corporations and for older and experienced workers over the 1980s and 19905 (Hall, 1982; 
Farber, 1995; Diebold et 01., 1997; Allen et 01., 1999; Neumark et 01., 1999; and Huff Stevens, 
2005). Additionally, evidence a 10 Davis (2008) and by Farber (2009) show job loss rates have 
not increased from the 1970s to the post 2000 time frame. Other sources of empirical 
evidence show a decline in the inflow rate into unemployment over the last three decades 
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(See Elsby et 0/., 2007 and Fujita & Ramey, 2006 for the evidence). And, the empirical 
evidence for the other components of labour market security, namely income volatility within 
jobs and the earnings losses following job displacement between jobs, show they have not 
increased over the last three decades to substantiate claims that workers have become worse 
off. 
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on three fronts. The first contribution 
clearly defines what is meant by 'job stability' and 'job security'. The empirical literature 
refers to these terms quite interchangeably without defining precisely what their relation is to 
the employment relationship. Although the concepts are related to each other, they refer to 
very different aspects of an employment relationship. This chapter defines job stability and 
job security as follows: Job stability refers to 'how stable are continuing jobs'. Job stability is 
likely to depend on wage movements, changes to the number of hours worked, job re-
assignments within employment which mayor may not result in demotion and affect how 
stable jobs may be over time. Job security refers to, 'how long do jobs last' and it reflects the 
probability of a job ending. The security of an employment spell is dependent upon the exit-
type from the employer, where the exit can be voluntary (worker initiated job separation or 
quit) or non-voluntary (firm initiated job separation, where the exit type may be due to plant-
closure or redundancies from mass-layoffs). The changes to job security can also vary with the 
business cycle - the general well-being of the economy as well as business conditions. There is 
a sense of job security during good times, where voluntary quits dominate layoffs than during 
bad times where firm-initiated job separations dominate quits. 
To assess if there has been any change to job security over time, the empirical literature has 
typically looked at the length of elapsed job tenure and job retention probabilities at similar 
points along the business cycle at different points in time. For the second contribution, I 
measure elapsed job tenure by utilising the methodology employed by Gregg & Wadsworth 
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(2002). Their analysis assessed job security from 1975 to 2000 by measuring the duration of 
uncompleted employment spells based on two measures: (1) median elapsed job tenure and 
(2) the proportion of job tenure shares in three specific job tenure bands: these are short, 
medium and long-term job tenure shares over time. This chapter uses these measures of 
elapsed job tenure to extend their analysis period by using the Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
(QLFS) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the period 1991-2006. 
For the third contribution, I explore the trends from three job transition states. These job 
transition states are (a) job-to-job transitions, (b) job-to-unemployment transitions and (c) job-
to-inactivity transitions. These are annual job transitions from year t - 1 to year t. This third 
contribution has two aims. First, they are an alternative measure for job security as they 
explore the types of job transitions workers can make over time in comparison to elapsed job 
tenure. Changes to elapsed job tenure simply tells us whether it is increasing or falling over 
time only; it does not tell us why job tenure has increased or fallen over time. This alternative 
measure is able to examine if job security is changing over time because more workers are 
making new job transitions to new employers, becoming unemployed, starting up their own 
business or leaving the labour force altogether in time period t. Secondly, by exploring jOb-to-
unemployment 'EU' transitions, it enables one to establish whether the probability of 
becoming unemployed is rising over time. The British empirical literature has so far measured 
job security by exploring the changes from various job tenure shares. There are no papers to 
my knowledge that have explored the changes from job transitions as an alternative measure 
for job security. Although this chapter is not able to distinguish between voluntary and non-
voluntary forms of job separations directly, there are questions within the BHPS and the QLFS 
surveys that allow one to distinguish whether job separations are due to firm closure or 
through layoffs. 
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Thus, the aim of this chapter is threefold. The first step has established definitions for job 
stability and job security. The second step is to try and obtain consistent estimates for median 
elapsed job tenure and the share of job tenure proportions in specific job tenure bands that 
are consistent for comparable periods of analysis using the methodology employed by Gregg 
& Wadsworth (2002) (methodology outline is in section 6.2). This chapter will provide own 
estimates of elapsed job tenure (presented in section 6.3), to analyse evidence for the post 
1990 period and to establish whether there have been continued changes to job security and 
whether this may constitute a change over time in relation to the results from Gregg & 
Wadsworth's (2002) paper. The third contribution examines the trends from three job 
transitions states (section 6.4). Section 6.S provides a brief discussion of the findings, and 
section 6.6 provides the concluding comments. 
6.2 Data & Methodology 
This chapter uses the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) and the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) to explore job security trends in Britain. The QLFS was first carried out from the 
spring quarter of 1992 onwards. This survey consists of a rolling panel of 60,000 households, 
where respondents are observed over five consecutive quarters4• The BHPS is a nationally 
representative annual survey, carried out by the Institute for Social and Economic Research 
(lSER) at the University of Essex. The survey interviews each adult member of a nationally 
representative sample of more than 5,000 private households (with a total of approximately 
10,000 individual interviews) randomly selected south of the Caledonian Canal. The first wave 
of the BHPS was conducted during the autumn of 1991, and annually thereafter (Taylor, 
4 Further details relating to the background and information about the QlFS can be found on the oNS website at the following 
link: http://www.statistics.gov.uklstatbase/Product.asp?vink=1537 • 
5 There have been three additional sub-samples added to the BHPS. The first was from wave 7, where the BHPS began providilll 
data for the United Kingdom European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP ceased at the end of 2001 (or wave 11 of 
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Authors Burgess & Rees (1996, 1997 & 1998) have used the General Household Survey (GHS) 
to measure elapsed job tenure trends and Gregg & Wadsworth (1995, 2000 & 2002) have used 
the British Labour Force Survey (LFS), the QLFS and the GHS to reconcile the estimates for 
elapsed job tenure over time. Both of these data sets provide data from the late 1970s to the 
early 1990s. Yet, the literature has failed to reconcile job tenure estimates from the BHPS. 
Primarily this may be because the BHPS commenced in 1991 and thus this survey does not 
provide sufficient data of comparable length to compare estimates with the LFS or with the 
GHS. As my research explores the changes to elapsed job tenure post 1990 and not from the 
1970s, I am able to utilise the BHPS for this task. I make use of the QLFS data in addition to the 
BHPS for two reasons. First, as I am replicating Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) paper by using 
their methodology; I want to compare my estimates of elapsed job tenure with their estimates 
over comparable periods. And, secondly, I want to reconcile the estimates from the BHPS with 
the QLFS over the post 1990 period. 
Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) sample is based on employees and the continuously self-
employed. Their sample is restricted to men aged 16-64 years and females aged 16-59 years. 
Their analysis uses questions from the annual Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the QLFS. 
Following Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) estimation strategy, the first step is to identify the 
questions used from the QLFS, to construct this chapter's measure for elapsed job tenure. The 
question utilised by Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) to carry out much of their analysis from the 
LFS involves the variable named: 'EMPLEN'. This variable is defined as the, "length of time 
with current employer or continuously self employed6n • The coverage of this variable has 
varied throughout the 198Os, where in 1984 this variable asked for the length of time spent 
the BHPS) due to lack of funding. Wave 9 saw the Introduction of two additional samples to the BHPS in Scotland and Wales. All 
members of households recruited at the first wave of the extension samples are treated as original sample members. Finally, at 
wave 11 a new sample of Northern Ireland, known as the Northern Ireland Household Panel Survey (NIHPS) was added. This 
chapter's analysis will focus solely on the sample of respondents who first took part in the BHPS from wave 1 onwards; this 
excludes the sample extensions of the ECHP, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
6 Regression analysis estimating time trend coefficients based on a sample of 'employees' only as opposed to a sample consisting 
of 'employees' and the 'continuously self-employed' does not alter the estimated time trend coefficients; there are very minor 
differences between the estimated time trend coefficients between the two samples. These comment based on QLFS data 
analysis only. 
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with current employer only. From 1985-1988 this variable consisted of employees and self-
employed individuals' reporting the time spent with current employer or continuously self-
employed. Finally, from 1989-1991 this variable accounted for all in employment, but no 
details are provided by the LFS as to what is meant by 'all in employment'. 
From the spring quarter of 1992 onwards, the QLFS asks all respondents three questions that 
can be viewed from appendix 1. These questions relate to the year the individual first started 
to work continuously for their present employer [question 101]; the year they first started to 
continuously work as self-employed [question 102] and the month they first started to work in 
their respective states of employment [question 103]. The first of these two questions lie in a 
similar vein to the question mentioned by Gregg & Wadsworth (2002), but there is no mention 
of the third question from appendix 1. This chapter utilises all three questions displayed in 
appendix 1 to calculate more accurately the number of months respondents have been 
employed by their current employer/have been continuously self-employed. However, an 
answer to question 103 [the month when employment with current employer/continuous self 
employment commenced] is only reported if answers to questions 101 [the year the individual 
first started working for their employer] or 102 [the year the individual started working 
continuously as self-employed] are reported within an eight year window of the current survey 
year for respondents' current job/continuous self-employment. For example, if a respondent 
was to answer these questions during the spring quarter of 1992, an answer to question 103 is 
only reported if the year reported for questions 101 or 102 is stated to be after 1984 onwards. 
An answer for the month [question 103] is coded to not apply to respondents if during the 
1992 questionnaire, they report starting work with their current employer or working as 
continuously self-employed before 1984. Therefore, to estimate precisely the number months 
respondents' have worked for their current employer/continuously self-employed requires 
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identifying those respondents who lie within and up to the 8 year reporting period for an 
answer to question 103 to be identified and used. 
In addition to the first method, a second method is employed to calculate the number months 
worked by those individuals who have worked for their current employer/worked 
continuously self-employed before 1984 in the example. I assume the current month of 
employment/self-employment is January rather than assigning any arbitrary value from one to 
twelve. Therefore, this second method of identification is a little inaccurate due to rounding 
of reported months and years worked by respondents. 
There are differences between the QLFS and the BHPS surveys in relation to the questions that 
are asked to respondents eliciting information about time spent in present employment. The 
QLFS questions ask respondents when they first started to work for their current 
employer/working as continuously self-employed. The BHPS7 asks respondents how long they 
have been working in their present position of employment. To obtain consistent data for 
spells of employment experienced by the respondents in present employment with their 
current employer, I make use of job history data to identify these spells. A similar procedure 
to calculate accurate job tenure data is reported by Dustmann & Pereira (2008)8. 
6.2.1 calculation of Elapsed Job Tenure: Median & Sample Proportions 
The first step is to calculate median elapsed job tenure. Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) estimate 
median job tenure rather than mean job tenure because the raw data on job tenure from the 
GHS and LFS is reported in discrete bands. The authors' report these discrete job tenure 
bands are not consistent over time and therefore this influences much of their work. Thus, 
due to the discrete nature of the data, they do not calculate mean elapsed job tenure because 
7 Appendix 2 provides details of the questions that are asked by the BHPS survey relating to time spent in present position of 
employment. 
S Dustmann & Pereira (2008) calculate job tenure as an explanatory variable to explore wage growth trends using the BHPS. 
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this would require making an assumption about the form for the maximum value for the open 
upper band of the job tenure groups. Instead they choose to estimate median job tenure and 
the share of elapsed job tenure specific to one of three bands. Although there are continuous 
job tenure data available from the QLFS and the BHPS from 1991 to 2006, I choose to estimate 
median elapsed job tenure and the share of job tenure in specific bands for two reasons. First, 
I want to reconcile my calculations of median job tenure with Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) 
estimates over comparable periods. And second, I do not calculate average job tenure 
because there are potential problems with the accuracy of the reported job tenure data noted 
in the last section9• 
To estimate median elapsed job tenure, the first step is to assume there are three job tenure 
bands1o: These are (1) less than five years, (2) five to ten years and (3) ten years or more. The 
five to ten year job tenure band is used to calculate the median job tenure if the median 
should lie in this band. If the median lies within this band, a uniform distribution is assumed in 
that band to calculate the value for each percentile. For example, if 30 percent of the data 
occupy the job tenure band of five to ten years, then each percentile occupies 2 months 
(6011/30 = 2); if 47 per cent of the sample have job tenure of less than five years, then the 
median job tenure is 66 months (60 + 3(2) = 66) (Gregg & Wadsworth, 2002). 
Much of Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) assessment of job security are based on analysing the 
changes to the share of elapsed job tenure from three specific job tenure bands via regression 
analysis. These three bands are (1) job tenure under one year; (2) job tenure greater than or 
equal to five years and (3) job tenure greater than or equal to ten years. They use these bands 
9 For the QLFS data, there Is the problem of identifying as accurately as possible the number of years and months workers has 
continuously worked with their employer. Information on the month respondents started working for present employers Is 
missing if workers have worked for the same employer for more than 8 years. For the BHPS data, there 15 the Issue of identifying 
job tenure from present employer rather than from the present job position with their current employer. This requires using the 
job history data. 
10 Note that these job tenure bands differ with respect to bands that are used to examine the changes to the short, medium and 
lonll term job tenure shares over time. 
11 Sixty months here refers to 5 years - the lowest number of years of job tenure possible for this job tenure band. 
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because they do not require any distribution assumptions to be made about each job tenure 
band unlike to calculate the median. The proportion of workers with job tenure under one 
year is taken to be a measure of the share of new jobs. This represents the sum of new hires 
from the creation of new vacancies and from firm relocations and worker replacements. They 
also examine the proportion of job tenure shares of five years and ten years or more because 
average job tenure depends on the share of new jobs and the stability of existing jobs. These 
job tenure bands allow one to explore secular changes in job security with the aim of looking 
at the changes in these three conditional job tenure shares over time (Farber, 1995; Burgess & 
Rees, 1998). These categories enable one to examine whether job turnover has grown over 
time with a rise in the share of job tenure less than one year or whether the fraction of 
workers with job tenure of five or ten years or more has fallen over time. 
6.2.2 The Exploration of Job Tenure via Regressions Analysis 
Job tenure shares from three specific bands are explored via regression analysis to explore the 
secular changes in more detail. The regression analysis is carried out in two stages: 
First Stage 
Equation (1) is estimated at the first stage for individual i, employed within industry j at time 
t. This stage requires each cross section of each data set to be pooled together to estimate 
the probability of belonging to the three job tenure bands, conditional upon a set of year 
dummy variables and a set of control variables. From equation (1), Tenure is a dummy 
variable equal to one if elapsed job tenure is (a) less than one year; (b) greater than or equal 
to five years and (c) greater than or equal to 10 years. For each of the job tenure bands, probit 
regression models are estimated. 
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Each regression includes control variables for the composition of the workforce and other 
socio-economic variables that could influence the job tenure shares over time. These control 
variables are: Individual Controls (Xi,i,t) consisting of age, educational attainment, children, 
marital status and regional dummy variables; Job Control I (Vi,i,t) consists of variables 
measuring part-time jobs, self-employment and five broad industry groupings. Job Control II 
(Zi,i,t)12 examine the effects on short-term job tenure shares ijob tenure <1 year); these 
variables are temporary working and government schemes. These variables are used to 
capture the possible differential ability of firms to release workers across time. Year 
represents a series of calendar year dummy variables for each cross section of data used for 
estimation. Finally, E is the error term. 
For the first stage regressions, the probability of having a job for five years or more is 
estimated on a sample aged 25 years and over and the probability of having a job for ten years 
or more is estimated from a sample aged 30 years and over. These restrictions are placed on 
these job tenure shares because it is not feasible for an individual who is aged 18 years to have 
had job tenure for five or even ten years. These age restrictions will prevent these individuals 
from entering these regressions13• 
Second Stage 
me = Po + P1 eyelet + pz Timet + Et (2) 
For the second stage of the estimation strategy, equation (2) is estimated where the cycle 
accounts for the economic environment and Time represents a linear time-trend. The aim 
from this second stage of estimation is to obtain estimates from the 'Time' coefficient. This 
12 this paper excludes Individuals on government schemes; Job Control II Is therefore defined by this paper as temporary working 
only. 
13 Initial first stage regressions were estimated without any age restrictions placed on job tenure shares >=5 years and tenure 
shares >-10 years. The results obtained from this first stage were then utilised in the second stage regression Inalysls which 
yielded strange results In comparison to the Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) results if these restrictions are not placed. These results 
are not presented. 
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coefficient will provide the per-year trend changes for each of the job tenure shares from the 
specific bands over the sample period. This is achieved through following a similar estimation 
strategy pursued by Jaeger & Huff Stevens (1999)14 for the U.S. This estimation strategy takes 
the marginal effects (me) which are evaluated around the sample mean of the dependent 
variable15 for each of the calendar year dummy variables from the first stage. They are then 
regressed onto a linear time-trend and a cyclical control variable from the second stage 
(estimation is via OLS). Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) use the vacancy-employment rate as their 
cyclical measure for the share of short-term job share (tenure < 1 year)16, the employment-
population rate as their cyclical measure for medium term job share (tenure shares >= 5 years) 
and the unemployment rate as their cyclical measure for long-term job share (tenure shares 
>= 10 years) regressionsl7,18. I make use of the same cyclical control variables for this chapter. 
The year estimates effectively measure sample year average proportions and they may be 
subject to heteroskedasticity when pooled. In accordance with the estimation strategy 
pursued by Gregg & Wadsworth (2002), the standard errors from the second stage regressions 
are bootstrapped and the standard errors from these estimates are reported from these 
repetitions. Maddala (1999) recommends this strategy when faced with heteroskedasticity in 
small samples. The reported standard errors come from 500 repetitions. 
14 For the first stage regressions, they estimate legit models for the probability of having employer tenure of less than 1 year and 
having employer tenure less than 10 years with control variables: age, ap squared, race, education and calendar year variables. 
The calendar year coefficients are used to calculate year-specific probabilities. From the second stage of their regression analysis, 
the year probabilities are regressed on a linear time-trend using ordinary least squares; but no attempt is made to control for 
cyclical fluctuation. Due to the error term being heteroskedastlc In the second stage regression, they estimate via jacknlfe 
heteroskedastlclty-conslstent standard errors In their results tables. 
15 
Jaeger & Huff Stevens (1999) evaluate the legit function at the observed mean of the other covarlates; this paper evaluates the 
marginal effects at the mean of the Independent variables. 
16 Please refer to Appendix 3 for a note on these second stage regressions for short term job tenure shares. 
17 Alternative specifications were estimated for second stage regressions. It was further Investigated whether the use of the same 
cyclical control variables for the different job tenure shares at the second stap had a similar Impact on the estimated time-trend 
coefficients compared to using three different cydlcal control variables. Appendix 4 provides the details for this robustness check. 
18 Appendix 9 provides the details for the data sources that are used to construct these cyclical control variables. 
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6.3 Results: Job Tenure 
This section presents various results from the analysis of job tenure for job security. Section 
6.3.1 examines trends from median job tenure and the shares of tenure proportions from 
three bands at the aggregate level and at the disaggregate level by gender and by presence of 
children. Section 6.3.2 will present results from the multivariate regression analysis where the 
estimated time-trend coefficients try to establish whether there has been a secular decline in 
job security over the period 1991 to 2006. 
6.3.1 The Analysis of Job Tenure Trends 
Tables 6.1A to 6.5A present the calculations of median job tenure and sample proportion from 
the QLFS and BHPS; these tables can be viewed in appendix 5 from this chapter. The results 
from these calculations have been plotted by figures 6.1 to 6.6. These graphs have two 
purposes: the first is to compare my calculations with that of Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) 
measures and the second is to view the trends for job tenure beyond the sample of Gregg & 
Wadsworth's (2002) analysis period. 
Figure 6.1 presents comparisons of median job tenure trends for the aggregate sample. This 
figure presents the published trends from Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) and from an earlier 
study by Gregg et 01., (2000). This chapter's calculations of median job tenure are presented 
by Own Measure 1 (QLFS data) and Own Measure 2 (BHPS data). Figure 6.1 shows own 
measure 1 (QLFS data) has similar cyclical variations and movements to the findings from the 
empirical literature. However. calculations from own measure 2 (BHPS data) shows a large 
difference between the results. Comparing own measure 2 with own measure 1, the gap is 
almost 15 months at 1995 between the two trends. 
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Figure 6.1: Comparison of Median Job Tenure 
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The differences between these results could be due to two reasons: (1) the two surveys use 
different questions to obtain information on job tenure. The QLFS asks respondents the 
period of time they have worked for their current employer. The BHPS on the other hand asks 
respondents the time they have spent in their current position regardless of whether this time 
has been spent with a current or new employer. And (2), the difference could be due to the 
samples of data: the BHPS aims to follow the same respondents over time, whilst the QLFS 
only follows respondents for five consecutive quarters. 
To explore whether these explanations account for the differences, figure 6.2A (Appendix 8) 
plots the imputed median job tenure for workers and the continuously self-employed from 
both data sets. This graph shows the trends for median elapsed job tenure are quite similar 
over the time frame and the big gap observed in figure 6.1 is not as big but at most 4 months 
from figure 6.2A. Table 6.16A in appendix 8 further examines whether the differences is 
related to the questions or with the pooled samples of data. The results from table 6,16A 
presents job tenure in months for the 25th, the 50th, the 75th and the 99th percentiles from 
cross sections of data for years 1992, 1996, 2002 and 2005. The results from this table show 
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from each of the percentiles over each year of data, there is little difference in job tenure 
between the two surveys. These results would suggest that the differences between the two 
samples are not related to the differences in the questions asked about job tenure. However, 
when the percentiles from the pooled samples of data are calculated, they reveal a greater 
difference in the upper tail of the job tenure distribution between the QLFS and the BHPS data 
sets. The QLFS sample shows job tenure is greater at the 75th and 99th percentiles compared 
to the BHPS sample. This latter result would suggest the difference is due to the pooled 
samples of data. Job tenure could be lower for the BHPS sample because this survey 
essentially observes the same people over time. This survey is a nationally representative, and 
as the sample gets older, these workers consequently experience less job moves and approach 
retirement from the labour market, which would mean they are no long observed in the 
labour market. 
Returning back to figure 6.1, the U.K. experienced a recession over the early 1990s, where 
median job tenure was at most 53 months (4 years and 5 months) in 1990. After the early 
1990s recession, all median job tenure measures from the literature and from own measure 1 
peaked at 68 months in 1995. Post 1995, median job tenure declined, where there has been 
no apparent trend after year 2000. These trends indicate median job tenure has remained 
stable over the post 2000 time frame. For the period 1992-2006, calculations from own 
measure 1 (based upon calculations displayed within table 6.1A - Appendix 5) show median 
job tenure fell by 1 month or 1.72%. In 1992 median job tenure was 58 months (4 years, 10 
months), this rose to a peak of 5 years, 7 months in 1996 (this represents a rise in median job 
tenure of 15.5%). From 1996 to 2006, median job tenure steadily declined by approximately 
15%. From the BHPS data, own measure 2 shows for the period 1991-2005, there was no 
change to median job tenure; it has remained at 3 years and 9 months in 1991 and in 2005. 
Median job tenure reached a peak of 4 years by 1995 (a rise of 3 months from 1991) but 
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median job tenure gradually declined back to 3 years and 9 months by 2005. Overall, the 
median job tenure trends from the aggregate sample analysis reveals that they are counter 
cyclical to the business cycle, which makes it difficult to judge whether secular changes have 
taken place over time. But figure 6.1 does illustrate the median job tenure trends have 
remained stable post year 2000 where economic conditions have been favourable. 
If job security has remained stable since year 2000, why is it that press references have 
remained high since 1995 and have continued to grow after year 2000? To answer this 
question, the first point to note is whether there is evidence that workers have felt insecure 
about their jobs over the last decade - the answer is in some respects yes. A publication from 
a survey conducted by Right Management Consultants, reported on by the BBC19 back in 2005 
reported U.K. employees topped a job insecurity table. Workers from the U.K. reported the 
lowest sense of job security out of employees from eighteen of the world's leading economies 
that were surveyed as part of the research. Thus, workers feel insecure even though the 
unemployment rate and job security as measured by median job tenure has remained stable. 
Part of this reason could relate to the high rates of job creation and destruction which can lead 
to high job turnover rates. Recent job creation and destruction estimates from Hijzen et al., 
(2007) show roughly 15 percent of jobs are destroyed annually and roughly 15 percent of 
newly created jobs come into being. Figure 6.8A in appendix 13 plots the rates of job creation 
and destruction from Hijzen et al., (2007) for the U.K. This graph shows job creation rates 
were higher than the rate of job destruction from 1998 to 2002. But post 2002, the job 
destruction rates have been higher than the job creation rates. This can lead to higher job 
turnover rates and this could be one of the reasons why workers continue to feel insecure 
about their jobs. 
19 Press reference to this article can be obtained from the followinillink: http://news.bbc.co.uklllhi/business/4443406.stm. 
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Figure 6.2 presents the median job tenure trends by gender and by presence of children (the 
calculation for each graph can be viewed from tables 6.2A - 6.5A for the QLFS and BHPS data 
respectively in Appendix 5). The first point to note is that the median job tenure trends from 
the QLFS are much higher compared to the BHPS. For men, there has been a gradual decline 
in median job tenure from the QLFS data; median job tenure was at most 85 months in 1995 
and after 2001 median job tenure remained stable at 65 months. From the BHPS data, there 
has been a very modest decline for men. Median job tenure fluctuated between 45-50 
months over the sample with there being an overall decline of only 2 months over the 15 year 
sample period. 
For women with no children, median job tenure rose during the early half of the 1990s to 
approximately 66 months, but declined to around 5S months by 2000. This is where median 
job tenure has remained stable over the latter half of the sample for the QLFS data. For 
women with no children, the results from the BHPS data show less of a trend, but they follow 
the same overall trend depicted by the QLFS data. These trends show median job tenure rose 
slightly during the mid 1990s to approximately 47 months. From 1998 onwards, median job 
tenure remained steady at approximately 45 months. Over the sample, median job tenure 
rose by one month. 
For women with dependent children and women with children under the age of 5 years, 
median job tenure trends from both data sets have increased over time. For women with 
children, median job tenure rose by seven months from the QLFS data and by five months 
from BHPS data. For women with children under the age of five years, estimates show a rise 
of ten months and five months from the QLFS and BHPS data sets. One interesting 
observation from these plots is that for all women, whether they have or do not have children, 
the median job tenure trends from both data sets are closer to each other. For men, these 
very same trends differ greatly, where this difference between the two data sets is greater 
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during the early 1990s. This gap between each data set narrows over time, but the gap 
between each data set remains at most 10 months over the 2000 periods for women with no 
children and for women who have dependent children. 
Figure 6.2: Comparison of Median Job Tenure by Gender & Presence of Children 
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Figure 6.3 compares the median job tenure trends from this chapter with those from Gregg & 
Wadsworth's (2002) paper. For men and for women with no dependent children, the trends 
published by Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) follow similar trends to the calculations from own 
measure 1. For women with children and for women with children under the age of five years, 
differences exist between the QLFS calculations. This chapter's calculations are bigger, 
whereas the calculations from Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) lie in closer proximity with the BHPS 
calculations (own measure 2). These graphs illustrate a downward trend in median job tenure 
for men from Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) calculations and from own measure 1. These 
graphs also show: a downward trend in median job tenure for women with no dependent 
children and an upward trend in median job tenure for women with dependent children and 
with children under the age of five years. 
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of Median Job Tenure by Gender & Presence of Children with G & W 
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To sum up, based on the calculations from this chapter only, the disaggregate results suggest 
there has been a downward trend in median job tenure for men. There is very little change 
for women with no children and rising median job tenure for women with dependent children 
and for women with children under the age of five years. After year 2000, there has been very 
little change to median job tenure for all groups. These plots confirm the aggregate trends 
from figure 6.1. 
6.3.2 Job Tenure Proportions in Specific Tenure Bands 
Figure 6.4 presents aggregate sample plots for job tenure shares <1 year and >=5 years. These 
plots compare this chapter's calculations to those presented by Gregg & Wadsworth (2002)20. 
These estimates relate to the calculations from the raw data. 
20 
There are plots for job tenure shares <1 year and >=5 years but there is no plot comparing the trends from job tenure shares 
>=10 years. This is because Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) do not provide a graph or sufficient data for a comparison to be made 
with data from this chapter. Therefore, I have chosen not to plot th is data. 
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The trends from Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) paper show during the latter part of the 1980s, 
job tenure shares under one year were rising and job tenure shares >=5 years were declining. 
Post 1990 the U.K. experienced a recession, figure 6.4 part (a) shows job tenure shares <1 year 
falling and job tenure shares >=5 years rising as shown by figure 6.4 part (b). After 1995, the 
U.K. experienced a steady period of growth, figure 6.4, part (a) shows job tenure shares <1 
year fluctuated between 18-22% and job tenure shares >=5 years have remained steady at 
48% from Own Measure 1 (QlFS Data) and ranged between 33-36% with Own Measure 2 
(BHPS Data). 
Figures 6.2 (median tenure) and 6.4 (sample shares in specific tenure bands) have shown that 
job tenure as a measure for job security is influenced by the movements of the business cycle. 
During an economic downturn, the number of individuals quitting their positions of 
employment is far less then firm-initiated job separations (either through redundancies or 
plant closure). Therefore, job tenure rises as there are fewer workers with job tenure under 
one year. However, the converse in true during an economic upturn, where voluntary quits 
dominates firm initiated layoffs as workers seek better opportunities. Thus on average, job 
tenure falls as there are a greater proportion of workers with job tenure under one year. 
What these graphs demonstrate is median job tenure and job tenure shares in specific tenure 
bands are not very good measures for job security because their movements are 
countercyclical to the movements of the business cycle. These trends do not provide a clear 
picture as to whether there has been a secular rise (decline) for tenure shares <1 year (>=5 
years) which would provide some evidence of a decline (rise) in job security Uob insecurity) for 
the U.K. over the post 1990 period. 
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Figure 6.4: Aggregate Sample: Probability of Tenure <1 Year & >=5 Years 
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Source: Figure compiled by the author. Figures for these graphs are ava ilable from appendix S. These 
plots relate to the raw data. 
The aggregate job tenure shares may mask different trends across different types of workers, 
therefore figures 6.5 and 6.6 present job tenure plots for job tenure shares <1 year and >=10 
years by gender and by presence of dependent children. Figure 6.5 presents various plots for 
job tenure shares <1 year. This graph shows there has been a decline in job tenure shares <1 
year for women with children and for women with children under the age of five years but 
there has also been a slight upward trend from these job tenure shares for men and for 
women with no children. 
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Figure 6.5: Probability of Tenure <1 Year by Gender and Presence of Children 
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Figure 6.6: Probability of Tenure >10 Years by Gender and Presence of Children 
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Figure 6.6 shows a gradual decline in job tenure shares >=10 years for men from own measure 
1 (QLFS data); but there is very little variation from own measure 2 (BHPS data). There is no 
evidence of a decline for women with no children as the two own measures appear stable, 
fluctuating between 25-30% from own measure 1 (QLFS Data) and between 15-20% from the 
own measure 2 (BHPS data). For women with children, there is a clear upward trend from all 
measures, but for women with children under the age of five years, there is a rise and a fall 
from these long-term job tenure shares over time. From own measure 2, job tenure shares 
declined from 1998 onwards. But from own measure 1 (QLFS Data) the decline from these 
long-term job tenure shares did not commence until 2004 - this is 6 years later compared to 
the BHPS calculations. 
Part of the explanation for the rise in job tenure shares >=10 years (and 5 years not displayed) 
and the decline in job tenure shares under one year for women who have dependent children 
can be accounted for by the introduction of maternity leave legislation, introduced in Britain in 
197621• Prior to 1976, women were required to leave their employment to have children and 
were forced to seek new employment once they re-entered the labour market. With the 
introduction of maternity leave legislation, women are entitled to leave from their 
employment to have children and are able to retain their employment with their employers 
upon return (Gregg & Wadsworth, 2002). 
6.3.3 Regression Analysis of Job Tenure Shares over nme 
Table 6.1 presents the estimated time-trend coefficients for job tenure shares <1 year, >=5 
years and job tenure shares >=10 years. The estimated time-trend coefficients control for 
individual and job characteristics in the first stage of estimation as well as controlling for the 
21 For details of maternity leave legislation in Britain, Wa!dtoiel (1998) provides details of maternity legislation entitlements in 
Appendix A, part B of her paper. 
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business cycle from the second stage of estimation22• All estimated coefficients (and robust 
standard errors) have been multiplied by 100 so that the time-trend coefficients can be 
interpreted as yearly percentage point changes. 
For job tenure shares under one year, the estimated time-trend coefficients from both data 
sets (from column 1-4) are not significant for the aggregate and disaggregate samples. These 
results therefore suggest little change over time. 
For job tenure shares >=5 years, column (1) provides the results from the QLFS which show 
significant and negative time-trend coefficients for the total sample, for men and for women 
with no children. Women with no children have a greater yearly percentage point decline at 
0.58% per year (this is an 8.7% decline over the sample period). For men the figure is -0.53% 
per year (this represents a 7.95% decline over the sample). For the aggregate sample the 
estimated time-trend coefficient for job tenure shares >=5 years suggest there has been a 0.36 
yearly percentage point decline (this is a 5.4% decline over the sample). Results from the 
BHPS (column 3) show a 0.15 per year percentage point rise for women with children (this 
amounts to a 2.25% rise over the sample period); whilst medium job tenure shares rose by 
0.28 percentage points per year (a 4.2% rise over the sample period) for women with children 
under the age of five years. 
These estimated time trend coefficients indicate that on average for the aggregate sample, the 
number of workers who have at least five years of job tenure has gradually declined over the 
period 1992 to 2006. At the disaggregate level, there has been a gradual decline in the 
22 There were a number of regression specifications which explored estimates of time-trend coefficients which controlled for/did 
not control for the business cycle and for Individual and job characteristics at each of the first and second stales of the estimation 
procedure outlined in section 6.2.2. The previous two sections from this chapter have shown median job tenure and job tenure 
shares in specific bands are counter-cyc!lcal to the movements of the business cycle; but these trends are also likely to vary with 
individual and job characteristics. Battu ~ t t al., (2002) found certain personal characteristics may allow workers to obtain lreater 
job security throulh favourable contractual lock-In effects. They report married males are offered favourable contractual 
arranlements whilst the presences of children or career Interruptions offer fewer contractual safe&uards. Whilst the type of 
contract workers are offered Is important, this chapter wishes to explore whether jobs have become shorter and hence may not 
last a life-time without beinl influenced In anyway by personal characteristics. Appendices 6 and 7 provide the full list of tables 
and the estimated coefficients for the various regression specifications that were run from the BHPS and QLFS data sets. The 
estimated coefficients presented In tables 6.1 to 6.4 only report estimated time-trend coefficients which account for Individual, 
jobs and cycle controls. 
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number men and women with no dependent children who have at least five years job tenure. 
The estimated time-trend coefficients are small and they suggest a small change to medium 
term job tenure shares over time. For example, if average job tenure is at most 60 months, 
then roughly speaking these estimated time-trend coefficients suggest these job tenure shares 
have declined by approximately 5-10%. This roughly translates to a 3 to 6 month fall in 
medium job tenure over the period 1992 to 2006. 
For job tenure shares >=10 years, estimated time-trend coefficients from the QLFS show a 
significant decline for the aggregate sample, for men and for women with no children. The 
estimated coefficients show men experienced a 0.59 per year percentage point decline in long 
term job tenure shares (this is an 8.85% fall over the sample period). Women with no children 
experienced a 0.53 yearly percentage point decline (this equates to a 7.95% over the sample 
period). For the sample as a whole there has been a 0.42 yearly percentage point fall (this a 
6.9% decline over the fifteen year sample period). The estimated results from the BHPS 
(results from column 3) show only women with children have seen a 0.06 yearly percentage 
point rise in job tenure shares >=10 years. This is a 0.9% rise in their long term job tenure 
shares over the sample. There are no other Significant time-trend coefficients for any other 
group presented within this table. 
These estimated time-trend coefficients suggest that the number of men and women with no 
dependent children who have job tenure shares greater than or equal to ten years has 
declined over the sample time frame. For example, if average job tenure is roughly 120 
months and these long term job tenure shares have roughly declined by 10% over the period 
1992 to 2006, this figure suggests long term job tenure shares have declined by roughly 12 
months. For men and for women with no children, these long term job tenure shares have 
declined by less than 10%, thus they indicate long term job tenure shares have declined by at 
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most 10 months over fifteen years. This is a very small fall in the long term job tenure shares. 
These results re-affirm the results from figure 6.6. 
Table 6.1: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients for Short, Medium & Long Term Tenure Trends 
QLFS Data: 1992·2006 BHPS 1991·2005 
'ndlvldua' + Job , 'ndlvldua' + Job " 'ndlvldua' + Job , 'ndlvldua' + Job " 
+cyde(J} +cyde(Z} +qde(3} + ~ 4 } }
Tenure <1 Year 
Total 0.14 0.17 O.OS 0.17 
{O.lS} {O.lO} {O.lS} (O.ll) 
Men 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.26 
{0.l4} {0.19} {0.46} {0.33} 
Women No 0.16 0.20 -0.04 0.03 
Children {O.lS} (O.ll) {0.23} (0.23) 
Women with -0.16 -0.06 -0.09 0.10 
Children {0.37} {0.34} {0.S7} {0.S9} 
Women with -0.45 -0.34 -0.09 0.03 
Children <5yrs {O.29} {0.30} {l.29} {1.2S} 
Tenure >=5 Years 
Total -0.36 nla 0.08 nla 
{0.l4} .... nla (O.lO) nla 
Men -0.53 nla -0.02 nla 
{0.09} ...... nla (O.07) nla 
Women No -0.58 nla 0.12 nla 
Children (0.23} .... nla (0.3l) nla 
Women with 0.19 nla 0.15 nla 
Children {0.l6} nla {O.OB}· nla 
Women with 0.18 nla 0.28 nla 
Children <Syrs {0.20} nla {0.l3}·· nla 
Tenure >=10 Years 
Total -0.42 nla 0.01 nla 
{O.OS}· .... nla (0.02) nla 
Men -0.59 nla -O.OS nla 
{O.ll}· .. • nla (0.03) nla 
Women No -0.53 nla -0.10 nla 
Children {0.07}· .. • nla (O.lO) nla 
Women with 0.002 nla 0.06 nla 
Children (0.05) nla {O.Ol) .. •• nla 
Women with -0.15 nla -0.09 nla 
Children <5yrs (O.H} nla (0.l6) nla 
Sourt:e: Author's own calculations from the BHPS and QLF5. Slgniflcance Level: ··*p<O.Ol, **p<O.05 and *p<O.lO. 
Time-trend coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 so the trend can be read as a yearly percentage 
point change. Bootstrapped standard errors are presented in the parentheses. Please refer to appendices 6 (BHPS 
estimates - table 6.64A) and 7 (QLFS estimates - table 6.1lA) for the full set of estimated coefficients. 
6.3.3.1 Education Specific Regressions 
Job Tenure Shares <l Year 
The top half of table 6.2 presents the estimated time-trend coefficients from the education 
specific regressions for the disaggregate sample. The estimated results from the BHPS reveals 
there are no significant time-trend coefficients for men (column 5) or for women with no 
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children (referred to as WNC from the table - column 6) across all education groups. For 
women with dependent children, the estimated results show a rise for some education 
groups; those who have graduate level education (column 7) have seen their job tenure shares 
<1 year rise by 0.31 yearly percentage points (this represents 4.65% rise over the total 
sample). Whilst for women with children under the age five years, their estimated time-trend 
coefficients suggest a 2.32 yearly percentage pOint decline for graduates (this represents a 
34.8% fall for the sample) and a rise of 12.71 percentage points for non-educated women over 
the period 1993-2005. 
The results for men and for women with no children from the QLFS provide no evidence of any 
change across all education groups. There is also no significant evidence of any change for 
women with dependent children and for women with children under the age of five years. 
These estimated results are in line with the trends shown by figure 6.5. 
Job Tenure Shares >= 5 Years 
The top half of table 6.3 presents the estimated time-trend coefficients from the education 
specific regressions for job tenure shares >=5 years for men and for women with and without 
dependent children. The QLFS results show significant and negative time-trend coefficients 
for men and for women with no children across all education categories. The magnitude of 
the fall is greater for those with a lower intermediate level of education: There is a 0.71 yearly 
percentage point decline for men (this is a 10.65% fall over the sample). For women with no 
children the time-trend coefficient is slightly bigger at 0.78 yearly percentage pOint decline 
(this is an 11.7% fall over the sample). For women with children (column 3) there is a 
significant rise for the no qualification group, accounting for a 0.29 yearly percentage point 
rise (this is a 4.35% rise over the sample). And for women with children aged under the age of 
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five years (column 4), the estimated coefficient suggests a 0.76 yearly percentage rise for the 
no education group (this is an 11.4% rise over the sample period). 
In contrast to the QLFS results, the estimated coefficients from the BHPS show no clear 
pattern across the education groups. The results show a 0.41 yearly percentage point decline 
for men with graduate level education; this is a 6.15% fall over the sample. This estimated 
time-trend coefficient for men is twice as big as the QLFS result (column 1). From other 
results, there is a 0.75 (column 5) yearly percentage point rise for men with no education (the 
QLFS data presents a negative coefficient). There are no significant time-trend coefficients for 
women with no children. For women with children and for women with children under the 
age of five years, there have been significant declines for women with graduate level 
education: a 1.09 yearly percentage point decline for women with children (this is a 16.35% 
decline over the sample span) whilst for women with children under the age of five years 
experienced a slightly bigger decline at 1.36 yearly percentage points per year (this is 20.4% 
fall for the sample span). Women with dependent children (column 7) but with no educational 
qualifications experienced a 0.76 yearly percentage point rise in job tenure shares >=5 years 
(or 11.4% rise over the fifteen year period). 
Job Tenure Shores >= 10 Years 
Finally the top half of table 6.4 presents the estimated time-trend coefficients from the 
education specific regressions for job tenure shares >=10 years for the sample of men and for 
women with and without dependent children. For men and for women with no children, the 
QLFS presents significant and negative time-trend coefficients across all education groups, 
where the yearly percentage point decline increases in magnitude for those workers with 
lower education levels. But the results also show a rise for women with children who have 
lower intermediate or no educational qualifications. 
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Lower intermediate educated males and females with no children experienced a 0.63 and 0.76 
yearly percentage point decline respectively in their long-term job tenure shares (this is a 
9.45% and 11.4% fall over the sample). For women who have children with graduate level 
education and with a lower intermediate level of education, they experienced a 0.25 yearly 
percentage points fall (this is a 3.75% fall over the sample) and a 0.13 yearly percentage pOint 
rise (this is a 1.95% rise over the sample) in their long-term job tenure shares. 
Women with children under the age of five years experienced a 0.31 yearly percentage pOint 
fall (this is a 4.65% fall over the sample) and a 0.42 yearly percentage point rise (a 6.3% rise 
over the sample) in their long-term job tenure shares with graduate level and no educational 
qualifications respectively. It is unclear why women with children who have fewer educational 
qualifications should have higher long term job tenure shares compared to educated women. 
One possible explanation could be that women with education may feel they have better 
prospects of obtaining another job compared to women with fewer qualifications where their 
chances of obtaining another job will be lower; thus they continue with their existing 
employment relationships. This explanation may explain the rise in their long-term and 
medium-term job tenure shares from the QLFS. 
The estimated results from the BHPS tell a similar story. For men and women with no children 
and with graduate level education experienced a 0.27 and 0.12 yearly percentage point 
declines in their long-term job tenure shares over the sample; these magnitudes are 
significantly smaller compared to the QlFS results. For women with children, who have 
graduate level education, they experienced a 0.68 yearly percentage point decline in their 
long-term job tenure shares; whereas women who have no educational qualifications 
experienced a 1.39 yearly percentage point rise in their long-term job tenure shares over the 
sample. 
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6.3.3.2 Age Specific Regressions 
Job Tenure Shares <l Year 
For job tenure shares <1 year, the bottom half of table 6.2 presents no significant time-trend 
coefficients from the BHPS data for men or for women with no children across all age groups. 
For women with dependent children (column 7), the 16-24 age group experienced a 2.14 
yearly percentage point rise (this represents a 32.1% rise over the sample). For women with 
dependent children under the age of five years, (column 8), the estimated coefficient is a 5.14 
yearly percentage point decline for the 40+ age group (this is a 56.54% fall over the period 
1993 to 2003). 
The QLFS results show a 0.12 yearly percentage point rise for men aged 25-39 years (this is a 
1.8% rise over the sample). There are no other significant time-trend coefficients for women 
with dependent children. These estimated results provide some evidence for rising job tenure 
shares under one year for prime aged men and for women with children for the 16 to 24 age 
group, but a decline for older women with dependent children under the age of five years. 
Job Tenure Shares >= 5 YeatS 
For job tenure shares >=5 years, the estimated time-trend coefficients from the bottom half of 
table 6.3 (column 1) show these job tenure shares have declined over time for men from the 
QLFS, where the estimated magnitude from the time-trend coefficients is greatest for prime-
aged workers. The magnitude decreases for each subsequent age group. For example, men 
aged 25-39 years experienced a 0.47 yearly percentage point decline (this is 7.05% decline 
over the sample); men aged 40-49 experienced a 0.40 yearly percentage point decline (this is a 
6% fall over the sample) and men aged 50+ years experienced a 0.12 yearly percentage point 
decline (this is a 1.8% fall over the sample). For women with no children the opposite trend is 
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observed from the results, where the magnitude of the decline from the estimated time-trend 
coefficients increases with age. The 25-39 age group experienced a 0.61 yearly percentage 
point decline (this is a 9.15% fall over the sample), whilst the 40-49 age group experienced a 
0.72 yearly percentage point decline (this is a 10.8% fall over the sample). For women with 
children under the age of five years and are aged between 40-49 years, there is evidence of a 
0.70 yearly percentage point rise for these medium-term job tenure shares (this is a 10.5% rise 
over the sample). These results suggest women who have dependent children as they get 
older are more likely to retain their jobs as they start their families to maintain job security 
rather than to have lengthy spells out of employment with small children. Whereas men tend 
to spend more time in employment as they get older and in most cases, men who have 
dependent children tend to be the bread winners in their families. 
From the BHPS results, there are fewer significant coefficients in contrast to the QLFS results. 
The BHPS results show men aged 40-49 years experienced a 0.36 yearly percentage point rise 
in job tenure shares >=5 years (this is a 5.4% rise over the sample). Whilst the 50+ age group 
experienced a 0.27 yearly percentage pOint decline in their medium-term job tenure shares 
(this is a 4.05% fall over the sample). For women with no children there are no significant time 
trend coefficients. For women with children and for women with children under the age of 
five years, there has been a rise for the 25-39 age group. The estimated time-trend 
coefficients show a 0.56 and 0.85 yearly percentage rises over the main child-bearing age. 
This is an 8.4% and 12.75% rise over the sample. 
The evidence from the medium job tenure shares show there have been secular declines for 
men and for women under the age of 50 years, whilst prime-aged and older women with 
dependent children have experienced a rise over this time frame. 
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Job Tenure Shares >= 10 Yeal'S 
The bottom half of table 6.4 presents the estimated results for job tenure shares >=10 years. 
From the QlFS results, the estimated time-trend coefficients for men are negative and they 
show the decline in long-term job tenure shares increase with age: The 30-39 age group 
experienced a 0.84 yearly percentage point decline (this is a 12.6% fall over the sample). For 
the 40-49 age group, the yearly percentage point decline rises to 0.99 (this is a 14.85% fall 
over the sample). For women with no children, the estimated time-trend coefficients show 
job tenure shares have declined over time, where the magnitude of the fall decreases with 
increasing age. The 30-39 age group experienced a 1.13 yearly percentage point decline (this 
is a 16.95% fall over the sample). The 40-49 age group experienced a 0.99 yearly percentage 
point decline (this is a 14.85% fall over the sample) and the 50+ age group experiencing a 0.42 
yearly percentage point decline (this is a 6.3% fall over the sample span). For women with 
dependent children there is a significant rise in long-term job tenure shares for the 50+ age 
group; there is a half a percentage point rise per year or a 7.05% rise over the sample. There 
are no Significant time-trend coefficients for women with children aged under five years. 
From the BHPS data, there is no evidence of any change across the age groups for men or for 
women with no dependent children. For women with children aged less than 40 years 
(column 7) there is a very small rise amounting to a 0.08 yearly percentage points (this is a 
1.2% rise over the sample). But there is no evidence of Significant changes for other groups of 
workers by age or by presence of dependent children. 
The estimated coefficients for job tenure shares >=10 years show men and women with no 
dependent children experienced a fall in their long-term job tenure shares over the period 
1991 to 2006 for workers under the age of 50. Additionally, these long-term job tenure shares 
have continued to rise for women who have dependent children and for women with children 
358 
under the age of five years. But these latter results show the estimated time-trend 
coefficients are smaller in magnitude for the 1991 to 2006 period in comparison to the 
reported results from Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) analysis from the mid 1970s to 1998. 
Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) conclude from their results that the changing nature of jobs that 
are offered to workers and changes in the structure of industry may have lead to the decline in 
the medium and long-term job tenure shares. This may be true if the nature of job contracts 
offered to new workers entering the workforce has changed over time. For example, if staff 
contacts were phased out and replaced with flexible job contracts - this could explain the 
decline in the medium and long-term job tenure shares and a rise in short-term job tenure 
shares over the mid 1970s to the 1990s. This may also explain why women with dependent 
children have experienced a smaller rise in their long-term job tenure shares over the post 
1990 period. But these explanations are just suppositions as the observed changes to short, 
medium and long-term job tenure shares have increased and declined over time but they do 
not provide an explanation as to why these trends have been observed over time. The 
exploration of job transitions trends from time period t - 1 to t may provide the answer to 
this question. 
These results may be linked to a rise in job-to-job transitions - that is workers who remain 
continuously in employment but transition to new employment from one year to the next. Or 
it could also be the result of a rise in job-to-unemployment transitions over time. These 
explanations may account for the fall in these medium and longer job tenure shares over time. 
I would argue that there is more impetus for these explanations for the last two decades as 
the advancements in technology have enabled many forces associated with globalisation, such 
offshoring, outward FDI and the dynamic nature of comparative advantage to affect the job 
creation and destruction rates over time. The reported changes that have been observed to 
the short, medium and long-term job tenure shares as measures of job security are not able to 
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provide these explanations. Job tenure as a measure for job security simply just tells one that 
it has increased or declined over time but it does not provide an explanation as to why these 
changes may have occurred over time. This is one potential sort coming for job tenure as a 
measure for job security. 
The next section examines whether the secular decline in these long and medium job tenure 
shares and a rise in short term job tenure shares can be explained by a rise in job-to-job or job-
to-unemployment transitions as well as other job transition states over time. 
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Table 6.2: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients from Education & Age Specific Regression for Job Tenure under 1 Year 
QLFS 1992·2006 BHPS 1991-2005 
Men WNe we WCS Men WNe we WCS 
IndMdUDI + Job I IndlvldUDI + Job I IndMdwl + Job I Individual + Job I Indlvldwl + Job I Individual + Job I Individual + Job I Indlvldwl + Job I 
+ qc/e (1) +qc/e(2} +qc/e(3} +qc/e(4} +cvde(5} + CVC/e (6) +cvc/e(1J + cvde (BJ 
Education 
Graduate 0.22 -0.02 -0.25 -0.25 0.13 0.06 0.31 -2.32" 
(O.30) (0.6O) (0.36) (0.36) (0.90) (0.62) (O.B)" (O.92}"" 
Hish Intermediate 0.10 -0.18 -0.09 -0.42 0.20 -0.10 0.24 0.47 
(O.21) (O.24) (O.27) (O.27) (0.46) (0.33) (0.61) (1.43) 
Low Intermediate 0.26 0.48 -0.09 -0.56 -0.10 -0.09 0.02 0.53 
(O.34) (O.33) (0.47) (O.43) (0.70) (0.71) (1.06) (2.16) 
None 0.37 0.52 -0.30 -0.46 0.54 -0.05 -0.90 12.71' 
(0.31) (0.51) (0.79) (1.85) (0.60) (0.36) (3.10) (7.58)" 
AD 
Ale 16-24 0.40 -0.04 0.10 -0.78 0.40 0.69 2.14 -0.02 
(0.56) (0.49) (l.O6) (1.05) (0.90) (0.79) (1.06) .... (1.07) 
Ale 25-39 0.12 0.12 -0.07 -0.19 0.11 -0.02 -0.07 0.10 
(0.05) .... (0.09) (0.11) (0.16) (0.27) (O.31) (0.13) (0.44) 
Ale 40-49 0.08 0.03 -0006 -0.11 0.003 -0.14 -0.09 -5.14° 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.46) (0.09) (0.18) (0.19) (3.02)" 
Ale 50+ 0.009 0.03 nla nla 0.04 -0.01 nla nla 
(0.03) (O.03) nla nla (0.09) (0.07) nla nla 
~ : : estimates compiled by the author. Significance Level: ···p<O.Ol, ··p<O.05 and ·p<O.10. Time-trend coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 50 the trend can be read as a yearly 
percentage point chanle. Bootstrapped standard errors presented in the parentheses. Identification Key: WNe = women with no dependent children; we = women with dependent children and WCS = 
women with dependent children under the age of 5 years. Symbol Key: 0 - resresslon run for the period 1993-2005; P - regression run for period 1991-2005; " - regression run for the period 1991-
2002; a - Ale dummy groups 46-50, 51-55 and 56-59 dropped; the latter two groups dropped out due to colllnearity, the former due to year dummy 1992 being dropped. See appendices 6 (BHPS data 
estimates - tables 6.7A - 6.8A) and 7 (QLFS estimates - tables 6.12A - 6.13A) for the full set of estimated coefficients with different sets of control variables used at the first and second stage of 
estimation. 
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Table 6.3: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients from Education & Age Specific Regression for Job Tenure greater than or equal to 5 Years 
QLFS 1992-2006 BHPS 1991-2005 
Men WNC WC WCS Men WNe we wcs 
IndIvIdUIIl + Job I IndltlldUIII + Job I IndillldUIII + Job I IndlvldUIII + Job I Individual + Job I Indlvlduol + Job I Individual + Job I Individual + Job I 
+cydeI1} +cydeIZ} +cvcleI3} +cvdeI4} +cvdeI5} +cycIe16} + cycle {7} + cycle IB} 
Education 
Graduate -0.19 -0.28 -0.17 -0.23 -0.41 0.05 -1.09 -1.36 
(0. OS}·'" (OlJ6}··· (o.o9)· (0.20) (0. OS}"'· (O.09) (0.22}·" (0.33}·" 
High Intermediate -0.49 -0.72 0.27 0.30 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.22 
(O.lO}··· (0.24}··· (0.23) (0.30) (0.07) (0.20) (O.04) (0.17) 
Low Intermediate -0.71 -0.78 0.28 0.39 -0.19 -0.03 0.27 0.43 
(O.OS}· ... (0.32}'" (0.20) (0.22)· (0.14) (0.85) (0.17) (0.3S) 
None -0.43 -0.64 0.29 0.76 0.75 -0.19 0.76 1.07
a 
(O.lS}··· (0.29)·· (0.12)·· (O.lS}··· (0.23}·" (0.52) (0. 1 7)*'" (3.53) 
Ale 
Age 25-39 -0.47 -0.61 0.29 0.30 -0.08 0.22 0.56 0.85 
(0.19)*· (0.31)·· (0.20) (0.29) (0.18) (0.40) (0.18)· ... (0.33)'" 
Age 40-49 -0.40 -0.72 0.24 0.70 0.36 0.42 0.03 -0.15 
(O.OS}··· (0.27}··· (0.23) (0.33)·· (O.lS)·· (0.43) (0.36) (1.21) 
Age 50+ -0.12 -0.15 0.41 nla -0.27 -0.08 0.80 nla 
(o.06)· (o.lO) (0.29) nla (O.lO}'" (0.30) (0.87) nla 
StHIrca: Estimates compiled by the author. Significance Level: ···p<O.Ol, ··p<O.OS and ·p<O.lO. Time-trend coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 so the trend can be read as a yearly 
percentage point change. Bootstrapped standard errors presented In the parentheses. Identification Key: WNC = women with no dependent children; we = women with dependent children and WCS = 
women with dependent children under the ale of 5 years. Symbol Key: n - regression run for the period 1993-2003; ~ ~ regression run for period 1991-2005; 0- regression run for the period 1991-2002; 
a- Age dummy groups 46-50, 51-55 and 56-59 dropped; the latter two groups dropped out due to coilinearity, the former due to year dummy 1992 being dropped. See appendices 6 (BHPS data 
estimates - tables 6.9A - 6.10A) and 7 (QLFS estimates - tables 6.14A - 6.15A) for the full set of estimated coefficients with different sets of control variables used at the first and second stale of 
estimation. 
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Table 6.4: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients for Education & Age Specific Regression for Job Tenure greater than or equal to 10 Years 
QLFS 1992-2006 BHPS 1991-2005 
Men WNC WC WCS Men WNC WC WCS 
IndlvldlDI + Job t IndlvldlDI + Job t Indlvldlltll + Job I tndlvldlltll + Job I tndlvldUGI + Job I tndlvldlMlt + Job I IndlvldlMll + Job I IndlvldlMll + Job I 
+cyct.(1} + ~ ( 2 J J +cyct.(3) +cyde(4} +qcM(5} +cyde(6} +qcMJ1} + g d e ~ } }
Education 
Graduate -0.37 -0.36 -0.25 -0.31 -0.27 -0.12 -0.68 -
(O.O6}·" (O.O6}·" (0.06)··· (0.13)·· (0.04)··· (0.05)" (0.18)"· -
High Intermediate -0.47 -0.68 -0.13 -0.24 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03 -0.08 
(0.13)··· (0.20)··· (0.13) (0.25) (0.03)·· (0.16) (0.04) (0.15) 
Low Intermediate -0.63 -0.76 0.13 -0.13 0.03 -0.11 0.15 0.37 
(0.12)··· (O.H)·" (0.06)" (0.15) (0.11) (0.29) (0.08)· (0.66) 
None -0.53 -0.68 0.07 0.42 0.36 -0.52 1.39 -
(0.11)··· (0.17)··· (0.07) (O.23)· (0.25) (0.51) (0.57)·· -
Ale 
Al,e30-39 -0.84 -1.13 -0.03 -0.20 -0.13 -0.03 0.08 -0.01 
(0.17)··· (0.25)··· (0.04) (0.15) (0.09) (0.06) (0.02)*** (0.09) 
A l , e ~ 9 9 -0.99 -0.99 0.11 -0.19 -0.20 0.01 -0.001 -0.78 
(0.15)*** (0.13)*·· (O.14) (O.53) (0.13) (0.26) (0.05) (0.69) 
Al,eSO+ -0.17 -0.42 0.47 nla -0.19 -0.25 0.33 nla 
(O.17) (0.16)··· (0.28)· nla (0.37) (0.27) (0.27) nla 
Source: Estimates compiled by the author. Significance Level: ···p<O.01, ··p<O.05 and ·p<O.10. Time-trend coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 so the trend can be read as a yearly 
percentage point change. Bootstrapped standard errors presented In the parentheses. Identification Key: WNe = women with no dependent children; we = women with dependent children and WCS = 
women with dependent children under the ale of 5 years. See appendices 6 (BHPS data estimates - tables 6.9A - 6.10A) and 7 (QLFS estimates - tables 6.14A - 6.15A) for the full set of estimated 
coefficients with different sets of control variables used at the first and second stage of estimation. 
6.4 Job Transition Trends: An Alternative Measure for Job Security 
This section of the chapter explores whether the fall in medium and long-term job tenure 
shares and the rise in short-term job tenure shares noted in the last section can be explained 
by the type of job transitions that can occur over time. There are four types of job transitions 
that can be made from year t - 1 to year t, these are: (1) job-to-job transitions; (2) job-to-
unemployment transitions; (3) job-to-non-activity transitions and (4) job-to-self-employment 
transitions. 
This section of analysis has two purposes: First, the type of job transitions made over time is 
used as an alternative measure for job security in comparison to job tenure. Job tenure as a 
measure for job security only tells one that it is rising over time - indicating jobs are stable and 
secure. Or they are falling over time - because workers quit their jobs or because workers 
were made redundant through mass layoffs/plant closures. These changes to job tenure tell 
us nothing about why it is rising or falling over time. Second, the job transition analysis 
examines whether the rise in short-term job tenure and the fall in medium and long-term job 
tenure shares can be explained by a rise in job-to-job transitions or whether this can be due to 
a rise in the probability of becoming unemployed (a job-to-unemployment transition) or 
because of a higher proportion of workers becoming inactive from the labour market. 
This chapter explores the changes from three types of job transition states from time period 
t -1 to t; these are: (a) job-to-job (EE) transitions, (b) job-to-unemployment (EU) transitions 
and (c) job-to-non-activity (EN) transitions. The job-to-job transition (EE) state is further split 
into two additional groups: the first is measure (1), which explores the proportion of EE 
transitions that accounts for workers who may be described as job-stayer. These workers 
continue to remain in employment with their current employer from one year to the next. Job 
transitions for these workers are identified as having 12 months of job tenure or more and are 
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differentiated from EE transitions as EEl transitions23. Measure (2) explores job-to-job 
transitions for workers who remain in employment but transition to new jobs from one year to 
the next. These individuals are identified with having less than 12 months of job tenure and 
are distinguished from EE transitions as EE2 transitions. This further classification of job 
transition measure 'EE' is important as these measures enable the exploration of whether job-
to-job transitions are driven by measure (1) or by measure (2). These measures also enable 
one to explore whether jobs are continuing to last with current employers (one expects an 
upward trend for job stayers) but also whether jobs are becoming shorter because there is an 
upward trend towards remaining in employment but frequently transitioning to new jobs. A 
point of note here is that these measures are imperfect but they are used to assess job 
security trends along with job-to-unemployment (EU) transition trends as there is no direct 
way to identify voluntary or involuntary job separations from the BHPS and QLFS. 
6.4.1 estimation Strategy 
To explore the changes to these job transitions states over time, I follow the two step 
estimation strategy outlined in section 6.2 but with a few minor changes to the first and 
second stages of the estimation procedure. 
First Stage 
(3) 
For the first stage, equation (3) is estimated for individual i at time t. The data for each year 
of the sample (that is 1992-2007 for the QLFS and 1991-2005 for the BHPS) are pooled 
together to identify the changes to each of the job transition states, conditional upon a set of 
calendar year dummy variables and a set of control variables. Variable ET identifies the job 
23 Exploring job-to-job trends for workers who may be classed as job stayers are not strictly job transitions per se as workers are 
not moving to other jobs. Hence these trends cannot be strictly described as transitions but rather job stayer trends. 
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transition state (T) made in period t from period t - 1 where the individual is in a state of 
employment (E). The other transition states are: T = E, El, E2, or U, which were defined 
above. 
Equation (3) includes control variables for the composition of the workforce and other socio-
economic factors that could influence the job transitions over time. These control variables 
are: Individual Controls (Xt,d consisting of age, educational attainment, children, marital 
status and regional dummy variables. Job Controls (Yt,t) consists of 5 broad industry dummy 
variables only. No attempt is made to control for the occupations that workers are employed 
by in period t or whether a job is temporary or part-time. This is because job security can 
change due to task biased technological change. Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) argue that 
computer capital may be able to substitute for human labour in job tasks that are routine and 
repetitive in nature; see the empirical evidence from chapters 2 and 5. Temporary and part-
time job characteristics are also factors that may affect job security over time. Therefore, 
using occupation dummies as controls could inhibit the full extent of the changes made from 
one job transition state to another. Finally, variable Year represents a series of calendar year 
dummy variables for each cross section of data that is used in estimation. 
Equation (3) is estimated via probit specification using the QlFS for the period 1994-2007 and 
for the BHPS data sample covering 1993-2005. The marginal effects from the calendar year 
dummy variables are evaluated at the mean of the independent variables. 
second Smge 
me = Po + Pi Unemploymentt + P2 Timet + Et (4) 
For the second stage of estimation, equation (4) is estimated. The estimated marginal effects 
(me) from the calendar year dummy variables from equation (3) are regressed (via OLS) onto a 
linear time-trend (this is variable Time) and the unemployment rate is used to control for the 
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economic environment. Controlling for the cycle is important as this chapter seeks to 
establish whether there is evidence of a secular rise in job insecurity emanating from changing 
job transition states over time. The analysis from section 6.3 noted voluntary job separations 
can be pro-cyclical and involuntary job separations can be counter-cyclical to the movements 
of the business cycle which could affect the type of job transition that is made over time. Not 
accounting for the cycle or not utilising control variables may lead to wrong conclusions. 
As with the job tenure analysis, the year estimates are effectively sample year average 
transition estimates and therefore may be subject to heteroskedasticity when pooled. The 
standard errors from the second stage regression analysis are bootstrapped with robust 
standard errors reported from these repetitions. The reported standard errors come from 500 
repetitions. 
6.4.2 Regression Analysis of Job Transition Shares over Time 
Tables 6.Sa and 6.Sb present the estimated time-trend coefficients from the two-stage 
regression analysis. All estimated coefficients account for individual and job controls from the 
first stage of estimation and the cycle in the second stage24• All estimated coefficients have 
been multiplied by 100 so that the time-trend coefficients can be interpreted as yearly 
percentage point changes. They reflect the sample average job transition change per year -
this means that if the estimated time-trend coefficient is positive for EU transitions, this 
implies on average EU transitions have risen by 'X'% per year. SpeCific job transition 
regressions are estimated for the aggregate sample, men, and women with and without 
dependent children, by education and age speCific regressions along with specific regression 
for public and private sector workers. 
24 Due to reasons for brevity, I have not provided a copy of all the estimated time-trend coefficients for each of the job transitions 
states with the Inclusions of different combinations of Individual, job and cyde control variables that were estimated with the 
QLFS and BHPS data sets In this thesis. They can be obtained by requesting a copy from the author. The results from these 
regressions show the cyclical control variable within the second stap of estimation Is Important because otherwise the estimated 
time-trend coeffident would be under-estlmated. The Inclusion of the control variables In the first stale appears to have 
negligible effects upon the overall estimated time-trend coefficients. 
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For the aggregate sample, columns (1) to (3) from table 6.5a presents the time-trend 
coefficients for three types of job-to-job transitions; these are EE, Eel and EE2 transitions. 
They capture the differing degree of employer attachment from period t - 1 to period t. 
From column (1), job-to-job transitions declined by 2 percent over the sample time frame (this 
is a 0.132 per year percentage pOint fall). Accounting for these trends lies with EE2 transitions 
(new employment transitions), which declined by 1.206 percentage points per year (this is a 
17 percent fall over the period 1994-2007). From Eel - job stayer transitions show there has 
been a 0.033 per year percentage point decline (this is a half a percent decline over the 
sample). These latter time-trend coefficients signify strong worker attachments to current 
employers and this could explain why job tenure shares of less than one year have not 
significantly increased over the period 1991 to 2006 - see table 6.1. From column (4), the 
estimated results for the aggregate sample indicate a 0.060 per year percentage point rise for 
EU transitions; this is a one percent rise over the sample. There are no significant EN 
transition trends (column 5). 
Overall, these results indicate a negligible decline in job security, but this secular fall is very 
small over the sample period as a large number of workers have continued to remain with 
their current employers. The estimated time-trend coefficients also show a decline in the 
number of workers making new job transitions (EE2) over the time frame. But more 
importantly these results indicate a very small rise in job-to-unemployment transitions. 
At the disaggregate level, the estimated time-trend coefficients for men are similar to the 
aggregate sample results - which show a decline in job-to-job transitions and a very small rise 
in EU transitions over time. For women, their estimated EU time-trend coefficient Signifies a 
0.714% rise over the sample. Additionally, the estimated magnitudes of the EU time-trend 
coefficients for women with and without dependent children are very similar per year. But, 
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these time-trend coefficients are very small and they imply there is no increasing tendency for 
women with and without children to become unemployed over time. 
Workers employed in highly skilled occupations experienced a 1.72% fall in EE transitions over 
the sample. Part of this fall is attributed to a half a percentage point fall in job stayer trends 
with present employers and a one percent point rise in EU and EN transitions over the sample. 
Low skilled workers are least likely to make new job transitions over time; their estimated 
time-trend coefficient shows a 17.6% fall in new job transitions (EE2); they are more likely to 
become unemployed with a 0.84% rise in EU transitions over the sample. This evidence shows 
that although EU transitions have increased by a percentage point or less over the sample for 
high and low skilled workers, these time-trend coefficients are very small and they imply that 
the risk of becoming unemployed has been very small over the period 1994 to 2007. Finally, 
estimated time-trend coefficients for private sector workers are very small. These workers are 
less likely to make new job tranSitions, where the estimated coefficient signifies a 6.23% fall in 
their job changing (EE2) transitions. This group of workers are also less likely to become 
unemployed as the estimated EU transition coefficient is close to zero but also inSignificant. 
The results from the BHPS data show there are no significant coefficients for the aggregate 
sample. For men and for women with no children and women with children, skill groups, and 
private sector workers, the estimated time trend-coefficients from columns (1) to (5) also 
provide few significant coefficients. The lack of significant time-trend coefficients suggests 
there is no evidence that job security has changed over the period 1991 to 2007. 
To sum up, the estimated results from table 6.5a, panel (A) reveal very little evidence to 
suggest there has been a secular rise in job insecurity over time. There is no evidence to show 
EE2 transition trends have increased over time and there is also no great tendency for workers 
to become unemployed over time. But the estimated results do suggest that workers are 
more likely to remain in employment with their current employers. 
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From table 6.5b, panel (B) presents the estimated coefficients from the education specific 
regressions. From the QlFS data, individuals with graduate level education experienced a 2 
percent fall (a 0.153 per year percentage point fall) from EE transitions. Workers with lower 
intermediate level education and workers with no formal qualifications also have negative EE 
time-trend coefficients, but workers with no qualifications are more likely to transition to 
unemployment. Their estimated time-trend coefficient is positive and it implies a 0.134 per 
year percentage point rise - or a 2 per cent rise in EU transitions over the sample. The BHPS 
estimates from panel (B) provide only two significant coefficients which are different to the 
QLFS results. These two coefficients show workers with graduate level education are more 
likely to remain in employment and workers with no educational qualifications are less likely 
to transition to unemployment. 
Finally from table 6.5b, panel (C) presents age specific regressions. The results from the QLFS 
data show young workers aged 16-24 years are less likely to make new job transitions (EE2); 
the estimated coefficient implies a decline of 30% over the sample. This group of workers are 
more likely to experience EU transitions; the estimated coefficient indicates a 4% rise on 
average over the sample. These results imply that this age group are most likely to experience 
unemployment as they are new entrants to the labour market where they will not have 
accumulated the general human capital experiences compared to the other age groups. They 
are more likely to experience employment changes early on within their careers as these 
workers try to find a good employer - employee job match. The BHPS results show prime-
aged workers (25-39) are less likely to make new job transitions (column (8); the estimated 
time-trend coefficient implies a 14 per cent decline over the sample). And workers aged 40-49 
years are more likely to be in employment, the estimated time-trend coefficient suggests a 
0.250 per year percentage point rise in EE transitions or a 3.25% rise over time. 
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In summary, the results from tables 6.5a and 6.5b yield few significant coefficients. There are 
few EU time-trend coefficients that are significant and positive; the magnitude from these 
estimated coefficients are small and they imply a small secular rise in the probability of 
becoming unemployed. But there is no clear pattern across the education and age groups. If 
anything, job security appears to have changed very little over time as there is no increasing 
tendency to become unemployed or to change employers. 
371 
IJo) 
..... 
N 
\ 
Table 6.5a: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients for various Job Transitions States 
Sample QLFSData BHPSData 
EE EEl EE2 EU EN EE EEl EE2 EU EN 
(l) (Z) (3) (4) (S) (6) (l) (I) (9) (lO) 
Panel (AI: Sample pedflc Trends 
Agregate Sample -a.132 -a.033 -1.206 0.060 0.022 0.098 0.033 -a.506 -a.OO3 -a.029 
(O.053}'" (O.OlS}'" (O.509)·· (0.017)··· (0.027) (O.093) (0.066) (0. 615} (0.013) (O.041) 
Men -a.156 -a.042 -1.440 0.064 -a.007 0.103 0.044 -a.727 -a.OO9 -a.037 
(0.039)··· (O.043) (O.478}··· (O.O34)· (O.023) (0. lOB) (0.062) (O.707) (O.014) (O.030) 
WNC -a. 136 -a.Ol0 -1.061 O.OSl 0.053 0.126 0.085 -a.497 0.002 -a.osa 
(O.O94) (O.OlO) (1.087) (O.024}'" (O.056) (0.138) (0.088) (0.834) (0.021) (0.068) 
Women -a.112 -a.Oll -a.992 0.052 0.013 0.069 0.018 -a.281 -0.008 0.053 
(O.076) (0.010)·· (0.679) (O.Oll}· ... (0.056) (O.09B) (0.089) (0.591) (0.014) (0.083) 
we -a.0B6 -a.035 -a.991 0.052 -a.042 -a.074 -a.llS 0.047 -a.027 0.269 
(0.094) (0.009)··· (0.608) (0.030)· (0.087) (O.276) (0.230) (1.263) (0.012)·· (O.202) 
High Skill -a.123 -0.036 -1.355 0.070 0.070 -a.172 -a.098 -1.033 -a.012 0.039 
(0.069)· (0.016)·· (0.978) (0.025)··· (O.025}··· (0.0156) (0.141) (0.607)· (0.010) (0.091) 
Medium Skill -a. 156 -a.028 -1.232 0.045 0.055 -0.200 -0.128 -a.781 -0.030 0.158 
(0.100) (0.016)· (O.691)· (0.046) (0.037) (0.103)· (O.HO) (0.307)'" (0.028) (0.087)· 
Low Skill -a. 194 -a.OlB -1.258 0.061 0.083 0.065 0.043 0.052 -a.038 0.183 
(0.054)··· (0.030) (O.515)·· (0.034)· (0.060) (0.372) (0.282) (1.084) (0.081) (O.201) 
Public Sector Workers 
- -
- - -
-0.058 -a.075 -a.OO4 -a.013 0.073 
- - - - -
(0.122) (0.092) (0.657) (0.019) (0.092) 
Private Sector Workers -0.072 -a.039 -a.445 -0.003 0.075 -0.144 -a. 112 -0.347 -0.033 0.137 
(O.OlS}··· (0.021)· (O.232)· (O.OO4) (O.029}· ... (O.O6O}'" (O.057)·· (O.lSO}'" (0.024) (O.047}··· 
Soune: Results compiled by the author. Slgnlflcance Level: ···p<O.Ol, ··p<O.05 and ·p<O.lO. Identlflcatlon Key: WNe = Women with no dependent children; we 
• Women with dependent children; Women - women with and without children. Time-trend coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 
100 so the time-trend coefficients can be read as yearly percentage point changes. Bootstrapped standard errors are presented in the parentheses. Reported 
coefficients account for Individual and job characteristics and for the cycle. High Skilled Occupations: legislators, senior officials and managers; professionals; 
technicians and associate professionals. Medium Skilled Occupations: clerks; services workers and shop and market sales workers; craft and related trades 
workers. Low Skilled Occupations: skilled agricultural and fishery workers; plant and machine operators and assemblers and elementary occupations. 
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Table 6.5b: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients for various Job Transitions States 
SImple· QLFSData IHPSData 
EE EEl EEZ EU EN EE EEl EEZ EU EN 
(J) (lJ (J) (4) (5) (6) (7) (S) (9) (lO) 
Panel (I): Education 5DedfIc R s 
Graduate Level -0.153 -0.074 -0.714 0.038 0.002 0.293 0.196 0.415 -0.011 -0.152 
(0.OS7}"- (O.OSl) (0.866) (0.022)- (0.02S) (0.172)- (O.lS6) (1.134) (0.017) (0.097) 
Higher Intermediate -0.062 0.007 -1.193 0.030 0.002 -0.098 -0.080 -0.949 0.025 -0.020 
(0.089) (0.020) (0.519)-- (0.034) (O.O44) (0.124) (0.092) (0.746) (0.017) (0.041) 
Lower Intermediate -0.124 -0.042 -1.368 o.on -0.032 0.164 -0.003 0.301 -0.006 0.026 
(0.070)- (0.022)- (0.471}-" (O.046)- (0.OS3) (0.188) (0.149) (1.271) (0.025) (O.094) 
No Education -0.267 -0.033 -1.607 0.134 0.056 0.619 0.264 -0.401 -0.015 0.151 
{0.lJ9}- (0.037) (0.901)- (0.029)··· (0.142) (0.455) (0.225) (2.382) (0.019}--- (0.161) 
hnel (C): Aae SDedfIc R 
16-24 -0.698 -0.032 -2.144 0.279 0.188 -0.343 -0.323 -0.559 -0.051 0.344 
(O.l66}--- (O.OlS) (O.J82}--- (0.110)** (0.132) {OA76} (0.2U) (1.362) (0.128) (0.284) 
25-39 -0.130 -0.042 -1.075 0.036 -0.008 0.106 0.097 -1.017 -0.007 -0.050 
(0.100) (0.027) (0.893) (0.044) (O.O6O) (0.099) (0.OB1) {0.61B}- (0.009) (0.051) 
40-49 -0.027 -0.051 -0.546 0.011 -0.032 0.250 0.100 0.852 0.004 -0.071 
(0.063) (0.033) (0.411) (0.021) (0.030) (O.llS)" (0.076) (1.272) (O.OlB) (0.054) 
50+ -0.097 -0.031 -0.518 0.064 -0.015 -0.104 -0.115 -0.991 -0.004 0.078 
~ - -
(0.0631 (0.016)-- (0.595) (0.027)" (0.OS2) (0.264) (0.129) (2.652) (0.032) (0.157) 
Source: Results compiled by the author. Significance Level: ···p<O.Ol, ··p<O.05 and ·p<O.lO. Identification Key: WNC = Women with no dependent children; 
we .. Women with dependent children; Women - women with and without children. TIme-trend coefficients and standard errors (In parentheses) are multiplied 
by 100 so the time-trend coeffldents can be read as yearly percentage point changes. Bootstrapped standard errors are presented in the parentheses. Reported 
coeffidents account for individual and job characteristics and for the cycle. Graduate Level Education" Degree or higher level; Higher Intermediate Level " A-
level or equivalent level qualifications; Lower Intermediate Level .. completion of secondary level education or equivalent and No Qualifications " no 
qualifications. Full specifications of results comparing time-trend coeffIdents where different control variables are employed can be obtained from the author 
by request. 
6.4.3 EU and EN Transitions: The Identification of Non-Voluntary Job Separations 
The estimated time-trend coefficients from the last section showed there is some evidence 
that EU transitions have slightly increased over time, although they only indicate a very small 
rise over time. This section tries to determine whether this rise in EU transitions is due non-
voluntary job separations through redundancies or plant closures. If job insecurity has 
increased over time, it is likely to stem from job separations that may be non-voluntary. 
Although there are no direct questions in the BHPS and QlFS surveys that allow one to identify 
voluntary and non-voluntary job separations directly, there are potential questions within the 
two surveys that can be used to identify potential job separations that could be considered to 
be voluntary or non-voluntary. 
Appendices 11 and 12 provide details of the survey questions that were used from both data 
sets to try to identify non-voluntary job separations. It must be noted here that the BHPS does 
not provide a comprehensive set of questions that allow for a further examination of the 
reasons for the job separations that can take place compared to the QlFS; therefore there are 
fewer results from this data set. Table 6.6 provides the estimated time-trend coefficients 
which specifically look at EU and EN transition changes over time for individuals who may have 
become redundant by using these questions. 
There are no questions within the surveys which allow one to identify non-voluntary job 
separations directly. However there are questions within the surveys that try to articulate the 
reasons for job separations which could be deemed to be non-voluntary. For example, a job 
may terminate for a variety of reasons, for instance: (I) dismissal, (II) temporary job finishing, 
(III) staff-cut backs, (IV) firm closure, etc. Firm closure can be thought of as a form of non-
voluntary job separation as workers choose not to vacate their jobs but are forced to do so 
because of firm closure. Other reasons such as temporary job ending or staff-cut backs are 
reasons that cannot be identified outwardly as non-voluntary job separations. This is because 
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there are no additional questions or information that may allow one to identify those 
individuals who may have known their jobs were temporary, but may not have wanted the job 
to end. And the second point in relation to this first point is that staff-cut backs may be 
associated with workers who mayor may not have been encouraged to take redundancies by 
their employers. This would insinuate that some of the redundancies may be voluntary job 
separations, when in fact some of the separations may be non-voluntary. Additionally, EN job 
transitions are also explored over time to assess whether there is a rising tendency for workers 
who may become redundant, these workers may choose to not participate within the labour 
market, ifthey choose to take a break. 
The estimated time-trend coefficients from table 6.6 were obtained by applying the same two 
step procedure outlined in section 6.4.1, but the sample of EU and EN transitions have been 
further filtered by the reasons for the job separation that occur during period t. 
From table 6.6, question M1 explores whether workers may have experienced a redundancy 
within the last three months from the interview date. From this question, the estimated time-
trend coefficient from column (1) suggests there has been a 3.963 per year percentage point 
rise in EU transitions. For the sample period 1994-2007, this figure implies there has been a 55 
percent rise in EU transitions. The estimated coefficient from column (2) suggests there has 
been no significant tendency for EN transitions ensuing from redundancies within the last 
three months. From the BHPS data, column (3) shows there is no significant coefficient; 
whereas column (4) suggests there has been a 0.795 per year percentage point decline in EN 
transitions resulting from redundancies. 
Question M2 explores whether redundancies within the last three months were due to: (I) 
dismissal, (II) workers being made redundant/took voluntary redundancy and (III) temporary 
job finishing. Column (1) reports a 4.452 per year percentage point rise in EU transitions 
resulting from the three listed reasons for job separations (this is a 58 percent rise over the 
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sample period). EN transitions that may emanate from these reasons show there has been a 
2.281 per year percentage point fall (this is a 30 percent fall for the sample period). 
Question M3 explores EU and EN transitions resulting from leaving last job due to: (I) 
dismissal, (II) being made redundant/took voluntary redundancy and (III) temporary job 
finishing, whilst relaxing the redundancy criterion in the last three months. The estimated 
coefficients from the application of question M3 suggest that EU transitions rose by 2.107 
percentage points per year (this is a 27 percent rise over the sample period). EN transitions 
declined by 0.883 percentage points per year (this is an 11 percent drop over the sample). 
Question M4 tries to further refine Question M3 by exploring the reasons for leaving last job 
which may constitute a non-voluntary job separation. From the various reasons that are listed 
as part of question M3, dismissal and temporary job ending may constitute non-voluntary job 
separations. From columns (1) and (2), EU and EN time-trend coefficients are not significant. 
Additionally, the estimated coefficients from the BHPS data also provide no significant results 
to similarly worded questions to the QLFS survey. These results provide no evidence to show 
there has been a rise in the number of workers experiencing non-voluntary job separations 
that result in becoming unemployed over time. 
Questions MS to M8 explore job terminations that may represent voluntary and non-voluntary 
job terminations. Jobs that are terminated due to firm closure may be classed as a non-
voluntary job separation. And jobs which may end due to staff-cut backs can be a result of 
voluntary job separations, although they can also be non-voluntary job separations if 
employers seek to terminate the employment positions of workers who have low ability and 
low productivity (Gibbons & Katz, 1991). From question MS, the estimated time-trend 
coefficient is positive and significant and it implies an 8.327 per year percentage point rise for 
EU transitions (this is a 108 percent rise for the sample period). There are no significant time-
trends coefficients for EN job transitions culminating from redundancies resulting from firm 
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closure in the last three months. Similarly, question M6 explores redundancies resulting from 
firm closure (differing from question M5 by relaxing the 'redundancy' made in last three 
months refinement) suggests there has been a 7.427 per year percentage point rise in EU 
transitions (this is a 96.5 percent rise over the sample period). Again there is no evidence for a 
rise in EN job transitions resulting from firm closure. 
Questions M7 and M8 explore the redundancies that may be the result from staff-cut backs. 
From these two questions, there are no significant time-trend coefficients for EU and EN 
transitions. Questions M9 and MI0 explore EU and EN transitions that may result from firm 
closure or staff-cutbacks. Question M9 suggests that redundancies within the last 3 months 
resulting from firm closure/staff-cut backs have seen EU transitions rise by 5.090 percentage 
points per year (this is a 66 percent rise over the sample period); whilst EN transitions have 
fallen by approximately 2 percentage points per year. The estimated coefficients from 
question MI0 indicate there have been similar changes to EU and EN transitions over time as 
shown from question M9. Thus, the estimated time-trend coefficients from questions M5-
MI0 suggest there is evidence showing there has been a secular rise in job insecurity where 
the reasons for job separations reflect rising EU transitions being driven by redundancies that 
are the result from firm closure and not staff cut backs. Questions Mll and M12 seem to 
conclude similar findings to the above array of question filters which is: rising job Insecurity 
resulting from firm closure. 
However, the estimated time-trend coefficients from this analysis are very large in magnitude 
and they signify very large increases in EU transitions over time which is at odds with the 
results from the previous section and from the job tenure analysis. One reason that could 
explain these inflated coefficients could be because this analysis is based on a very small sub-
sample of individuals who may have experienced a redundancy. Kennedy (2010) notes that 
pro bit estimation is asymptotically unbiased, but it is biased In small samples. This could mean 
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that the filtration of the questions that were used to analyse EU and EN job transitions that 
can be result from voluntary and non-voluntary job separation could result with the estimated 
time-trend coefficients that were based on a sample of less than one hundred observations 
covering almost 14 years of data as part of the first stage estimations. This small sample may 
exaggerate the estimated time-trend coefficients based upon the reasons for job dislocation. 
Thus, to sum up, based on this information, I would say that these time-trend coefficients 
exaggerate the rise in job insecurity over the period 1991 to 2007. The post 1990 and post 
2000 time frame explored by this chapter, is a period that has experienced continuous growth 
in GOP since 1992 and a falling unemployment rate since the early 199Os25• These estimated 
time-trend coefficients seem to be at odds with these facts. 
25 See fllure 3.2 from chapter 3 for further details. 
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Table 6.6: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients for EU and EN Job Transition Trends by Reason for Job Separations 
QLFSData BHPSData 
Reasons For Job SeparatIons EU EN EU EN 
(J} J2} 00 (4L 
Ml: Redundancy In the last three months (QLFS Data: 1994-2007) 3.963 -1.678 0.613 -0.795 
(1.8H)-- (0.993) (0.572) (0.371)--
M2: Redundancy In the last three months due to: (I) dismissed, (II) made redundant/took voluntary redundancy 4.452 -2.281 
- -
and (ill) temporary job finished (QLFS Data: 1995-2007) (2.002)-- (1.103)--
- -
M3: Reasons for leavinllast job due to: (I) dismissed, (II) made redundant/ 2.107 -0.883 
- -
took v o l u n t a ~ ~redundancy and (ill) t e m p o ~ r y y job finished (QLFS Data: 1995-2007) {0.723}--- {0.458}-
- -
M4: Reasons for leavinllast job clue to: (I) dismissed, and (III) temporary job 1.504 -0.971 0.213 -0.236 
finished (QLFS Data: 1995-2007) (1.028) (0.998) (0.582) {0.225} 
M5: Redundancy In the last three months as a result from firm closure (QLFS Data: 1995-2007) 8.327 -1.000 
- -
(4.974)- (2.595) 
- -
M6: Redundancy as a result from firm dosure (QLFS Data: 1995-2007) 7.427 -2.074 
- -
il·139)--- (2.176) - -
M1: Redundancy In the last three months emanatlna from staff cut-badcs (QLFS Data: 1995-2007) 2.512 -1.431 
- -
(3.034) (1.334) 
- -
Me: Redundancy emanatlna from staff cut-backs (QLFS Data: 1995-2007) 1.919 -1.636 
- -
(2.560) (1.342) 
- -
M9: Redundancy In the last three months resultlna from firm dosure or staff 5.090 -2.018 
- -
cut-backs (QLFS Data: 1995-2007) (2.B1W (1.200)-
- -
M1O: Redundancy resultlna from firm dosure or staff cut-backs (QLFS Data: 1995-2007) 4.581 -2.089 - -
(2.256)-- (1.241)-
- -
Mll: Redundancy In the last three months resultlna from belnl made redundant/ 8.830 -1.093 
- -
taken voluntary redundancy resultlnl from firm dosure (QLFS Data: 1995-2007) (5.33W (2.696) - -
M1Z: Redundancy resultl"l from belna made redundant/taken voluntary 7.881 -2.053 - -
r e d u n d a n c y r e s u l t l ~ ~from firm dosure (QLFS Data: 1995-2007) {2.374)--- (2.143) 
- -
Souta: Author's own calculations from the BHPS and QLFS. Note: Sianiflcance Level: ---p<O.Ol, "p<O.05 and -p<O.10. Time-trend coefficients and standard errors 
(In parentheses) are multiplied by 100 so the time-trend coeffIdents can be read as yearty percentale point chanles. The bootstrapped standard errors are 
presented In the parentheses. Appendices 11 and 12 provide details of questions that are used to lenerate questions Ml-M12. The BHPS data questions (appendix 
12) are not the same as the QLFS data (appendix 11). For question M4, the BHPS estimates account for reasons for job separations in last job as being made 
redundant, dismissed or sacked and temporary job ended. For question Ml, the BHPS data explored job separations In last the job that is the result from being made 
redundant. Reported coeffIdents account for IndMdual and job characteristics and for the cycle. 
6.S Discussion 
This chapter has explored two different measures for job security. These are: (a) median job 
tenure and job tenure shares from three specific bands measuring short, medium and long-
term job tenure shares and (b) five different job transition states. This section discusses a 
summary of the findings. 
Using job tenure as a measure for job security, this chapter first provided calculations for 
median job tenure. They were found to be close to the reported findings from the empirical 
literature using the QLFS data (figure 6.1). The estimated calculations showed median job 
tenure was stable post year 2000, at approximately 57 months according to the QLFS 
estimates and at around 4S months from the BHPS estimates. Over the sample, my results 
showed median job tenure at most fell by one month, although median job tenure 
movements are counter cyclical to the movements of the business cycle and thus this measure 
of job security does not definitively show the secular changes that might occur and affect job 
security over time. 
The second part of the analysis explored job tenure shares from three specific bands. The 
main results are summarised by table 6.7 which compares this chapter's estimates of tlme-
trend coefficients to that of Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) paper. This chapter finds no 
evidence of a decline in job tenure shares of less than one year for women with children and 
for women with children under the age of five years, unlike Gregg & Wadsworth (2002). From 
job tenure specific regressions greater than or equal to 5 years, both papers find significant 
declines for men. My estimates show medium job tenure shares declined by 7.95% for the 
period 1992-2006, whereas Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) find a 6.96% fall for the period 1975-
1998. These estimates show the decline in medium job tenure shares for men were greater 
over the post 1990 period than over a twenty four year time span explored by Gregg & 
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Wadsworth (2002). Additionally, this chapter finds modest declines for all workers and for 
women with no children. 
The evidence from long-term job tenure shares show a continued fall for all workers, men and 
for women with no children. For the aggregate sample, job tenure shares greater than or 
equal to 10 years fell by 6.3%; for men there was an 8.85% fall and for women with no 
dependent children, there was a 7.95% fall. These estimates again suggest the decline in long-
term job tenure shares has been greater over the 1992 to 2006 period compared to the 1975 
to 1998 period analysed by Gregg & Wadsworth (2002). I find no evidence for continued rising 
long-term job tenure shares for women with dependent children and for women with children 
under the age of five years compared to the reported results from Gregg & Wadsworth (2002). 
A possible reason for the secular decline in these long-term job tenure shares could be 
attributed to a decline in staff contracts and with the rise in flexible job contracts. The Unfair 
Dismissal and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order was 
introduced in 1999 by the Labour Government; this policy reduced the qualifying period to 
claim unfair dismissal from employment from 24 months to 12 months. Thus, firms have two 
options: (1) to employ better monitoring procedures to make sure workers with the right skill 
intensities are hired and (2) to specifically state when advertising vacancies that jobs are 
attached with a short term contract. Although, these explanations are only speculation, which 
have not formally been examined by this thesis. 
From the education and age specific regressions (results not reported here), I find no evidence 
of there being a rise in job tenure shares of less than one year for men or for women without 
children. But Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) report a rise for men across all education groups 
(higher rises were for those with graduate level education) with significant time-trend 
coefficients observed for women with no children. From the age specific regressions, Gregg & 
Wadsworth (2002) find the 16-24 age groups for men and women with no children 
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experienced a rise in their short-term job tenure shares over time. For women with children 
and for women with children under the age of five years, Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) find 
declines across most age and education groups, with the greater magnitude of the decline for 
the most educated workers and those aged less than 40 years. 
From job tenure shares greater than or equal to 5 years and greater than or equal to 10 years, 
I find significant declines across most age and all education groups for men and for women 
with no children. My results also show these medium and long-term job tenure shares have 
continued to rise for women with children and for women with children under the age of five 
years in accordance with the results from Gregg & Wadsworth's (2002) paper. But my results 
present fewer significant coefficients that are smaller in magnitude. Gregg & Wadsworth 
(2002) find significant declines from long-term job tenure shares for men and for women with 
no children, but rises across most age and education groups for women with children and for 
women with children under the age of five years in age. 
With job security assessed from a variety of short, medium and long-term job tenure shares 
over time, my results show there is evidence of a secular decline in job security, but they are 
small. The evidence shows medium and longer-term job tenure shares declined for men and 
for women with no children. For women with children and for women with children under the 
age of five years, this chapter finds little change In their job security. Although short-term job 
tenure shares declined for women who have dependent children, their medium and long-term 
job tenure shares have not risen as much over the post 1990 period analysed by this chapter 
compared to Gregg & Wadsworth (2002). This could be because the three job tenure 
classifications used to examine these trends do not pick up those with job tenure between one 
and five years. 
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The next stage of analysis tried to understand whether the fall in medium and long-term job 
tenure shares were the result of a rise in job-to-job transitions or job-to-unemployment 
transitions or both. If globalisation has increasingly integrated world markets, ideas through 
trade and advancements in information technology, jobs could increasingly become less 
secure if competition puts pressure on production costs. This could in turn affect the demand 
for labour. Job creation and destruction rates could rise as the nature of comparative 
advantage becomes more kaleidoscopic. This would mean workers would continually be 
forced to search for new jobs if their jobs are not permanent and/or secure or they may 
become unemployed if they are unable to find another job. Thus, this next stage of analysis 
tried to determine whether job-to-job (EE) transitions or job-to-unemployment (EU) 
transitions had increased over time. 
Taking EU transitions as a measure for job security, my results show there has been a small 
rise in EU transitions - insinuating a small rise in job insecurity over time. This evidence shows 
there has been a slight decline in job security for the aggregate sample, for men and for 
various sub-samples for women. By age and education specific regressions, there is very little 
evidence of declines in job security from the results. 
Finally, the last part of this chapter explored EU and EN transitions resulting from the reasons 
that lead to job separations. The aim of this analysis was to gage whether EU and EN 
transitions had increased over time because of non-voluntary job separations emanating from 
firm closure and layoffs. This analysis showed the estimated time-trend coefficients were 
large and positive for EU and EN transitions. However, the estimated time-trend coefficients 
were brought into doubt because the analYSis was based on a small sample of observations 
which focused on workers who had become redundant over a period of ten years or more. 
This chapter concludes there Is no evidence of rising job insecurity emanating from job 
dislocations that may be non-voluntary. 
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Table 6.7: Comparison of Findings from Time Trend Coefficients 
Grea & WMsworth 12002) 
LFS OWl: 1985-ZOOO GHS o.ta: 1975-1998 LFS DIbI: 1985-ZOOO 
Tenure <1 yr Tenure >-5 yrs Tenure >-10 yrs 
All Workers -0.10 (0.17) -0.14 (O.cJ6) -0.20 (0.03)** 
Men 0.09 (O.15) -0.29 (0.06)-- -0.36 (0.04)--
WNe 0.11(0.20) -0.24 (0.07) -0.26 (O.05)** 
we -0.76 (0.14)" 0.40 (0.09)** 0.42 (0.06)** 
WCS -1.32 (0.12)" 0.58 (O.10)*.a 0.47 (0.06)--
CIIIcuIMlons from I ( Z 0 1 1 ~ ~
QLFS OWl: 1992-200& 
Tenure <1 yr Tenure >-5 yrs Tenure >-10 yrs 
All Workers 0.14(0.25) -0.36 (0.14)·· -0.42 (0.08)*·* 
Men 0.21 (0.24) -0.53 (0.09)*** -0.59 (O.ll)··* 
WNe 0.16(0.25) -0.58 (0.23)** -0.53 (O.07}*** 
we -0.16 (0.37) 0.19(0.16) 0.002 (0.05) 
WCS -0.45 (0.29) 0.18(0.20) -0.15 (0.11) 
~ : : Table compiled by the author. SiJnlflcance Level Key: ***p<O.Ol. **p<O.05 and *p<O.10. 
Specifically referring to Gress • Wadsworth (2002) estimates. asterisks Indicate Significant time-trend 
coefficients only; they do not signify the level of Significance. Identification Key: WNC .. women with no 
dependent children; we = women with dependent children and WCS = women with dependent children 
under the age of S years. Time-trend coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 so the trend 
can be read as a yearly percentage point change. Bootstrapped standard errors presented In the 
parentheses. Reported coefficients Indude controls for Individual and job characteristics and for the 
cycle. 
Each of the measures of job security utilised by this chapter does not provide a complete 
picture as to 'how long jobs do last' and they do not satisfactorily measure job security on 
their own. Each of these measures and a number of labour market indicators such as the 
employment level, the unemployment inflow rate, the uptake of job seekers allowance figures 
have to be viewed to assess job security trends in Britain. Davis (2008) presents evidence from 
a variety of indicators that tell a similar story for the U.S. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to address whether there has been a decline in job security over the last 
two decades. The changes from two measures of job security were explored to answer this 
26 For women with children under 5 years, analysis commences from 1979-1998 for the GH5. 
27 
This citation Is made In reference to this chapter. 
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question. The first measure of job security was based on exploring the changes to median job 
tenure and job tenure shares from three specific bands over the period 1991 to 2006. The 
second measure explored the changes to yearly job transitions to different states of 
employment from year t - 1 to year t over the period 1991 to 2007. 
From these two measures of job security, there is evidence which shows over the period 1991-
2006, there was a secular decline in job security for men and for women with no children. 
These declines have been greater over the most recent two decades compared with the 
results from Gregg & Wadsworth (2002). However the overall declines cannot be described as 
substantial but small. My results show medium job tenure shares Gob tenure greater than or 
equal to five years) declined by 7.95% and 8.70% for men and for women with no children. 
Additionally, my results also show the long-term job tenure shares declined by 8.85% and 
7.95% for men and for women with no children. Roughly speaking, these medium and long-
term job tenure share have declined by approximately 10% over fifteen years, meaning if 
average job tenure was roughly 60 (120) months, medium (long) job tenure shares would have 
declined by roughly 5 (10) months over fifteen years. These declines in these medium and 
long-term job tenure shares are concentrated among men and women with no dependent 
children under the age of 50 years. 
My results also show short-term job tenure (job tenure under one year) has not increased over 
time for men and for women with no children as found by Gregg & Wadsworth (2002). There 
is also no evidence of rising medium and long-term job tenure shares for women with children 
and for women who have children under the age of five years over the last two decades. 
These results may reflect the changing nature of the Industrial structure, the retirement of the 
baby boom generation born post 194Os, the changes in the composition of jobs that are 
offered to workers and because of the forces associated with globalisation. Or lack of 
Significance could be due to the job tenure shares between 1 and 5 years are not accounted 
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for within the results. A combination of these reasons could explain the lack of significant 
changes to these job tenure shares over time. 
Statistics from the ONS relating to the uptake of claimant benefits (see figure 3.5 from chapter 
3) have not increased over this period and nor has the inflow rate into unemployment 
(Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2008), which would suggest there is no evidence of large scale job 
destruction rates over the last two decades. Part of Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) explanation 
for their results relating to the rise in short-term job tenure shares and the subsequent decline 
in the medium and longer-term job tenure shares they conclude could relate to a rise in job-
to-job transitions. The results from section 6.4 dispel this explanation as there is no evidence 
showing new job transitions or job stayer transitions have increased over the period 1991 to 
2007. The fa" in new job transitions could explain the lack of evidence showing any significant 
time-trend coefficients for short-term job tenure shares (table 6.1). But there is evidence 
showing job-to-unemployment and job-to-non-employment transitions have risen over this 
time frame, which may explain the fa" in the medium and long-term job tenure shares from 
this chapter. Further evidence shows that these job transitions have not arisen because of 
involuntary job separations resulting from redundancies or from firm closures. 
Thus, a possible explanation for the rise in job-to-unemployment transitions could be linked to 
the type of job contracts workers have been offered over the period 1991 to 2007. \f there 
has been a decline \n staff contracts, then workers who come to the end of their jobs may 
become unemployed in the short-term whilst they find new jobs. This could explain the fa" in 
new job transitions and the fa" in job stayer transitions over this period and why there has 
been a rise in job-to-unemployment transitions. Thus, this chapter concludes there is little 
evidence showing there has been a substantial decline in job security as insinuated by press 
references from Green (2003) and from newspaper headlines that note the death nail to jobs 
for life. 
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6.7 Appendices 
Appendix 1 
The QLFS questions below identify the start dates for respondents' from the survey, working 
with present employer/continuously self-employed. 
[Q101J: In which year did you start working (continuously) for your current employer? 
[Variable Name: CONMPY] 
[Q102J: In which year did you start working continuously as a self-employed person? [Variable 
Name: CONSEY] 
[Q103J: And which month was that? [Variable Name: CONMON) 
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Appendix 2 
The BHPS questions relate to dates spent by respondents' in their present position of 
employment. These questions do not relate to the year or month the respondents' first 
started working for their present employer. 
Q AE25M: What was the date you started working in your position, by that I mean the 
beginning of your current spell of the job you are doing now for your present employer? 
Month. [Variable Name: wJBBGM] 
Q AE25Y: What was the date you started working in your position, by that I mean the 
beginning of your current spell of the job you are doing now for your present employer? Year. 
[Variable Name: wJBBGY] 
Q AE43M: On what date did you start doing your present job, by that I mean the beginning of 
your current spell of doing the work you are doing now on a self-employed basis? Month 
[Variable Name: wJSBGM] 
Q AE43Y: On what date did you start doing your present job, by that I mean the beginning of 
your current spell of doing the work you are doing now on a self-employed basis? Year 
[Variable Name: wJSBGY] 
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Appendix 3 
Second Stage Regressions: 
Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) estimate the following second stage OLS regression for their job 
tenure analysis in three specific bands: 
(AI) 
Where Time = linear time trend; cycle = cyclical component dependent upon short, medium 
and long-term job tenure shares and me = estimated marginal effects evaluated at the mean 
of the independent variables obtained from the first stage regressions. 
For the short-term job tenure share regressions, this chapter uses the vacancy-employment 
ratio constructed by using data on unfilled vacancies at Job Centres divided by work force jobs. 
The vacancy data utilised by Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) uses data series name BCOM (from 
Economic Trends - data from the ONS website). This data series runs from the 1950s to 
1999Q1, upon which this data series is discontinued due to the following reasons. A technical 
report published by Labour Market Trends in July 200328 provides details of the deferred 
publication of Job Centre vacancy statistics since May 2001 was due to distortions in the 
reported data. Up until March 2001, employers would notify the Employment Service about a 
vacancy by contacting their local Job Centre. The Job Centres would try to fill the vacancies 
that were notified to them by the employers. However it was common practice amongst 
some Job Centres to only record as many vacancies that were filled, even if the employers may 
have notified more. From March 2001, the method for reporting vacancies changed as 
Employer Direct was introduced. Under Employer Direct, centre staff record the number of 
vacancies notified to them by the employers. This lead to a 20% increase in the level of 
28 
This report Is available at: http://www.statistits.gov.uk!articles/labour market trends/JobCentrePlus lMT0703.pdf. The 
report Is written by Jessica Arrowsmith for the DWP. 
389 
recorded notifications. This can be seen from figure 6.lA below, which plots the unfilled 
vacancy data. From this graph, Nomis data for unfilled vacancies show an upward trend. The 
ONS data for notified vacancies under the new system of reporting show the vacancy data 
trends are substantially higher compared to the Nomis data which was collected under the old 
system. ONS data shows no trend after the new system of reporting vacancies was 
implemented. 
Figure 6.1A: Vacancy Data Trends 
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Nate: Figure compiled by the author. Unfilled vacancy data from Nomls presents 
figures for Great BrItain. Appendix 9 provides details for the data source. 
Therefore, the data for vacancies from July 2002 onwards are not comparable with the original 
data series. Hence, with two differing sources of vacancy data, the second stage regressions 
for short-term job tenure shares needed to take this discrepancy into account. Thus, this 
chapter ran the following regression shown by equation (A2): 
(A2) 
From equation (A2), the cycle variable is interacted with the dummy variable Dli this variable 
accounts for vacancy data for the period 1991-2000. This procedure should account for the 
distortion associated with the notified vacancy data. Variable (eye/e)*DJ from equation (A2), 
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accounts for the vacancy data for the period 1992-2000 (this is for the QLFS data; for the BHPS 
the period is 1991-2000). The second term (cycle)*(l-DJ accounts for vacancy data for the 
period 2001-2006 (this is for the QLFS data; for the BHPS the period of analysis is 2001-2(05). 
There were concerns that from estimating equation (A2), the specification for this equation's 
use of the vacancy data to measure the vacancy-employment ratio may have had some impact 
on the estimation of the linear time-trend coefficients due to the change in measurement for 
the vacancy data. To check this concern and to gather whether equation (A2) was correctly 
specified, the following analysis was carried out. Equation (A2) was re-estimated with the 
inclusion of a dummy variable D1 equal to 1 for the period 1992-2000 (this is for the QLFS data; 
for the BHPS the period is 1991-2000) and zero otherwise. The new equation specified for re-
estimation was equation (A3). This re-estimation helped to determine whether P1 = P2' 
(A3) 
The test command in STATA was used after two sets of estimations: 
1. The test command was used after estimating equation (A3) without bootstrapped 
corrected standard errors in the second stage of the estimation procedure. 
2. The test command was used after estimating equation (A3) with the additional step of 
estimating bootstrapped standard errors in the second stage of the estimation 
procedure. 
From results (not presented) for job tenure shares less than one year reveal that with the test 
command carried out after estimating models with bootstrapped standard errors, the null 
hypothesis of P1 = P2 was accepted from all estimated models. However, when the test 
command was employed after estimating the OLS regression models without bootstrapped 
standard errors, there were a few results where the null hypothesis was rejected. Thus, with 
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the first method, this robustness check provides evidence that changes in the vacancy data 
and the subsequent estimation of equation (A2) has had no influence on the estimated linear 
time-trend coefficients for the short-term job tenure shares from this chapter's analysis. 
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Appendix 4 
Gregg & Wadsworth (2002) use different cyclical control variables in the second stage of 
estimation for the three job tenure share bands of <1year, >=5 years and >=10 years. An 
alternative specification was explored whereby for each of the three job tenure share bands 
for the second stage regressions were estimated with the use of only two cyclical variables. 
The two cyclical control variables that were used were the vacancy-employment ratio and the 
unemployment rate. The equation that was estimated is specified by equation (A4) below: 
me = Po + Pl(Vacancy) * Dl + P2(Vacancy) * (1- D1) + 
(A4) 
The aim of estimating this equation was twofold: The first was to see whether the estimated 
results were sensible and the second reason was to determine whether the inclusion of the 
unemployment rate reveals whether th and Jh are positive. From the results (not presented), 
the estimation of equation (A4) for the three job tenure shares reveals estimated coefficients 
Pl and P2 are not always positive; on some occasions, either one of the two estimated beta 
coefficients were negative. The estimated time-trend coefficients from equation (A4) were 
different to the results provided from the estimation of equation (1) [see section 6.2] for job 
tenure shares >=5 and >=10 years and equation (Al) for job tenure shares <1 year. In some 
instances, the estimated time-trend coefficients were quite similar to the estimated time-
trend coefficients from the regressions which used the three different cyclical control variables 
in the three job tenure share regressions. And in other cases where equation (M) was used to 
estimate the linear time-trend coefficients, there were differences between the two sets of 
results (this refers to estimated results from equation [Al] and [A2] compared to [A4]) and 
changes to the Signs for some of the estimated coefficients. The most important observation 
from these regressions (from estimating equation [M]) was the estimated time-trend 
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coefficients were not significant. And in the majority of cases the estimated bootstrapped 
standard errors were very big, indicating the possibility of collinearity between the two cyclical 
control variables resulting with the insignificance for the estimated time-trend coefficients. 
Therefore these second stage regressions are quite sensitive to the choice of the cyclical 
variables employed in estimation for the different job tenure shares. 
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Appendix 5 
Table 6.lA: Median Job Tenure and Sample Proportions for the Aggregate Sample 
AifregtJte SGml!!! 
QLFSDatcr SHPSDatcr 
Year Medkln <11' >5yrs >J0l!! MedIon <11' >5l!! >J0l!! 
1991 3,9 17.85 39.63 24.00 
(O.S) (O.7) (O.7) 
1992 4,10 15.31 56.38 39.83 3,8 16.82 38.62 22.18 
(O.l) (O.2) (O.l) (O.S) (O.7) (O.7) 
1993 5,2 15.03 57.36 39.19 3,9 18.49 39.58 21.92 
(O.l) (O.2) (O.2) (O.6) (O.B) (O.7) 
1994 5,6 16.38 58.62 38.90 3,10 19.76 41.93 21.56 
(0. I} (O.2) (O.l) (O.6) (O.B) (0.7) 
1995 5,7 17.89 59.19 38.02 4,0 19.51 43.91 22.53 
(O.2) (0.2) (O.2) (O.6) (O.B) (O.7) 
1996 5,7 18.12 59.22 37.n 3,10 20.73 41.55 21.90 
(O.2) (O.2) (O.l) (O.6) (O.7) (O.7) 
1997 5,3 18.90 57.62 37.67 3,10 20.88 40.91 21.97 
(O.2) (0.2) (O.2) (O.6) (O.7) (0.7) 
1998 4,11 19.52 56.66 37.58 3,9 21.62 39.71 22.84 
(O.2) (O.2) (O.2) (O.6) (O.7) (O.7) 
1999 4,10 19.08 55.42 37.95 3,9 20.41 39.30 22.59 
(O.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) 
2000 4,9 18.94 55.00 38.58 3,8 20.74 38.65 23.96 
(O.2) (O.2) (0.2) (0.6) (O.7) (O.7) 
2001 4,9 19.48 57.68 38.96 3,8 21.89 38.06 23.11 
(O.2) (O.2) (O.2) (0.6) (O.7) (0.7) 
2002 4,8 19.00 53.56 38.19 3,9 19.81 39.04 23.76 
(0.2) (0.2) (O.2) (0.6) (O.B) (0.7) 
2003 4,9 17.80 54.33 37.79 3,8 19.25 38.13 22.22 
(O.2) (0.2) (O.2) (O.6) (O.B) (O.7) 
2004 4,8 18.03 54.16 37.08 3,9 19.03 39.23 22.84 
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) (O.B) (0.7) 
2005 4,9 17.71 54.31 36.15 3,9 18.55 39.99 22.42 
(O.2) (0.2) (O.2) (0.6) (O.B) (0.7) 
2006 4,9 19.17 54.28 36.46 
(O.2) (0.2l (O.2) 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS and QlFS data sets. Median job tenure is presented in years and months; standard 
errors of the sample proportions are in the parentheses. 
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Table 6.2A: Median Job Tenure and Sample Proportions for Men 
M"" 
QLFSData BHPSData 
YeGr Median dl!: >5l!! >J0l!! MedIan dl!: >5l!! >J0l!! 
1991 4.1 14.70 45.69 28.87 
(O.5) (1.0) (1.0) 
1992 6.10 12.72 63.65 48.65 4.0 14.87 44.03 26.76 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.7) (1.0) (1.0) 
1993 6.11 12.93 63.93 47.62 4.0 17.15 45.06 26.89 
(O.2) (O.3) (O.3) (0.7) (1.1) (1.0) 
1994 7.0 14.4 64.32 46.6 4.1 18.86 45.36 26.18 
(0.2) (O.3) (O.3) (O.B) (1.1) (1.0) 
1995 6.11 15.92 64.49 45.58 4.2 17.68 46.48 26.23 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (O.B) (1. I} (1.0) 
1996 6.10 16.55 63.71 44.99 4.0 19.79 43.75 26.07 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (O.B) (1.0) (1.0) 
1997 6,4 17.55 61.38 44.05 3.11 20.69 42.40 25.99 
(O.2) (O.l) (O.l) (O.B) (1.0) (1.0) 
1998 6.1 18.07 60.26 43.17 3.10 20.30 41.90 27.18 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (O.B) (1.0) (1.0) 
1999 5.11 17.28 59.4 43.54 3.11 19.37 41.85 26.03 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (O.B) (1.0) (1.0) 
2000 5.8 17.58 58.57 43.96 3.10 19.76 41.05 26.78 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (O.B) (1.0) (1.0) 
2001 5.8 17.88 58.42 43.98 3.10 20.45 40.84 26.66 
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.8) (1.0) (1.0) 
2002 5.3 17.52 57.27 42.75 3.11 18.47 41.61 26.36 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.8) (1.1) (1.0) 
2003 5.5 16.63 57.69 42.18 3.10 18.48 40.88 24.79 
(0.2) (O.3) (0.3) (0.8) (l.l) (1.0) 
2004 5.3 17.12 57.34 40.97 3.11 17.67 42.12 25.59 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.8) (1.1) (1.0) 
2005 5,4 16.59 57.14 39.92 3.11 17.26 42.60 25.22 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.8) (l.l.) (l..0) 
2006 5.5 18.29 57.22 40.50 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS and QLFS data sets. Median job tenure Is presented In years and months; standard 
errors of the sample proportions are in the parentheses. 
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Table 6.3A: Median Job Tenure and Sample Proportions for Women with No Dependent 
Children 
Women, No Dependent Children 
QLFSDfIta BHPSDfIta 
YeGr Median dyr >Sl!! >10l!! MecIan dE >Sr!! >10l!! 
1991 3,8 17.68 40.66 26.81 
(1.0) (1.4) (1.4) 
1992 4,7 15.14 55.47 39.36 3,7 16.36 38.33 24.36 
(0.3) (0.4) (O.S) (1.0) (1.4) (1.4) 
1993 4,10 14.04 57.42 39.26 3,8 15.50 40.02 23.58 
(0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (1.0) (1.5) (1.4) 
1994 5,4 15.37 59.29 39.91 3,11 17.68 45.20 24.50 
(0.3) (0.4) (O.S) (1.0) (1.5) (1.4) 
1995 5,7 16.86 60.7 39.15 4,1 19.41 48.07 26.25 
(0.3) (0.4) (O.S) {l.l} (1.5) (1.5) 
1996 5,6 17.41 60.29 38.54 4,0 18.96 45.69 24.47 
(0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (1.1) (1.5) (1.4) 
1997 5,6 17.59 59.99 39.27 3,11 20.06 44.46 23.70 
(0.3) (0.4) (0.5) {l.l} (1.5) (1.4) 
1998 5,2 18.91 58.43 39.46 3,9 20.48 41.69 24.19 
(0.3) (0.4) (O.S) (l.l) (1.4) {1.4} 
1999 4,10 18.34 56.21 39.51 3,9 18.78 40.86 25.24 
{0.3} (0.4) {O.S} {1.0} {1.4} (1.4) 
2000 4,10 17.88 56.06 40.70 3,8 20.28 41.01 27.80 
(0.3) {0.4} (O.S) {1.1} (1.5) (1.5) 
2001 4,8 19.85 54.69 41.02 3,9 21.34 40.71 26.76 
(0.3) {0.4} (O.S) {l.l} {l.S} {1.5} 
2002 4,7 18.73 53.18 39.86 3,9 20.27 40.80 27.n 
(0.3) (0.4) (O.S) {l.l} (l.S) (l.S) 
2003 4,8 17.51 54.30 39.72 3,8 18.74 39.53 25.11 
(0.3) (0.4) (O.S) (l.l) {l.S} (1.4) 
2004 4,8 17.41 53.90 38.83 3,9 19.85 39.92 25.41 
(0.3) (O.S) (O.S) {l.l} {l.S} (l.S) 
2005 4,8 17.48 54.17 37.n 3,9 18.47 40.42 24.53 
(0.3) (O.S) {O.S} {1.1} {1.5} {l.S} 
2006 4,7 18.86 53.43 37.68 
(0.3) (0.5) (O.S) 
Source: Author'S own calculations from the BHPS and QLFS data sets. Median job tenure Is presented In years and months; standard 
errors of the sample proportions are In the parentheses. 
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Table 6.4A: Median Job Tenure and Sample Proportions for Women with Dependent Children 
Women with Children 
QLFSOGta IHPSOGta 
Year MedIGn <1l! >5l!! >J0l!! MedrGn dl! >5l!! >J0l!! 
1991 3,1 26.50 23.22 8.79 
(1.3) (1.3) (1.0) 
1992 3,8 22.68 37.28 16.37 3,2 23.29 24.26 7.05 
(0.4) (O.S) (0.4) (1.4) (l.S) (0.9) 
1993 3,10 21.85 40.1 17.57 3,2 26.65 25.09 7.72 
{0.4} {OA} {0.4} {l.S} {l.S} {1.0} 
1994 3,11 22.76 43.02 18.23 3,4 25.32 28.91 6.84 
(0.4) {O.S} {0.4} (1.4) (l.S) (0.9) 
1995 4,0 24.16 43.87 17.71 3,6 24.65 32.04 9.16 
(0.4) (O.S) (0.4) (1.4) (1.6) (1.0) 
1996 4,2 22.92 46.57 19.03 3,5 25.60 30.95 9.42 
(0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (1.4) (1.5) (1.0) 
1997 4,1 23.78 45.53 20.39 3,6 22.58 32.64 10.43 
(OA) (0.5) (0.4) (1.3) (l.S) (l.l) 
1998 4,1 23.85 45.60 21.83 3,5 26.73 31.39 11.01 
(0.4) (O.S) (0.4) (1.4) (l.S) (1.1) 
1999 4,0 24.30 44.74 22.93 3,5 25.51 30.74 10.90 
(0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (1.4) (l.S) (1.1) 
2000 4,1 23.46 45.01 23.45 3,4 23.90 29.75 12.89 
(0.4) (O.S) (0.4) (1.4) {l.s} (1.2) 
2001 4,1 22.94 45.52 24.88 3,4 26.28 28.19 10.95 
(0.4) {O.S} (0.4) (H) (l.S) {l.l} 
2002 4,0 22.90 44.83 25.53 3,5 22.62 30.61 13.25 
(0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (1.4) (l.s) (1.2) 
2003 4,1 21.00 46.10 25.22 3,4 21.87 29.79 13.05 
(0.4) {O.S} (0.4) (1.3) (l.S) (1.2) 
2004 4,2 20.91 46.70 25.93 3,5 21.29 31.58 13.70 
{0.4} (0.5) (0.4) {1.3} (1.6) (1.2) 
2005 4,3 20.59 47.65 25.66 3,6 21.86 33.18 13.59 
(0.4) (O.S) (0.4) {1.3} (1.6) (1.2) 
2006 4,3 21.62 48.10 25.64 
{0.4} (0.5) (O.S) 
Soulft: Author's own calculations from the BHPS and QLFS data sets. Median job tenure presented in years and months; standard 
errors of the sample proportions are in the parentheses. 
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Table 6.5A: Median Job Tenure and Sample Proportions for Women with Dependent Children 
under the age of 5 Years 
Women with Children oged <5 years 
QLFSDcItG 8HPSDcmr 
Yecrr ,.." dl!; >5l!! >lD l!! Medfan dl!; >5l!! >lDl!! 
1991 2,11 33.57 19.26 7.09 
(2.B) (2.S) (2.2) 
1992 3,6 28.13 34.93 20.34 3,1 30.36 22.06 7.94 
(0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (3.!) (2.9) (2.4) 
1993 3,11 24.58 39.44 23.2 3,1 36.17 22.38 9.29 
(0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (3.!) (2.9) (2.S) 
1994 4,1 25.82 42.74 23.24 3,1 33.86 23.68 8.23 
(0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (3.0) (2.B) (2.2) 
1995 4,1 26.21 42.36 22.32 3.4 31.10 28.82 8.14 
(0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (2.9) (3.0) (2.l) 
1996 4,3 25.32 44.91 22.08 3,3 32.59 29.49 8.47 
(0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (2.B) (3.0) (2.l) 
1997 4,3 24.44 44.76 23.63 3,5 29.37 31.17 10.12 
(0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (2.B) (3.0) (2.3) 
1998 4,2 24.n 43.93 24.n 3,3 30.94 29.82 13.66 
(0.7) (0.8) (0.8) {2.B} {3.0} (2.7) 
1999 4,2 24.01 44.5 25.87 3,2 34.29 27.50 13.61 
(0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (2.B) (2.9) (2.6) 
2000 4,2 22.92 44.65 26.00 3,1 28.10 23.83 14.12 
(0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (V) (2.B) (2.B) 
2001 4,3 22.14 45.n 26.40 3,2 26.62 25.62 10.27 
(0.7) (0.9) (0.9) {2.7} {2.B} {2.2} 
2002 4,2 22.22 45.76 27.63 3,4 24.50 30.22 10.86 
(0.7) (0.9) (0.9) (2.7) {3.l} (2.3) 
2003 4,3 20.58 46.27 27.54 3,2 23.27 26.24 9.25 
(0.7) (0.9) (0.9) (2.7) (3.0) (2.2) 
2004 4,3 19.58 46.51 26.06 3,4 22.32 29.58 9.70 
(0.7) (0.9) (0.9) {2.7} {3.!} (2.3) 
2005 4,4 19.41 46.6 25.50 3,4 25.10 30.84 7.60 
(0.7) (0.9) (0.9) (2.B) {3.2} (2.0) 
2006 4,4 19.88 45.81 22.58 
(0.7) (0.9) (0.9) 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS and QLFS data sets. Median job tenure is presented in years and months; standard 
errors of the sample proportions are in the parentheses. 
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Table 6.6A: Estimated Yearly Percentage Point TIme Trend Coefficients for Short, Medium and 
Long-Term Job Tenure Shares, 1991-2005 
BHPS 1991-2005 
NaControls No Controls IndMduoI+ IndMduol + Job I IndlvldUGI + Job " 
{l} +qde{Z} qde{3} +C)Ide{4} +qde{5} 
Tenure <1 Year 
Total 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.17 
(o.o4) (O.ll) (0.l9) (O.lS) (O.ll) 
Men 0.07 0.07 0.26 0.23 0.26 
(O.OS) (O.lS) (O.48) (O.46) (O.33) 
Women No 0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 
Children (O.O3}·" (O.09) (O.ll) (0.l3) (0.l3) 
Women with -0.14 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 0.10 
Children (O.OS} .. • (O.lS) (O.SS) (O.S7) (0.S9) 
Women with -0.56 -0.01 0.08 -0.09 0.03 
Children <5yrs (O.lO}·" (0.67) (1.33) (1.29) (1.2S) 
Tenure >-5 Years 
Total -0.12 0.05 0.04 0.08 nla 
(O.09) (O.ll) (0.09) (0.10) nla 
Men -0.31 -0.12 -0.09 -0.02 n/a 
(O.07}·" (0.13) (0.07) (0.O7) n/a 
Women No -0.16 0.05 0.11 0.12 n/a 
Children (0.17) (0.2S) (0.29) (0.31) n/a 
Women with 0.31 0.40 0.13 0.15 n/a 
Children (O.lO}··· (0.19)·· (0.07)· (0.08)· n/a 
Women with 0.32 0.48 0.16 0.28 n/a 
Children <5yrs (O.lO}·· .. (0.22)·· (O.OS)·· (0.13)·· n/a 
Tenure :.10 Years 
Total 0.02 -0.12 0.01 0.01 n/a 
(0.02) (O.OS)·· (0.02) (O.Ol) n/a 
Men -0.08 -0.24 -0.07 -0.05 n/a 
(0.03}· .. • (0.06)··· (0.03) .. •• (0.03) n/a 
Women No 0.05 -0.16 -0.12 -0.10 n/a 
Children (0.04) (0.13) (O.ll) (0.10) nla 
Women with 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 nla 
Children (0.01)··· (0.02) .. •• (0.01} .... • (0.01) .. •• n/a 
Women with 0.001 -0.08 -O.OS -0.09 n/a 
Children <5yrs (O.Ol) (0.08) (O.OS) (0.l6) nla 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Individual controls consist of 9 .,e dummies for men, 8 for women, 3 
dummies for education, gender dummy, child indicator dummy, 9 regional dummies. Job Controls I comprise of part-time 
job dummy, self-employment dummy and 5 broad industry dummy variables; Job Controls " comprise in addition to jOb 
control I variables a temporary job dummy variable. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The 
estimated coeffidents and standard errors multiplied bv 100 so the time-trend can be read as a yearly percentage point 
change. Significance Level: ···p<O.Ol, ··p<O.05 and ·p<O.lO. 
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Table 6.7A: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients for Job Tenure Shares under One Year, 1991-
2005 - Men & Women with No Dependent Children 
Men Women, No Dependent 0I1Idren 
BHPS 1991-2005 
IndMdllll' + Job I IndItIIduGI + IndMdIllll + Job I IndItIIduGI + 
CYCIe(l} + cycle IZ} Job 1113} cycle I"} +qdeI5} Job 1116} 
Education 
Graduate 0.001 0.13 0.78 -0.11 0.06 0.07 
(0.24) (0.90) (0.14}**· (0.s7) (O.62) (0.12) 
High Intermediate 0.04 0.20 0.32 -0.10 -0.10 0.11 
(0.20) (O.46) (O.OB}**· (0.16) (0.33) (O.07) 
Low Intermediate 0.02 -0.10 0.34 -0.03 -0.09 0.70 
(O.2S) (O.70) (O.14)** (O.21) (O.71) (O.13}·" 
None 0.26 0.54 0.22 0.11 -O.OS 0.26 
(O.22) (0.60) (O.l9) (0.15) (0.36) (0.07)**· 
Ace 
Age 16-24 O.SO 0.40 0.49 0.96 0.69 0.78 
(0.69) (0.9O) (0.26)* (0.7s) (0.79) (0.11)**· 
Age 25-39 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.03 -0.02 0.10 
(O.22) (0.27) (O.O6}**· (O.32) (0.31) (0.06)· 
Age 40-49 0.02 0.003 0.04 -0.07 -0.14 0.10 
(O.OB) (o.o9) (0.02) (O.ll) (0.18) (0.03j*** 
Age 50+ 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
(0.10) {O.09} (0.01)** (0.07) {0.07} (0.01) 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Refer to notes from Table 6.6A 
Table 6.SA: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients for Job Tenure Shares under One Year, 1991-
2005 - Women with Dependent Children 
Women with c:hIchn Women with dependent CNId < Syrs Old 
BHPS 1991-2005 
IndNIdIIIII + Job I IndItIIdIIIII + IIttIIttItIUGI + Job I IIttIIvItIIIIII + 
cycIell) +qdeIZ} Job" + qde (3) cycIe{'" + ~ 1 5 ' ' Job" + qde 16} 
Education 
Graduate -0.65 0.31 0.28 -1.92 -2.32° -2.2s"' 
(0.62) (O.l3)" (0.12)** (1.97) {0.92}** (0.92)** 
High Intermediate 0.12 0.24 0.27 0.51 0.47 0.29 
(0.26) {0.61} (0.59) (0.86) {1.43} (1.23) 
Low Intermediate 0.13 0.02 0.31 0.69 0.53 0.68 
(0.57) {1.06} {l.U} {1.57} (2.16) {2.31} 
None -0.16 -0.90 -0.98 8.4(/ 12.71' 13.15' 
(1.07) {3.10} (3.l4) (4.42)* (7.SS)* {7.83*} 
Ace 
Age 16-24 2.42 2.14 2.26 1.81 -0.02 -0.03 
{l.Ol}·* (l.O6)** {1.16}· {l.77} {l.07} (UO) 
Age 25-39 -0.11 -0.07 0.04 0.22 0.10 0.14 
(0.27) (0.23) (0.24) {O.65} (O.44) (O.39) 
Age 40-49 -0.13 -0.09 -0.08 _1.910 _5.140 -5.2aD 
(O.26) (O.19) {O.18} (1.02)* (3.02)* (2.BS)· 
Source: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Refer to notes from Table S.fiA. SymbollCey: 0 - n!Ires5IOn run for the perfod 
1993-2003; IS - recresston run for period 1991-2005; 0 - recressIon run for the period 1991-2002; a - Ace dummy If'OUP$ 46-50, 51-
55 and 56-59 dropped; the latter two aroups dropped out due to coIlinearity, the former due to year dummy 1992 bel", dropped. 
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Table 6.9A: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients for Shares of Medium and Long-Term Job Tenure, 1991-2005 - Men & Women No Dependent Children 
Men Women, No Dependent Children Men Women, No Dependent Children 
BHPS 1991-2005 
Medium Term LonaTerm 
IndlvidllGl + Job I IndlllldUCII + Job I IndivldllGl + Job I Individual + Job I 
C)Ide(J} +qde(Z} C)Ide(3} +qde(4} ~ J S } } +qde(6} ~ ( 7 ) ) +qde(,} 
Educ:Mion Echation 
Graduate -0.09 -0.41 0.49 o.os Graduate -0.01 -0.27 -0.09 -0.12 
(O.lO) (O.08}*-- (O.2S)- (O.O9) (0.08) (O.04}-·- (0.13) (0.05)-· 
HIIh Intermediate 0.06 -0.02 0.23 0.03 High Intermediate -0.27 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 
(0.17) (0.07) (O.l7) (O.20) (0.09)--- (O.03)" (0.18) (0.16) 
Low Intermediate -0.06 -0.19 0.51 -0.03 Low Intermediate -0.06 0.03 -0.09 -0.11 
(0.14) (O.l4) (O.SO) (O.BS) (0.21) (0.11) (0.46) (0.29) 
None 1.00 0.75 0.09 -0.19 None 0.66 0.36 -0.12 -0.52 
(O.26}--- (0.23)--- (0.47) (O.S2) (O.39)- (O.2S) (0.36) (0.52) 
Ale Ale 
Ale 25-39 -0.26 -0.08 -0.04 0.22 Ale 30-39 -0.10 -0.13 -0.03 -0.03 
(O.U)-- (UB) (O.l7) (0.40) (O.OS)-- (O.O9) (0.07) (0.06) 
Ale 40-49 0.11 0.36 0.19 0.42 Ale 40-49 -0.30 -0.20 -0.08 0.01 
(O.lS) (O.lS)-- (0.4O) (0.43) (O.O7}-·- (O.U) (0.19) (O.26) 
Ale 50+ -0.51 -0.27 -0.15 -0.08 Ale 50+ -0.43 -0.19 -0.37 -0.25 
(O.ll}--- (O.lO)-· (O.29) (O.30) (O.32) (O.37) (0.29) (0.27) 
Souta: Author's own calculations from the BHPS. Refer to notes from Table 6.6A. 
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Table 6.10A: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients for Shares of Medium and Long-Term Job Tenure, 1991-2005 - Women with Dependent Children 
Women, Dependent OIlIdren Women, Dependent OIlldren <5yrs Women, Dependent OIRdren Women, Dependent OIllcIren <5yrs 
BHPS 1991-2005 
MedlumTenn Lone Term 
Indlt!ldUIII + Job I IndlvldUIII + Job I IndMdual + Job I IndMdual + Job I 
I ()de(l) +qde(Z} c,de(J} +qde(.} c,de(5} +cycle(6} Cyde(l} +cycIe(B} 
Education Education 
Graduate O.SO -1.09 1.01 -1.36 Graduate 0.07 -0.68 
- -
(0.25)·· (O.22}··· (O.51)" (O.33}··· (0.10) (0.18)··· 
- -
High Intermediate 0.08 -0.05 0.25 0.22 Hiah Intermediate -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 
(0.13) (O.O4) (0.24) (0.17) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.15) 
low Intermediate 0.47 0.27 0.54 0.43 Low Intermediate 0.17 0.15 -0.14 0.37 
(0.44) (O.17) (0.36) (0.35) (0.10)· (0.08)· (0.25) (0.66) 
None 1.32 0.76 1.39- 1 . 0 ~ ~ None 0.12 1.39 
- -
(O .• 3}··· (0.11)··· (1.99) (3.53) (0.10) (0.57)·· 
- -
A.e ~ ~
A,e2S-39 0.44 0.56 0.43 0.85 Aae30-39 0.07 0.08 -0.06 -0.01 
(0.15)··· (O.lB}··· (O.21)·· (O.33)·· (O.02}··· (O.02}··· (0.07) (0.09) 
A,e049 -0.08 0.03 0.12 -0.15 Aae40-49 -0.02 -0.001 -0.16 -0.78 
(0.33) (0.36) (0.95) (1.21) (0.04) (0.05) (0.23) (0.69) 
.50+ 0.67 0.80 n/a nla Aae50+ 0.62 0.33 nla nla 
(O.72) (O.B7) n/a nla (0.43) 
___ j g . 2 ~ ~____ ... nla nla 
Sourer. Authors own calculations from the BHPS. Refer to notes from Table 6.6A. Symbol Key. 0 - resresslon run for the period 1993-2003; " - relression run for period 1991-2005; 0 - resresslon run for the 
period 1991-2002; a - Aae dummy sroups 46-SO, 51-55 and 56-59 dropped; the latter two sroups dropped out due to collinearlty, the former due to year dummy 1992 belnl dropped. 
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Table 6.11A: Estimated Yearly Percentage Point Time Trend Coefficients for Short, Medium 
and Long-Term Job Tenure Shares, 1992-2006 
QLFS 1992·2006 
No Controls No Controls IndltlldUIII + IndltlldUGI + Job I IndltlldUIII + Job " 
{II + ~ ( l l l ~ ( 3 1 1 + ~ ( 4 1 1 + ~ ( 5 ) )
Tenure <1 Year 
Total 0.09 0.04 0.18 0.14 0.17 
(0.030)··· (0.09) (0.28) (0.25) (0.20) 
Men 0.12 0.08 0.30 0.21 0.22 
(0.03)··· (0.09) (0.31) (0.24) (0.19) 
Women No 0.10 0.05 0.18 0.16 0.20 
Children (0.03)··· (0.08) (0.26) (0.25) (0.22) 
Women with -0.06 -0.13 -0.20 -0.16 -0.06 
Children (0.03)· (0.14) (0.40) (0.3l} (0.34) 
Women with -0.28 -0.33 -0.61 -0.45 -0.34 
Children <5yrs (0.03)··· (0.15)·· (0.31)·· (0.29) (0.30) 
Tenure >=5 Years 
Total -0.34 -0.23 -0.34 -0.36 nla 
(0.07)··· (0.11)·· (0.13)·· (0.14)·· nil 
Men -0.57 -0.37 -0.55 -0.53 nla 
(O.OS)··· (0.06)··· (0.09)··· (0.09)··· nla 
Women No -0.42 -0.43 -O.SO -0.58 nla 
Children (0.13)··· (0.21)·· (0.22)·· (0.23)·· nla 
Women with O.SO 0.49 0.17 0.19 nla 
Children (0.12)··· (0.20)·· (0.13) (0.16) nla 
Women with 0.55 0.48 0.13 0.18 nla 
Children <5yrs (0.15)··· (O.26)· (0.15) (O.20) nla 
Tenure >=10 Ye.s 
Total -0.18 -0.43 -0.34 -0.42 nla 
(0.03)··· (0.10)··· {O.(6)··· (O.OB}··· nla 
Men -0.56 -0.63 -0.54 -0.59 nla 
(0.03)··· (0.13)··· (0.09)··· (0.11,··· nla 
Women No -0.09 -0.61 -0.42 -0.53 nla 
Children (O.07) (0.12)··· (0.07)··· (0.07)··· nla 
Women with 0.44 0.13 0.02 0.002 nla 
Children (0.04}··· (0.06)· (0.03) (O.OS) nla 
Women with 0.26 -0.19 -0.08 -0.15 nla 
Children <5yrs (O.OB,··· (0.19) (0.07) (0.11) nla 
Source: Author's own calculations from the QLFS. Individual controls consist of 9 ace dummies for men, 8 for women, 3 
dummies for education, gender dummy, child indicator dummy, 9 reaional dummies. Job Controls I comprise of part-time 
job dummy, self-employment dummy and 5 broad Industry dummy variables; Job Controls II comprise In addition to job 
control I variables a temporary job dummy variable. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported In the parentheses. The 
estimated coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 so the time-trend can be read as a yearly percentaae 
point change. Significance Level: ···p<O.Ol, ··p<O.OS Dnd ·p<O.10. 
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Table 6.l2A: Estimated Time Trend coefficients for Job Tenure Shares under One Year 1992-
2006 - Men & Women with No Dependent Children 
Men Women, No Dependent Children 
QLFS 1992-2006 
Indlllldual + Job I Individual + Individual + Job I Individual + 
CycIe(1} +qde(Z} Job II (3) C)de(4} +qde(5} Job II(Ii} 
Education 
Graduate 0.04 0.22 0.18 -0.15 -0.02 0.25 
(0.03) (0.30) (0.05)··· (0.27) (0.60) (0.08)··· 
High Intermediate 0.08 0.10 0.17 -0.12 -0.18 0.19 
(0.07) (0.21) (0.04)··· (O.ll) (0.24) (0.07)··· 
Low Intermediate 0.03 0.26 0.39 0.10 0.48 0.44 
(0.1.1) (0.34) (0.08)"· (0.09) (0.33) (0.05)··· 
None 0.18 0.37 0.28 0.16 0.52 0.38 
(0.13) (O.32) (O.O6}·" (0.08)·· (0.51) (O.07}··· 
Ace 
Age 16-24 0.64 0.40 0.56 0.35 -0.04 0.41 
(0.76) (0.56) (0. 17}"· (0.68) (0.49) (0. 13}"· 
Age2S-39 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.12 
(O.09) (0.05)" (O.Ol}·" (0.13) (O.09) (0.01}··· 
Age 40-49 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.09 
(0.05) (0. OS} (O.OO9}"· (O.O4) (O.O4) (0.01)··· 
Age 50+ 0.01 0.009 0.009 0.03 0.03 0.007 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.005)" (0.03) (0.03) (0.005) 
Source: Author's own calculations from the QLFS. Refer to notes from Table 6.11A. 
Table 6.13A: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients for Job Tenure Shares under One Year, 1992-
2006 - Women with Dependent Children 
Women with c:hIIcIren Women with dependent ChIld < 5yrs Old 
QLFS 1992-2006 
Individual + Job I IItdIWduaI + IttdMtIuaI + Job I 1ItdMduo/+ 
C)de(l) +qde(Z} Job II + qde f3} C)de(4} +qde(5} Job" + qde (IiL 
Education 
Graduate -0.16 -0.25 -0.14 -0.07 -0.25 0.25 
(0.15) (0.36) (0.33) (0.16) (0.36) (0.11)·· 
High Intermediate -0.04 -0.09 0.01 -0.17 -0.42 -0.25 
(0.15) (0.27) (0.17) (O.19) (0.27) (0.24) 
Low Intermediate -0.13 -0.09 -0.02 -0.41 -0.56 -0.48 
(0.22) (0.47) (0.39) (0.27) (O.G) (O.G) 
None 0.06 -0.30 -0.33 -o.SO -0.46 -0.42 
(0.37) (0.79) (0.76) (1.36) (US) (US) 
Ale 
Age 16-24 0.19 0.10 O.IS -0.69 -0.78 -0.68 
(1.01) (1.06) (0.99) (U3) (1.05) (0.99) 
Age2S-39 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02 -0.24 -0.19 -0.14 
(0.12) (O.ll) (O.ll) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
Age 40-49 -0.05 -0006 -0.03 -0.15 -0.11 -0.07 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.49) (0.46) (0.38) 
Souftw: Author's own calculations from the QLFS. Refer to notes from Table 6.1tA. 
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Table 6.14A: Estimated TIme Trend Coefficients for Shares of Medium and Long-Term Job Tenure, 1992-2006 - Men & Women with No Dependent Children 
Men Women, No Children Men Women, No Dependent Children 
QLFS 1992·2006 
MedkmTerm lDnITerm 
1ndW#d1lG1 + Job I IndlvldUGI + Job I InditlldllGl + Job I IndlvldllGl + Job I 
C)I'de(l} +cyde(l} C)I'de (3) +cyde(4} C)I'de(5} +cyde(6} CycIe(7} +cyde(B} 
Eck.atIon Education 
Graduate -0.28 -0.19 0.13 -{).28 Graduate -0.87 -0.37 -0.16 -0.36 
(O.ll}··· (O.OS}··· (0.18) (0.06)*" (0.20r** (0.06)*** (0.22) (0.06)*** 
High Intermediate -0.27 -0.49 -{).22 -{).72 High Intermediate -0.43 -0.47 -0.44 -0.68 
(0.07)*·* (O.lO}*** (0.19) (0.24)*** (0.06)*** (0.13)**· (0.28) (0.20)··· 
Low Intermediate -0.44 -0.71 -0.30 -{).78 Low Intermediate -0.54 -0.63 -0.67 -0.76 
(0.06}*** (O.OB}**· (0.27) (0.32)** (0.14)·*· (0.12)··· (0.12)**· (0.11)*** 
None -0.27 -0.43 -{).32 -{).64 None -0.57 -0.53 -0.76 -0.68 
(0.10}*·· (0.15)*·· (0.26) (0.29)** (0.12)*** (0.11)*·· (0.29)**· (0.17)*** 
Ale Ale 
Aae25-39 -0.73 -0.47 -0.87 -{).61 Aae30-39 -0.89 -0.84 -0.92 -1.13 
(0.17}·** (0.19)·· (O.29}*** (0.31)*· (0.14)**· (0.17)**· (0.21)**· (0.25)*** 
Aae40-49 -0.48 -0.40 -{).S9 -{).72 Aae40-49 -1.01 -0.99 -0.75 -0.99 
(0.04)*·· (0.05)··· (0.15)·· (0.27)·" (0.13)··· (O.lS)*·· (0.13)··· (0.13)··· 
Aae50+ -0.21 -0.12 -{).12 -{).15 Aae50+ -0.24 -0.17 -0.26 -0.42 
(O.OB)··· (0.06)· (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14)· (0.16)··· 
Scua: Author's own calculations from the QLFS. Refer to notes from Table 6.11A. 
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Table 6.1SA: Estimated Time Trend Coefficients for Shares of Medium and Long-Term Job Tenure, 1992-2006 - Women with Dependent Children 
Women, Dependent Children Women, Children <5yrs Women, Dependent Children Women, Dependent Children <5yrs 
QLFS 1992-2006 
MedIumTenn LonaTenn 
IrtdltlldlMll + Job I IndMdlMll + Job I Indltlldutll + Job I Indltlldutll + Job I 
C)de(1} +cyde(Z} C)de(J} +qde(4} C)de(5} +qcIe(6} CycIe(7} + cycle(S} 
Education Education 
Graduate 0.003 -0.17 -0.27 -0.23 Graduate -0.23 -0.25 -0.53 -0.31 
(0.29} (0.09)* (0.4()} (O.20) (0.20) (0.06)·" (0.28)· (0.13)·· 
High Intermediate 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.30 High intermediate -0.10 -0.13 -0.23 -0.24 
(0.26) (0.23} (0.37) (0.30) (0.12) (0.13) (0.27) (0.25) 
Low Intermediate 0.53 0.28 0.52 0.39 Low Intermediate 0.20 0.13 -0.10 -0.13 
(Ool2)·* (O.lO) (Ool3)·· (O.22}* (0.06)··· (0.06)·· (0.18) (0.15) 
None 0.44 0.29 1.03 0.76 None 0.13 0.07 1.00 0.42 
(O.lS}" (O.U)** (0.24}*·· (0.15)**· (0.10) (0.07) (0.43)·· (0.23)· 
Ale Ale 
Ale 25-39 0.32 0.29 0.36 0.30 Ale 30-39 -0.30 -0.03 -0.25 -0.20 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.28} (0.29} (0.07) (0.04) (0.18) (0.15) 
Ale 40-49 0.25 0.24 o.n 0.70 Ale 40-49 0.12 0.11 -0.22 -0.19 
(0.l4} (O.l3) (0.33)** (0.33)*· (0.13) (0.14) (0.46) (0.53) 
.50+ 0.51 0.41 nla nla Ale 50+ 0.63 0.47 n/a n/a 
---------
L .. (0.28)* (O.29) 
----
nLa rlla (0.27)" (0.28)· n/a n/a 
Source: Author's own calculations from the QLFS. Refer to notes from Table 6.1lA. 
s 
Appendix 8 
Figure 6.2A: Comparison of Imputed Median Job Tenure 
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Table 6.16A: Comparison of Job Tenure in Months 
2000 
Year 
QLFS Data 
2002 
BHPSData 
Percentiles 
Job Tenure (Months) 
25 3 1.68 
1992 50 7 3.8 75 10 6.48 
99 16 10.06 
25 7 8.28 
1996 50 18 21.3 75 36 37.74 
99 62 68.02 
25 11 12.88 
2002 50 30 28.81 75 64 56.27 
99 132 135 
25 13 14.1 
200S 50 38 33.43 75 77 65.88 
99 168 168 
25 8 9 
Total Sample 50 23 23 
7S 51 44 
99 156 135 
2004 
Source: Table compiled by the author. The sample span for the BHP5 data IS 
1991-2005. The sample span for the QLFS is 1992-2006. 
2006 
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Appendix 9 
Data sources used for Cyclical Measures in Second Stale Regressions: 
The following data sources have been used to create the cyclical variables used within the 
second stage regressions: 
Vacant - Vacancy - employment ratio • 1000 = Unfilled vacancies at Jobcentres/Workforce 
Jobs, Q2 of each year, not seasonally adjusted. Source: Nomls. 
Unemp - Claimant Unemployment Rate • 100 = Claimant Count/(Workforce Jobs + Claimant 
Count), Q2 of each year, not seasonally adjusted. Source: Data code BCJA - Total Claimant 
Count NSA (UK) Thousand. 
Upop - Unemployment population ratio • 100 = Claimant Count/Population Working Age, Q2 
of each year, not seasonally adjusted. Source: Data code BCJA - Total Claimant Count NSA 
(UK) Thousand. 
Epop - Employment population ratio • 100 = Workforce Jobs/Population Working Age, Q2 of 
each year, not seasonally adjusted. Source: DYDA UK Workforce Jobs NSA. 
Population of Working Age numbers were derived from published Tables from the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics. 
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Appendix 10 
Figure 6.3A: Press References per Year to the search term 'Job Cuts' 
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Source of Information: 
Press references to the search term 'job cuts' have come from the times-online web site only. 
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Appendix 11 
QLFS Questions: 
Three redundancy data variables were utilised from the QlFS data and the estimated results 
from the use of these questions are presented in table 6.6 in section 6.4. The variables that 
were used are: (1) 'REDUND' measures whether a redundancy occurred in the last three 
months; (2) 'REDYLFT' measures the reasons for leaving last job and (3) 'REDCLOS', which 
captures the reason for leaving last job in last three months. This variable follows on to some 
extent from variable 'REDYLFT' and 'REDUND'. The definitions for all variables (taken from the 
code book) are given by figures 6.4A, 6.5A and 6.6A. 
Figure 6.4A: Definition of variable 'REDUND' 
REpUNDANCY WITHIN LAST 3 MONTHS 
RECUNO • Whether made redundant in last three months 
(1) Made ..ctuna .. 
(21 Not mac. ,"unci.", 
PRI!QUI!IIICY: Eaen q u a ~ r r fr:Im Spring 9 ~ ~
COVERAGE: >\p,::lies "'.lI1 ~ s : > O n c » n l S S agee 16+. 
NOT!S: This variable combines all the qLes1icmaire "anables and should be u$ed in aU anaysls 
of redJndoTl :Ies. 
This variable is deived tom AGE, EVERWK. REFW<Y LEFT'r'R, REFWKM. LErM, REOYLF'T, 
REDAN", CON.APY. CClNvION, CCo,,"SEY & REDPAD 
Ctanges tave rra::te te tie derivation of REeL"C- il the LFS It roN COolen Ite rUITber of people ...no 
were rot in ! ! m : : l b ~ ~ C l U ~ n g g the reterenee \\/MIt and _ reponed lllat the\, !\ad beer rr3d. 
redLn:lanl ir the TOOth c:lthe reference week o· WI the I o N : ) c a ~ . . months priortc this; plus I ~ ~ number 
of people wile were Ir employmenl dLl'i'lg Its reference WHIt wto st:Irted Itelr JOb In the same c.JllHldar 
monti', ~ , , or the tVIc CilIendar Mortha prior 10. the reference week, and VitlO r e p o r t ~ ~ :ha: they had t-o 
mac» redln:larl In the past !h'ee montts. 
See art e e en p225-22€ of the May 2000 Labclr Mat/(eol T re'nos for further d e I I l ~ s s
Figure 6.SA: Definition of variable 'REDYLFT' 
REDYLFT • Reason left last job 
(11 Dismissed 
C2) .... NdundMtftook voIuntllry...cluftdlnoy 
(31 T4IIItfIOnIY job ftnIshecI 
C'" Resigned 
(81 o.v. up WOftI for hNIIh ~ ~
(81 Took MrIy ..... ....... 
m RedrecI (lit or., ..... pensIon ... , 
(II o.v. up for l'amlly or persoNl re..-
(81 Other 1"NSOI'1 
FREQUENCY: Each quarter from Sprilg 95 
COWRAGe: AppliN to aU respondenIs who left paid jOb in .... 3 monItIs ~ ~ not wortcing and left job In 
8 years before reference week (REDPAID = 1 OR YLESS "'=8). 
NOTES: If analysing data on redundancies made in the last tine mondls. you thWcI also filler 
on the variable REDUND = 1 (made redundant). 
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Figure 6.6A: Definition of variable 'REDCLOS' 
REDCLOS • Reason for leaving job left in last three months 
(1) Closing cbwn 
(2) Cutdng back on sUfI' 
(3) OIhtr ,.3son 
FREQUENCY: E ~ e h h quarter !rem 5pirg 95 
CO'vERAGE: A ~ p i e s s to all respooden1S whc were made redll1d .... t from la:otjci:l (REDYLFT = 2 AN) 
REDPAID = ')ORREDANY= 1)). 
NOTES: r anat,'sing data or redundancies made in the last tlTee lTonths. yoo sIIould also titer 
on 1he vanable REDUNC = 1 (made redundant). 
These three variables are used to construct the twelve different measures for exploring EU 
and EN job transitions over time. Questions M1·M4 are constructed from variables 'REDUND' 
and 'REDYLFT'. Questions MS-M12 makes use of some or all of these variables. The 
definitions of the twelve new measures are defined as follows for the aggregate sample 
measures only: 
Question (M1): Uses derived variable REDUND only to capture EU and en transitions 
emanating from a redundancy in the last three months. The period of coverage for this 
variable is 1993-2007. 
Question (M2): Uses derived variable REDUND as well as variable REDYlFT to capture EU and 
en transitions emanating from a redundancy in the last three months based on reasons for 
leaving last job. The reasons for leaving last job which are part of this measure are: (I) 
dismissed, (II) made redundant/took voluntary redundancy and (III) temporary job finished. 
The period of coverage for this variable is 1995-2007. 
Question (M3): Uses variable REDYlFT to capture EU and en transitions emanating from 
reasons for leaving last job. The reasons for leaving last job which are part of this measure 
are: (I) dismissed, (II) made redundant/took voluntary redundancy and (III) temporary job 
finished. The period of coverage for this variable is 1995-2007. 
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Question (M4): Uses variable REDYLFT to capture EU and EN transitions emanating from 
reasons for leaving last job. This fourth measure is an attempt to obtain a measure for 
involuntary job separations. The reasons for leaving last job which are part of this measure 
are: (I) dismissed and (III) temporary job finished. It could be the case that being dismissed or 
a temp job ending may be a non-voluntary job separation if the worker may have wanted to 
continue to work at a particular firm but are unable to do so. The second category is omitted 
from this measure because there is not an additional variable within the data set that can 
separate the distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary job separations. The period of 
coverage for this variable is 1995-2007. 
Question (MS): Uses derived variable REDUND and REDCLOS to capture EU and EN transitions 
emanating from a redundancy in the last three months as a result from firm closure. That is 
[REDUND==l & REDCLOS=-l]. The period of coverage for this variable is 1995-2007. 
Question (M6): Uses variable REDCLOS only to capture EU and EN transitions emanating from 
a redundancy as a result of firm closure. That is IREDCLOS=-l]. The period of coverage for 
this variable is 1995-2007. 
Question (M7): Uses derived variable REDUND and REDCLOS to capture EU and EN transitions 
emanating from a redundancy in the last three months emanating from staff cut-backs. That 
is [REDUND=-l & REDCLOS==Z]. The period of coverage for this variable is 1995-2007. 
Question (Ma): Uses variable REDCLOS only to capture EU and EN transitions emanating from 
a redundancy as a result staff cut-backs. That is (REDCLOS==Z]. The period of coverage for 
this variable is 1995-2007. 
Question (M9): Uses derived variable REDUND and REDCLOS to capture EU and EN transitions 
emanating from a redundancy in the last three months resulting from firm closure or staff cut-
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backs. That is [REDUND==l & (REDCLOS==ll REDCLOS==2)]. The period of coverage for this 
variable is 1995-2007. 
Question (Ml0): Uses variable REDCLOS only to capture EU and EN transitions emanating 
from a redundancy as a result firm closure or staff cut-backs. That is [REDCLOS==l 
I REDCLOS==2]. The period of coverage for this variable is 1995-2007. 
Question (Mll): Uses derived variable REDUND, REDYLFT and REDCLOS to capture EU and EN 
transitions emanating from a redundancy in the last three months resulting from being made 
redundant/taken voluntary redundancy resulting from firm closure. That is [REDUND==l & 
REDYLFT==2 & REDCLOS==l]. The period of coverage for this variable is 1995-2007. 
Question (M12): Uses variables REDYLFT and REDCLOS to capture EU and EN transitions 
emanating from a redundancy, resulting from being made redundant/taken voluntary 
redundancy resulting from firm closure. That is [REDYLFT=2 & REDCLOS==l]. The period of 
coverage for this variable is 1995-2007. 
From all of these definitions, I believe that questions Ms, M6, Mll and M12 may capture 
involuntary job separations because the reason for the redundancy is due to plant closure. 
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Appendix 12 
BHPS Questions: 
With the BHPS data, only two measures are created using variable 'wJHSTPY'; this variable 
consists of the reasons for ending last job and this is shown by figure 6.7A below. 
Figure 6.7 A: Definition of variable 'wJHSTPy,29 
NJHSTPY Re3son for stopping previous Job 100 . (al ) 
Question Number dnd rext " J27 "',ou yoo 100II at thb ca'll .4} e lnd Iii me Which ot the St.'l:.ments 0<1 
the rd beSt d S "h, ~ ~ s1J)pped dOO1O IIl3I job' 
Valu. Lab.] valu. r Y ~ 6 6 C ] " " ~ ~ Valid ~ ~
p p a l ' K K t ~ ~ 1 
.0' 1 0 . 2 i s.S Loft for bcttu job 1 701 .17 _, :!7 1 
IUde r""""d;mt ) ])3 S . J •. 0 
DJ el\iosQd 0 (' .ackee! • .. 1.1 1.7 
'NqiOruy j cb en.s.d 5 : 40 !:4 • 1 
Took ret 1 rQlMnt , 100 ~ ~ 1 ) S 
~ ~ t ~ ~ h 4 i i l ~ l t h h reu 7 1 ~ ' ' 1 • ) , 
Loft t o hove boby e SQ 1.1 1 7 
CblldrQn/ h""", CU .. , SO 11 1 . 7 
( ( ~ r . . of other peroon 10 7 2 l 
M : ) V ~ ~ a r . ~ ~ 11 'Q 1 . 0 ) 1 Started colleoe! univ 12 3. :: . ': J J 
Ot her ra.i\80n 1) UO 14 . 5 2 ~ ~ 1 
Mio.1D1 o r wilel -, H .. Mi .. lng 
ID-i'w11c .atle - 8 14 '7 ll . 7 Ht •• 1ng 
PAtUaed -2 1 . 0 Mi .. ln9 
Using this variable, two measures that are generated are as follows to explore EU and EN job 
transitions: 
Question (Ml): explores EU and EN job transitions based on the reasons for leaving last job as 
being made redundant only. 
Question (M4): explores EU and EN job transitions based on the reasons for leaving last job as 
being made redundant, dismissed or sacked and temporary job ended. 
Both of these questions should capture elements of involuntary job separations; but there are 
reasons that may constitute voluntary job separations as well. For instance, having left for a 
better job may be considered to be a voluntary job separation. 
29 For reasons of brevity, the definition for variable wJHSTPV has been taken from walle N or year 2004 survey. This variable has 
on the whole remained the same throughout the survey. Although there were a few additional categories that were added to this 
variable, they relate to reasons why students may have left their job. Please refer to the BHPS codebook for further details. 
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Appendix 13 
Figure 6.8A: Rates of Job Creation & Job Destruction 
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7 
Concluding Comments 
How long are jobs likely to last and how much they pay are the two most important questions 
workers ask themselves about their employment relationship (Burgess & Rees, 1997). Ideally, 
workers would like to have secure and permanent jobs {job security} that pay a predictable 
wage {job stability}. And workers hope that the cost of adjustment as a result of layoffs and 
re-employment are not too large. This thesis refers to these three components as labour 
market security. 
However, many workers believe 'jobs are not for life' and this is in part attributed towards 
globalisation - increased trade and advancements in technology, the fall in transportation 
costs, exchange rate volatility and offshoring are all potential factors that have contributed 
towards greater competition in world markets for goods and services over the last thirty years. 
Workers believe this has caused jobs to be less secure and has contributed towards changing 
the structure of employment. The forgoing chapters have shown there is some evidence of 
downward pressure on wage levels but there is no evidence that job insecurity has increased 
as a result of offshoring and ICT substituting for routine intensive job tasks, although workers 
who are employed in the most tradable jobs that are also intensive in routine job tasks have a 
higher probability of becoming unemployed. But there is no evidence to suggest there has 
been a secular decline in job security over the last two decades. Further details are provided 
below. 
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This thesis began by asking if potential forces associated with globalisations such as trade, 
technology and policy reforms to labour market institutions could change the three 
components of labour market security over time. The answer is that these forces can affect 
the rate of job creation and destruction, which underlies the life and death of all jobs and thus 
can affect job turnover rates over time. They have also contributed towards raising the 
elastiCity of labour demand for less skilled workers. Yet the empirical evidence shows job 
creation and destruction rates for the U.K. have not changed much over time; if anything they 
have declined over time (Hijzen et 01., 2007). The empirical evidence presented by Davis et 01., 
(1997) shows job creation and destruction rates on average observe the 15 percent rule: 
approximately 15 percent of all jobs are destroyed each year and roughly 15 percent of new 
jobs come into being as a share of jobs. This percentage is roughly observed by all national 
economies, where job creation and destruction rates are higher in the services sector than in 
the manufacturing sector. This reflects the growing decline of the manufacturing sector as 
fewer jobs are created and destroyed and the growing presence of the services sector as 
technology and innovation create new jobs that embody the latest technology and replace old 
jobs. Although this empirical evidence suggests these rates have not changed much over time, 
the 15 percent rule does imply the possibility that job turnover rates can lead to changes In 
labour market security. 
The empirical evidence also shows offshoring (material & services), exchange rate volatility, 
ICT innovations and reforms to labour market Institutions have affected the employment and 
wage levels but so far the empirical research has only found material offshorlng to have 
increased the elasticity of labour demand for less skilled workers over the last 20 years. MNEs 
are footloose with higher exit rates (Garg & Strobl, 2003; Bernard & Sjaholm, 2003 & Bernard 
& Jensen, 2007), yet they are able to provide secure jobs which would otherwise not exist 
(Becker & Muendler, 2008) and the empirical evidence reviewed by CrinO (2009a) shows that 
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whilst domestic and foreign workers are substitutes in the MNEs technology, the strength of 
the relationship is weak. The substitutability between domestic and foreign labour is found to 
be driven by affiliate firms to MNEs in high-income countries, which results from horizontal 
FDI. The substitutability between domestic and foreign workers is found to be much weaker 
with respect to employment in affiliate firms in low income countries, which is the result from 
vertical FDI. Although, at present the impact from offshoring and the substitutability between 
domestic and foreign labour is small, this could change in the future. 
The next question that this thesis asked was whether empirical evidence exists to substantiate 
claims of a fall in labour market security. Chapter 3 examined the empirical evidence for the 
three components of labour market security, which is composed of (a) job security; (b) income 
volatility within jobs Oob stability) and (c) the loss of earnings between jobs. This chapter 
assessed whether these three components changed over time to make workers worse off. 
The short answer is that they have not changed significantly over time though this could 
change in the future. 
The U.K. empirical evidence for job security showed there is evidence of a small decline in long 
and medium term job tenure shares Oob tenure greater than or equal to five and ten years) 
for male and female workers who have no dependent children. But the change in these job 
tenure shares has been very small (they have fallen by less than 10 percent from 1975 to 
1998). Faggio et al., (2011) find long term job tenure for men has continued to fall, especially 
for young men but has rose for women with young children over the period 1985-2009. And 
the evidence from the U.S. literature showed job loss rates have not increased over time and 
job retention rates have not declined over time. The additional empirical evidence from 
papers that have explored the unemployment Inflow rates also adds weight to there being 
secure jobs over time as does a decline in the uptake of the Federal State Unemployment 
Insurance benefits for involuntarily displaced workers (Davis, 2008). 
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For the second component of labour market security, the empirical evidence from the income 
volatility and mobility literature based on U.S. evidence showed the permanent and transitory 
components of income volatility rose from the 1970s to 198Os. There was little change over 
the 1990s, but a rise once again after 1998 and over the most recent decade. However, 
average income volatility has not increased for all individuals over time. Income volatility did 
rise for those individuals who have high tolerances for risk with income levels in the 90th plus 
percentile of the income distribution. But generally, the vast majority of individuals who have 
income below the 75th percentile have not had as volatile income levels over the last thirty 
years (Jensen & Shore, 2008). Additionally, the research from the income mobility and income 
dispersion literature is not conclusive, that is the literature fails to signify whether individuals 
have become better off or have become worse off over time (Winship, 2009). 
The final component of labour market security reviewed the evidence from the earnings losses 
from job displacement between jobs. The empirical evidence shows the size of the earnings 
losses depend on two potential factors: (1) the nature of job displacement - whether job 
displacement is the result from mass layoffs or through plant closures and (2) the economic 
environment. Bearing these two factors in mind, the literature shows the earnings losses 
following job displacement can be large during unfavourable economic conditions compared 
to favourable economic conditions. These earnings losses are also larger for workers displaced 
from mass layoffs than from plant closures. But the question is whether these earnings losses 
have become larger over time to leave workers worse off. This literature review reconciled 
the findings from administrative and survey data sets to find the magnitude of the earnings 
losses have not increased over time. They show the earnings losses lay in the region of 7-16 
percent per year, five years after job displacement based on the U.S. findings. The literature 
from the U.K. shows earnings losses are larger from plant closures than from mass layoffs 
where the subsequent earnings losses are lower. But it is harder to reconcile the findings from 
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the British literature because there are few papers to compare the estimates for the earnings 
losses over time to determine whether workers have had to accept worse jobs following job 
loss. Overall, this literature review shows labour market insecurity has not increased over 
time. 
Following these literature reviews, this thesis examined the following questions: (I) can 
offshoring and the advancements in ICT lead to a rise in wage instability (job stability)'? (II) Can 
a rise in offshoring and related activities associated with globalisation raise job insecurity'? 
And (III) have job security trends declined over the last two decades? 
To explore these questions, this thesis has made a number of significant contributions to the 
empirical literature: From chapter 4, this thesis explored the impact from service and material 
offshoring intenSity, job tradability from the creation of a British version of Blinder's (2007) job 
offshorability index, and the impact from technology analysing the implications from the TBTC 
hypothesis (Autor et 01., (2003) on wage levels (at the individual level) rather than on relative 
wages (that has used industry level data) to gage the monetary impact from these factors at 
the individual level. These factors had not been explored on wage levels using British data. 
Two further contributions from this chapter relate to the creation of data that can be made 
available to other researchers: First, the creation of a British version of Blinder's (2007) job 
tradability index is a potentially useful resource that can be made available and be used by 
other researchers. Secondly, the application of the O*NET data and the details of the 
variables that were used from O*NET and applied to British data to measure the T8TC via 
principal component analysis can also be made available. Chapter 5 examined the impact 
from the same variables used in chapter 4 to explore their impact on job security, which was 
measured by different job transitions flows. These factors had not been examined on job 
security for the U.K. 
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And chapter 6 examined whether there had been a secular decline in job security over the 
post 1990 time frame. This chapter used two measures of job security: the first was job 
tenure (a stock measure), where I replicated the empirical paper by Gregg & Wadsworth 
(2002). And the second measure was employment transition (a flow measure) data that was 
used to look at flows into and out of employment. This second measure had not been used to 
explore job security by the British empirical literature. This thesis finds the following evidence. 
Chapter 4 addresses the first of these three questions. This chapter examined the effects of 
industry level offshoring intensity (services and materials), the potential impact from job 
tradability (Blinder, 2007) and the implications of the AlM hypothesis (Autor et al., 2(03) on 
the wage levels for individual workers. Using the BHPS from 1992 to 2007 by estimating 
Mincerian wage regressions, this chapter found the impact of service offshoring (measured at 
the industry level), the potential threat from the advancements of technology that increasingly 
pose a threat to many more potentially tradable occupations (job tradability measured from 
the creation and application of a British version of Blinder's (2007) occupation tradability 
index) and the threat of TBTC - particularly from the importance of completing routine 
intensive job tasks, have all had a negative and significant impact on the wage levels of 
workers. But material offshoring intensity did not have a significant Impact on wage levels. 
Material offshoring intensity was found to benefit skilled workers at the expense of lesser 
skilled workers. These findings are consistent with the reported results from the empirical 
literature: Feenstra & Hanson (1995, 1996 & 1999) and CrinO (2009c) from the U.S. and 
Geishecker & Garg (2008a, b), Hummels et al., (2009) and Munch & Skaksen (2009) from the 
European countries. 
Additionally, the potential wage losses associated with offshoring and technology can be 
significantly higher for workers employed in the most tradable jobs and for those workers that 
are employed in jobs that have a high importance for routine intensive job tasks. These latter 
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results imply there is considerable scope to suggest that offshoring and the advancements in 
technology can lower wage levels within industries. Yet, do these forces raise job insecurity? 
This is the question that was posed by chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 examined whether a rise in offshoring intensity and the advancements in 
technological innovations had increasingly made many more jobs at risk of being offshored 
abroad or replaced by computer capital which could lead to a rise in job insecurity by 
increasing the probability of becoming unemployed. This chapter used BHPS data for the 
period 1992 to 2005 to explore the impact these factors have had on the probability of 
experiencing job-to-unemployment transitions during the annual time intervals U - 1,j]. The 
results from the estimation of single risk models via discrete time hazard analysis showed a 
rise in offshoring (materials and services) did not lower job security. Further examination of 
these results from the estimation of competing risk models showed that a rise in offshoring 
raised the probability of workers remaining in employment with their current employers over 
time. This result may seem surprising, however the U.K. unemployment rate (see figure 3.2 in 
chapter 3) has declined over the time frame of data. And these results also suggest that these 
factors appear to aid job security. What the findings from chapters 4 and 5 collectively 
suggest together is that workers are more likely to remain in employment with their current 
employers by potentially having lower real wage levels rather than to lose their jobs and 
become unemployed. This should imply secure jobs. This is because real wages could fall as 
workers may be prepared to take a nominal pay freeze in return for firms to retain or hoard 
labour during unfavourable trading conditions by reducing the number of hours and days 
worked. This process can serve two purposes: First, by retaining labour, firms are able to 
have the capacity to expand production when trading conditions Improve. This allows firms to 
not have to go through the process of hiring labour during favourable trading conditions as 
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this process can be costly. Second, workers have job security in the sense that they do not 
incur the costs associated with job loss from becoming unemployed. 
The final chapter addressed the third question: whether there has been a secular decline in 
job security over the last two decades. This chapter explored two measures of job security 
using data from the QLFS and the BHPS for the period 1991 to 2007. The first measure of job 
security examined the changes to the shares of job tenure from three job tenure groups: 
short, medium and long-term job tenure shares over time. For the second measure, the 
trends from three different job transitions: job-to-job, job-ta-unemployment and job-to-
inactivity were examined over time. The results from the changes to job tenure showed 
medium [longer-term] job tenure shares Uob tenure greater than or equal to five [ten)] years) 
declined by 7.95% [8.85%] and 8.70% [7.95%] for men and for women with no children. These 
percentage changes represent very small changes to these job tenure shares from 1992 to 
2006. Roughly speaking, these medium and long term job tenure share have declined by 
approximately 10% over fifteen years, meaning if average job tenure was roughly 60 (120) 
months, medium (long) job tenure shares would have declined by roughly 5 (10) months over 
fifteen years. This fall in long and medium term job tenure shares is found not to be indicative 
of a rise in job-to-job transitions, but from a slender rise in job-ta-unemployment and job-ta-
non-employment transitions over the time frame. Further analysis also shows there is no 
evidence that these latter job transition results have Increased over time because of a rise in 
involuntary job separations resulting from redundancies or firm closures. 
In summary, this thesis posed three questions: (I) can offshoring and the advancements in 
technology raise wage Instability? The answer to this question Is unclear as these factors can 
lower wage levels, but their monetary impact has so far been small. 
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(II) Can a rise in offshoring and related activities associated with globalisation raise job 
insecurity? The answer to this question is no. The evidence from this thesis suggests that it 
does not have a significant impact. The evidence from chapters 4 and 5 suggest that it may be 
preferable to experience job instability than to suffer job loss and become unemployed. Thus 
to have job security, workers may accept lower wage levels to remain in employment rather 
than suffer the costs associated with unemployment scarring on wage levels and future 
employment prospects and spend considerable time and effort searching for new jobs. This 
could explain the lack of evidence. 
And (III) have job security trends declined over the last two decades? This thesis has found no 
evidence of a secular decline in job security over the last two decades. There is evidence of a 
negligible fall in job tenure from medium and long term job tenure shares over time for men 
and women with no children, but this does not indicate a rise in job insecurity. 
Future avenues of research that could build upon this this thesis may want to examine the 
magnitude of income losses from unemployment scarring for the U.K. over the most recent 
time frame. At present there is no clear consensus as to whether they have increased over 
time. Additionally, further innovations in ICT may shift the composition of employment; at 
present, the empirical evidence currently suggests that ICT innovations and offshoring have 
benefited high skilled workers in line with a developed countries' comparative advantage. 
However, this could change in the future. With further innovations in technology, many more 
workers, especially skilled workers in high skilled white collar jobs may potentially face the risk 
of job loss because of structural changes in tastes and technology in the future, though this 
thesis does not find evidence of this fact at present, this could change in the future. 
Another area of research may look to explore the impact of job polarization over a longer time 
horizon for the U.K. For instance do new workers enter the labour market and into jobs that 
425 
are non-routine intensive and what happens to workers to older workers who have jobs that 
are routine intensive? How does technology affect relatively skilled and non-skilled workers 
who work for the same employer over time? Do these relatively skilled workers upgrade their 
job tasks from routine to non-routine job tasks within a firm? And, is it more likely that less 
skilled routine worker are more likely to lose their jobs but end up in other low paid non-
routine jobs. And finally, to build upon the analysis from chapter 6, there would be scope to 
follow the work of Elsby et at., (2007, 2009) to construct a steady state/equilibrium 
unemployment rate model based on the flows into and out of unemployment. This research 
could be further used to assess job security in the U.K. 
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